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ABSTRACT
When and how do public institutions work effectively on behalf of marginalized citizens? The
Indian government has enacted a number of policies for universal primary education, and yet the
extent and quality of implementation varies significantly across regions. Why, operating under the
same national policy framework, democratic institutions and administrative structures, do some
public agencies in India implement policies more effectively than others? This dissertation identifies
the mechanisms behind policy implementation through a series of sub-national comparisons and
nested case studies carried out in three north Indian states-Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and
Uttar Pradesh. While much scholarship emphasizes the design of formal institutions, my study
highlights the importance of informal bureaucratic norms, unwritten yet widely observed rules
within the state that guide how public officials behave and relate to citizens. The study find that
agencies governed by deliberative norms-these are norms that encourage bureaucrats to work
collectively to solve problems, bend official rules and promote civic participation-implement
policies more effectively than agencies that operate in a legalistic fashion, adhering strictly to formal
rules and procedures while discouraging citizen engagement. These findings are drawn from more
than two years of field research, including over 500 interviews and focus group discussions,
participant observation within public agencies and primary schools, and village-level ethnography.
The study of policy implementation in India sheds critical light on how public institutions function
in practice and relate to citizens on the ground, and offers new theoretical insights on the
relationship between governance and well-being in developing democracies.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard M. Locke
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This dissertation would not have been possible without the enduring support and generosity
of so many people. First and foremost, I owe a great debt of gratitude to my dissertation
committee-Richard Locke, Suzanne Berger, Edward Steinfeld, and Patrick Heller. I feel truly
fortunate and honored to have worked under the supervision of such an inspiring circle of scholars.
Their intellectual influence is readily apparent in the research questions, methods, and arguments
advanced in this dissertation. Needless to say, all errors are my own.
Professor Suzanne Berger's impact on my intellectual development is beyond measure.
From her formative course on theories of political economy, to her dissertation workshop, which
provided the intellectual springboard for my early research proposals, she helped lay the foundation
for my thinking as a social scientist. Having read numerous renditions of my underdeveloped ideas,
she always found a way to distill my arguments in terms far clearer than anything I ever had in mind.
Were it not for her guidance over the course of many years, the arguments contained in this
dissertation could not have taken form.
Professor Edward Steinfeld helped shape my thinking in the political economy of
development and beyond. He always showed great sympathy for my arguments while persuading
me to give alternative explanations a fair chance. Professor Steinfeld encouraged me to embrace the
richness of empirical material based on field research and not to shy away from fine-grained
argumentation. At the same time, he impressed upon me the need for clarity and discipline when it
came to the exposition of my ideas. I am deeply grateful for his patient, careful reading of my work,
which helped to improve this dissertation immensely.
Professor Patrick Heller was my intellectual guide in the political economy of South Asia.
Yet his influence and advice went well beyond the particulars of the region. Our many
conversations on the Indian state, civil society and development gave shape to my own
understanding of how India's democracy works. His insights on the role of subordinate actors in
development inspired me to examine further the promise and limitations of collective action from
below. And his own research offered an example of how field research can be mobilized effectively
to improve our understanding of how democracy works. Professor Heller helped shape the central
ideas and methods of this dissertation.
While all of my committee members were of enormous help, I owe a special debt to
Professor Richard Locke. Back when I was a master's student at Oxford, Professor Locke inspired
me to pursue a doctorate, and his course on labor politics, globalization and development greatly
shaped my thinking. Upon arrival at MIT, I quickly learned why so many students gravitated
towards this exceptional scholar and educator. His research projects on labor standards in global
supply chains helped lay the foundation for my development as a comparativist and field researcher,
while at the same time creating an intellectual community among graduate students. Professor
Locke provided a level of guidance and support that I could never have expected as a graduate
student. He offered countless hours of advice, constructive criticism and encouragement along the
way, well beyond the call of duty for a doctoral advisor. His enduring support, careful reading and
invaluable advice improved this dissertation immeasurably. His incredibly busy schedule
notwithstanding, Professor Locke always made time to meet with me (often under short notice) to
discuss not only the dissertation project but also the practical mechanics of graduate school and
academia. As Department Chair, he brought vitality and dynamism to the Department of Political
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Science, all of which motivated me in the process of writing. Last but not least, Professor Locke's
enduring commitment to scholarship that combines intellectual rigor with practical relevance to the
world has been a real inspiration, and I thank him for being a model scholar that I hope to emulate.
Along with my committee, a number of other scholars at MIT and beyond contributed to
the development of this dissertation. Throughout the course of this project, Professor Ashutosh
Varshney offered constant encouragement and constructive feedback. In both academic forums as
well as through many informal conversations, his enthusiasm and critical engagement with my work
helped improve the dissertation greatly. My conversations with Professor Devesh Kapur were
equally engaging and helpful, particularly as I moved between the early bouts of fieldwork and
writing. Professor Alice Amsden, whose sudden passing left an incalculable void at MIT, offered
guidance and support for the project. At various stages of writing the dissertation, I benefited from
the insights and support of other scholars, includingJoshua Cohen, Archon Fung, Roger Petersen,
Michale Piore, Lant Pritchett, Bish Sanyal, Susan Silbey, Judith Tendler and Lily Tsai. I learned an
incredible deal from their work, as well as from numerous conversations and critical feedback.
I was very fortunate to be surrounded by a group of highly supportive and intelligent fellow
graduate students. I have benefitted from countless conversations and feedback from Matthew
Amengual, Nathan Cisneros, Salo Cozlovsky, Greg Distelhorst, Erica Dobbs, Kristin Fabbe, Jason
Jackson, Gabrielle Kruks-Wisner, Reo Matsuzaki, Jonas Nahm, Timea Pal, Roberto Pires, Andrew
Radin, Paul Staniland, Rachel Wellhausen and Adam Ziegfeld. I feel honored to count them among
my friends and colleagues.
I was equally fortunate to learn from scholars and practitioners in India, far too many to
name here. Professor Arvind Mohan of Lucknow University advised me during my early days of
field research with UNICEF India. His grounded knowledge of Indian political economy was very
helpful as I attempted to learn how governance operates in rural Uttar Pradesh (UP). And his
warmth and encouragement made my time in UP that much more productive and enjoyable. Dr.
Rashmi Sinha, who led the Mahila Samakhya program in Uttar Pradesh, was also of tremendous help
as I conducted fieldwork across the state. Her insights on gender and development, and incredible
efforts to advance the education of girls in Uttar Pradesh, were an inspiration throughout.
I benefitted tremendously from the generosity and support of civic agencies in India. I first
must thank UNICEF India. I embarked on this study as a research intern with UNICEF, and
learned a great deal from my project in Uttar Pradesh. After completing the internship, UNICEF
India program officers in New Delhi and Lucknow continued to provide support for my research in
Uttar Pradesh. I would also like to thank the officers and field staff at Mahila Samakhya Uttar
Pradesh, particularly in Saharanpur and Sitapur districts, who were incredibly supportive. Village-
level fieldwork in these districts would have been impossible were it not for their help. They opened
my eyes to the realities of social inequality in rural UP, and I drew no less from their warmth and
good cheer. In Lalitpur district, I benefitted from the support of the Sarathi Development
Foundation, whose fieldworkers helped me learn about rural governance in this far-flung region of
UP. Finally, I must thank Pratham, one of India's most remarkable education NGOs. Dr. Rukmini
Banerji was particularly helpful in sharing ideas and providing access to Pratham's field program.
Pratham's local officers and field staff in New Delhi, Lucknow and Agra were generous with their
time, sharing their work and many insights along the way. I would also like to thank the officers at
Pratham for giving me access to data on ASER, the remarkable annual survey on primary education
in rural India.
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In Himachal Pradesh, I benefitted tremendously from the guidance and support of Himachal
Pradesh Gyan Vigyan Samiti (HGVS). The officers and field staff at HGVS assisted me throughout
my field research. I would like to give special thanks to Kuldip Singh Tanwar, Dr. O.P. Bhuraita,
Kaushalji , and, last but not least, Pradip Thakur. Pradipji and his family welcomed me into their
home with open arms, allowing me to learn about village life in Shimla's Apple Belt. I thank them
for their warmth and generosity. In Uttarakhand, I enjoyed the generous hospitality and assistance
of Uttarakhand Sewa Nidhi. Dr. Lalit Pande and Anuradha Pande were incredibly warm and
supportive throughout my fieldwork in Almora district. I learned tremendously from Dr. Pande
over many conversations about rural governance and education in the hill region. I also would like
to thank the field staff at Uttarakhand Sewa Nidhi, who showed me around the villages of Almora.
I also benefitted immensely from the guidance and support of state officials across India. In
Himachal Pradesh, I must give special thanks to Deepak Sanan, Akshay Sood and Bansi Lal Shukla,
who always made time to meet with me. Fieldwork in Uttarakhand drew heavily on the support of
Keshav Desiraju. Keshavji helped me gain access to the bureaucracy, provided intellectual guidance
and unparalleled hospitality. Other senior officials I would like to thank include: Dr. Rakesh Kumar,
Vrinda Swarup, Ashok Ganguly, Amit Kaushik, Dhir Jhingran and Jagdish Chandra Pant. Along
with senior officials, I benefited from hundreds of conversations with local officials and school
teachers. I cannot possibly thank them enough for allowing me the opportunity to learn from them.
They shared so much of their time, providing the grounded knowledge upon which this dissertation
is based. I drew greatly on their experiences in developing the argument.
This dissertation would not have been possible without the bedrock of support from my
family. Words defy how grateful I am to my parents, Dr. and Mrs. Arun and Malti Mangla, for
always believing in me and for making countless sacrifices so that I could pursue higher education.
They stuck by me through all the uncertainties of graduate school, and gave me more than I ever
could have asked for in the process. I will forever be in their debt. My elder brother, Aditya,
provided all the comforts and distractions I needed to maintain a smile. My younger sister, Mahima,
was always helping me as I worked on the dissertation, while also making sure that I enjoyed myself.
Together, they made my time in graduate school a wonderful experience.
I was equally fortunate to have the support of my family members in India, helping to carry
me through many bouts of research. I especially want to thank my Mamaji, Suresh Chandra Sharma,
who was always thrilled to welcome me home in New Delhi. Mamaji provided constant support
and encouraged me to put my best effort forward. I must also give hearty thanks to my elder
brother, Aditya Chandra Sharma, who did everything in his power to make sure I was able to pursue
my dissertation research, and enjoy it along the way. Along with my family, I would also like to
thank my closest friends in Lucknow-Raghav, Ajit, Pranav, Gagan and Geetu-who welcomed me
with open arms and did all that they could to make my time in India equally fun and productive.
Last but not least, I must thank the families across rural India who taught me so much over
the course of fieldwork. The debt I owe them is of a different order altogether. This dissertation
could never have taken off without them. They welcomed me into their homes and shared with me
the struggles they had to endure while endeavoring to make life better for their children. As an
external researcher, I could only partially observe and write about their struggles. And yet, it is from
them I drew the inspiration and courage to understand when and how public agencies work
effectively. Their attempts to make demands on the state, under the toughest of circumstances,
motivated my intellectual project. It is to their children that I dedicate this dissertation.
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Bureaucratic Norms and Policy Implementation
The central problem ofplanning is increasingly that of implementation,
and the problems of implementation are essentially those ofpolitics, social
organization and cultural values... The result is often a great hiatus
between law and reality, between what is willed by the national
leadership and what is done at the local level, between the high ideals in
New Delhi and the gynidsm in the mofussil towns.1
1.1. Introduction
To provide every child with an education is considered a fundamental duty of the modern
state. Governments across the world have enacted laws making primary education universal, free
and compulsory. Many declare it a basic right. Yet the relative ease with which rights can be
declared belies the immense challenge states face in securing them. Notwithstanding major
governmental efforts for universal primary education in developing countries, 70 million school-age
children remain out of school. A far greater number fail to complete a full course of primary
schooling. At the same time, states vary considerably in their ability to implement universal primary
education, and there are striking examples of progress, even in the most unlikely settings. South
Asia, home to some of the most egregious educational inequalities in the world, saw the disparity in
primary school completion between girls and boys fall to 3.2 percent by 2009, a remarkable four-
fold decline within a decade.2 Yet significant variation exists across the region and within countries
as well, compelling one to ask: Why do public agencies in some places work more effectively than
others on behalf of marginalized citizens? More specifically, when and how do public agencies
implement universal primary education effectively? This dissertation aims to address these questions
in the context of rural India.
For a developing country like India, with a legacy of entrenched social inequality, education
is considered the great equalizer. It is a means for the marginalized to participate in a modern
economy and achieve social mobility. At the same time, India's large, multiethnic, federal
democracy displays significant subnational variation in the implementation of primary education
policy, and thus offers a valuable setting to examine the above questions. Operating under the same
national policy framework, democratic institutions and administrative structures, why do some
public agencies in India implement universal primary education policies more effectively than
others? In answering that question, this dissertation helps advance our understanding of the
conditions under which public institutions function effectively, and offers new theoretical insights
on the relationship between governance and well-being in developing countries.
A variety of explanations exist for why implementation outcomes for primary education
policy should vary. A first line of reasoning emphasizes the role of economic factors, such as levels
of income and economic growth. Yet these are insufficient for explaining variation within India. A
number of Indian states have made substantial gains in primary education at relatively low levels of
'Excerpt from Myron Weiner (1962), The Politics of Scardy: Public Pressure and Political Response in India, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
2 "World Bank Support for Education: Learning for All, Skills for Jobs," April 2012, The World Bank:
http://go.worldbank.org/AFKZ7L50LO.
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income, and some outperform much wealthier states.3 A second set of theories maintains that
democracies generate better outcomes for education and health by making public agencies formally
accountable to citizens.4 Such explanations are limited by the fact that Indian states are subject to a
common federal system of democratic institutions and rates of political participation are
comparatively high throughout the country. In fact, political participation is higher among India's
disadvantaged rural voters in comparison to their more privileged, urban counterparts (Yadav 2002).
According to a third line of reasoning, it is not democracy per se, but who governs that matters
most, and left-leaning parties are more likely to ensure that policies for the poor get implemented.'
Yet even those arguments face a difficult time accounting for subnational variation in India. Most
Indian states have not been subject to leftist government, and several of them are among the top
performers in primary education. Meanwhile, the two states that do possess a communist political
legacy (West Bengal and Kerala) are on virtually opposite ends of the spectrum, all of which suggests
that left-leaning government is insufficient at best.
This dissertation advances an alternative account for when and how public agencies
implement universal primary education effectively. To understand policy implementation, I argue,
we need to look beyond the arena of elections and formal institutions to examine the informal
institutions that govern how public agencies function in practice and relate to citizens on the
ground. I advance a theory centered on bureaucratic norms, unwritten yet widely observed rules
within the state that shape the behavior of public officials and structure their relations with civic
actors outside the state. Bureaucratic norms guide public officials on how to enact their roles and
responsibilities in carrying out the tasks associated with policy implementation-from infrastructure
development to community outreach. They also shape how public officials relate to citizens and
civic agencies outside the state in critical areas of monitoring and service delivery. Through the
mechanisms of bureaucratic behavior and civic action, the norms governing public agencies generate
outcomes for policy implementation.
I employ a combination of field research methods at the state- and local-level, including 500
in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, participant observation within public agencies and
schools, and village ethnography, to show that public agencies governed by different sets of norms
generate varying outcomes for the implementation of primary education across Indian states.
Through a series of subnational comparisons and nested case studies conducted in rural north India,
I identify the mechanisms by which bureaucratic norms produce variation in implementation
outcomes. As many have pointed out, the delivery of public services in India involves a
combination of both "public action" by officials within the state and "societal action" from below
by citizens and civic groups (Heller 1999; Dreze and Sen 2002; Banerjee, Iyer et al. 2007). This
dissertation offers one of the first systematic, field-based investigations of the causal mechanisms
underlying that interaction.
3 India's abysmal human development record overall, along with major advancements in some of its less wealthy states
and regions, has led many scholars to question the connection between economic development, governance and the
quality of life experienced the poor. See, for example: Dreze and Sen (2002), Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan (2007) and
Kohli (2012).
4 On the relationship between democracy and the provision of healthcare and educational services, see Brown and
Hunter (1999), Przeworski et al. (2000) and Lake and Baum (2001).
1 On the connection between left-leaning parties and improved social development outcomes for the poor, see for
example: Korpi (1983) and Shalev (1983). For an argument along those lines within the Indian context, see Kohli
(1987).
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Building on theories of governance and organization, I develop two ideal types of
bureaucratic norms: deliberative and legalistic. When public agencies are governed by deliberative
norms, bureaucrats tend to communicate and work collectively across organizational divisions
within the state. They bend official rules to suit varying local contexts and redefine policies in
response to conditions on the ground, for example, by targeting marginalized communities with
special teachers and schools. Deliberative norms encourage bureaucrats to seek input from civic
agencies and citizens, who can provide local knowledge and resources critical for planning and
monitoring. These interactions help raise societal expectations around the benefits of participation,
encouraging further collective action around primary schooling. Through bureaucratic behavior and
civic engagement, the implementation is responsive to local needs and conditions, leading to well-
functioning schools. In that way, agencies governed by deliberative norms implement universal
primary education effectively.
By contrast, legalism takes rule-following as its principal concern. In public agencies
governed by legalistic norms, bureaucrats tend to work within their official roles and adhere closely to
organizational hierarchies. They tend to apply policies and procedures uniformly across cases,
seeking to avoid particularism. Legalistic norms steer bureaucrats towards meeting official mandates
and targets, often to the neglect of varying local needs. They will tend, for instance, to develop new
schools based on official standards and override local demands. Bureaucrats subject to legalistic
norms tend to discount the input of citizens and limit the involvement of civic agencies. By keeping
societal actors at bay, bureaucrats show a commitment to upholding the administrative order and
protecting the internal affairs of the state from interference and capture. In so doing, however, they
undermine collective action directed at the state. Marginalized citizens see little benefit to joining
hands with public agencies, and they are less likely to devote time and resources to collectively
monitor government schools. Public agencies bound by legalistic norms can be effective in areas
such as infrastructure development, which carry well-specified targets and demand comparatively
little citizen input. However, when it comes to service delivery and ensuring that schools function,
they tend to falter. In that way, legalism leads to primary schooling expansion of poor quality.
In analyzing how the norms that govern public institutions shape behavior, this dissertation
helps integrate and advance new theoretical insights across several, long-standing bodies of
scholarship. Philosophers have long contemplated the connection between deliberation and the
quality of government. Contemporary political theorists such as Cohen (1989; 1997) and Habermas
(1998) emphasize how deliberation can shape the interests and expectations of citizens, strengthen
the legitimacy of public institutions, and help inculcate a sense of the common good. Scholars of
governance have applied these ideas across a number of policy areas, from public service delivery to
poverty alleviation, analyzing how deliberative processes operate, foster citizen participation and
shape the quality of implementation (Ostrom 1996; Fung and Wright 2003). Yet their analytical gaze
has fallen primarily on the formal design of deliberative institutions and programs.
Social theorists and scholars of organization, meanwhile, have stressed the importance of
norms, the informal rules of the game that shape the expectations and behavior of social actors
(Elster 1989; Wilson 1989). Bureaucratic norms-the unwritten rules that guide public officials-
can profoundly affect the ability of states to secure the collective well-being of citizens. They can, as
Tendler (1997) observes in the Brazilian province of Ceara, motivate frontline health workers to
cooperate with local communities to improve service delivery in otherwise unlikely settings. They
can also compel bureaucrats to dominate local communities, and override the knowledge and needs
of marginalized groups, producing the manifold developmental disasters that Scott (1998) describes.
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Building on these insights, this study unpacks the black-box of public institutions, and shows how
norms that guide behavior and internal processes within public agencies also structure their relations
with citizens and agencies outside the state. In so doing, it helps advance new insights for the study
of informal institutions and governance in developing democracies (Helmke and Levitsky 2004).6
The rest of this introductory chapter sets out the theory and analytical roadmap of the
dissertation. In Section 2, I define policy implementation and discuss the comprehensive indicators
used in the study for measuring implementation of universal primary education policy in India. The
research design and methodology of the study are presented in Section 3. There I explore the broad
patterns of subnational variation in outcomes across India and discuss the advantages of a multi-
level research design. I then go on to develop a theory of bureaucratic norms and policy
implementation in Section 4. I consider some alternative approaches to the study of bureaucracy
and discuss their limitations for explaining variation in the performance of public agencies in India.
I then present my theory of bureaucratic norms, which draws on a vast literature in political theory
and organizational behavior. I end the section with a discussion of how bureaucratic norms relate to
democratic governance in India. Finally, Section 5 concludes the chapter with an overview of the
remaining sections of the dissertation.
1.2. Defining Policy Implementation
Studies of governance take policy implementation as a critical component for evaluating the
effectiveness and accountability of public institutions (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1994). Yet few
provide an explicit definition of the concept. Policy implementation involves the range of activities
carried out by public and private agencies for achieving the objectives of a policy (Van Meter and
Van Horn 1975: 447-448). In the case of universal primary education, it involves the array of tasks
required to ensure that every child is in school and learning. These tasks include not only the
provision of school buildings and physical infrastructure, but the delivery of services and local
monitoring to ensure the quality of primary schooling.
I conceptualize policy implementation in terms of three broad sets of tasks. These include:
(1) planning and provision, (2) educational service delivery and (3) system monitoring and feedback.
The first set of tasks relates to the quantitative aspects of universal primary education, which
involves the expansion of physical infrastructure and provision of school facilities. The second two
sets of activities are more directly tied to the quality of educational services provided. Educational
service delivery includes the placement and training of teachers, the provision of learning materials,
and other forms of academic support. System monitoring and feedback incorporates the activities
necessary to ensure that schools are functioning, that gaps are identified and corrected. Since public
officials cannot possibly monitor every school, particularly in far-flung villages, a critical aspect of
monitoring and feedback involves community participation and collective vigilance.
6 As these scholars note, the study of bureaucratic norms occupies a place within the larger theoretical enterprise of
informal institutions: "[s]ocially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside
officially sanctioned channels" (Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 5).
12
In selecting outcome indicators for policy implementation, I draw on much existing
literature in social development. In their seminal contributions to the field, Dreze and Sen (2002)
investigate a wide range of outcomes to assess the implementation of universal primary education in
India. Building on their work and the growing body of research on education in development
economics, I employ a comprehensive set of indicators to capture implementation. Tables 1.1.1-
1.1.6 in the chapter Appendix showcase some of the variation in outcomes across the three major
Indian states covered in this study. First, I examine indicators related to access to schooling. These
include measures for the provision of school infrastructure and facilities prescribed under India's
Right to Education Act and provided under Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), the central government's
flagship primary education program. I supplement school infrastructure indicators with rates of
school enrollment and attendance.
Second, to capture how well schools are functioning, I use indicators related to teaching and
learning, the availability of academic support materials (e.g. library books) and the provision of
school lunch programs. For teaching, I use indicators such as the percentage of schools managed by
a single teacher, rates of teacher absence, and the presence of library and teaching materials. School
teacher absence is a major impediment to the delivery of education in primary school systems across
the developing world, and has received much scholar attention as of late (Banerjee and Duflo 2006).
Ensuring that schools are adequately staffed, that teachers show up each day, and have teaching
materials available are all essential to the delivery of educational services. I also examine outcomes
associated with India's Midday Meal Program, a national policy to provide free lunches each day in
primary and middle schools. Finally, I include student dropout rates as a final check on school
quality. For any policy, one can ask whether target populations are making use of governmental
services, and the rate of dropout serves as a proxy for the quality of the experience students have
within the primary school system. In sum, the broad range of indicators allows for a rich, nuanced
picture of the variation in policy implementation across Indian states.
The data for implementation outcomes analyzed in this study comes from multiple sources.
These include the National Family Health Survey (NFHS), one of India's most comprehensive and
reliable household surveys. I also examine data from multiple years of the Annual Status of
Education Report (ASER). The report is published each year by Pratham, one of India's leading
nongovernmental organizations working in primary education for the poor. The data are collected
in a national, large-N survey of approximately thirty villages and government primary schools per
district, covering all rural districts of India. In addition, I use data from a major World Bank study
on teacher absence conducted by Kremer et al (2005). Finally, I supplement these independent
sources with governmental data from the Census of India, along with departmental data and official
reports from India's Department of Elementary Education, Ministry of Human Resources and
Development. Although official data carries problems of reliability (e.g. the artificial inflation of
enrollment rates) and thus should be interpreted with caution, they offer an additional source of
evidence for exploring subnational variation in policy implementation outcomes.
The decision to conceptualize institutional effectiveness in terms of these outcomes is driven
not only by theoretical concerns but the realities facing India's primary education system. With
approximately 54 percent of the country's 1.2 billion people under the age of 25, India is home to
one of the world's youngest populations. The much-vaunted fact of India's "demographic
dividend"-a large and growing proportion of working-age people-hinges crucially on the young
generation's ability to obtain a quality education. The optimism and high economic aspirations one
reads about in the foreign press rest in stark contrast to the appalling conditions of basic public
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services across the country, particularly in early child education and health. According to India's
Minister of Human Resource Development, Kapil Sibal, "It will be a dividend if we empower our
young. It will be a disaster if we fail to put in place a policy and framework where they can be
empowered."7 With the country's recent achievement of nearly universal enrollment-the primary
school enrollment rate currently stands at 96 percent-the poor quality of education and fast-
growing privatization are subjects of fervent public discussion and debate. As Professor Krishna
Kumar, one of India's leading educationists, writes in an editorial for a major daily, "Why India can't
do better in education is a question many people who praise our economic growth rate frequently
ask."' The indicators used for this study capture the realities of the country's notable and yet highly
uneven progress towards achieving universal primary education, a public issue of pressing concern
to Indian citizens.
1.3. Research Design and Methodology
This study aims to understand when and how public agencies are effective in implementing
universal primary education policies in rural India. In particular, it seeks to identify the mechanisms
underlying effective policy implementation. For a number of reasons, India presents an ideal setting
to carry out such a study. Notwithstanding more than sixty years of nearly uninterrupted
democracy, several decades of robust economic growth, and a significant expansion in policies and
services for the poor, India's record in human development is nothing short of abysmal. In the area
of basic literacy, India lags substantially behind other BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China)
countries, the group of emerging economies with which it is often compared (Kingdon 2007). In
terms of early child education and health, India's performance is among the worst in the developing
world, even in comparison to poorer countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Dreze and Sen 2002). India's
woeful human development record raises the sobering question of why democratic institutions and
economic growth have failed so remarkably to improve the quality of life for so many people.
At the same time, however, India has made substantial progress in expanding primary
education. Over the last two decades, the growth of new policies and budgetary commitments by
the central government has been substantial, and India has experienced a surge in primary school
infrastructure and enrollment over the last two decades. With policies like Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan
(SSA), the country's flagship "Education for All" program, the Midday Meal scheme, and most
recently, the Right to Education Act, India's central government has actively set a national policy
framework for Indian states (or provinces) to implement. Yet the extent and quality of
implementation varies substantially, which makes a study like this even more compelling. Public
agencies in some Indian states have made remarkably progress, while others continue to lag behind.
Moreover, the variation across Indian states is not well-explained by levels of economic
development and income growth, helping to clear the way for political analysis. As Figures 1.2.1-
1.2.2 in the chapter Appendix show, taking the basic literacy rate as a proxy indicator for the reach
of primary schooling, India has seen steady improvement, and yet subnational variation remains
significant.
7 "Amid population boom, India hopes for 'demographic dividend' but fears disaster," The Washington Post, October 15,
2011.
8 Krishna Kumar, "Ensuring Education for All", The Hindu, Thursday, July 27, 2006,
http://www.hindu.com/2006/07/27/stories/200607270554100O.htm.
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To identify the mechanisms by which public agencies implement universal primary education
effectively, this study advances a subnational comparative research design. Subnational comparative
research has the advantage of allowing one to control for a whole host of explanatory factors, which
aids in the identification of causal mechanisms (Locke and Thelen 1995; Snyder 2001). The method
has been effectively applied in studies examining a wide range of political and economic phenomena
in India, and it is particularly well-suited for a study of policy implementation in India.9 Indian states
(or provinces) face a common set of democratic institutions and formal bureaucratic structures.
More recently, Indian states (or provinces) have adopted a common policy framework for primary
education, which is financed largely by the central (or federal) government. At the same time, the
responsibility for implementing these policies falls on state governments. A subnational comparative
approach thus allows us to hold the design of formal institutions and policies constant, and opens
the analytical space for a study focused more squarely on the policy implementation process.
This study takes subnational comparative analysis one step further by adopting a multi-level
research design, one that incorporates analysis at both the state- and local-level. The reasoning
behind that approach is twofold. First, a multi-level analysis responds to the realities of governance
in India (Kohli 1990). India's federal democracy is organized into three tiers of elected government:
the central (or union) government, state (or provincial) government and the local village council
(grampanchaya). With the organizational breakup and electoral decline of the Congress Party, and
concomitant rise of regional parties and coalition governments, India's central government has
experienced a steady erosion of authority and greater assertion of power by state governments
(Frankel 2005). These changing authority patterns are evident especially in policy areas that impinge
on the daily lives of citizens-poverty alleviation, health and education, and law and order.
Pressures to decentralize further have come from the 7 3 rd and 7 4 h Amendments to India's
Constitution, which call for the devolution of resources and decision-making power to locally
elected village councils, known as the Panchayati Raj Institutions. Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA),
India's flagship "Education for All" program, requires all states to adopt a similar administrative
structure with state and district teams, along with village-level institutions-the gram panchayat and
Village Education Committees (VECs). Notwithstanding the formal mandate to decentralize,
however, state-level governments in India continue to exert significant authority over policy
implementation, primarily through district administration, which remains the principal node of the
state overseeing the routine operation of public agencies such as primary schools, public health
centers, and the police.
Second, the findings and puzzles thrown up by existing research on governance in India
make the case for a multi-level analysis further compelling. Studies by development economists
analyzing the provision of public goods and services in India have identified the significance of
several local-level factors: village size and levels of development, social heterogeneity based on caste
and religion, historical patterns of inequality in land ownership, and the presence of village
associations (Betancourt and Gleason 2000; Dreze and Kingdon 2001; Banerjee, Iyer et al. 2007;
Banerjee and Somanathan 2007; Pandey 2010). At the same time, however, these same studies find
that substantial variation is left unexplained by local district and village characteristics. They report
large and significant state-level fixed effects, that is, a com mon set of mechanisms operating
across villages and administrative districts within a particular state, but that vary across states. For all
9 The method has been applied effectively within the Indian context to study a wide range of political and economic
phenomena. See for example: Varshney (2002); Sinha (2005); Thachil (2009); Ziegfeld (2009); Singh (2010).
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the above reasons, implementation outcomes in India, these authors argue, are a product of both
"top-down" processes within the state and forms of "bottom-up" pressure and collective action
(Banerjee, Iyer et al. 2007; Iyer 2010). A multi-level research design allows one to examine the full
chain of governance and probe this two-way causal process."'
To identify the mechanisms behind implementation, this study incorporates a series of
subnational comparisons and nested case studies in three states of rural north India: Himachal
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand (see below Figure 1.1.1). The reasons for selecting these
three north Indian states go as follows. First, these three states exhibit maximal variation in policy
implementation while controlling for a number of cultural, historical and political economy factors.
The north Indian Hindi belt is often depicted as uniformly "backward" with regards to education
and other facets of social development, especially in comparison to the more socially "progressive"
states of south India. Yet substantial variation exists across north India and significant changes
have taken place over the last two decades, which has yet to be fully explored. The tables in
Appendix A illustrate the wide range in policy implementation outcomes observed across these three
states.





11 Migdal (2001) articulates convincingly the need for a multi-level, process-oriented approach to analyzing the state.




The hill state of Himachal Pradesh (HP), which at the time of independence was one of
India's most illiterate, is now among the leading states in primary education. It has achieved
universal access to schooling, service delivery is far superior to other state, and gains have been
equally shared by marginalized groups and regions within the state. HP's achievements are all the
more remarkable given the unfavorable conditions of the Himalayan region-low population
density, highly scattered settlement patterns, harsh climate and geography, and absence of industrial
development and urbanization. Notwithstanding these conditions, HP is today widely regarded as
one of India's best-performing states in primary education and has achieved the second highest
literacy rate in the country. It lags only Kerala, the southern coastal state a widely revered model of
social development in India.
Existing studies of governance and social development based on the experiences of south
Indian states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu offer many important insights. Yet the sociopolitical
conditions in north India are, in many important respects, different. Unlike the south, the Hindi belt
region has not experienced major social movements around labor, literacy and caste." Social norms,
identities and conflicts around gender and caste are also distinct. These social processes are central
to the exclusion and integration of marginalized groups, particularly within the education system,
and do not translate easily across these regions. Focusing the study on comparisons within north
India thus allows for more "contextualized comparison" (Locke and Thelen 1995). While none of
this is to deny the utility of the lessons drawn from Kerala and other south Indian states, there is
substantial variation to be explored within the context of north India.
The selection of states and administrative districts aims for critical comparison across cases,
which aids in the identification and testing of causal mechanisms (Bowen and Petersen 1999). States
and districts were selected to control for (or let vary) certain key explanatory factors for policy
implementation, including geography, levels of income and poverty, caste composition, party
competition and historical legacies of landlordism (lamindan). A profile of the states and districts
based on these explanatory factors for policy implementation can be found in the chapter Appendix
(Figure 1.3.2). Case selection incorporates a matched-pair comparison between Himachal Pradesh
and Uttarakhand. The comparison holds constant many crucial explanatory factors, producing a
"most similar" case analysis that allows us to test the impact of bureaucratic norms (which vary
across these two states) on policy implementation outcomes (Lijphart 1971). These two states,
located adjacent to each other in the Himalayan region, share very similar geography, culture and
political economy characteristics. Yet Himachal Pradesh significantly outperforms Uttarakhand on
most indicators of policy implementation, notwithstanding the fact that it began with a much lower
literacy base at the time of independence.
In addition, the research design incorporates the least-likely case of Uttar Pradesh (UP),
India's largest and most politically significant state. Bordering the two hill states to the southeast lies
the plains region of UP. Notwithstanding its venerable bureaucratic legacy, and the recent political
mobilization of lower caste groups, UP is among India's worst performing states in primary
education. At the same time, it has made significant gains in infrastructure expansion and school
"Unlike Kerala, the states I examine (1) did not enjoy the spread of education by enlightened rulers or Catholic
missionaries, (2) have no history of social movements among lower caste groups and workers, and (3) have no left-
leaning political parties, some of the most oft-cited explanations for social development in India (Kohli 1987; Heller
1999; Dreze and Sen 2002).
17
enrollment, though service delivery remains highly inadequate. Given the significant variation
across UP, I analyze policy implementation across two very different administrative districts, which
aids further in the identification and testing of causal mechanisms. Finally, the research design
exploits the fact that Uttarakhand was carved out of UP in 2000, the same year that the Indian
government began implementing its flagship primary education program nationwide. Save for their
common administrative history, the two states are different along virtually all other explanatory
factors. The recent separation of Uttarakhand from UP thus allows me to test for whether and how
bureaucratic norms endure and operate under a new political party system and very different social
conditions.
The findings for this study are drawn from more than two years of field research conducted
at multiple levels: state, administrative district and village/school (see Figure 1.3.2 in the chapter
Appendix). I conducted approximately 500 interviews and focus-group discussions, visited more
than 50 primary schools, and conducted 12 village case studies. Fieldwork at the state-level involved
interviews with state planners, senior officials in the education bureaucracy, local and international
civic agencies, educationists and teachers' union leaders. Interview evidence was further bolstered
by participant observation that I conducted of meetings and informal interactions across various
subdivisions of the education bureaucracy, including the Department of Education, SSA State
Project Office and Midday Meal Program Office.
While the findings from state-level fieldwork offered early evidence for the presence of
bureaucratic norms within the state, to determine whether norms operate further down the
bureaucratic chain, fieldwork was also conducted in four administrative districts: Shimla (HP),
Almora (Uttarakhand), Saharanpur (UP) and Sitapur (UP). The district-level fieldwork combined in-
depth interviews and focus group discussions with local officials from the education bureaucracy,
local civic agencies, school teachers and parents. In addition, I conducted participant observation
with local officials and civic agencies, which covered planning meetings, training sessions and school
and community monitoring visits. I also attended meetings and rallies for primary education
organized by local civic agencies and community groups.
To determine how local public agencies interact with schools and citizens, intensive
fieldwork was conducted in rural primary schools and villages. I conducted in-depth interviews and
focus group discussions with school teachers and parents. I supplemented interview evidence with
participant observation inside schools, often leading lessons in the classroom and observing directly
the interactions between school teachers, students and parents. Lastly, I conducted intensive
ethnography inside villages. Villages were selected after accounting for some of the chief
explanatory variables identified in the literature on rural governance and primary schooling in India,
including village size, caste composition and proximity to motor roads (Dreze and Kingdon 2001).
To obtain a granular understanding of village institutions and community dynamics, I stayed in or
near case study villages for significant periods of time, on average four weeks per village. I used
participatory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques such as community social mapping, in-depth
interviews and focus group discussions with residents and village officials (Chambers 1983). I
observed the meetings and operations of formal institutions, including gram panchayats and Village
Education Committees (VECs), as well as informal associations, particularly village women's groups.
To further ensure the robustness of my findings, I made shorter field visits to primary
schools and villages outside the original sample of cases and visited six additional administrative
districts. Recognizing the limitations of qualitative field research and the pitfalls of generalizing
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outside a small number of cases, these supplemental field visits helped probe and test further the
causal mechanisms by which bureaucratic norms influence policy implementation. All in all, I
conducted fieldwork in ten rural districts, 20 villages and 50 schools. Fieldwork was supplemented
with the systematic collection of documentary evidence. I gathered data and reports from official
sources (the Department of Elementary Education), as well as local media and NGO reports on
primary education within each district. Taken together, the multiple levels, methods and sources of
data collection provide a reliable, fine-grained analysis of policy implementation in rural India.
1.4. Theory and Mechanisms
A large and diverse body of scholarship seeks to explain why some states are more effective
than others in implementing universal policies like primary education. Within the Indian context,
two influential lines of reasoning may seem particularly compelling. First, some argue that
democratic institutions lead to better social policy outcomes by enhancing the state's responsiveness
to the needs of citizens (Przeworski, Stokes et al. 1999). In the Indian case, however, the
pervasiveness of clientelism seems to render democracy largely procedural, incapable of addressing
the substantive needs of poor citizens, especially in the delivery of universal public services like
education (Heller 2000; Keefer and Khemani 2004). According to a second body of research,
effective government requires more than formal democracy. Where elections alone may not work,
civic norms and networks enable citizens to make collective demands on the state (Putnam,
Leonardi et al. 1994; Woolcock 1998). Notwithstanding its civic traditions, the low levels of
membership in formal associations and deep social divisions that characterize Indian society force
one to question the extent to which civil society alone can hold India's public institutions
accountable (Chhibber 2001; Chhibber, Shastri et al. 2004).
Without denying the importance of democratic institutions and civic participation, to
understand when and how policies for universal primary education get implemented in practice, I
argue, we must turn our attention to the bureaucracy, those very agencies in charge of policy
implementation. In what follows, I develop a theory centered on bureaucratic norms, unwritten yet
widely held rules within public agencies that shape the behavior of officials and structure their
relations to citizens on the ground. I begin with a discussion of how the study of bureaucracy can
advance our understanding of policy implementation in India, and governance relations more
broadly. After considering alternative approaches for analyzing bureaucratic behavior, I argue for
the need to examine the informal norms and processes by which public agencies operate. I then go
on to advance a theory of bureaucratic norms, delineating the mechanisms by which norms
influence behavior and generate outcomes for policy implementation. I offer two ideal types of
bureaucratic norms, deliberative and legalistic, which produce varying forms of bureaucratic
behavior and civic action in the policy implementation process. After presenting the theory, I revisit
the literature on democratic institutions and civic engagement, and consider how a theory of
bureaucratic norms and policy implementation can complement these alternative approaches for
analyzing governance.
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4.1. Bringing the Bureaucray Back In
A significant body of scholarship produced under the intellectual rubric of the
"developmental state" highlighted the importance of public institutions in charge of governing the
market and industrial policy (Johnson 1982; Wade 1990; Woo-Cumings 1999). The developmental
state literature was motivated by calls for "bringing the state back in" to the analysis of social and
political processes (Evans, Rueschemeyer et al. 1985). Yet studies have shown great conceptual
latitude in defining the "state," which often stands as an all-encompassing moniker for a wide variety
of political and social institutions, from political parties, leadership and governing regimes to state-
class relations and various bureaucratic agencies. Notwithstanding the significance accorded
bureaucracies, comparatively few studies examine them in much empirical detail. Bureaucratic
agencies are often depicted in broad brushstrokes and their effectiveness is taken to be a function of
autonomy, how well they conform to the ideal of rational-legal authority proposed by Weber
(1947). 12 How agencies go about the task of governance, meanwhile, has received comparatively
little attention, rendering the bureaucracy an organizational black box.
The need to bring the bureaucracy back in to the study of governance is motivated both by
theoretical concerns and the empirical realities facing democratic governments and citizens.
Theoretically speaking, our understanding of how democracy works carries implicit assumptions
about how public institutions operate. Across many developing democracies, where political
arrangements are found to be cientelistic, that is, where they involve the exchange of political
support for material rewards, elected officials are thought to target citizens with particularistic
benefits. Bureaucracies, who control access to public resources up for exchange, are integral actors
in the supply chain of goods and services linking politicians to citizens. At the same time,
bureaucracies are not merely vestiges of political exchange. They possess independent
organizational qualities and capabilities that bear significantly on the fair and even implementation of
laws and policies, especially in political environments that breed particularism (Piattoni 2001; Keefer
2007). Though it is still a budding area of research, some suggest that a well-developed bureaucracy
is one of the primary defenses against political corruption and implementation failure in cientelistic
political systems (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).
The study of bureaucracy is further warranted by the empirical realities of governance in
India. With the country's remarkable growth over the last two decades, the dominant image of the
stifling and corrupt public official has hardly waned. If anything, the image has gained greater
purchase with rising social inequality and growing cases of large-scale corruption, brought on
perhaps by the excesses of what some call, "India's gilded age."" Yet grand corruption is not the
only lens through which public officials are seen. Whether it is applying for a work permit or
enrolling children in school, it is through everyday encounters with public agencies that Indian
citizens come to "see the state" (Corbridge, Williams et al. 2005). At the same time, the quality of
encounters with the state can vary dramatically, often in unpredictable ways. Stylized assumptions
about how public agencies function and relate to citizens cannot substitute for close empirical
12 An important exception is Schneider (1993), who analyzes how the nature career paths influence the policy
preferences and relative insulation of bureaucrats from business interests
13 Sinha, Jayant and Varshney, Ashutosh, "It is Time for India to Rein in its Robber Barons," Financial Times, January 6,
2011.
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inquiry (Harriss-White 2003). Our knowledge of how Indian democracy works hinges, to some
degree, on well we understand how Indian bureaucracy works.
Having justified the need to study the bureaucracy, the question we now face is along what
theoretical lines ought we to study it? Two approaches tend to dominate the political economy
literature on bureaucracy. The first approach, which I mentioned earlier, draws on Weber's classic
formulation of bureaucracy as the basis for identifying the organizational features that promote
autonomy and corporate coherence of the bureaucracy (Migdal 1988). Bureaucracies that have the
ideal systems in place-i.e. civil service protection, meritocratic procedures for recruitment and
promotion, a clear division of labor, and rules delineating the lines of authority-are viewed as
autonomous organizations, free from the trappings of societal forces and thus capable of
commanding "the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." 14
States having such bureaucracies are understood to be developmental. By contrast, "predatory",
"neo-patrimonial", or "failed" states operate according to personalistic ties and lack collective
purpose, which dampens their ability to implement universal policies (Evans 1995; Herring 1999;
Kohli 2004). 15
A second body of scholarship, informed by theories of rational choice, understands
bureaucratic performance as a question of designing the appropriate incentives. Studies model the
control of bureaucratic discretion as a principal-agent problem, wherein political leaders (principals)
ensure that policy mandates are carried out by bureaucrats (agents) by providing institutionalized
rewards and penalties (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Moe 1984; McCubbins, Noll et al. 1987;
Banks and Weingast 1992). Public agencies (or political firms) are conceptualized in terms of a
hierarchy of contracts linking political principals to bureaucratic agents (Moe 1995)." The design of
these contractual controls, enforced through systems of monitoring, provide the basis for
bureaucratic compliance with policy objectives.
Their differences notwithstanding, both statist and principal-agent approaches arrive at
similar conclusions regarding the Indian state. Taking the Weberian rational-legal state as the model
for bureaucracy, statist scholarship finds the Indian state comparatively weak (Migdal 1988). In the
domain of economic development policy, the bureaucracy is thought to be overrun by elite class
interests, personalistic leadership, populist pressures, and, more recently, divisive caste politics
(Bardhan 1984; Rudolph and Rudolph 1987; Herring 1999; Kohli 2004). Although the reasons they
supply are different, a similar conclusion has been reached by scholars writing from a public choice
perspective (Krueger 1990; Bhagwati 1993). India's lackluster growth through much of its post-
independence history is understood to have been a product of an interventionist state that promoted
rent-seeking behavior among bureaucrats. The very idea of public office, according these scholars,
came to be associated the selling of licenses and regulatory exemptions, not the public good
(Krueger 1974).
" From Max Veber Essays in Sociologv, translated and edited by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford
University Press), p. 78.
15 Some even suggest that Indian bureaucracy had the trappings of a Weberian state, but for a variety of reasons, such as
the inherent difficulties of centrally managing a large, federal, multi-ethnic state, was unable to realize its developmental
promise. As Herring writes: "India must be the most dramatic case of a failed developmental state" (1999: 306).
" This approach draws much inspiration from transaction cost economics and contractual theories of the firm
(Williamson 1998).
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While most of this scholarship focuses on industrial policy, a similar kind of analysis has
been carried out concerning India's failed anti-poverty programs and poor record of social
development. Kohli (2012) connects the persistent poverty and growing inequality across India to a
ruling alliance of business interests within the state, which has led to the adoption pro-business
growth policies, while neglecting the delivery of public goods and services for the poor. Those
writing from a principal-agent perspective, meanwhile, situate rising inequality and poor social
development in the structure of incentives facing politicians and bureaucrats. Public officials gain
from providing short-term, particularistic benefits while extracting rents for themselves, rather than
delivering quality services for all (Walton 2010).
The developmental state and principal-agent literatures offer important insights, but the
extent to which they can explain variation in policy implementation across India is limited. Most
informed observers would agree that India's bureaucracy faces severe incentive problems. Systems
of performance appraisal within the government rarely if ever take note of implementation
outcomes, such as crime rates, levels of student achievement, rates of child immunization, and so
on. Systems of promotion within most public agencies are based on seniority within the agency
rather than anything having to do with one's achievement. "A striking aspect of India's public
institutions," Kapur and Mehta note, "is the paucity of transparent performance criteria by which to
gauge their performance." (2005: 13). Yet the (however poor) design of formal incentive systems is
practically identical across Indian states, making it difficult to connect these incentive problems to
subnational variation in policy implementation outcomes. Moreover, given the absence of
appropriate incentives, it is unclear why some public agencies in India perform surprisingly well.17
The statist approach, meanwhile, ties this variation to broad contours of state-society
relations across India. It provides a useful macro-lens for understanding the political economy
configurations across India, in particular how political preferences of governing elites are shaped by
societal interests and coalitions. Yet these studies offer sparse empirical evidence for the
mechanisms by which alternative state-society configurations influence the operation of public
agencies in India, and yield subnational variation in outcomes across states. Moreover, their
tendency to equate clientelism and political interference-the realities facing most public agencies in
India-with state failure or predation is analytically unwarranted. Such classification renders it
difficult to analyze when and how bureaucracies do effectively carry out their functions under
challenging sociopolitical circumstances.
The need to unpack the bureaucracy is motivated further by the very nature of policy
implementation in India's large, federal state system. Significant institutional changes have taken
place in India over the last few decades, including the devolution of and authority away from the
national government and the concentration of power by state governments with the rise of regional
parties and subnational politics (Yadav 1999). " Meanwhile, serious efforts to decentralize decision-
making authority down to the local district- and village-level have also been underway for some
17 It may still be the case that the overall poor performance of public institutions across India may is tied to the lack of
appropriate incentive systems. That said, the principal-agent literature tends to rely on overly stylized assumptions
regarding bureaucratic motivation-a universal tendency to shirk responsibility-that makes it difficult to imagine public
officials performing their jobs absent formal pressures. Some question the assumption that bureaucratic effort is a
product of coercion by principals (Brehm and Gates 1999).
18 Kapur and Mukhopadhyay (2007) similarly argue that the concentration of authority at the state level is due to regional
parties having strong electoral incentives to control resources at the local level. So long as electoral success depends on
the ability of politicians to dispense local patronage, however, the same incentives can obtain for national parties as well.
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time. While development policies are formulated primarily by state governments, implementation
follows a long chain of governance from the state capital down to the administrative district, and
ultimately, the village and primary school. Understanding the roles and relations of bureaucrats
stationed at different levels of the governance chain is essential to understanding how policy
implementation takes place in practice.
4.2 Bureaucratic Norms
The above discussion points to the strengths and limitations of existing approaches to
analyzing bureaucratic performance. The theory I develop here shifts our attention to the informal
institutions that govern public behavior. I begin with an observation long made by scholars of
organization and bureaucracy, namely, that norms, informal rules of the game, shape the expectations
and behavior of public officials (Gouldner 1954; Kaufman 1967; Fox 1974). Weber's own theory
identified rational-legal norms as the defining feature of the ideal bureaucracy. Yet he tended to
equate these norms with the formal rules and procedures themselves, from which he thought
autonomy and corporate commitment would universally emerge, motivating officials to apply rules
in a fair and impartial manner (Gerth and Mills 1946). Questioning the assumptions behind rational-
legal bureaucracy, Crozier (1964) called attention to the informal features of organization-
unwritten rules, norms, and practices-that evolve with time as bureaucrats learn to cope with the
hierarchies and power dynamics inside the organization. A chief contribution of his work was to
challenge the claim that the exercise of bureaucratic authority, even in well-defined hierarchies was
rational and unproblematic. Instead, he found that norms enable public officials to cope with
organizational uncertainties, power asymmetry and conflict.
Building on this earlier work, I take bureaucratic norms to be uncodified yet widely shared
understandings within public agencies that instruct officials on how to behave. Studies in public
administration and management find that norms shape how agencies function. Among other things,
norms can influence the degree of commitment among officials, their propensity to engage in
collective behavior, and the course of action they deem appropriate in carrying out an agency's
mission (Wilson 1989; Miller 1993; Dilulio 1994). A parallel set of studies of "street-level
bureaucracy" have shown that organizational norms guide the judgments and behaviors of everyday
frontline workers (e.g. school teachers, cops and labor inspectors), helping them filter complex
ground realities and determine how to apply the rules fairly while responding to the needs of
individual citizens (Lipsky 1980; Piore and Schrank 2008; Piore 2011).
At a micro-level, social theorists recognize that instrumental rationality-a matter of
choosing the course of action that produces the highest expected material outcome for the agent
concerned-provides insufficient grounds for explaining much of individual and collective action."
Rather, they argue that individuals (and groups) also operate in accordance with norms-rules of
conduct that instruct agents on how to behave under a given set of social conditions (Bourdieu
1977; Elster 1989). Norms help establish expectations and how alternatives are perceived and
weighed. Crucially, they reflect the valuations and standards by which individuals judge an act,
without reference to the immediate consequences or results of that act. Scholars examining a wide
range of sociopolitical phenomena, from dominance and rebellion to the provision of public goods,
1 On models of rationality and their limits, see Elster's (1986) edited volume, Rational Choice.
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have demonstrated how norms produce concrete behavioral outcomes (Ostrom 1990; Scott 1990;
Petersen 2001).
Following Elster (1989), I understand norms to be rules of conduct that instruct agents on
how to act under a given set of social conditions. In his theory of normative behavior, Elster
identifies a variety of norms: (1) rules of thumb (e.g. don't judge a book by its cover), (2) norms of
virtue or good character (e.g. show kindness to strangers), (3) norms of etiquette (e.g. take your hat
off in church), and (4) moral norms (e.g. don't lie or cheat). Common to all of these norms are two
characteristics. First, they are not outcome-oriented by design, meaning that the norms themselves
do not point to actions producing outcomes we necessarily prefer. I may or may not enjoy the
consequences, for example, of having to remove my hat in church. Norms in that sense can be
distinguished from consequentialist principles of action like instrumental rationality, which requires
an agent to pursue the course of action that best satisfies her preferences. To be sure, the motivation
to comply with a norm can be instrumental. Fear of public reprimand may well move me to take my
hat off in church. Yet the desirability of that action is independent of the norm itself. Second,
norms do not simply describe patterns of behavior, but govern how people ought to behave. They
are prescriptive in a practical sense, providing standards to guide individual behavior and evaluate
the conduct of others.
Within a bureaucracy, norms provide standards and guidelines that determine which actions
are mandatory, permissible, prohibited or even exemplary (Brinks 2006).20 A public official's
adherence to such standards is greeted with social approval or other rewards while deviation should
arouse social disapproval or other forms of sanction. For purposes of analysis, bureaucratic norms
carry two essential features: they are (1) broadly shared by officials in a bureaucracy and (2) sustained
by acts of approval (or reward) and disapproval (or sanction) by agency members. The above two
features help guide the process for investigating whether or not a norm is at work within a public
agency. First, one must find evidence demonstrating that individuals working within the public
agency possess a common understanding for how officials ought to behave, and make sense of their
own and others' actions with reference to it. Second, there needs to be evidence showing that
bureaucratic behaviors consistent with (or in violation of) the prevailing standards of conduct carry
some form of social approval (or disapproval). Merely observing patterns of behavior that appear
consistent with a hypothesized norm is not sufficient for establishing that the norm exists
empirically. As one scholar has put it, "rules must have both normativ4-in the limited sense that
they provide a standard of conduct-andfactiiy--in the sense that they are actually enforced
(Brinks 2006:204). I offer a method for the empirical validation of bureaucratic norms in Appendix
D at the end of this chapter.
4.3. Bureaucratic Norms and Poliy Implementation
The core of my argument is that the bureaucratic norms governing public agencies influence
how effectively they implement universal primary education (see Figure 1.1.2). More specifically,
20 While Brinks discusses norms that require, permit or prohibit certain actions, I add to this the significance of
standards for exemplary action. As some philosophers have argued, supererogation, or action that goes above and
beyond the call of duty, commands a distinct kind of moral approval or recognition. See, for example, J.S. Mill (1969),
who hailed the special value of non-obligatory meritorious action.
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bureaucratic norms shape the behavior of public officials as they carry out the critical tasks involved
in implementing primary education, including school planning and provision, educational service
delivery and monitoring and feedback. Norms influence how officials interpret and apply rules and
procedures. They regulate the nature of communication and coordination across hierarchical
boundaries, and crucially, the participation of lower-level bureaucrats. Furthermore, bureaucratic
norms operate indirectly through their influence over civic participation. Along with input from the
state, the implementation of universal primary schooling requires the engagement of citizens and
civic agencies. Norms guide how public officials relate to citizens and civic groups outside the state.
Civic actors, meanwhile, learn to adjust their expectations and behaviors based on their experiences
with public agencies. The theoretical process by which bureaucratic norms are hypothesized to
influence policy implementation thus consists of two causal channels: bureaucratic and civic. It is
through the joint operation of both mechanisms that bureaucratic norms generate implementation
outcomes.
Figure 1.1.2 Theoretical Process
Bureaucratic Bureaucratic Policy
Norms . ... Behaviors Implementation
Civic
L- - - - - - -- participation - - - - - - - -
Bureaucratic norms get reinforced through a variety of formal and informal practices within
public agencies. Planning meetings and other organizational channels provide opportunities for
bureaucrats to learn how they ought to interpret and carry out their responsibilities. They also give
officials the opportunity to learn about each other's actions and communicate signs of approval or
disapproval. More informally, senior officials can signal their appreciation or dissatisfaction with
subordinates through routine communication. In other cases, they may resort to symbolic forms of
recognition, for instance underscoring media accounts of agency efforts and achievements.2 ' By
observing how senior officials and their colleagues behave, as well as how they respond to their
peers, bureaucrats learn the behaviors associated with good governance.
Building on the above theoretical process, I propose two distinct sets of bureaucratic norms,
deliberative and legalistic, which produce divergent patterns of behavior and yield varying outcomes
for policy implementation. When bureaucratic norms are deliberative, public agencies are responsive
to local needs and thus implement primary education policy effectively. Public officials subject to
deliberative norms are encouraged to discuss practical matters of implementation across formal
organizational divides, coordinate efforts to solve problems collectively, and adapt official rules and
policies to meet ground realities. They lead public officials to seek input from citizens and civic
21 Tendler's (1997) examination of the public health program in Ceara, a traditionally underperforming province of
Brazil, highlights the mechanism of media scrutiny and recognition.
25
organizations outside the state, encouraging local communities to engage in collective action to
monitor the functioning of primary schools. Meanwhile, when bureaucratic norms are legalistic,
agencies operate in a more rigid and hierarchical fashion, which leads to much less effective
implementation. Legalism encourages officials to adhere strictly to official procedures, maintain
organizational boundaries, and apply policies in a narrow, uniform manner across diverse contexts.
Public officials tend to marginalize civic agencies and exclude citizens from the policy
implementation process. The impulse within communities to organize collectively around primary
education is dampened as a consequence, which undermines local monitoring of primary schools.
While they do not always refer explicitly to bureaucratic norms, field-based studies of
governance in developing countries have arrived at similar insights. In her study of public
bureaucracies in Brazil, Tendler (1997) finds that local agencies in the northeastern province of
Ceara encouraged frontline health workers to engage with local communities, not only by way of
material inducements but through symbolic gestures such as public information campaigns and
prizes for good performance. Within the Indian context, studies of effective public service delivery
find that agencies that encourage repeated informal interaction across divisional boundaries, as well
as between public officials, citizens and elected leaders, can help foster and sustain innovative
practices (Chand 2006). In a similar vein, research on co-production arrangements, where local
agencies and citizens collectively manage policy implementation, have examined conditions under
which bureaucracies can foster greater participation from local officials and input from citizens
(Ostrom 1996; Joshi and Moore 2004). In his study of effective irrigation systems in Taiwan, for
example, Lam (1996) finds that notwithstanding what appeared to be rigid formal rules delineating
the roles and responsibilities of local agencies, informal norms within the bureaucracy encouraged
flexibility in the application of policies and promoted engagement between farmers and local
officials.
4.4. Alternative Paths: Deliberative and Legalistic
I have so far described in general terms how bureaucratic norms influence policy
implementation. I now delineate in greater detail the mechanisms by which the two alternative
paths-deliberative and legalistic-generate divergent outcomes for the implementation of universal
primary education. As the discussion proceeds, it helps to bear in mind that deliberative and
legalistic norms are ideal types. They are analytical constructs that clarify and even accentuate
certain elements of bureaucratic organization, which aids in the process of drawing comparisons
across concrete cases (Giddens 1973: 141-143). While no bureaucracy operates in perfect
accordance with the deliberative or legalistic model, the two ideal types put forward here capture the
central tendencies one can observe across the empirical cases under investigation. A graphical
representation of how the alternative paths operate is provided below in Figure 1.1.3.
My formulation of deliberative norms builds on the insights from the literature on
deliberation and participatory governance. This line of research draws its normative commitments
from the work of political philosophers writing on deliberative democracy, particularly Joshua
22 The notion of ideal types used here comes from Weber. For his original statement of the method of ideal type
theorizing and its purpose within social science, see Weber, Max, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy," The
Metodology of the Social Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1949).
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Cohen (1989) and Jurgen Habermas (1998), who have argued that the practice of deliberation,
communication and public justification can advance democratic ideals. It aims to identify
institutional arrangements that can produce more substantive forms of citizen participation and
promote the collective good." It starts with the recognition that public institutions often lack the
information, know-how and resources to carry out critical functions of the state, from the regulation
of private firms to the provision of public services. Bureaucracies possessing highly centralized,
hierarchical authority are found to be ill-suited to the complexities associated with implementing
public policy (Sabel 1994; Fung and Wright 2001). Instead, the literature finds promise in more
deliberative forms of organization, which promote collective discussion and problem-solving across
organizational divisions and between public officials and citizens (Cohen and Sabel 1997).







- - Civic Inclusion - - - - - - - - -
Rational
Implementation
L -------- Civic Exclusion - - - - - - - -
Though it has focused primarily on the formal features of deliberative organizations, I
extend the insights of this research to the norms governing public agencies as well. I take
deliberation to be the mutual give and take of reasons and arguments directed towards common
goals (Fung 2002: 69). Deliberative norms encourage public officials to engage in collective
23 See the volume edited by Fung and Wright (2003) for a theoretical statement and examples of empirical work along
these lines. In addition, a growing number of studies analyze how deliberative institutions function in practice, from
participatory budgeting in Brazil to gram panchayats in India (Isaac and Heller 2003; Baiocchi 2005; Rao and Sanyal
2010).
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discussion regarding how implementation ought to proceed. They promote open and candid
communication across the organizational hierarchy. Lower-level bureaucrats learn to participate in
collective decision-making, discuss practical concerns and share their experiences with seniors,
thereby allowing local knowledge to move up the hierarchy. Senior officials, meanwhile, come to
value ground-level experiences and information held by their subordinates, which then feeds back
into the planning process.
In the interest of solving problems, bureaucrats across the hierarchy take a flexible approach
to implementation and learn to adapt policies to meet the varying needs of local communities. In
contrast to the legalistic model I present below, deliberative norms encourage officials to exercise
discretion to depart from the rules and respond to the requirements of the task at hand (Sabel and
Zeitlin 2011). As studies of regulatory agencies have shown, when public officials enjoy flexibility in
interpreting the rules, they are more responsive to the needs of individual cases (Silbey 1984;
Selznick 1994; Braithwaite 2006). They are also better able to work across organizational
boundaries, which helps expand the resources available for enforcing the law (Silbey, Huising et al.
2009; Pires 2011). In a similar vein, deliberative norms lead to responsive policy implementation by
encouraging officials to coordinate across divisions of the state and adapt policies to suit varying
local contexts.
Along with shaping bureaucratic behavior, there is a second channel through which
deliberative norms lead to responsive implementation, namely the path of civic participation. Public
agencies governed by deliberative norms promote the input and participation of citizens and civic
groups. Public officials learn to go beyond their officially-sanctioned roles and organizational
boundaries to establish ties with societal groups that can aid in policy implementation. To use
Scott's (1998) terms, deliberative norms allow the state to "see" the possibilities of partnership with
citizens and civic agencies. In much the same way that senior officials encourage input from their
subordinates, local public officials learn to draw upon the knowledge and organizational resources of
citizens and civic agencies, whose collective input can aid in the policy implementation process. The
inclusive behavior of public officials helps reinforce the participation of local communities, who
experience tangible benefits of collective action around primary schooling.
In contrast to the deliberative model, I conceptualize an alternative process driven by
legalistic norms governing bureaucracy. Legalism, according to philosophers of law, refers to a
general attitude, ethos or ideology that holds moral conduct to be a matter of following the rules
(Shklar 1964). Legalistic norms invoke rule following and deference to official hierarchies and
procedures. Weber's formulation of the ideal bureaucracy could be interpreted as the foremost
example of legalism applied to the state. It envisions the impartial application of general rules on
society by public officials having an unwavering commitment to rational-legal norms. However,
unlike the ideal Weberian bureaucracy, I do not assume that legalism derives from the formal
features of the bureaucracy itself. Nor do I assume it to be universally "rational" in the sense that it
operates the same everywhere regardless of sociopolitical context. Rather, legalism encapsulates a
particular set of norms that promote the strict interpretation of rules, policies and procedures.
Legalism induces protective behaviors among bureaucrats, who learn to uphold official hierarchies
and divisional boundaries, thereby limiting the scope of coordination across divisions of the state.
With a view towards preventing societal encroachment over the state, the flow of communication
and decision-making across the hierarchy tends to follow official channels from the top down, as
bureaucrats learn to value the rules over local knowledge.
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Subject to legalistic norms, lower-level bureaucrats interpret their mandate in narrow terms
and apply policies in a rigid, uniform manner across cases. When they attempt to question official
policy based on their experiences in the field, lower-level bureaucrats are met with disapproval. By
the same token, they also learn to downplay the significance of local knowledge and maintain a strict
interpretation of what actions policies require. To bend policies according to the needs of
communities carries the risk of local political interference or even capture, which officials seek to
avoid. As Canales (2011) observes in his study of microfinance loan officers in Mexico, agents that
adhere strictly to the "letter of the law" understand official policies as binding constraints that
prescribe a narrow course of action, thereby deferring to official hierarchy and renouncing their own
discretionary authority. The result is a policy implementation process that is fully rational, within the
narrow mandate of official policy and uniform in its application across cases.
Along with its impact on bureaucratic behavior, legalistic norms also operate through the
channel of civic behavior. Legalistic norms discourage public officials from developing ties with
societal groups in the policy implementation process. Bureaucrats learn to resist the input and
participation of citizens and civic agencies, whose influence is understood to interfere with the
internal operations of the state. In areas of policy where community participation is prescribed,
bureaucrats choose to work only through officially-recognized agencies and channels, excluding
groups that are unrecognized by the state. Again, that is not to suggest that local collective action
around primary schooling could not thrive on its own. Citizens can, in theory, contribute to primary
schooling irrespective of how public agencies operate. However, their collective efforts are likely to
be dampened in areas of implementation that require coordination with public agencies. Faced with
the exclusionary tendencies within the state, citizens and civic groups learn to adjust their
expectations and collective behaviors accordingly. Taken together, the combination of protective
behavior by bureaucrats and civic exclusion produces a rational implementation process, one that
aims to preserve official authority within the state while limiting the scope for societal interference.
To see more concretely how these two alternative models produce varying implementation
outcomes, it helps to break apart the administrative tasks involved in the delivery universal primary
education. 24 Figure 1.1.4 below summarizes the major activities associated with implementing
India's policies for universal primary education. It also provides a short description of how public
agencies governed by deliberative versus legalistic norms are theorized to carry out each task. These
tasks can be divided into three broad categories: (1) school planning and provision, (2) delivery of
educational services, and (3) system monitoring and feedback. While the first category involves
activities related to quantitative improvements, like the development of physical infrastructure and
school facilities, the latter two sets of activities are more closely tied to the quality of service delivery.
System monitoring and local feedback is particularly relevant to education quality, since the daily
functioning of primary schools is largely outside the hands of state planners.
Consider first the activities associated with school planning and provision. India's primary
education policies aim to achieve universal access through the construction of new schools in
underserved communities. In carrying out that task, public agencies governed by deliberative norms
will tend to encourage broad participation from officials across the organizational hierarchy, along
with elected leaders and civic agencies working at the grassroots level. Through the mutual
exchange of ideas and information, school development plans are tailored to address varying local
24 The list of administrative tasks was developed based on extensive interviews with public officials, educationists, civic
agencies and school teachers.
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needs. Similarly, local agencies involved in carrying out new school construction will tend to consult
with local communities in deciding where to place new schools, even when doing so may break with
official rules. As a result, agencies are more likely to meet the needs facing communities.
Public agencies governed by legalistic norms will tend to follow a different course of action.
Rather than promote broad participation, they seek to avoid local demands and political interference
while planning the development of new schools. They tend to confine the task of school
infrastructure planning within a designated sub-division of the bureaucracy with little outside input
or engagement. When deciding where to construct a school building, bureaucrats adhere strictly to
rules regarding village population size and school distance. Whether communities express the need
for school infrastructure or not is of secondary concern. Nevertheless, the strict adherence to well-
specified rules and targets helps ensure that school infrastructure is provided uniformly across
communities.
Figure 1.1.4 Bureaucratic Norms and Administrative Tasks
Administrative Tasks Legalistic Norms Deliberative Norms
School planning and provision
School infrastructure -Conduct planning process within -Conduct deliberative planning
development dedicated agency and restrict process with input from multiple
outside input or interference agencies and civic actors
Regional planning and policy -Apply policies uniformly across -Adapt policies to suit the context
targeting different regions and social groups across different regions and social
groups
Educational service delivery
Teacher posting -Apply uniform, rational procedure -Apply flexible teacher allocation
for allocation of teachers across process according to school needs
schools
Academic support -Provide academic resources in - Coordinate with school teachers and
uniform, top-down process civic agencies to provide academic
resources
Community support -Work with officially-recognized -Work with both official and unofficial
school agencies within the areas groups to identify and address school
mandated by policy needs
Monitoring andfeedback
System monitoring -Follow top-down school inspection -Combine official inspections and
model and identify gaps through surveys with unofficial, community-
official surveys based monitoring
Local feedback -Incorporate local feedback through - Incorporate local feedback from
official channels informal groups and through
unofficial channels
25 According to India's primary education policies, the state is required to provide all rural habitations of a certain
population size access to a primary school within a distance of one kilometer.
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While school infrastructure planning in India carries well-specific targets and requires
comparatively little community input, regional planning and policy targeting is quite the opposite.
India's primary education policies provide resources for states to implement special programs to
address the distinct needs facing underperforming regions and disadvantaged social groups (e.g.
disabled children and out-of-school girls). Agencies governed by deliberative norms will tend to
interpret these policies flexibly and adapt them to the varying conditions of different regions and
social groups. For example, they will tend to coordinate with local officials from underserved
regions and draw input from civic agencies working with disadvantaged social groups to tailor
programs in a context-specific manner. As a result, these policies are more likely to reach intended
recipients and address their educational needs. By contrast, agencies governed by legalistic norms
will tend to adopt a narrow interpretation of these policies. Regional planning will involve little
coordination across the official hierarchy, and the involvement of non-state agencies will be limited.
Officials will tend to implement regional and targeted policies in much the same way they carry out
school infrastructure projects, in a top-down, uniform manner across regions and social groups,
producing far less effective results.
Consider further the provision of academic support in the delivery of educational services.
To aid in the teaching and learning process, India's primary education policies provide a bundle of
academic resources (e.g. reference materials and teaching supplies) for each school. They also call
for the provision of library books to help create a learning environment within schools. Public
agencies governed by deliberative norms will tend to coordinate efforts across the bureaucratic
hierarchy to determine the most appropriate means of delivering these resources to schools when
they are needed. They may, for example, coordinate with school teachers informally during training
sessions outside of class. Or in the case of libraries, they may enlist the support of local NGOs to
provide library books and academic support in underserved communities. Consequently, primary
schools are more likely to have these resources available for teachers and students to use. By
contrast, agencies governed by legalistic norms will tend to supply academic resources in a uniform,
top-down fashion according to the official planning calendar. Local officials will tend not to
coordinate with school teachers or civic agencies in determining when and how to provide teaching
supplies or library books. Instead, they will deliver them based on directives from within the
bureaucracy. Depending on local conditions, schools may or may not receive these materials in time
to make use of them. Consequently, schools are less likely to have these academic resources
available for use.
Finally, consider the activities around monitoring and feedback, the mechanisms by which
public agencies try to ensure that the education system is functioning well. Bureaucrats have in
theory a range of possible methods at their disposal for monitoring the education system. Agencies
operating according to deliberative norms will tend to combine the official school inspection system
with unofficial mechanisms of feedback from local communities, which are often better situated to
identify problems. Importantly, they will seek input not only from formally recognized bodies such
as Village Education Committees (VECs), but also informal groups at the village level, such as
women's associations. Given the fact that formal village institutions in India are often dominated by
privileged social groups, the ability to work with informal groups at the village level allows agencies
to identify and respond to the problems facing marginalized communities. With the encouragement
of local agencies, community groups are more likely to invest the time and resources to keep a check
on primary schooling and report gaps in service delivery. As a result, monitoring systems are more
likely to ensure that schools are functioning well.
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Meanwhile, agencies governed by legalistic norms will tend follow the standard, top-down
system of school inspection. The standard inspection model requires local administration to
conduct a fixed number of school visits per month and run through a checklist of items related to
infrastructure, the Midday Meal Program, and so on. Inspections are supplemented by official
surveys conducted by school teachers to identify out-of-school children and other potential gaps in
policy implementation. Notwithstanding acute resource constraints and other limitations facing the
inspection system, public officials will tend to discourage feedback from agencies outside the state,
such as local NGOs and community groups. In the same way that senior officials tend to downplay
the local knowledge held by their subordinates, local officials see little reason to use the information
provided by non-state agencies. By following standard inspection procedures and limiting the range
of feedback to official information sources, bureaucrats avoid outside interference. In so doing,
however, they dissuade local communities from collectively monitoring primary schooling.
Moreover, the application of standard inspection procedures is likely to disempower marginalized
citizens, who are often reluctant to report formal complaints. As a consequence, the monitoring
system is less likely to ensure that schools are functioning well.
To summarize the argument, when public agencies are governed by deliberative norms,
policy implementation is more responsive to local needs. Bureaucrats learn to coordinate across
hierarchical boundaries, adapt policies to suit varying conditions and encourage participation from
citizens and civic agencies in policy implementation. Such agencies are, as a result, effective in
carrying out a majority of tasks associated with implementing universal primary education policy.
They are likely to achieve not only high levels of infrastructure provision, but well-functioning
schools with high quality educational services as well. When public agencies operate according to
legalistic norms, meanwhile, policy implementation tends to follow the rules rather than local needs.
Bureaucrats learn to uphold official hierarchies, apply policies in a rigid, uniform manner across
cases, and discourage input from citizens and civic agencies. Such agencies are, as a result, less
effective in carrying a majority of tasks associated with implementing universal primary education.
While they can achieve high levels of infrastructure provision, they are likely to produce schools that
function poorly and deliver low quality educational services.
4.4. Bureaucratic Norms and Democratic Governance
Having presented my theory of how bureaucratic norms influence the implementation of
universal primary education, I now consider how the theory relates more broadly to democracy and
civil society in India. As mentioned, earlier, alternative approaches for understanding the quality of
public institutions highlight the role of democratic governance and civic participation. In a vibrant,
multiethnic democracy like India's, no study of primary education would be complete without
accounting for the democratic and civic context in which public agencies are embedded. How do
public agencies governed by bureaucratic norms operate within India's democratic system, and in
particular, the system of clientelism and caste politics? How do public officials navigate the vast,
socially heterogeneous terrain of Indian civil society? In this final sub-section I discuss how the
theory of bureaucratic norms and the research design of this study address these features of
governance in India.
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4.4. 1. Democratic Governance
Many argue that democratic institutions lead to better social outcomes by enhancing the
responsiveness of state agencies to citizens' needs. Through representative channels like
competitive elections, disadvantaged citizens can hold officials accountable for advancing their
interests within the state. Scholars writing on the politics of welfare and redistribution observe a
connection between democratic institutions and governmental expenditures for the poor
(Przeworski 1986; Skocpol and Amenta 1986; Esping-Anderson 1990). In the context of developing
countries, many find that democracies outperform authoritarian regimes in the provision of public
services like health and education (Brown and Hunter 1999; Przeworski, Alvares et al. 2000; Lake
and Baum 2001; Deacon 2009). Yet a growing number of studies question the supposed link
between democracy, social policy and human development (Keefer and Khemani 2004; Stasavage
2005; Ross 2006). While it may be the case that democratic governments tend tofinance social policy
at a higher level than authoritarian regimes, there is little to suggest that these services always reach
their intended beneficiaries, let alone produce desirable outcomes like improved literacy or lower
infant mortality. 26
With more than sixty years of nearly uninterrupted democratic rule, India may well be the
most successful democracy in the developing world. Moreover, with the recent political
mobilization of lower caste groups, it may well be the only large democracy where voter turnout
among traditionally marginalized citizens-those who are most likely to benefit from primary
education policies-is markedly higher than among the privileged (Yadav 2002). Yet the abysmal
quality of public services in India poses a puzzle for theories of democratic accountability. Kapur
and Mukhopadhyay (2007) document well over a hundred governmental anti-poverty programs
active in India. The failure of most of these programs has been broadcast widely among governing
elites through official reviews and audits, and yet they continue to receive an outpouring of
resources. The lesson seems to be that India's democracy is far better at producing policies than
realizing them through in the implementation process.
Why do Indian voters, especially those belonging to poor and marginalized communities,
participate zealously in a democratic process that has done little to improve their quality of life?
Perhaps the most convincing arguments center on the role of cientelism in Indian politics.
Clientelist systems are characterized by particularistic transactions, in which citizens surrender votes
in exchange for private, material benefits from political patrons (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). As
Heller (2000) points out, the pervasiveness of clientelism in India-a form of political subordination
in exchange for material rewards-renders democracy largely procedural and relatively ineffective in
addressing the substantive needs of citizens, particularly the poor. Similarly, others have observed
that political parties in India tend to compete not on programmatic policy platforms but on their
ability to control local access to state resources, often through caste- and other identity-based
channels (Chhibber 1995; Chandra 2004). The drawback for policy implementation is that, while
clientelism favors informal, targeted transfers of excludable goods, it undermines institutionalized
provision of universal public services like health and education, an outcome that is all the more
aggravated by limited information, social cleavages and inequality among voters (Keefer and
Khemani 2004).
26 For a discussion of governance failures in public service delivery across the developing world see the World Bank's
2004 World Development Report: World Development Report 2004: Making Services W/ork for Poor People (World Bank 2003).
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These studies suggest that poor implementation in India stems not from a lack of democracy
per se but the nature of party politics and political ties between voters and politicians. Seeking to
reward their supporters with selective benefits, elected officials may try to exert influence over the
bureaucracy. One form of political influence is found to occur through the transfer and
reassignment of bureaucrats.27 Yet the system of bureaucratic transfers is no less pervasive in states
like Kerala and Himachal Pradesh, which are considered examples of good governance in India.
Moreover, the very fact that Uttar Pradesh, a state notorious for its highly divisive caste politics, has
made remarkable gains in the provision of school infrastructure poses a puzzle for theories that
assume that universal public goods could not be delivered under clientelist systems. Still, the system
of bureaucratic transfers may well reduce the quality of public administration in India, even when
agencies are governed by deliberative norms. To address that question, we would need to carry out
a comparative study of cientelism that connects patterns of voter-politician linkages to variation in
the operation of public agencies. An investigation of that kind is beyond the scope of this study.
Nevertheless, the theory of bureaucratic norms I put forward here can contribute to our
understanding of democratic governance in India. I share the view that procedural democracy does
not ensure the substantive participation of marginalized citizens. In much the same way that formal
democratic procedures do not sufficiently promote substantive citizen participation, I argue that
bureaucratic procedures carried out in a legalistic manner by public agencies are unlikely to enhance
policy implementation. Unlike much recent literature, however, I do not assume that clientelism or
even caste politics necessarily undermines the bureaucracy's ability to implement universal policies.28
Studies tend to paint India's bureaucracy as a victim, forced to work under the control of corrupt
principals. Absent field-based evidence, however, they leave open the question of how public
officials negotiate political pressures in performing their duties. According to the theory I put
forward here, public officials subject to legalistic norms tend to adopt a narrow definition of the
rules and adhere strictly to procedures as a way to avoid political interference. In public agencies
governed by deliberative norms, meanwhile, bureaucrats tend to consult with elected officials and
adapt policies to suit the varying needs of their constituents. Whether and how these alternative
approaches address clientelistic pressures is worthy of investigation.
While a thoroughgoing investigation of cientelism is beyond the scope of this study, the
research design and methods I use allow me to probe how bureaucratic norms relate to democratic
governance. I take explicit account of political party systems, which have been found to effect the
provision of public goods (Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004). In the matched-pair of Himachal
Pradesh and Uttarakhand, I hold party system constant, as both states have a two-party system
comprised of India's two national parties--the Congress Party and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The
comparison allows me to analyze how distinct sets of bureaucratic norms operate under the same
party system. Meanwhile, the study of Uttar Pradesh, which is governed by a mix of regional parties
that make overt claims to represent particular caste groups, allows me to examine how agencies
subject to legalistic norms operate in very different party system. Fieldwork provided opportunities
to observe how public agencies relate with local elected leaders and village councils (panchayats).
While it may be that clientelism in India's democracy undermines the delivery of public services,
27 In one of the few studies on the subject, Iyer and Mani (2009) observe significant political influence over the
bureaucracy through the transfer and reassignment of officers. They find that officers that exhibit high ability are no
more likely to be rewarded with assignments to more important posts than other officers, and that transfers may also
lead bureaucrats to invest less in skills, which can undermine the quality of administration.
28 On that point, the collection of studies of cientism found in Piattoni (2001) offer a useful corrective.
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field evidence from Himachal Pradesh, a truly exceptional performer in primary education, reveals a
relatively well-functioning education system that is rife with cientelism.
4.4.2. Rethinking Civil Sode_*
According to a second body of research, civil society strengthens the performance of public
institutions. A vibrant associational life produces social capital-norms and networks of trust and
reciprocity-which enables citizens to overcome problems of collective action and coordinate
effectively to make demands on the state (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1994).29 While this body of
research draws primarily from the experience of advanced industrial countries, studies from across
the developing world associate civic engagement and social capital with a wide range of policy
outcomes, from poverty reduction and public goods provision, to interethnic cooperation and
communal peace (Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Varshney 2001; Krishna 2003; Miguel 2004). 30
With its traditions of nonviolent civil disobedience and Gandhian volunteerism, civic participation
may be an appropriate place to search for the mechanisms underlying effective policy
implementation.
Setting aside a great many conceptual and normative disagreements, there is little scholarly
consensus regarding the nature and extent of civil society in India." Scholars of India's social
movements and the NGO sector describe a terrain rich in civic resources with a wide range of
associations making collective demands on the state (Heller 1999; Ray and Katzenstein 2005; Jenkins
2007). Survey research, on the other hand, finds low levels of reported membership in formal
associations, suggesting that Indian civil society is much thinner than might appear (Chhibber 2001;
Chhibber, Shastri et al. 2004). It may also be the case that survey instruments are too blunt to
capture the informal networks and associations that operate in rural India (Krishna 2003). A
separate literature on ethnic divisions and public goods observes that Indian society suffers from
fragmentation along caste, tribal and religious lines, which appears to undermines the provision of
public goods and services (Banerjee, Iyer et al. 2005). All in all, these studies leave the effect of
Indian civil society on governance ambiguous.
I embrace this ambiguity and treat civil society as a complementary, rather than competing,
explanation for policy implementation. The theory of bureaucratic norms I propose takes explicit
account of civic participation, but leaves open the question of its efficacy. The reason to
incorporate civic participation into the model rests on the empirical fact that rural primary schooling
is a community-based institution that cannot exist apart from the social relations upon which it is
embedded (Coleman 1988). Perhaps more than any other policy domain, primary education hinges
on the participation of local communities and civic groups. India's policy framework for universal
primary education, which builds on the global Education for All campaign, thus calls for the
29 See for example the following studies: Brehm and Rahn (1997), Knack and Keefer (1997), and Knack (2002).
3 For a critical review of social capital theory, see Portes (1998) and Woolcock and Narayan (2000).
31 The very use of the term "civil society" is hotly contested by scholars of Indian politics. Some argue that most Indian
citizens, particularly the poor, are part of a "political society", in which the terms of political access and exchanged are
dominated by principles of communalism and corruption, far from the democratic ideal of free and equal citizenship
that informs many theories of civil society (Kaviraj 2002; Chatterjee 2006).
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participation of local communities and civil society groups in implementation.12 Yet the extent and
quality of participation, particularly among local communities, is thought to vary considerably.
Some argue that the nature of social divisions and caste hierarchies across India determine
the extent of civic participation. For example, in the case of Uttar Pradesh, Dreze and Sen (2002)
observe that traditional caste divisions impede local collective action and lead to public neglect
around basic services like education and health. By contrast, they argue that primary schools in the
state of Kerala function much better due to greater community vigilance. Implicit in their account is
the assumption that social structure ultimately drives or hinders community action around primary
education. By the same token, the widely-heralded PROBE study on primary education in north
India associated the well-functioning school system in Himachal Pradesh with comparative high
levels of local collective action, aided in part by less divisive caste relations in the Himalayan region
(PROBE Team 1999).
As the above studies indicate, social divisions and caste norms continue to play a significant
role in rural India, and their significance for collective action cannot be overlooked. I address the
issue of social structure in my selection of cases. The hill states of Himachal Pradesh and
Uttarakhand share very similar caste compositions and both have a history of collective village
institutions, which aids in the matched-pair comparison. Meanwhile, Uttar Pradesh has a highly
fragmented caste composition with a history of social exclusion and economic exploitation of lower
castes, which provides a least-likely case for civic participation. Similarly, at the village-level I
examine cases of both relatively homogeneous caste communities along with highly fragmented ones
to account for the possible influence of caste composition over civic participation.
Yet I would also caution against overstating (and oversimplifying) the significance of social
structure. As village-level studies have shown, the capacity for collective action cannot simply be
read off the number of caste divisions within a community (Somanathan, Prabhakar et al. 2002;
Krishna 2003)." Nor is it appropriate to assume that historical legacies of caste exclusion forever
condemn communities to civic disengagement. The theory of bureaucratic norms I advance here
draws our attention the critical function that public agencies can play in harnessing the civic
capabilities of citizens. When bureaucratic norms are deliberative, officials will tend to encourage
civic participation in the implementation process. When agencies are governed by legalistic norms,
officials will tend to exclude citizens and civic agencies. A vibrant associational life, while perhaps
valuable in its own right, does not alone produce effective policy implementation according to my
theory. Rather, the efficacy of civic participation is conditional on the norms governing public
agencies.
To clarify, I do not mean to suggest that civic participation is a mere function of
bureaucratic norms within the state. The presence (or absence) of civil society and the extent and
quality of civic engagement can be shaped by any number of factors external to the operation of
public institutions. The earlier discussion on research design touched upon some of these factors
32 The Dakar Framework for Action, signed by 164 countries participating in UNESCO's global Education for All
campaign, pledged to "ensure the engagement and participation of civil society in the formulation, implementation and
monitoring of strategies for educational development." (UNESCO 2000: 8)
3 The impact of social heterogeneity on collective action may be more ambiguous than we may think. As the research
on forest resource management shows, caste heterogeneity does not always have an adverse impact on collective action
(Poteete and Ostrom 2004).
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(e.g. levels of economic development, social heterogeneity, the presence of village associations, etc.)
identified in studies analyzing village-level characteristics that shape policy implementation. What I
propose here is more modest. Given a set of civic organizations and capabilities within a society,
bureaucratic norms influence whether and how those capabilities are brought to bear in the
implementation process. When civic action is directed at the state, bureaucratic norms shape how
public officials respond, which in turn can influence the nature and extent of civic input in policy
implementation. None of that is to say that the norms governing public agencies unilaterally
determine civic participation.
At the same time, however, it is important not to discount the role of public institutions in
helping to foster and strengthen the participation of citizens in policy implementation. Under
conditions of entrenched social inequality and exclusion, which characterizes much of rural India,
marginalized citizens face significant barriers to accessing to the state. In the domain of education,
moreover, social norms continue to restrict the participation of lower caste children, girls, and other
disadvantaged groups. The encounters such groups have with public agencies can play a
foundational role in how they come to see the state and their relation to it as citizens (Corbridge,
Williams et al. 2005). How public agencies respond to the collective demands of marginalized
citizens shape their expectations regarding the benefits of further collective action. In theorizing the
process by which bureaucratic norms shape civic action, I follow the line of reasoning established in
a number of studies that find that public institutions can, over repeated interactions, help foster,
sustain and enhance the efficacy of civil society and social capital (Ostrom 1996; Fox 1997;
Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Locke 2003).
1.5. Overview of Dissertation
This dissertation relies on a series of subnational comparisons and nested case studies to
analyze variation in the performance of public agencies implementing universal primary education in
India. The research examines implementation within the Hindi-speaking belt of north India, a
region that is often described as uniformly backwards yet shows striking variation in outcomes for
primary education. I closely analyze implementation within three geographically contiguous states-
Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand-that show maximal variation while controlling
for a host of political economy factors. In the empirical chapters of this study, I trace the full chain
of governance within each of these three states, from the state capital down to the village. I examine
how bureaucratic norms operate at multiple levels of administration (state, district and village).
Fieldwork conducted at these multiple levels reveals the impact of bureaucratic norms over the
policy implementation process. The case study chapters establish the presence of bureaucratic
norms, the chief explanatory variable, within each state and test the propositions of the theory over
a range of activities associated with policy implementation, from school planning and infrastructure
development to educational service delivery and local monitoring. The outline below details the
contribution of each chapter to the overall study.
3 To explain the uneven development of civil society in Mexico, for example, Fox (1997) offers a "political
construction" approach that analyzes the recursive cycles of interaction between the state and societal actors. As he aptly
puts it: "Associational life does not unfold in a vacuum: state or external societal actors can provide either positive
incentives or negative sanctions for collective action" (Fox 1997: 121).
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I begin in Chapter 2 by setting out the empirical context of the study. I present an overview
of the Indian government's national policy framework and budgetary commitments to primary
education. While the central government's role in the social sector has increased with the enactment
of several new policies, India's federal structure provides state governments with greater authority
over policy implementation. I examine in more detail the trends and recent outcomes in primary
education across India, and discuss systematic hurdles affecting the school system, including weak
administrative capacity, poor teacher accountability, and inequalities around caste and gender.
At the same time, some regions perform significantly better than others, bringing the empirical
puzzle of the dissertation into sharp relief. I then shift attention to the roles and responsibilities of
bureaucratic and civic agencies working in the domain of primary education. I describe the
administrative makeup of India's education bureaucracy, including the formal hierarchy, modes of
recruitment and career trajectories. As the discussion makes clear, the formal incentives and
administrative structure of the Indian education bureaucracy cannot explain the variation in
implementation outcomes across states. I then examine the range of civic actors involved in
education and their relationship to the state, particularly within the context of policies to decentralize
governance and foster local community participation. Finally, I consider the challenge that public
agencies face in trying to evoke participation from marginalized communities, particularly in light of
the social divisions and entrenched inequalities that characterize much of rural north India.
I then turn to an analysis of the empirical cases in Chapters 3-5. I start in Chapter 3 with the
case of Himachal Pradesh (HP), an exceptional performer in the sphere of primary education. I
situate HP's achievements in light of its unfavorable conditions, including widespread illiteracy at the
time of independence, the harsh physical environment in the Himalayan region, and relatively low
levels of economic development and urbanization. Second, I go on to discuss the role of the state
and provide detailed evidence for how public agencies operate in practice. Through interviews and
participant-observation, I establish the presence of deliberative norms within HP's education
bureaucracy. Public officials in HP work collectively to bend official rules, interpret policies and
procedures flexibly, and incorporate civic actors in the implementation process. I then connect
these norms to the outcomes for policy implementation through a series of case studies conducted
at the state and local-level. Findings show how deliberative norms shape bureaucratic behavior
around the critical tasks for policy implementation, enabling the state to respond to varying local
needs and redress inequalities in access across regions and social groups. Beyond improved access,
findings at the village-level reveal how local agencies respond to the collective demands of
community groups, encouraging further civic action that improves the functioning of schools and
leads to better outcomes for educational service delivery. Finally, I consider potential limitations of
the deliberative model in HP. As rapid income growth and privatization undermine social cohesion
in some parts of the state, public agencies may face new challenges as they attempt to foster local
collective action around primary schooling.
Chapter 4 analyzes the mixed achievements of Uttarakhand, a newly established state that
was carved out from the hill region of Uttar Pradesh. This chapter constitutes an important test for
my theory. It demonstrates the endurance of bureaucratic norms under a new state government and
political party system. Uttarakhand provides an ideal matched-pair comparison with Himachal
Pradesh, allowing me to assess the differential impact of bureaucratic norms on policy
implementation. I discuss Uttarakhand's mixed performance in implementing universal primary
education. The state has achieved remarkable gains in terms of infrastructure expansion and access
to schooling. Yet primary schools function poorly and deliver exceedingly low quality education,
which is puzzling in light of the region's historically high literacy and collective action around
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education. To explain these mixed results, I first establish the persistence of legalistic norms within
Uttarakhand's bureaucracy following its break from UP. Notwithstanding the new state's political
mandate-to improve the responsiveness of government to the local needs of the hill population-
public officials continue to adhere strictly to uniform rules, procedures and policies, while at the
same time marginalizing civic input and participation. I connect legalistic norms within the state to
the implementation outcomes for primary education policy in Uttarakhand through a series of case
studies drawn from the state and local level. In sharp contrast to the responsive implementation
process observed within HP, fieldwork in Uttarakhand reveal that public officials tend to disregard
civic input and ignore local demands, which has driven communities to exit the government system
and seek private schooling options.
Chapter 5 analyzes the severe underperformance of Uttar Pradesh (UP), India's largest state.
I begin by situating the task of implementing universal primary education in the context of social
inequalities and recent political mobilization of lower caste groups in UP. According to much recent
scholarship, the prevalence of caste politics in UP has undermined the state's ability to deliver
universal primary schooling. At the same time, however, the state has made notable progress in the
expansion of school infrastructure over the last decade, an outcome that is not explained by UP's
unfavorable economic, social and political conditions. Second, I present my explanation for the
highly mixed performance of UP, which centers on norms governing public agencies. Fieldwork
reveals an administrative legacy of legalism that continues to operate within the state. Public
officials in UP tend to interpret rules and mandates strictly, apply policies uniformly across cases,
and adhere to official hierarchies, while at the same time marginalizing the input of societal actors. I
connect these norms to the mixed outcomes for policy implementation in UP through a series of
nested case studies. Legalistic norms have enabled dedicated agencies within the state to carry out
their official mandate for school infrastructure provision, while protecting them from political
interference. Meanwhile, these same norms constrain their ability to deliver services like the Midday
Meal effectively. Village case studies demonstrate the tendency of local bureaucrats stifle the
demands of community groups, even those having strong formal representation within local
government. I show how the unresponsiveness of local bureaucracy has undermined collective
action around primary schooling, leading to poor quality in educational service delivery.
In Chapter 6, I conclude with a discussion of the dissertation's broader theoretical
significance and policy implications. The central findings of the study, that bureaucratic norms
influence how effectively public agencies implement primary education in India, raise a natural
question regarding the origin of bureaucratic norms. As the study highlights, bureaucratic norms
cannot be reduced to other factors that plausibly influence policy implementation, including social
structure and caste norms, political party system, and political culture more broadly. I consider
potential avenues for future research on the evolution of bureaucratic norms in light of field-based
evidence, in particular the historical trajectory of state development and the role of political
leadership. Next, I go on to discuss the larger theoretical contribution of the argument. I connect
the dissertation's central findings to other empirical cases outside my original sample and in other
policy domains.
While a significant line of research emphasizes the formal design of institutions, agencies of
the state are no less beholden to informal, unwritten rules that shape how public officials behave
and relate to citizens and civic agencies outside the state. These findings compel us to go beyond
the dejure rules of the game and consider how their defacto interpretation and enactment by public
officials (and citizens) shapes the quality of governance. In that regard, more scholarly attention
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should be placed on the qualitative features of public institutions, the organizational norms and
practices that sustain them, and the mechanisms by which they facilitate or impede civic
participation. For policy, the findings suggest that formal administrative structures within the state
should not occupy the entire focus of institutional reform efforts in developing democracies. As
recent waves of decentralization and local planning have shown, even well-designed attempts to
improve accountability do not always lead to better governance outcomes, particularly for the poor.
Rather, a closer understanding of the informal norms and practices within the state opens the
possibility for more nuanced interventions that can improve the responsiveness of public
institutions to the needs of marginalized citizens.
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Chapter 1 - Appendix
Policy Implementation Indicators (Tables 1.1.1 - 1.1.6)
Table 1.1.1 School Facilities and Physical Inputs
(/ of schools that have the following)
At least one Office / Boundary Drinking Toilets Kitchen
classroom per Storage Wall water shed
State teacher space facility
Himachal Pradesh 76.7 75.5 37.3 87.5 89.2 82.0
Uttarakhand 81.6 87.9 67.0 77.9 94.2 96.3
Uttar Pradesh 87.4 88.6 44.4 93.1 93.3 89.3
All India 75.6 74.5 52.2 82.6 89.9 81.3
Source: ASER Report (2011).
Table 1.1.2 Provision of Midday Meal
Midday Meal Served






Source: ASER Report (2011).








Source: Kremer et al. (2005)
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Table 1.1.4 Single-Teacher Primary Schools
% Primary schools % Students enrolled
Himachal Pradesh 7.9 4.6
Uttarakhand 19.5 10.6
Uttar Pradesh 3.0 2.3
All India 11.8 6.1
Source: ASER Report (2011).
Table 1.1.5 Library and Teaching-Learning Materials
Library Books Available Teaching-Learning Materials
(% schools) Available
Himacha Pradesh 80.3 91.5
Uttarakhand 48.6 82.4
Uttar Pradesh 47.7 73.5
All India 63.1 80.4
Source: ASER Report (2011).
Table 1.1.6 Student Dropout Rate
(% students in grades 1-5)
Boys Girls All
Himachal Pradesh 2.6 2.7 2.6
Uttarakhand 7.4 6.3 6.9
Uttar Pradesh 17.4 15.0 16.2
AllIndia 10.15 9.75 9.95
Source: Mehta (2011)
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Figure 1.2.1. - 1.2.2. Literacy in India - Trends and Subnational Variation
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Figure 1.2.2 Relationship between Literacy and Economic Development in Indian States
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Figure 1.3.1 Profile of Case Study States and Administrative Districts
State District Explanatory Factors
Geography Income Poverty Caste Poltitical Legacy of
Level Rate Structure Party landlordism
System (zamindori)
Himachal Shimla Hills High- Low Mainly Two party No
Pradesh medium upper caste (national)
Uttarakhand Almora Hills Medium Low Mainly Two party No
upper caste (national)








Figure 1.3.2 Multi-Level Research Methodology
a Interviews with state planners, senior officials in education bureaucracy, civic
State level agencies and educationists
* Participant observation across subdivisions of education bureaucracy
0 Interviews and focus group discussions with local officials, school teachers and
District level civic agencies
* Participant observation with local education bureaucracy and civic agencies
* Interviews and focus group discussions with government and private school
Village/School teachers, village officials, parents and children
level * Participant observation inside primary schools
I Ethnographic fieldwork inside villages
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Chapter 2. State, Civil Society and Primary Education in India
When it comes to the legal and constitutionalframework for child rights,
India is well ahead... There is no lack of laws and polides. The problem
we face is in administering those policies on the ground 5
2.1. Introduction
Primary education in India today is the joint product of initiatives by India's central
government, states and local communities. Within a broad national policy framework, Indian states
wield great authority over the implementation process. This chapter helps set the stage for the
subnational comparative analysis of policy implementation across Indian states.
I begin in Section 2.2 with a brief account of the history of India's universal primary education
policies. I discuss the policy framework in India, which provides state governments with increasing
authority over policy implementation. The focus is not so much to explain the politics behind the
central government's policy actions and omissions, but rather to situate the subnational variation
across India within the broader narrative of education in India. I also detail the historical financing
and current policy framework of primary education in India. Notwithstanding a common policy
framework and administrative system, I show that some parts of India perform significantly better
than others within the domain of primary education, which forms the empirical puzzle of the
dissertation.
Section 2.3 discusses the administrative structure of India's education system, as well as key
actors, including the bureaucracy, school teachers and civic agencies. I describe certain critical
features of the Indian bureaucracy, some of which (e.g. civil service protection) appear Weberian
while others (e.g. bureaucratic transfers) do not. I show that formal structures and procedures
within the education bureaucracy are very similar across Indian states, making the study of
bureaucratic norms all the more compelling. I then discuss a critical hurdle that agencies face in
implementing primary education policy, namely, the reality of deeply entrenched social inequalities in
rural India. However, the nature of inequalities and how it is experienced by communities and
inside classrooms varies significantly across rural India. I argue for a contextualized approach to
analyzing policy implementation, one that accounts for the diverse meanings and practices, for they
structure the very nature of the "problem" that public agencies must set out to "solve." I conclude
in Section 2.4, shifting our focus to the subnational level, where public agencies face the concrete
problems of implementation.
2.2 Universal Primary Education Policy
2.2.1. Historical Context
Soon after independence, India's state planners took on the formidable task of educating a
large, poor and overwhelmingly illiterate population. As article 45 of India's Constitution
proclaimed, '[t] he State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of tenyears from the commencement of the
1 Quote from senior public official presenting India's policy framework on child rights to the 2006 cohort of research
interns at UNICEF India headquarters, New Delhi.
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Constitution, forfree and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age offourteenyears." They
had their work cut out for them. Educational neglect under British rule left the vast majority of
Indians outside the school system. The first Census of India, taken in 1901, reported a literacy rate
of 5 percent, which barely rose to 10 percent by the time of the 1941 Census. Although the Hunter
Commission of 1882 recommended mass education in India, little investment was made by the
British Raj to extend education to the masses, and the first official census taken after India's
independence saw literacy at a measly 18 percent.
Yet the British legacy for India's education system went beyond neglect. The purpose
behind the colonial government's education policy was to groom a cadre of Anglicized elites to help
administer the country on the crown's behalf.3" While these policies allowed for the spread of the
English language among Indian elites, they had the consequence of segmenting the education system
into those who received an "English-medium" education (the rules) and those who did not (the
ruled)." The segmentation of India's education system was superimposed on what was already an
extremely hierarchical and oppressive social system, one that excluded lower castes, women and
other marginalized groups from obtaining an education.
The caste system traditionally barred lower caste groups from setting foot in schools, and
well after the formal bars were lifted, casteism continued to obstruct their participation. Girls also
faced educational discrimination under patriarchy and restrictive gender norms, which limited the
physical mobility of women outside the home (purdah) and placed the economic burden of paying a
marriage dowry (dahej) on the daughter's family. These barriers were reflected in the gender gap in
literacy as well as the literacy gap between the general population and Scheduled Castes (SCs) and
Scheduled Tribes (STs). Although they are increasingly narrowing, these gaps have persisted in the
decades after independence (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2 in chapter Appendix).
If implementing primary education in India was daunting, national leadership could not have
been accused of showing an excess of activism. Indeed, the history of primary education policy in
post-independence India reveals a pattern of inconsistency between official rhetoric and tangible
policy measures.38 The Congress Party, which ruled India for first three decades after independence,
was in the habit of announcing ambitious targets for school enrollment that it routinely failed to
meet. Notwithstanding the constitutional goal for achieving universal primary education by 1960,
financing for primary education in the early 1950s was below 1 percent of GDP (see Figure 2.2 in
chapter Appendix).
To address the policy deficiencies in the education system, a national commission on
education was set up in 1964-66. Known popularly as the Kothari Commission, it was the first time
that policymakers drew an explicit connection between investment in education and India's social
and economic development (Tilak 2007). The commission's emphasis on the expansion of
educational financing was seen by many observers as a turning point in India's education policy."
36 As Lord Macaulay wrote in in 1835 in his Minute on Indian Education British education policy aimed to develop a class
of Indians trained in English, who could "be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern."
37 For a discussion of British ideology attitudes towards Indian education and intellectual traditions more generally, see
Sen (1997) and Fischer-Tin6 and Mann (2004).
38 On the gap between official rhetoric and the reality of India's education system, see Myron Weiner's (1991) landmark
study of child labor and education in India.
3 As the Kothari Commission declared: " [W] e should strive to allocate the largest proportion of GNP possible to educational
development' (Education Commission 1966:889).
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Yet the express intentions of policymakers in New Delhi continued to depart from reality. A full
decade after the Kothari Commission made its recommendation to increase education financing to 6
percent of GDP, India's education budget continued to hover around an abysmal 2 percent of
GDP. For a summary of central government policies in primary education see Tables 2.1-2.2 in
chapter Appendix.
The tides began to change in the mid-1970s, as India's central government began taking a
more active role in education policy. India's federal structure gives state governments the primary
authority over development policies, particularly in sectors like education and health. Although
states had full authority over education in the past, in light of the country's poor aggregate
performance and growing regional disparities, India's central government took joint responsibility
for education policy alongside the states, placing it on the Concurrent list of subjects in 1976. With
newfound influence over education, the central government began investing more heavily in primary
education. By the mid-1980s, India's education budget increased by a significant margin to more
than 3.5 percent of GDP (see Figure 2.3 in chapter Appendix).
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, India's Congress party pushed for
further educational reforms in the 1980s. Ambitious targets for universal primary schooling were set
once again with passage of the 1986 New Policy on Education. However, this time the central
government not only increased the financing for primary education, but developed specific policy
requirements, including free and compulsory education and a more decentralized administration.
Targeted programs like the Jawahar Navoday Vidyalay System, a tuition-free, residential school
system for rural children grades 6-12 was administered by the central government. A related policy
known as Operation Blackboard was enacted a year later for school at the primary level. It provided
basic school facilities, instructional materials for teachers, and provided states with financing for
additional school teachers.
Notwithstanding the spurt in policy activism by the central government during the 1970s
and 1980s, domestic criticism had mounted over India's education budgets. Compared to other
countries at similar levels of development, the Indian state was investing more heavily in tertiary
education and elite institutions, to the relative neglect of primary education. India's Third Five-Year
plan saw 15 percent of the education budget allocated to the tertiary level, a proportion that
increased to 25 percent in the Fourth plan and hovered at 22 percent in the Fifth plan. The share
allocated to primary education, meanwhile, remained at 30 percent of the total budget (Tilak 2007).4
2.2.2. Economic Libera/iZation and Education Reform
India's fiscal condition deteriorated significantly over the 1980s, as the country external debt
ballooned to $70 billion. A balance of payments crisis in 1991 led to the adoption fiscal discipline
and structural adjustment reforms. IMF-supported economic stabilization also led significantly
curtailed spending in the social sector. At the same time, however, the Congress Party government
led by Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao adopted major economic reforms that would help set
India's future growth trajectory. Under the guidance of Dr. Manmohan Singh, erstwhile Finance
41 India's development planning is based on a five-year planning model that is administered by the Planning Commission
of the Central government.
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Minister, the Indian state liberalized several key sectors of the economy, introduced market reforms
and undid much of the restrictive License Raj. The same decade witnessed India finally break past
the sluggish "Hindu rate of growth" to achieve an admirable income growth rate of 6.5 percent
(Ahluwalia 2002)."
The 1990s also ushered in major international commitments on the part of India's central
government to primary education. UNESCO's 1991 World Conference on Education for All in
J omtien, Thailand marked a turning point in the global movement for universal primary education.
India was among the developing country signatories at the conference that expressed a commitment
to "Education for All" by the year 2000. The same decade also witnessed a surge in foreign aid and
technical assistance within India's education sector. World Bank support for primary education
grew significantly of a "social safety net" provided in light of structural adjustment reforms (Kumar,
Priyam et al. 2001).42 World Bank investment came under the District Primary Education Program
(DPEP). DPEP was a technical assistance program targeting underperforming districts, while at the
same time decentralizing the planning and administration of primary schooling. The program began
in 1994 in 42 districts and eventually spread to cover close to 60 percent of the country.
With a fast-growing economy and generous external assistance, India's education budget in
the 1990s stood consistently at 4 percent of GDP. Though still far below the 6 percent
recommended by the 1964 Kothari Commission, investment in primary education had reached a
steady rise, and primary school enrollments began to surge. Whereas in 1992, close to one half of
rural girls and one third of rural boys ages 6-14 were not attending school, by the end of the decade
non-attendance had declined to 30 percent and 19 percent, respectively. As Table 2.3 in the chapter
Appendix shows, the gender gap in school completion had also narrowed significantly. Still, even
as late as 2001, more than a third of primary school-aged children in India were out of school.
2.2.3. EducationforAll Current Poliy Framework
More than fifty years after independence, universal primary education remained a distant
goal for India. And yet the last decade has witnessed a sea change in terms of primary school access
and enrollment. Starting in the 1990s, primary education received a major boost from India's central
government through several new policies. India's central government launched its flagship universal
primary education program in 2001, this time under the BJP-led government of Prime Minister Atul
Bihari Vajpayee. Like its Congress Party predecessors, the BJP government displayed continuing
commitment to economic liberalization, opening India's economy to foreign direct investment,
while at the same time expanding the central government's role over the education sector. Along
with SSA, the National Program for Nutrition Support to Primary Education was launched in 2002.
The Midday Meal Program, as it is more commonly known provides a free, hot lunch daily to
-" From 1950-1980, India's famous "Hindu rate of growth" was 3.5 percent per annum, as compared with 4.9 percent
among other developing countries and 4.1 percent for the entire world economy (Herring 1999). While many observers
have credited India's subsequent stellar growth rate to the 1991 reforms, a growing body of research finds that the
growth acceleration was already underway in the 1980s, when India's central government under the Congress Party
began to shift its policy stance in favor of private business (Rodrik and Subramanian 2004; Kohli 2006).
42World Bank spending on education in India began in the 1980s at a negligible amount and grew to $2 billion by 2000.
The DPEP program was initiated in a few select states under different names, starting with the Uttar Pradesh Basic
Education Program (UPBEP) in 1993.
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students attending government primary and middle schools. The policy aims to improve school
enrollment rates as well as mitigate high malnutrition rates among children.
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan43 (SSA) consists of a variety of policy interventions to improve
school access, the retention of students, and the quality of education for children ages 6-14. Since
the start of SSA, India has witnessed tremendous growth in the primary education sector. Whereas
in the 1980s about half of the child population (6-14 years) was sout of school, according to the
latest estimates, primary school enrollment has crossed 95 percent (ASER 2012). This expansion can
be attributed largely to massive infrastructure expansion financed by the central government.
Whereas in the 1980s, close to 90 percent of education spending was borne by state governments,
that proportion decreased to 85 percent in the 1990s, and then again declined further to 75 percent
over the last decade (see Figure 2.4 in chapter Appendix).
Though the financial burden for primary education still rests primarily with state
governments, the educational expansion over the last fifteen years or so has been born largely by the
central government." The central government has borne the majority of capital costs for school
expansion, which include infrastructure, incentives and other policy inputs. Along with major
infrastructure expansion, SSA provides a mix of incentives-scholarships conditional on enrollment,
free textbooks, uniforms and schoolbags-to attract and retain children from disadvantaged
communities. In addition, SSA targets girls' education through programs like Kasturba Gandhi
Balika Vidyalaya (KGBV), residential schools for girls who have dropped out after completing fifth
grade. In addition, the central government has helped financed teacher training centers, known as
DIETs-District Institutes for Educational Training-in every administrative district across the
country. A detailed summary of the components of SSA are provided in Table 2.2 in the chapter
Appendix.
As societal momentum behind universal primary education grew in India, the Central
government most recently enacted a law recognizing education as a fundamental right. The Right to
Education (RTE) Act, which was passed by Parliament on August 4, 2009, guarantees free and
compulsory education for all children in the age group 6-14. Beyond its symbolic importance, the
act fixes a judicial responsibility on the state to provide education and is enforceable by law.
The discussion of India's universal primary education policy helps set the context for the
study of subnational variation. Policies like SSA, the Midday Meal Program all involve a series of
attempts by India's central government to universalize primary education, equalize investment across
states and improve service delivery and accountability. Notwithstanding the same national
education policies, formal democratic institutions, and, as we shall see below, similar administrative
structures, implementation outcomes vary dramatically across India. Figure 2.5 in the chapter
Appendix offers a visual representation of that subnational variation based on one very important
metric, primary school attendance rates. Although I examine other outcomes for policy implement
in the chapters to follow, the variation in student attendance offers a glimpse of just how diverse the
performance is across Indian states. South Indian states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu have effectively
achieved goals of universal access to education, ensuring that approximately 95 percent of students
4 Sar'a ShikshaAbhgian in Hindi for the "Education for All Campaign."
44 The major cost for education in India consists of recurring teacher salaries, which is borne by states. The salary of
teachers is set at the national level through a National Pay Commission. While states have room for adjustment, most
follow the nationally recommended salary range.
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attend school daily. Meanwhile, in the Hindi belt region of north India, close to a third of children
ages 6-14 are not attending school.45 At the same time, we observe significant variation even within
north India, which motivates the selection of cases, as discussed in Chapter 1.
As a final point, it is important to bear in mind that, while Indian states exhibit significant
variation in outcomes for the implementation of primary schooling, India as a whole continues to
underperform in relation to other developing countries against which it is often compared. Literacy
rates in India, while no doubt improving, are still far behind in comparison to other BRIC countries
and are much close to those in sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 2.4 in the chapter Appendix). Placing
India within a global context reminds us of the fact that the insights put forward in this dissertation
are drawn from an educational environment that remains highly underdeveloped. That is not to say
that the insights could not transfer over to the context of other, more educationally developed
countries. The point, rather, is to be explicit about where India falls in the universe of cases, with an
eye towards developing a more nuanced, comparative perspective on policy implementation.
2.3. The Primary Education System
2.3.1 FormalAdministrative Structure
The administrative structure for primary education reflects a governance paradox facing
India's central government: how to decentralize authority down to the local level while at the same
time ensuring upward accountability? India's federal democracy is organized into three tiers of
elected government, which include the central (or union) government, state (or provincial)
government and the local village council (grampanchaya). The electoral decline of the Congress
Party and the rise of regional parties and coalition governments at the national level contributed to
the steady erosion of authority within India's central government and greater assertion of power by
state governments (Yadav 1999; Frankel 2005; Ziegfeld 2012). As the locus of power has shifted
away from the center towards states, power below the federal level has also become increasingly
concentrated in the hands of state governments. Critical functions of the state, such law and order,
economic development and social policy fall under the control of state governments (Kohli 1990;
Sinha 2005).46 The implementation of universal primary education policy is among those critical
functions.
State governments implement universal primary education policy their own bureaucracies.
Indian states have more or less identical administrative structures, functions and administrative
resources available for primary education. Similar to India's governmental setup, the structure of the
Indian state also follows a three-tier hierarchy, with a central administration in New Delhi, state-level
administration based in each state capital, and local district administration. For a diagram of the
formal structure of the primary education system, see Figure 2.6 in the chapter Appendix.
4s The data on this map are taken from India's National Family Health Survey 3 (2008-9), considered one of the most
accurate and reliable social surveys in India.
46 Kapur and Mukhopadhyay (2007) argue that the concentration of authority at the state level is due to regional parties
having strong electoral incentives to control public resources at the local level. So long as electoral success depends on
the ability of politicians to dispense patronage, the same argument can obtain for national parties as well.
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The Principal Secretary of Education sits at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy within each
state. This individual is invariably an officer from the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), India's
elite civil service. Both of these individuals report directly to India's central government, in
particular the Ministry for Human Resource Development (MHRD), which oversees all education.
Below the Secretary of Education are subdivision heads in charge of various functions. These
include the State Project Director for SSA, who oversees the central government's SSA program, the
Directorate, which oversees routine operations such a teacher salaries, and then more specific
functions like the Midday Meal Program.
The state-level bureaucracy implements policies at the local level primarily through district
administration. The district official in charge of education oversees the lower units, which include
the administrative block, cluster and finally, the Village Education Committee (VEC). Teacher
training institutes, known as DIETs, are located within each district and carry the same formal
structure across Indian states. Finally, funds for SSA get disbursed to each district via the state
government, and bureaucratic oversight is conducted by the Secretary of Education.
Although defacto authority over implementation resides with state bureaucracies,
decentralization in India was intended to go down much further. The passage of the 7 3rd and 74'h
Amendments to India's Constitution called for the devolution of functions, administrative authority
and resources to locally elected village councils, known as the Panchayati Raj Institutions. With
some notable exceptions such as Kerala, most state governments in India have been slow to
decentralize and part with their authority (Heller 2000). Panchayats have made little headway in
policy areas like education, which continue to remain highly centralized (Pritchett and Pande 2006).
In the context of Hindi-belt states like Uttar Pradesh, even the implementation of village elections
has been deeply problematic, leading to calls for even greater administrative oversight (Dutta 2012).
With calls to decentralize public service delivery and enhance community governance, SSA
also sought to encourage local community participation by working through panchayati raj
institutions and Village Education Committees (VECs). Comprised of parents and teachers and led
by the village council head (grampradhan), VECs command funds and authority over school
infrastructure, the MDM program, and hiring of para-teachers.47 Notwithstanding these attempts at
decentralization, across most states, SSA is effectively managed by the state and district offices.
To strengthen local administrative capacity, India's universal primary education program
provides for local district teams. The SSA program in particular decentralized governance to the
local district level and invested in expanding the size and skill mix of local district administration.
Modeled after the World Bank's DPEP program, which was implemented in select regions of rural
India and Bangladesh in the 1990s, SSA created a District Project Office within each district to
implement a variety of program components, such as infrastructure planning, community
participation and gender needs.
2.3.2 The Education Bureaucrag
47 Studies of VECs in Uttar Pradesh find these agencies either defunct or ineffective
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In addition to the formal structure described above, there are other features to India's
bureaucracy that make it compelling to study, particularly through subnational comparative
methods. Bureaucratic line departments like Department of Education have virtually identical
procedures for recruitment and training, incentives for promotion, and terms of service across
Indian states. Some these features of the Indian bureaucracy, such as meritocratic recruitment
procedures and civil service protection, have been understood by some scholars to approximate the
ideal of Weberian autonomy and professionalism (Evans 1995; Herring 1999). Importantly, India's
politicians are constitutionally constrained from hiring or firing bureaucrats.
There are good reasons to doubt that the Indian state actually approximates the Weberian
ideal. Although bureaucrats in India enjoy security of tenure and cannot be terminated based on the
whims of individual politicians, alternative means of political control over the bureaucracy have
emerged. The most visible among these is the rise of what Iyer and Mani (2009) refer to as the
"Transfer Raj," a system in which politicians use frequent (threats of) reassignment across posts of
varying importance to and prestige to exert control over bureaucrats. Faced with the risk of being
reassigned to less prestigious positions, or even worse, undesirable geographic locations (known
popularly within the bureaucracy as "punishment postings," bureaucrats may seek to develop ties
with politicians to ensure the security of their posts.
These problems of transfer notwithstanding, the Indian state does possess a degree of
procedural integrity. What matters for the purposes of our analysis here, moreover, is that
bureaucratic procedures are consistent across Indian states. Senior levels of the education
bureaucracy, which include posts like the Secretary of Education and State Project Director for SSA,
are drawn from the IAS, which is both nationally-recruited and trained. Modeled after the Indian
Civil Service (ICS), which was established by the British to administer over India, IAS officers are
career civil servants that must remain politically non-aligned. They cannot join political parties or
campaign. Selection to the service is based on an incredibly selection national examination that is
administered by an independent commission, or else through promotion from the state civil
services, which operate as state-level versions of the IAS. Once selected for the IAS, officers are
assigned to work in particular states, and it is in those states that they spend the majority of their
careers. Barring a few exceptions, such as married couples in the IAS, officers cannot choose which
states they are assigned to, which helps to mitigate the concern the that some states may be able to
attract higher-skilled or more motivated officers.
The procedural consistency across Indian states makes it possible to compare them. Even
the informal system of transfer and reassignment, which is the primary basis through which politicians are thought
to exert influence over bureaucrats, applies only to position wibtin the particular state that an IAS officer
was originally assigned. Below the IAS, each state in India has its own state civil service, which
operates according to similar procedures. Highly competitive examinations, this time carried out by
a Public Service Commission within each state, rather than nationally, form the basis for selection
into the state civil service. Like the IAS, the state civil service officers do not move across Indian
states. That ensures that officers do not move across Indian states, creating the formal conditions to
allow informal bureaucratic norms to evolve differently across different states.
To help anchor this discussion empirically, consider the comparison across the states
selected for this study: Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh. Table 2.5 in the chapter
Appendix summarizes the key features of the primary education bureaucracy across these three
states. The table lists the key features of bureaucracy that scholars associate with Weberian-ness,
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which obtain evenly across all three states. These formal features of the bureaucracy cannot form
the basis for any differences observed within the state.
Also included in the table is evidence of the politicization of the education bureaucracies
across these three states, namely the frequency of reassignments that took place in the two most
important posts within the education bureaucracy over the course of fieldwork conducted for this
study. From 2008-10, the Education Secretary of Uttar Pradesh change four times, as did the State
Project Director of SSA in Himachal Pradesh. Needless to say, such frequent turnover of top
leadership weighs heavily on bureaucratic organizations. As many officers explained during
interviews, the frequency of transfer can be disruptive. It takes time to get acquainted with the
demands of a post and establish relations with fellow colleagues and subordinates. The insecurity of
one's position also makes it difficult to develop domain expertise, and as Iyer and Mani (2009) show,
may even incentivize bureaucrats not to invest in skill development.
As a final point of comparison, Table 2.6 presents data on the administrative capacity of the
education bureaucracies in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. These two states of similar size and
geographic area have broadly similar human resources for delivering primary education. Not
included in the table but again very similar are the physical resources within their respective offices,
including computers to assemble information from school inspections and develop reports and
other official documents for dissemination to stakeholders. Importantly, the administrative
resources for implementing SSA are provided directly by India's central government.
2.3.3 Primary School Teachers
A discussion of India's primary education system would be incomplete without paying due
attention to school teachers. With one in four school teachers found absent on a given day in
government primary schools, the dysfunction of India's primary education system has been largely
attributed to poor teacher accountability (Kremer, Muralidharan et al. 2005).48 While there are likely
many causes behind poor teacher accountability in India, low pay is not among them. By both
domestic and international standards, government school teachers in India are paid handsomely, and
the overwhelming proportion of India's education budget consists of payment of teacher salaries.'
While the variation in the rate of teacher absence across Indian states is quite significant, it is also
worth pointing out that educationally advanced states like Kerala and Himachal Pradesh appear to
perform only marginally better than average, which suggest that accountability problems are
systematic across India.
The influence of school teachers over education policy and administration in India has also
been well-documented (Kingdon and Muzammil 2003)." Primary school teachers constitute the
largest group of government employees in India. Their sheer numbers, geographical reach and
influence at the local level make them prime agents for political campaigning. Although campaigning
48 As Kremer et al (2005)report in their comprehensive survey of teacher absence in India, of the remaining teachers
who were present in school, only 45 % were found to be actively engaged in teaching.
4 Based on my own fieldwork conducted across three north Indian states, I found that government school teachers can
earn anywhere from 2-10 times the salary of their counterparts working in private schools.
50 The Constitution of India also makes a special provision granting school teachers at the secondary level representation
in the upper house of state legislatures, a political status that no other government employees enjoy.
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by government employees is officially illegal, the influence of school teachers over elections is widely
acknowledged. Apart from (illegal) campaigning, school teachers are charged with manning election
booths during Parliamentary and state assembly elections, which confers another source of political
influence (Beteille 2009).
Yet there is another side to the low levels of teacher motivation that has received less
attention from academics. Government primary school teachers face an uphill teaching
environment, with multi-grade classroom settings, an abundance of non-teaching duties, little
administrative support or oversight, irrelevant forms of training, and alienation from the education
bureaucracy, and the like." The inflexible and overambitious primary school school curriculum
written by administrators in New Delhi and state capitals appears to correspond little to the realities
facing children in rural India (Pritchett and Beatty 2012). On top of all this, the social distance
between school teachers and the children in government primary schools is large and appears only
to be widening as poor and traditionally marginalized groups enter the school system. For all of
these reasons, primary school teachers across India are demotivated and disheartened, even in
educationally advanced states (Ramachandran 2005).
2.3.4. Civil Sodey
Before we can set out to analyze India's education system, we must also take account of the
societal organizations and communities upon which primary education is embedded in rural India.
Indian civil society has played a significant role in the country's educational development. I take
civil society here to include not only formal organization recognized by the state, but also informal
associations, religious institutions and community groups organized around education. India has
had a vibrant history of religious voluntarism, especially in fields like education and medicine.
Secular service organizations based on Gandhian voluntarism grew in the post-independence era and
were precursors to the modern NGO, which is now a widespread form of organization across India.
However, their relationship to the state has often been characterized by antagonism (Sen 1999).
India's central government has actively partnered with civil society groups in the education
sector. The 1987 National Literacy Mission of 1987, a central government policy to develop adult
literacy, helped spawn a number of associations to help deploy literacy camps across the country.
External agencies working with India's central government have also actively promoted civil society
partnerships. The World Bank DPEP program, for example, aimed to work with local communities
and NGOs as part of the effort to decentralize education planning. State-led efforts to work with
civil society effectively have, in some ways, the boundaries between the state and NGOs.12
State governments also developed ties with civil society groups. However, the nature of
state-civil society relations varies significantly across states, a fact that further prompts the
subnational comparative analysis. Some Indian states have led the development of civic agencies
1 Interviews and Focus Group Discussions with 150 primary school teachers.
52 As Jenkins (2010) notes, organizations like Kerala's KSSP became closely tied with the Communist Party. He also
draws important parallels between the rise of young NGO fieldworkers in education and related sectors, and what
Krishna (2003) has described as "naya neta," new politicians that help broker relations between communities and local
public agencies.
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within education, such as the policy Mother-Teacher Associations in Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan's
Lok Jumbish program, which engaged in community-level micro-planning, and Kerala's Shastra
Sahitya Parishad (KSSP), which worked on local capacity building of panchayats.53 Others have
effectively blocked civic groups from working with local public agencies, as in the case of Uttar
Pradesh.
According to the Indian government's most recent policy framework under Sarva Shiksha
Abhjyan, local public agencies are encouraged to work with civic partners in a variety of areas. For
example, states are encouraged to work with NGOs to manage residential schools for disadvantaged
girls. NGOs are also featured in the policy for "bridge courses," which are programs for helping
out-of-school children catch up and get mainstreamed into the primary school system. Women's
organizations, such as Self Help Groups (SHGs) are identified in the SSA policy framework as
critical partners for assisting in areas like the Midday Meal Program.
Perhaps the most far-reaching push for civic participation comes from the administrative
framework for SSA, which outlines the roles, responsibilities and statutory powers of Village
Education Committees (VECs). VECs were explicitly adopted under SSA to help manage schools,
make key decisions around infrastructure, and in some cases, even hire additional teachers. VECs
are also closely tied to the Panchayati Raj System, as the gram pradhan is made an official member
on the VEC. Although a standard organizational blueprint for VECs has been adopted across the
country, the substantive participation is likely to vary considerably based on, inter alia, the extent to
which public agencies engage in the capacity building of VECs. The variable quality of VECs
across Indian states point to yet another reason for subnational comparative analysis.
2.4. Social Inequality
India's education policies make explicit reference to "community participation." However,
the sociocultural composition and dynamics of community vary tremendously across Indian states
and localities. These dynamics are tied to a legacy of entrenched social inequality. Within that
context, education is considered the great equalizer. It is a means for the marginalized to participate
in a modern economy and achieve social mobility. Yet one need not travel to rural India to
recognize that education systems also reproduce inequality (Coleman 1968; Bourdieu 1984). As one
moves beyond the enactment of policies to problems of implementation, one must contend with the
meanings and social practices association with educational institutions. In the context of education
in rural India, that requires one to grapple with the meanings and practices associated with caste.
Here I discuss briefly the nature of caste inequality in India's education system, and their
implications for policy implementation.
Caste divisions in India correspond broadly to the varna system of social classes in Hinduism,
which includes Brahmins (priest/scholar), Kshatriya (warrior/ruler), Vaisya (merchant) and Shudra
s- On the varied experience of community participation in primary education across Indian states, see Govinda and
Diwan (2002).
- In some states, such as Uttar Pradesh, VECs have found to be largely defunct, even after conducting capacity building
exercises, which suggests that other features of the local institutional environment may hinder their effective
participation (Banerjee, Banerji et al. 2008).
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(peasant, laborer and servant). The first three are referred to as upper castes, while Shudras are
considered to be lower, or backward castes." Beneath the backward castes are Dalits, former
untouchables of the caste system, who technically have no caste (avarna) and are therefore not
included in the varna system. The term Dalit, which means "oppressed" (literally "broken to pieces"
in Sanskrit), was adopted in protest of the injustice experienced by Dalits at the hands of upper
castes.56
While there exist literally hundreds of castes and sub-castes (/ati) within each of these broad
categories, for policy and administrative purposes, the Indian state collapses these distinctions. The
Indian state places all upper castes into one "General" (samanya) category. Lower caste groups,
meanwhile, are classified into two categories. Dalits fall in the Scheduled Caste (SC) category, while
backward castes fall in the Other Backward Classes (OBC) category. Finally, along with lower
castes, the Indian state classifies tribals (adivasis) into a single Scheduled Tribe (ST) category.
Although the Indian constitution outlaws untouchability and legal provision are in place to protect
SCs and STs, these groups continue to endure social discrimination, economic marginalization and
atrocities at the hands of upper castes (Borooah 2005). There is evidence, however, that education
policies are reaching Dalits and producing changes in terms of greater social mobility and economic
participation. 57
Much existing scholarship in the political economy of development has taken note of the
caste divisions across India, and their ramifications for the distribution of public goods and services
(Betancourt and Gleason 2000; Banerjee, Iyer et al. 2005). Some of this work draws explicitly on the
economistic literature on ethnic diversity and public goods provision (Alesina, Baqir et al. 1999;
Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Banerjee and Somanathan 2007). The many contributions of this
research notwithstanding, however, it has tended to overlook the varied social meanings and practices
attached to caste, and what ramifications these have for how public goods and services are used and
experienced by their beneficiaries.5"
The problem of meaning and practice gets magnified for social policies like education, where
processes of social discrimination, both overt and subtle, can have significant ramifications for the
education process. For example, these caste categories that outlined above are officially sanctioned
and reproduced on a daily basis inside government primary schools. Caste identity forms the basis
upon which children qualify for certain incentives under SSA, such as free uniforms and
scholarships conditional on student enrollment. These categories also form the basis for continued
stigma and discrimination within the education system (Nambissan 1996).
s5 According to the Vedic social order, these four varna are said to have come, respectively, from the mouth, arms, thighs
and feet of the creator. The former Untouchables have no place in the social order (Srinivas 1962).
56 Dalit has increasingly come to replace Harijan (or "children of God" in Hindi), the name given to the former
untouchables by Mahatma Gandhi, particularly among intellectuals, official circles and contemporary scholarship. That
said, few Dalits I met during fieldwork across rural north India used the term Dalit to refer to themselves or others from
their community. Many used the term Harijan, though most often they would go by their particularjati (e.g. Chamar,
Pasi, etc.).
57 Dalits and tribals are among the most vulnerable and socioeconomically marginalized populations in India. I focus
here on Dalits because they form a much larger population within the states I examine.
58 As Singh (2011) is correct to point out, the economistic approach to this work has also produced a tendency to "read
off' the politics of identity from objective population counts, ignoring the subjective sense of belonging to a particular
group, which can also have ramifications for public goods provision. To that I would add the further point that even
the "objectivity" of population counts can be called to question. On the political construction of population counts, see
Nobles (2000).
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Processes of caste exclusion and discrimination vary across India, with important
ramifications for the delivery of educational services. 9 To help situate the empirical setting of this
dissertation, I contextualize the comparison between the plains regions of Uttar Pradesh and the
Himalayan region, which includes Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand.' A typical village in UP is
segregated into multiple hamlets and smaller habitations based on caste andjati, and it is not
uncommon to find schools within the same village segregated along caste lines (De, Khera et al.
2011). Casteist practices can obtain inside of schools as well. Take as another example, the
provision of the Midday Meal program. In schools across rural Uttar Pradesh, it is still common to
find children of different caste groups, even lower caste groups, segregated from each other during
lunchtime." What this implies for policy implementation is that public agencies in Uttar Pradesh are
faced with problems of spatial discrimination and caste conflict around provision of the Midday
Meal.
The same kinds of meanings and practices, however, do not obtain in the Himalayan region.
There, rituals of caste purity and pollution are somewhat attenuated by the distinct forms of
Hinduism. That is not to say that casteism does not obtain in the hills. Villages in the hill region
tend to be far more spatially segregated along caste lines, owing in part to very different agricultural
economies. Moreover, the dominance of the two main upper caste groups-Brahmin and
Kshatriya-within the hills affects the landscape significantly for policy implementation. Public
agencies that aim to redress uneven access in the education system must find ways of targeting
spatially segregated, minority villages comprised of lower caste groups. This contrasts significantly
from the spatial distribution of castes in UP villages, which are more likely to be mixed in terms of
caste composition. And while the physical distance between hamlets is far less than in the hills, the
social distance across even proximate hamlets is far greater, which may have even more subtle
implications for school placement.
Other important differences to bear in mind relate to the local economy and class
differences that may or may not overlap with caste. In the plains of UP, surplus agricultural
production has been pursued through highly differentiated caste hierarchies that connect tightly with
occupation. In the hills, meanwhile, caste and economic activities are less tightly linked, owing in
part to a subsistence agricultural economy that requires members of all caste groups to perform
agricultural labor (Berman 1997). In other words, the social and economic distance across groups
varies across these regions as well. However, the nature of caste discrimination and experiences
associated within the school system varies in important ways.64 For all the above reasons, a study of
policy implementation must account for meanings and practices, for they structure the very nature
of the "problem" that public agencies set out to "solve."
- On the disparate practices of caste across the Indian subcontinent, see Ghurye's (1932) classic study as well as the
edited volume by Gupta (1992).
0 On the need for "contextualized comparison in the study of policy implementation, see Locke and Thelen (1995).
61 In many primary schools I visited across the state of UP, Dalit children are made to sit and eat in separate sections of
the school campus.
62 As I observed in select hill districts of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, upper caste parents continue to object to
the hiring of Dalit cooks for the Midday Meal program.
63 On segregation and social distance in UP villages, see
64 As part of ethnographic fieldwork conducted at the village-level, I spent significant time interacting with members of
the Dalit and OBC community across different regions. These rich conversations shed much light on the experience of
being lower caste within the formal school system.
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2.5. Conclusion
This chapter has helped set the empirical backdrop for the remainder of this dissertation. I
discussed the history of primary education policy in India, highlighting the many decades of neglect,
which were followed by an more recent outpouring of activity by India's central government. The
policy framework under SSA, the Midday Meal program and other central government schemes is
common across Indian states, as are the formal institutions and administrative structure of
implementing agencies. Holding these features of policy and administration more or less constant,
we observe significant subnational variation in policy implementation outcomes across Indian state.
Furthermore, our analysis of the procedural commonalities across India's bureaucracies in terms of
bureaucratic recruitment and training, along with the geographic limitations on bureaucratic
movement-these officials serve the majority of careers within a single state, while at the same time
facing transfers to different regions within those same states-make the study of bureaucratic norms
all the more compelling. How is it that agencies facing similar formal institutional conditions can
operate so differently over policy implementation? The account of civil society's involvement in
education and the varying processes of social inequality offered some potential avenues. To explore
these and other plausible factors that might account for variation in outcomes, our analysis must
move down to the state and local level, where public agencies face concrete problems of
implementation. The remainder of this dissertation is devoted to that task.
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Table 2.1. Central Government Policies in Primary Education
Year Laws and Policies Passed Notes
1950 Article 45, Constitution of India - Free and compulsory education up to age 141968 National Policy on Education (NPE) 9 Policy led by Kothari Commission (1964-66)
* Emphasized free and compulsory education
* Common school system with no tuition
* Improved teacher pay, education and service
conditions
_____________________* Regional languages used in education media
1976 Constitutional Amendment * Education made a concurrent subject, allowing both
central and state governments to enact policies
1986 National Policy on Education (NPE) * Policy led by Kothari Commission (1964-66)
* Decentralized administration through District Boards
of Education to manage
* Emphasized free and compulsory education
* Common school system with no tuition
1987 Operation Blackboard * Basic school facilities (e.g. blackboard, books, charts)
* Instructional materials for teachers
* Additional teachers appointed in schools with
enrollment more than 100 students
* Financing ratio (center:state) - 60:40
* Teacher salaries paid by central government first 5
years
1993 Supreme Court Decision: * Pronounced Right to Education a Fundamental Right
Unnikrishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh
1994 District Primary Education Program (DPEP) 9 Decentralization of education planning and
implementation at the district level
- Covering about 60% of the country
* Enrollment, retention and achievement
* Targeted districts with low female literacy with
program to reduce gender disparities
* World Bank technical support
1995 National Program of Nutritional Support to * Mandated provision of free meals in all government
Primary Education (Midday Meal Program) primary schools
- Every child enrolled to be served free meal on school
premises
- Central government provided food grains
e Conversion costs (e.g. cooks and utensils) covered by
state governments
2000 Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) e India's Flagship "Education for All" Program
* Focused on enrollment, retention and achievement
* School infrastructure and student incentives
* Teacher training
a Targeted programs for girls and disadvantaged groups
2001 Supreme Court Decision: 9 Directed all state governments that had not yet
People's Union for Civil Liberties v. implement Midday Meal Program to provide cooked
Union of India & Others meals in schools according to the official policy within
six month time frame
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2004 Free and Compulsory Education Bill . Precursor to Right to Education (RTE) Act
. Drafted by Ministry of Human Resource Development
(HRD)
2004 Education Cess - income tax of 2% devoted to education
* Levied on all major central and state sources of income
2010 The Children's Right to Free and e Education declared a fundamental right enforceable by
Compulsory Education Act (Right to law
Education Act) - Covered all children ages 6-14
e Specific minimum norms within primary schools for
physical facilities and school teachers
* Required surveys in all neighborhoods to identify
children out of school and provide educational
facilities to them
a Mandated 25% of seats in private schools to be
reserved for children belonging to SC/ST categories
Table 2.2. Policy Components of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA)
Scheme Notes
Infrastructure * New school buildings and classrooms
* Campus boundary walls, kitchen sheds and water pumps
e Norms for maximum school distance from villages:
1 km distance for primary and 3 km for middle schools
Incentives * Scholarships conditional on enrollment (SC/ST and girls)
- Free uniforms, backpacks and textbooks
Teaching and Learning Materials - Teaching guides
* Interactive wall posters
Teacher training . District Institutes for Education and Training (DIETs)
* Pre-service training and bi-annual in-service training
Targeted programs for girls * NPEGEL: Districts with low female literacy for program
to reduce gender disparities
e KGBVs: Residential schools for disadvantaged girls
Decentralized administration * District Project Offices
. Village Education Committees (VECs)
* Habitation-based planning
. Surveys to identify out-of-school children
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School Attendance age 6-14 (%)
Rural 52 72 70 81
Urban 79 85 86 89
Combined 59 75.5 74 83
Proportion of persons aged 15-19
who have completed (%)
Grade 5 51 73 61 77
Grade 8 36 54 43 56
Source: National Family Health Survey I (1992-3) and I (1998-9).
Table 2.4. India in Comparative Perspective: Adult and Youth Literacy Rates
Adult literacy rates Youth Literacy rates
(15+ year olds) (15 - 24 year olds)
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Bangladesh 42.6 51.7 33.1 51.5 59.4 43.1
Pakistan 49.9 63 36 65.5 75.8 54.7
Sri Lanka 90.7 92.3 89.1 95.6 95.1 96.1
India 61 73.4 47.8 76.4 84.2 67.7
China 90.9 95.1 86.5 98.9 99.2 98.5
Brazil 88.6 88.4 88.8 96.8 95.8 97.9
Russian Federation 99.4 99.7 99.2 99.7 99.7 99.8
World 82.2 87.2 77.3 87.3 90.5 84.1
Developing countries 76.8 83.5 70.1 84.8 88.6 80.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 61.2 69.5 53.3 72.9 77.8 68.3
Source: 2000-4 data from the Education for All Global Monitoring Report (UNESCO, 2006), as reported in
Kingdon (2007)
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Figure 2.5. Subnational Variation: Student Attendance Rates across Indian States (2005-6)
Figure 2.6. Administrative Structure for Primary Education
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Source: National Family Health Survey 3
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Table 2.5. Bureaucratic Autonomy and Politicization
Himachal Pradesh Uttarakhand Uttar Pradesh
Exclusive employment for the state
Civil service protection / V/
Meritocratic recruitment
Long-term career prospects V
High salaries
Bureaucratic transfers (2008-10)
Secretary of Education 2 2 4
SSA State Project Director 4 2 1
Table 2.6. Administrative Capacity in Education Bureaucracy of
Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand
Himachal Pradesh (HP) Uttarakhand (UK)
State officials 123 119
Local officials 2,665 2,869
School teachers 26,238 25,818
Student-teacher ratio 16 23
Source: Internal documents and interviews with state officials in the Department of Education,
Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand.
65
Chapter 3. Deliberative Norms and Primary Education in Himachal Pradesh
Implementation of any development project is not possible without the
active and widespread participation of the people. It becomes the
responsibilioy of the administrative authoriy to spot active persons in the
localpopulation, awaken their interest and mobilise their initiative."
3.1. Introduction
Himachal Pradesh stands out among Indian states for its achievements in primary education.
Yet this relatively small, north Indian hill state is not the first place one would have expected
primary education to be well-implemented. The harsh physical conditions in the Himalayan region
place acute constraints on infrastructure development and public service delivery. Conventional
wisdom suggests that the spread of mass education follows modernization and economic
development. Yet Himachal Pradesh is among India's most rural states, with few urban centers and
a highly scattered hill population. It has enjoyed comparatively little industrial development and the
economy consists primarily of subsistence agriculture. Nor was HP blessed with progressive social
movements or left-leaning political parties, two prominent explanations for the gains in social
development achieved by some of its peers." Despite the odds, HP is on track to meet a majority
of the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals by 2015, and is far ahead of other Indian
states in primary education, including its much wealthier neighbors located in the plains. 7
The central objective of this chapter is to make sense of HP's exceptional performance in
implementing universal primary education policies. In what follows, I develop an explanation that
centers on the norms governing the education bureaucracy. Based on a combination of field
research methods, including in-depth interviews, participant observation and village ethnography, I
find that deliberative norms governing public agencies in Himachal Pradesh lead to the effective
implementation of universal primary education policy. Deliberative norms lead bureaucrats to work
collectively across organizational hierarchies and bend official rules to suit varying local contexts.
Bureaucrats encourage participation from citizens and civic agencies to identify and solve problems
on the ground. Marginalized citizens, in turn, witness the benefits of collective action and learn to
voice their demands to the state. Through coordinated bureaucratic action and civic engagement,
policy implementation is responsive to local needs, generating positive outcomes for universal
primary education.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 begins with an account of HP's
achievements in universal primary education. Based on a comprehensive set of outcome indicators,
I present a nuanced picture of the educational scenario within the state and consider some
alternative explanations for the success of implementation. I then provide a preview of the
argument in Section 3.3, where I offer preview of the larger empirical findings and detail the
mechanisms through which deliberative norms generate implementation outcomes for primary
education policy. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 present the main empirical findings of the chapter. I first
establish the presence of deliberative norms within the state, drawing on the fieldwork conducted
inside the state as well as outside the stat
65 Excerpt taken from Himachal Pradesh State Development Report (Planning Commission 2005: 255).
66 See the role of left-leaning parties and social movements, see Kohli (1987) and Heller (1999).
67 See UNDP (2002) and World Bank (2007).
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Fieldwork conducted at the state and local levels demonstrates that deliberative norms have
enabled public agencies in Himachal Pradesh to effectively implement primary education across a
range of activities, from school planning and infrastructure development to local monitoring.
Furthermore, I show that deliberative norms lead bureaucrats to promote civic participation
throughout the policy implementation process, which improves the functioning of primary schools
and quality of service delivery. I reconsider the findings in light of alternative explanations in
Section 3.6, including the possibility of reverse causality and other plausible mechanisms based on
theories of civil society and social capital. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter with a summary of the
main findings and a segue to the comparative analysis of Uttarakhand in Chapter 4.
3.2. The Educational Scenario in Himachal Pradesh
Nestled in the western Himalayan region, the hill areas that comprise Himachal Pradesh
(pop. 6.8 million) have a checkered history of administration. At the time of independence, HP was
a loose confederation of approximately 31 princely states administered by India's central
government. It was later raised to the status of a Part C state in 1952, which provided for a small
legislative assembly and limited government, though still far short of statehood. HP was then
reverted back to a Union Territory in 1956, dissolving its legislative assembly and placing it again
under central administration. Between the years 1961-1971, the state underwent significant changes
to its jurisdictional boundaries with the addition and reorganization of districts.6 1 It became the
eighteenth state of the Indian union on the 2 5th of January, 1971. Present day Himachal Pradesh
is surrounded in all directions by neighboring states and shares a border with China to the east. The
twelve districts that comprise the state present remarkable geographic and sociocultural
heterogeneity (see Figure 3.1 in the chapter Appendix).
Notwithstanding significant administrative challenges, Himachal Pradesh has achieved near
universal primary school enrollment and currently records the second highest literacy rate among
major Indian states. It trails only Kerala, India's much vaunted case of social development. As
Dreze and Sen (2002) point out, however, the advancement of primary schooling in HP is in many
respects even more extraordinary than Kerala's achievements. For one, the initial conditions in
Himachal Pradesh were far less favorable. Around the time of independence, the hill region
suffered near universal illiteracy (93 percent) and was classified as an educationally "backward"
region in north India (see Figure 3.2 in Chapter Appendix). Kerala, meanwhile, was already far
ahead of the rest of India at this time. Even as late as 1971, which is when India's central
government first granted Himachal Pradesh statehood, primary school enrollment and literacy rates
were below the national average. As the much-discussed Public Report on Basic Education pointed
out, the "schooling revolution" of Himachal Pradesh took place over a short period of time
(PROBE Team 1999). Within just two decades, HP made remarkable progress in expanding the
reach not only of primary schooling, but child health as well.'
68 With the reorganization of neighboring Punjab in 1966, four Hindi-speaking districts (Kangra, Kullu, Lahaul-Spiti and
Shimla) that formed the Punjab hills were added to Himachal Pradesh.
69 Dr. Y.S. Parmar, led the movement for a separate state of Himachal Pradesh, and later became its first Chief Minister.
70 The comparison with Kerala is telling. By 2002, HP had 138.65 primary schools, 5.0 Primary Health Centers and
165.69 hospital beds per 100,000 people. Kerala meanwhile had 21.91 schools, 3.03 Primary Health Centers, and 134.3
hospital beds. To be sure, some of the discrepancy between HP and Kerala in the ratio of schools can be attributed to
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Kerala's gains in education and literacy took place over the course of many decades, with
several conducive factors at work: an "enlightened" leadership prior to independence, Christian
missionaries emphasizing mass education, a history of social movements tied to literacy and equality
across caste and gender, and last but not least, Leftist political leadership under India's Communist
Party (CPI-M). None of the above factors obtained in HP, and yet the expansion of primary
education has been remarkable. Perhaps even more significant are the gains in distributional equity.
Traditionally disadvantaged groups utilize and benefit from these public investments, in the absence
of social movements and Leftist governments. School enrollment for disadvantaged groups,
including rural girls, Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) has quickly caught pace, and
drop-out rates are much lower in comparison to states (PROBE 1999).
3.2.1. SchoolAccess and Infrastructure
In terms of student enrollment and attendance, two crucial indicators of school access, HP is
among the best performing states in India. These achievements are connected to the remarkable
expansion of school infrastructure across the state. Although school infrastructure expansion took
off in HP even before the central government enacted SSA and other policies, the state has
continued to make significant progress in that area. By official sources, 306 new government
primary schools and 1,341 new middle schools were opened across the state between the years 2002-
2011, an expansion of nearly 15 percent in less than a decade (NUEPA 2012). Importantly, the
expansion of infrastructure has closely tracked the needs of communities within the hill region.
According to the PROBE Revisited report, a reassessment of primary schooling conditions in north
Indian states by the original PROBE research team, the expansion of schooling has ensured that
children have access to primary schools close to their habitations. Nearly 90 percent of surveyed
parents said that their local primary school was less than 30 minutes away, and the average reported
time to reach school was only 20 minutes, a significant achievement given low population density
and highly dispersed settlement patterns in the Himalayan region (De, Khera et al. 2011: 97).
At the same time, it should be noted that the provision of physical facilities within schools is
about average for India. Table 3.1 summarizes the data from Pratham's ASER Report on the
presence of school facilities and physical inputs in government primary schools in rural Himachal
Pradesh. The facilities listed in the table, such as classrooms and school boundary walls, are
provided by SSA, the central government's flagship education program. The provision of these
facilities is deemed mandatory under India's recently passed Right to Education Act. Data for the
other two states included in this study are provided for comparison. Interestingly, in some areas it
performs worse than Uttar Pradesh, such as in the provision of toilets and school boundary walls.
Taken together, the outcomes for school infrastructure indicate that public agencies in HP have
been effective in providing schools to all communities. Even the smallest villages located in remote
regions of the state are served by primary schools. At the same time, agencies have not closely
followed the infrastructure mandates prescribed under India's primary education policy.
the relatively small and geographically scattered distribution of habitations across HP. But the fact that the state has
been effective in implementing social services like primary schooling across a scattered population merits attention.
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The school infrastructure gains made by Himachal Pradesh have been matched by the
growth of student enrollment and attendance across the state. According to the latest ASER report,
which surveys progress in primary education each year across rural India, less than one percent of
children in the age group 6-14 were out of school during the 2011 academic year (ASER 2012).
Gains in access to schooling have also helped close the gender gap by raising the enrollment of rural
girls, a particularly vulnerable group. The ASER survey finds that the proportion of rural girls ages
11-14 who were out of school came down to 1 percent in 2011.
No less noteworthy are the achievements in student attendance. While enrollment rates
have soared across rural India, regular student attendance continues to pose a significant challenge.
Some even question the reliability of enrollment rates, as they may reflect only "nominal"
enrollment, i.e. children whose names are written in official enrollment registers but fail to show up
(Dreze and Sen 2002). Meanwhile, the true proportion of students that regularly participate in the
school system is likely to be much lower. Himachal Pradesh has gone against that trend,
consistently showing high rates of student attendance. The latest National Family Health Survey
(NFHS) finds that 96.2 percent of children ages 6-14 were attending school in rural Himachal
Pradesh during the 2005-06 school year, far above the national average of 79.6 percent for rural
India (NFHS-3 2007). That places HP at the top of the national chart, only marginally behind
Kerala (97.8 percent) and ahead of other top-performing states like Tamil Nadu (93.4 percent).
Table 3.1 School Facilities and Physical Inputs
(% of schools that have the following)
At least one Office / Boundary Drinking Toilets Kitchen
classroom per Storage Wall water shed
State teacher space facility
Himachal Pradesh 76.7 75.5 37.3 87.5 89.2 82.0
Uttarakhand 81.6 87.9 67.0 77.9 94.2 96.3
Uttar Pradesh 87.4 88.6 44.4 93.1 93.3 89.3
All India 75.6 74.5 52.2 82.6 89.9 81.3
Source: ASER Report (2011).
3.2.2. Service Delivey
Moving beyond infrastructure provision to outcomes related to educational service delivery,
Himachal Pradesh performs significantly better than most other states (see Tables 3.2-3.6). Take
first the Indian government's Midday Meal program, a major policy for improving child nutrition
and school attendance. According to the ASER survey data, India's Midday Meal program was
found to be functioning in 98 percent of primary schools, significantly higher than in most Indian
states. These findings are further supported by field studies showing high rates of community
participation in the Midday Meal program (PROBE Team 1999; De, Khera et al. 2011).
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Table 3.2 Provision of Midday Meal
Midday Meal






Source: ASER Report (2011).
Before examining other aspects of service delivery, it important to note that school teacher
absence is as much of a problem in Himachal Pradesh as it is in other Indian states. According to
the most comprehensive survey undertaken, the rate of school teacher absence (21.2 percent), while
slightly below average and notably less than that of Uttarakhand, its hilly neighbor, remains
alarmingly high (see Table 3.3). The primary school system in Himachal Pradesh has followed the
national trend across India in which government school teachers have grown increasingly
unaccountable to parents and the local communities they serve.7 That is an important observation,
as it points to the fact that HP's political system is not immune from the school teacher politics and
weak accountability that pervade India's education system. Public officials in Himachal Pradesh
have themselves pointed out that the expansion of primary schooling has been rife with patronage
politics, with school teachers exerting political influence for desirable postings and resisting
pressures for accountability (Sood 2003; Sanan 2004).








Source: Kremer et al. (2005)
Notwithstanding common political pressures, the school system in Himachal Pradesh still
continues to function much better than in other states. The incidence of single-teacher schools,
71 As I discussed in Chapter 2, school teachers wield significant political power, and teachers' unions have consistently
blocked efforts to make them more accountable to parents and local communities. That observation is no less true for
Himachal Pradesh, or even the educationally advanced south Indian states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, which also display
rates of teacher absence above 20 percent (Kremer, Muralidharan et al. 2005).
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which reflects the implementation of policies for the recruitment and posting of school teachers,
shows Himachal Pradesh ahead of the pack, with less than eight percent of schools having only one
teacher (see Table 3.4). That achievement must be recognized within the context of delivering
primary education within the Himalayan region. The rapid development of primary schools across
highly dispersed settlements has meant that, a much larger number of schools have to be provided
school teachers, including those located in the interior hills, all of which makes it much harder to
ensure that teachers are allocated to every school. The relatively low incidence of single-teacher
schools in HP reflects the state's ability to meet the needs of each community, even those located in
the remotest regions of the state.
Along with teachers, schools within HP are significantly more likely to be equipped with
academic resources such as libraries and teaching-learning materials (Table 3.5). The provision of
these academic resources creates a learning environment within schools, which helps further attract
and retain students. As the data indicate, HP's education system is ahead not only with respect to
enrollment, but student retention as well. As Table 3.6 shows, official dropout rates for boys and
girls at the primary school level.72 At below three percent, HP's official dropout rate (which
corresponds to independent assessments) is far below that of neighboring states. These
observations are further supported by surveys of parental satisfaction with the school system
(PROBE Team 1999; De, Khera et al. 2011). According to the most recent survey, parents in
Himachal Pradesh were significantly more satisfied with the functioning of government primary
schools compared to their counterparts in neighboring states of north India.73
Table 3.4 Single-Teacher Primary Schools
% Primary schools % Students enrolled
Himachal Pradesh 7.9 4.6
Uttarakhand 19.5 10.6
Uttar Pradesh 3.0 2.3
AIl India 11.8 6.1
Source: ASER Report (2011).
Table 3.5 Library and Teaching-Learning Materials
(% of schools that have these available)
72 Given pressures to inflate official statistics, actual dropout rates are likely to be higher.
7 In the PROBE Revisited household survey, parents were asked the question, "If costs of education remained the same,
would you prefer to send your children to a government or private school?" Close to 50 percent of parents in Himachal
Pradesh said they would opt for government schools, as compared to 30 percent of parents who said so in neighboring
north Indian states (De, Khera et al. 2011: 106).
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Library Books Teaching-Learning Materials
Himachal Pradesh 80.3 91.5
Uttcrakhand 48.6 82.4
Uttar Pradesh 47.7 73.5
All India 63.1 80.4
Source: ASER Report (2011).
Table 3.6 Student Dropout Rate
(% students in grades 1-5)
Boys Girls All
Himachal Pradesh 2.6 2.7 2.6
Uttarakhand 7.4 6.3 6.9
Uttar Pradesh 17.4 15.0 16.2
All India 10.15 9.75 9.95
Source: Mehta (2011)
The superior performance of the government primary school system within HP is evidenced
further by data on student learning levels. The latest ASER Report, approximately 8 percent of fifth
graders surveyed cannot read from a second grade textbook, while only 12 percent of them cannot
do basic arithmetic involving two-digit subtraction, much lower than the corresponding figures for
most other states (ASER 2012). These outcomes are significantly better than most other Indian
states. That said, learning levels in Himachal Pradesh still show much room for improvement. As
discussed earlier Chapter 2, HP is no exception to the nationwide trend in India of poor learning
outcomes. Nevertheless, within the context of India's comparatively low learning levels, it remains
far ahead of other Indian states. According to the ASER data, it is among the few states that has not
shown a decline in learning levels over time with the implementation of universal primary schooling.
Taken as a whole, the comprehensive indicators show that public agencies in Himachal
Pradesh have been highly effective in implementing universal primary education policy. From
school infrastructure, student enrollment and retention and educational service delivery, Himachal
Pradesh performs at the top among Indian states. HP has been able to address the schooling needs
of its interior regions and disadvantaged social groups, raising the participation of girls and lower
castes, leading to a broadly inclusive primary school system. As a final point worth noting, these
achievements in primary education can be attributed almost entirely to public efforts (Dreze and Sen
2002). While privatization has grown over time, the prevalence of rural private schooling is well
below the national average and also much lower compared to the other states examined in this
study.
71 In their survey of private schooling, Muralidharan and Kremer (2007) find that 15 percent of villages sampled in
Himachal Pradesh have private schools, as compared to 28 percent across all of India, and a much larger percentage in
neighboring states such as Punjab and Haryana.
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3.2.3. The Limits of Modernization and Economic Development
Before going further, it helps to consider some alternative explanations that may account for
the effectiveness of policy implementation within Himachal Pradesh. Theories of modernization
associate the expansion of mass education with economic development, industrialization and
urbanization. Yet these are not the ingredients behind HP's achievements. The state's harsh
topography and severe climate present major obstacles for economic growth. It is very costly to
construct and maintain roads, school buildings and other physical infrastructure in the Himalayan
region. Road and building projects are difficult to execute; habitual landslides and winter weather
provide no guarantee of successful completion. Prohibitively high production and transport costs
make it difficult to attract new industry to the state, making HP among India's least industrialized.
Over 90 percent of the population secures its living from small-scale agriculture, animal husbandry,
and more recently, horticulture (UNDP 2002).
Though it is not the poorest state in India, HP is not wealthy. State per capita income today
is slightly above average for India, though it has been below the national average throughout most
of its history. The two neighboring states of Punjab and Haryana, which are far wealthier, display
significantly worse outcomes in primary education. Along the same lines, HP's economic growth
rate since independence has closely tracked the national average. Growth only began to take off in
the 1990s, by which time the state had already begun to make significant progress in implementing
primary education policy (World Bank 2007). Per capita income around that time was near or below
the national average. HP's economic began to record higher rates of growth after education was
already on the rise. Economic growth was probably not the cause of policy implementation, though
it may have played a role in helping to sustain HP's achievements over time.
Along with an unspectacular economy, there are other reasons not to have expected primary
education to succeed in this state. Personal travel on the precarious hill terrain, over short distances
even, is physically demanding and potentially hazardous, especially for young children. 75 Habitations
within the Himalayan region are dispersed over large topographic distances, making it very costly for
the state to build, maintain and monitor primary schools. It is much less costly (and politically more
rewarding) for governments to provide education and other social services in areas with
geographically concentrated populations, particularly in towns and cities, where demand is also
expected to be higher. Yet HP is among the least urbanized states in India and has the lowest
population density in the country.
Another set of explanations points to the role of social structure and caste. India's
Himalayan region displays a preponderance of upper caste groups, particularly Brahmins and
Kshatriya. Moreover, compared to the plains regions of north India, social equalities based on caste
and gender run less deep in Himachal Pradesh, owing perhaps to the subsistence economy in the
hills. The system of landlordism (lamindan) imposed by the British across the Gangetic plain led to
severe inequalities and exploitation of lower castes. Some argue that these historical institutions
continue to influence the delivery of public goods, though their effect has greatly decreased over
time (Banerjee, Iyer et al. 2005). The hills, meanwhile, were spared of such polarizing institutions,
and lower caste groups were less dependent on upper castes for their livelihood.
75 The author can attest to both facts based on personal experience.
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Although it would be a mistake to discount the pernicious influence of caste and gender
discrimination in the Gangetic plains, one must be careful not to oversimplify social structure in the
hill region. Though it may take on different forms, caste discrimination has long existed within the
Himalayan region." Dalits, the former untouchables of the caste system, were traditionally excluded
from entering upper caste temples in Himachal Pradesh. Across many parts of the state, the bajgis,
as they are known, were required to stand outside village temples during Hindu festivals to perform
drums and other musical instruments to invoke the local village deity (devta).7" Moreover, as I will
demonstrate in Chapter 4, very similar caste and gender norms in the neighboring hill state of
Uttarakhand have not translated into effective policy implementation. The comparison between
these two states points to the limitations of arguments emphasizing social structure.
3.3. Mechanisms Illustrated
The above discussion helps contextualize the exceptional performance of Himachal Pradesh
in implementing universal primary education. Not only has the state achieved remarkable gains in
physical infrastructure and access, but the functioning of schools is far superior in comparison to
other Indian states. Even with a common set of policies and administrative resources, public
agencies in Himachal Pradesh have proven far more effective in carrying out their mission in a
challenging physical environment. Yet some conventional theories fail to account for these
achievements. In this section, I offer a preview of the argument based on findings that help
illustrate the mechanisms of the theory and anchor the discussion of deliberative norms. I begin
with a puzzling vignette taken from District Shimla, demonstrate how local officials understand and
carry out their responsibilities. I then lay out the mechanisms by which deliberative norms are
theorized to generate positive outcomes for implementation in Himachal Pradesh.
3.3.1 Motivating Vignette
Nestled in the Himalayan foothills, Shimla, the present-day state capital of Himachal Pradesh
once served as the summer capital for the British colonial government. It was from this rural town
that the British controlled a global empire. Little investment was made, however, to develop the
local economy and surrounding communities. A short walk from the town center reveals how little
has changed since colonial times. Small villages made up of scattered hamlets no larger than a few
houses apiece speckle the rugged landscape far out into the horizon. Subsistence farming on tiny
landholdings is how most families eke out a livelihood, though young men (and increasingly women)
seek education and employment outside their villages. Harsh terrain and severe weather conditions
put transportation to a standstill for months on end, limiting the scope for industry and economic
76 Nor should we assume that geography by itself necessitates greater equality across caste groups. The neighboring
country of Nepal, a largely hill-based economy, has one of the most oppressive caste systems in South Asia (Bennett
2005).
77 According to interviews with local scholars and residents of Himachal Pradesh, these practices continue to this day,
though they meet growing resistance. I observed caste exclusion first hand as well. During fieldwork, I was required to
verify my caste credentials with local pandits (priests) before entering village temples, which were not open to Dalits and
other lower caste groups.
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activities beyond agriculture. It was in this unlikely corner of the Himalaya that a "schooling
revolution" had taken place. "
Eager to understand more about it, I arrived at the office of the local education bureaucracy
in Shimla. I was warmly greeted by Mr. Chauhan, one of the senior officials stationed there. I asked
him questions about the expansion of primary school infrastructure, implementation of the Midday
Meal program, and other policies enacted by the state. Our conversation, however, took an
unexpected turn as he began to describe a program he had helped develop to provide schooling to
children belonging to the Muslim Gujjar community. A small nomadic tribe, the Gujjars would
spend their summers herding cattle in Shimla and return to their agricultural base in Saharanpur, a
district located in the fertile Gangetic plain in the nearby state of Uttar Pradesh. Seeing the toll this
nomadic lifestyle was taking on the education of Gujjar children, Mr. Chauhan and his colleagues
came up with a plan to create a mobile primary school for the tribe. Wherever the Gujjars would
travel, the school would follow in a small caravan comprised of teachers and learning materials. And
like that, in a matter of a few years, the first batch of Gujjar children in Shimla was able to complete
primary school.
Straightforward as this anecdote may sound, I found Mr. Chauhan's enthusiasm for the
mobile school somewhat puzzling. Why spend scarce time and administrative resources towards
creating a program that targets a politically irrelevant population within Shimla? Nowhere in the
policies of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, India's flagship program for universal primary education, was it
written that a mobile school should be provided to children belonging to nomadic tribes. Policies to
expand school infrastructure, appoint new teachers and provide incentives like the Midday Meal, al
of which constitute the bread and butter of primary education policy in India, were not the basis for
this simple yet compelling innovation. Nor was there anything special about the formal incentives
and career trajectory of this education officer and his supporting team. Like his colleagues in other
parts of Himachal Pradesh as well as other nearby states, Mr. Chauhan competed in a state-wide
exam administered by the Public Service Commission and had risen through the ranks based on his
seniority. Political gain could not form the basis for his actions either. Given the tiny size of the
Muslim Gujjar population in Shimla, the potential electoral benefits from this investment would
have been negligible at best. By contrast, no such program had even been considered by his
counterparts in District Saharanpur of Uttar Pradesh, a place where Gujjars reside in far greater
numbers and carry political clout.
As I met more bureaucrats in Shimla, this particular officer's story began to appear less and
less unique. In a far-flung corner of the district, Govindji, a local official much his junior in rank
had created a program for educating migrant child laborers hailing from poor, far-off states like
Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. While making his school monitoring rounds each week, he would
notice them working at construction sites along the one road connecting the administrative block
where he was posted to district headquarters in Shimla. Determined to address the problem,
Govindji proposed a plan to his seniors and with their support was able to attach an alternative
school close to the construction sites. "Why create schools for children that do not even live in
Himachal Pradesh?", I asked him. "Well of course we care about Himachali children, but they too an children
ofIndia," he replied. Yet even his personal concern for the migrant children could not explain why
he was able to break with official policy, which required that new schools be built according to
78 PROBE, "The Schooling Revolution in Himachal Pradesh," Public Report on Basic Education in India, (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 115.
75
official rules of access and school distance from a village so that no child would have to walk more
than a kilometer to reach school. Yet here he was targeting children without a formally recognized
place of residence, coordinating with the local police to identify their (illegal) makeshift
accommodations, and persuading their parents to send them regularly to the new primary school
constructed on their behalf.
3.3.2. The Argument in Brief
From the vantage point of official policy, the formal incentives system within the
bureaucracy, and logic of electoral politics, the actions I describe above make little sense. Yet as I
demonstrate below, they reflect a more general logic by which public agencies operate in Himachal
Pradesh, namely the logic of deliberative norms. As I theorize in Chapter 1, deliberative norms lead
to participatory behavior among bureaucrats (see below Figure 3.3). Public officials learn to discuss
practical matters of implementation across formal organizational divides, coordinate efforts to solve
problems collectively, and adapt official rules and policies to meet ground realities. Importantly,
lower-level bureaucrats learn to share practical concerns and experiences with seniors, allowing local
knowledge to move up the hierarchy.
Deliberative norms also lead public officials to seek input from citizens and civic
organizations. In much the same way that senior officials encourage input from their subordinates,
local public officials learn to draw upon the knowledge and organizational resources of citizens and
civic agencies, whose collective vigilance and input helps improve the functioning of primary
schools. The participatory behavior of public officials helps further sustain the collective action of
local communities, who come to experience tangible benefits of organizing around primary
education. Taken together, these behaviors generate a responsive implementation process, which
leads to positive outcomes for universal primary education.
Figure 3.3. Theoretical Process
Deliberative Participatory Responsive
Norms A.- Behaviors Implementation
L- - - - - - - -> Civic inclusion ---------
The theoretical process I describe above helps illuminate the mobile school example
presented above. When he first came to learn about the difficulties enrolling Gujjar children, Mr.
Chauhan was unsure how to proceed. The tribe, after all, spent more of its time outside of HP in
the plains district of Saharanpur in Uttar Pradesh. Mr. Chauhan discussed the problem with his
senior colleagues in the education bureaucracy. They encouraged him to take time away from his
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normal routine and travel down with a small team to Saharanpur, as an "exposure visit," to learn more
about the nomadic community of Gujjars and work towards a practical solution. As Mr. Chauhan
explained:
With the support from the Department, I visited the Mohammedan Gujar community in
Saharanpur. The children were lagging far behind and their parents had doubts about the school
system. We explained to them that SSA provides all the inputs, like books, uniforms, bags, free of
cost. So that helped"
The exposure visit not only presented the Gujjar community with information about state programs,
but provided Mr. Chauhan and his team with relevant knowledge about their distinct needs. The
wider thinking within the bureaucracy at the time was that the Gujjars most probably did not want
primary schooling. Their children performed critical economic roles, tending to their cattle and
buffalo. Yet Mr. Chauhan's team found that the community had an interest in educating their
children. As another official went on to describe:
During our interactions, one Gujar said, If I send my child to the school, then who will watch my
buffalo?" Then another replied back to him, Ifyour buffalo is keepingyour kidfrom school, throw
it out!" A larger discussion ensued...and we learned that there was a latent demandfor education.
The Gujjar community wanted schooling, but not necessarily in the standard format provided by the
state. They required a more flexible approach that would accommodate their nomadic livelihood
and the fact that children contributed to it through their labor. Senior officials took a keen interest
in the experience of Mr. Chauhan and his team. A plan had to be made for hiring teachers to the
run school for the nomadic tribe, which was nowhere written in the official policy framework.
Importantly, senior officials called on his team to discuss the matter together and find a collective
solution. They settled upon hiring volunteer teachers who would be appointed on a contractual
basis. Later on, these teachers would be promoted to become Vidya Upasaks, a para-teacher scheme
that was adopted by the state.
As the example illustrates, norms within the bureaucracy encouraged officials to
communicate and work collectively across hierarchical boundaries, draw upon local knowledge and
adapt policies to suit local needs. Far from an isolated case, I found numerous examples of this
behavior in the field, across a wide range of tasks and situations. To see more concretely how
deliberative norms generate the implementation outcomes observed in Himachal Pradesh, it helps to
break apart the administrative tasks required for implementing universal primary education. Figure
3.4 summarizes these tasks and describes how public agencies governed by deliberative norms are
theorized to carry them out. These tasks can be divided into three broad categories: (1) school
planning and provision, (2) delivery of educational services, and (3) system monitoring and feedback.
While the first category involves activities related to quantitative improvements, like the development
of physical infrastructure and school facilities, the latter two sets of activities are more closely tied to
the quality of service delivery. System monitoring and local feedback is particularly relevant to
education quality, since the daily functioning of primary schools is largely outside the hands of state
planners.
79 Interview with senior official, District Project Office, SSA, Shimla, March 5, 2010.
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Figure 3.4 Policy Implementation: Tasks and Behaviors
Administrative Tasks Bureaucratic Behaviors
School planning and provision
School infrastructure development -Conduct deliberative planning process with input from
multiple agencies and civic actors
Regional planning and policy targeting -Adapt policies to suit the context across different regions and
social groups
Educational service delivery
Teacher posting -Apply flexible teacher allocation process according to school
needs
Academic support - Coordinate with school teachers and civic agencies to
provide academic resources
Community support -Work with both official and unofficial groups to identify and
address school needs
Monitoring and feedback
System monitoring -Combine official inspections and surveys with unofficial,
community-based monitoring
Local feedback - Incorporate local feedback from informal groups and through
unofficial channels
As a preview to the detailed case studies presented in the following section, let us consider
some examples of how deliberative norms shape bureaucratic behavior around these activities. Take
first the activities associated with school planning and provision. India's primary education policies
aim to achieve universal access through the construction of new schools in underserved
communities. In carrying out that task, public agencies in Himachal Pradesh tend to encourage
broad participation from officials across the organizational hierarchy, along with elected leaders and
civic agencies working at the grassroots level. Through the exchange of information and local
knowledge, public officials tailor educational development plans based on varying local contexts.
Similarly, agencies involved in carrying out new school construction tend to consult with local
communities in deciding where to place new schools, even when doing so may break with official
rules. As a result, agencies are more likely to meet the educational needs facing communities.
While school infrastructure planning is relatively straightforward and requires comparatively
less community input, regional planning and policy targeting is far more complicated. India's
universal primary education program provides a standard framework and resources for special
programs that target underperforming regions and disadvantaged social groups, such disabled
children and out-of-school girls. Public agencies in Himachal Pradesh will tend to apply these
policies flexibly and adapt them to the varying conditions of different regions and social groups.
They will tend to coordinate with local officials from underserved regions and draw input from civic
agencies working with disadvantaged social groups to tailor programs in a context-specific manner.
As a result, these policies are more likely to reach intended recipients and address their educational
needs.
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Consider, finally, the activities around monitoring and feedback, the mechanisms by which
public agencies try to ensure that the education system is functioning well. Bureaucrats have in
theory a range of possible methods at their disposal for monitoring the education system. Agencies
in Himachal Pradesh will tend to combine the official school inspection system with unofficial
mechanisms of feedback from local communities, which are often better situated to identify
problems. Importantly, they will seek input not only from formally recognized bodies such as
Village Education Committees (VECs), but also informal groups at the village level, such as
women's associations. Given the fact that formal village institutions are often dominated by
privileged social groups, the ability to work with informal groups, particularly women's associations,
enables agencies in Himachal Pradesh to identify and respond to the problems facing marginalized
communities. With the encouragement of public agencies, local communities see the benefits of
investing time and resources to keep a check on primary schooling and report gaps in service
delivery. As a result, monitoring systems work more effectively to ensure that schools are
functioning well.
3.4. Deliberative Norms in Himachal Pradesh
Having reviewed the mechanisms by which deliberative norms are theorized to influence
policy implementation in Himachal Pradesh, this section turns to the main empirical findings of the
chapter. I begin by demonstrating the existence of deliberative norms within the Himachali state,
drawing on examples taken from different subdivisions and levels of the education bureaucracy as
well as the experiences of civic actors involved in primary education. I then go on to present a series
of case demonstrating how deliberative norms shape implementation across the range of tasks
associated with primary education policy.
3.4.1. Inside the State
Viewed from the outside, the Himachali state appears no different from others in India. The
bureaucracy in Himachal Pradesh is organized hierarchically and divided functionally by policy
domain. Civil service examinations determine who gets hired, and promotion is based largely on
seniority along with performance in terms of meeting official policy targets. With respect to material
and human resources, what one may refer to as "administrative capacity" within the state, the
education bureaucracy in HP is again unremarkable. The Department of Elementary Education,
which combines primary and middle school, is organized according to the same administrative
blueprint and endowed with the same material and human resources as in other states.
Nor is there anything peculiar about the formal training of public officials in HP. In fact,
when Himachal Pradesh was first granted statehood in 1971, bureaucrat from the Uttar Pradesh
cadre of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) were summoned to train and help guide the
bureaucracy on how to administer the fledgling state. At the senior levels of bureaucracy,
particularly within the IAS, an administrative position in the relatively small hill state has not carried
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the same degree of prestige as a posting in the politically prominent state of UP.0 Yet the
bureaucracy in HP operates in a manner entirely distinct from its more prominent neighbor.
Beneath an otherwise unremarkable exterior, a distinct set of norms operate within public agencies
of Himachal Pradesh that closely approximate the deliberative model detailed above.
The first stream of evidence for the presence of deliberative norms within the education
bureaucracy comes from the interactions between senior officials and lower ranking bureaucrats.
One of the most striking observations that came out of interviews and participant observation with
the education bureaucracy was the value senior officials placed on the input and participation of
their subordinates. During one of my earliest interviews, a senior bureaucrat stationed in the
Secretariat in Shimila pointed out to me in telling fashion: "Ifyou want to learn anything at allyou must
talk to the block [offiiai. Though even the district is important, it's reallyyour block offidals who understand what is
happening in thefield"8 ' The same view was expressed many times over the course of my fieldwork.
State planners belonging to the IAS and upper echelons of the state civil service urged me to seek
input from local officials who were much closer to the ground. Even more than district-level
administration, they emphasized the importance of block-level administration, the lowest
subdivision of the state. Whereas in other states, officials equated "local" administration with the
district, officials in Himachal Pradesh were careful to distinguish between the two. As a former
Director of Education for Himachal Pradesh explained:
When it comes to administration, the block is most effective. Even though the district is also
important, ifyour block isn'tfunctional, then education won't work. Each block covers more than
100 primay schools. Meanwhile in a districtyou have 1,000 schools, which is too much to monitor
and manage. So if the block administration receives appropriate attention, thenyou get a real boost.
What Ifound is that the district can only compile and disseminate information. When something is
needed at the primary school, the local [/dti1en] willfirst go to the block. Even if I [the Director of
Education] were contacted directly, I would still rely on the block administration for support. The
real knowledge of what is happening rests with the Block Education Oficer. He knows his school
catchment area better than anyone else.8 2
To the officials serving within HP's education bureaucracy, the quote above reflects little more than
common sense. Because the lowest rungs of the state are closest to the ground and interact regularly
with school teachers and common citizens, they are in the best position to know about what is
happening within the primary school system, and should thus be granted the authority and support
to respond to inquiries and make decisions. Yet the same understanding was not shared by officials
in the other states examined in his study, who felt the need to maintain rigid hierarchical boundaries
and viewed block-level officials as little more than underlings of district administration.
The importance that senior officials in HP attached to the participation of subordinates was
further reflected in local planning meetings. Consider one such meeting I attended in Shimla. Mr.
Dhiman, a senior development officer invited his block-level associates to discuss any challenges
that had come up while implementing and monitoring various development projects. One block
official described a recent problem in his area. Funds for a new school classroom had been
80 Interviews with IAS officials in Himachal Pradesh, UP and New Delhi revealed a common belief that a position
within the UP LAS cadre offered a major advantage for career mobility.81 Interview with senior official, State Project Office, SSA, Shimla District, July 03, 2008.
82 Interview with former Director of Education, Himachal Pradesh, July 16, 2008.
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sanctioned, but construction had not commenced for more than six months afterwards. Soon after
the room was finally built, the structure fell apart and it was discovered that a cheap quality cement
mixture had been used.
After hearing the full story, Mr. Dhiman engaged the group in a conversation to determine
the ideal response to the situation. Over the course of a healthy exchange, a number of block
officials repeatedly raised the concern that "formalproceedings willtake too long?' Others pointed out the
risk of local political inference in the judicial process. Instead, the block officials felt it was better to
work around the judicial system. They decided to act in concert against the concerned builders, as
well as any others whom they suspected might be involved in delinquency. They would keep each
other informed about such cases in the future and prevent the actors from receiving future contracts
in their respective blocks. By encouraging the block officials to discuss practical problems in the
field and work collectively to solve them, Mr. Dhiman was effectively promoting deliberative norms
in the governance process. Moreover, the content of deliberations reflected the willingness of
officials to cooperate across organizational divisions and even work around the legal system.
One might suppose that the collective participation of block officials was unique to local
administration in Shimla District. Because these officials were based in the capital district of
Himachal Pradesh, perhaps they received more attention from senior colleagues than would
normally have been the case in other districts. To probe the matter further, I sought the experiences
of officials who had been posted outside of Shimla. As a first point worth noting, virtually none of
the bureaucrats I interviewed had spent their entire careers in one district, let alone in the capital
district. Over the course of a normal career, officials would spend at most two-three years working
in one particular district, after which time they would be transferred to a new position elsewhere.
Notwithstanding the physical proximity to departmental headquarters in the Secretariat, local
officials found the bureaucracy in Shimla no better or worse than in other districts. In fact, almost
all the officials I interviewed in Shimla had spent the early, formative years of their careers in other
districts. Take the case of Mr. Dhiman, the senior development official who ran the meeting
described above. Prior to gaining a position in Shimla's district administration, Mr. Dhiman had
spent his entire career moving around different districts outside of Shimla. It was during his earlier
stints that he learned the value of establishing strong lines of communication with his subordinates.
Among his most memorable experiences was as an assistant to the District Magistrate, the highest
ranking local official, in Lahaul-Spiti, a tribal district that borders Kashmir and China. Due to severe
climate conditions in the winter months, Lahaul-Spiti is practically cut off from the rest of Himachal
Pradesh for six months out of the year. Yet even in this far-flung district, local agencies encouraged
the participation of block officials. As Mr. Dhiman explained, their input was critical for
understanding the realities of implementation on the ground:
When I was stationed in Lahaul-Spiti much of my time was spent with my team of BDOs [Block
Development Officers]. Majorgovernmentprogramsfor infrastructure, employment and public
services had been introduced in Lahaul-Spiti. Large stakes were involved and issues of
accountability came up. To monitor so many programs, I could not ignore the concerns of block
officers. I kept in constant touch with them and pulled them together to learn and discuss what was
happening. I came to learn all the pressures they facedfrom the gram pradhan and MLA [Member
of Legislative Assembly], including the pressure to misutiliZe funds... I realiked that we had to work
together, because public serices are only effective whenyou know the needs and aspirations of
everyone, even the officer sitting in the remotest corner of the district.
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As this official described, the value placed on the participation of subordinates was tied to the
notion of effective governance, particularly in the face of severe administrative constrains and
political pressures.
To be sure, senior officials in Himachal Pradesh held no rosy image of their junior
colleagues. Much like their counterparts in other states, they expressed concerns regarding low
motivation, incompetence and indifference among the lower ranks. As another senior official who
spent several years as a District Magistrate across the state explained:
The qualigty of the block oficials will vay depending on the person. Sometimesyou get ayoung,
highy educated oficer who has the -eal to work. Oryou can get those who have come up the ranks
by promotion, guys who are lethargic andjust sitting on retirement age. So really it is a mixed bag.
But as the DM [District Magistrate] it is up toyou set the example and guide the peopleyou have.
Faced with the same human resource issues at the lower rungs of the bureaucracy that exist in other
states, senior officials in Himachal Pradesh nevertheless expressed the need to encourage the
participation of their subordinates and coordinate efforts with them across the hierarchy.
Further evidence for the prevalence of deliberative norms come from even further down the
ranks of the education bureaucracy. As part of my fieldwork, I observed local education officials
carry out day-to-day activities, such as teacher training and the routine monitoring of schools.
Consider the example presented earlier of Govindji, the block-level official based in Shimla who had
helped develop a schooling program for migrant children from Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. A
Sanskrit scholar, Govindji spent more than two decades as a primary school teacher before being
promoted to Block Resource Coordinator (BRC) for Shimla's Mashobra region. As part of his
charge to provide academic support to school teachers within Mashobra, Govindji ran training
sessions at the Block Resource Center, along with onsite training at designated primary schools. I
had the opportunity to attend his training sessions at primary schools near Kota, a small town
outside of Shimla proper. The lectures he delivered on group-based teaching methods were in many
ways no different from the rote, textbook-style of teacher training that I had observed in other
places. It was Govindji's informal interactions with teachers outside the classroom, however, that
shed light on prevailing norms within the local education bureaucracy.
The new school year had only recently begun and during one of several breaks for chai,
Govindji went around asking the teachers about their experiences at the start of the year. A few
teachers smiled and answered politely that everything so far had progressed fine. The mood quickly
changed, however, when a young teacher with a troubled look on his face began to rehearse the
story of two children living within his school's catchment area.83 Sunil and Anil, brothers aged eight
and nine respectively, came from a poor family of landless tenant farmers. Poor health and
malnutrition had kept them out of school for a few years and the teacher was at pains to figure out
how to re-enroll the boys in primary school. Govindji listened patiently to the story and at the end
suggested the teacher visit the boys' home and inform their parents about the Midday Meal Program
and other policy incentives that might persuade them to reconsider sending the pair to school.
83 The catchment area for a school is comprised of habitations located within at least a kilometer distance from the
school.
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Later that week, I came across the same young teacher again at the Block Resource Centre in
Mashobra, where he had come to collect textbooks and teaching materials. I listened intently as
Govindji asked him for an update on Sunil and Anil. The teacher went on to describe his
experience of visiting their home and learning that they suffered from physical disabilities and had
acute difficulty speaking. Govindji encouraged the teacher to get in touch with Prerna, a local NGO
that specialized in helping disabled children overcome barriers to learning. With Govindji's
guidance and local NGO support, the school teacher was able to enroll the boys in a remedial
education program. Contrary to the popular portrayal of bureaucrats in India shirking their duties,
the example illustrates how norms that foster deliberation encourage local officials to identify local
needs and coordinate efforts in response.
It was in a similar manner that Govindji came to learn about the migrant children from
Rajasthan and UP living near construction sites where their parents worked. While he would often
see the children along his route to work, it was only after soliciting the support of a local primary
school headmaster that he was able to conduct a proper round of monitoring within the area.
Together, they identified thirty-six migrant children who had not enrolled in primary school.
Govindji and the headmaster took turns narrating the story to me:
We tried convindng their parents to send them to school, but they were not willing to. Some were
worried about what would happen if they had to move to another worksite and their children could
no longer attend the schooL We tried hard to persuade them, even offering the SSA incentives from
the government, like scholarships andfree uniforms, but none of it worked 8 4
Seeing that the parents were unconvinced, Govindji and the school master approached Mr. Negi, a
more senior bureaucrat who was the Additional District Magistrate (ADM) at the time. He
contacted the District Superintendent of Police (SPD) and inquired as to whether local law
enforcement could help Govindji and the school principal persuade the migrant families to send
their children to school. The SPD responded to Mr. Negi's request and local police in the end
proved helpful:
On the SPD's recommendation we went to the local police precinct and askedfor their help. A
senior officer came with us to the worksite and told the parents that it was illegal not to enroll their
children in school and that they were committing a crime. People are naturallyfearful of the uniform
[vardi] and so the parents gave in and agreed to enroll the children.
I later had the opportunity to meet Mr. Negi and learn about his experiences working in local district
administration. As the ADM in charge of law and order his responsibility was to help ensure the
smooth running of the legal system within the district. From the sea of legal files scattered
throughout his office I could tell it was a demanding job. Primary education policy was outside the
scope of his official duties, yet he made the effort to contact his counterparts in law enforcement,
who normally do not work with the Department of Elementary Education. Mr. Negi described to
me how his superiors encouraged him from early on in his career to coordinate with colleagues
across divisions and maintain routine contact with his subordinates. Through his experience
working as ADM in Shimla and before that in Chamba District, one of the more economically
8 Interview with Block Resource Coordinator and primary school headmaster, Mashobra Block, Shimla District, July 30,
2008.
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deprived regions of Himachal Pradesh, he came to internalize the deliberative norms governing the
bureaucracy. As he explained:
One positive point I have seen over the last twen_0years is that, when I started in 1986, poor ladies
and chaps wouldn't come to my ofice for help. There was a hesitation in people to work with state
agencies. But over time we learned that ifyou deprive dalits, women or any weaker section of access
to basic rights, thenyou cannot achieve overall development... I've learned this from watching the
example of my seniors. If my senior oficer shuns people away from his ofice then naturally that will
shape how I do things. Those I worked under encouraged me to stay in close touch with my
subordinates and keep my doors open to people. So I think that's a major sign ofgood governance.
That is where it starts.8 '
The learning process Mr. Negi described was reiterated by other local bureaucrats. They had learned
how to approach their work, over time, by observing colleagues and senior officials within the
hierarchy. Sometimes the learning process was quite explicit, as in the case of planning meetings. In
those formal settings, senior officials would ask subordinates to participate and provide information
about conditions on the ground. In other instances, the process was less formal, like in the case of
Mr. Chauhan, who helped develop the mobile school program for children belonging to the
nomadic Gujjar tribe that I described in the motivating vignette.
The value placed on participation and local knowledge within the bureaucracy is further
reflected in official documents and planning reports. In a recent development report produced by
the Planning Department of Himachal Pradesh to help inform the government's Five Year Plan, an
entire chapter is devoted to "People's Participation." In it, the report emphasizes the importance of
devoting administrative efforts to conduct training courses, exposure visits, panchayat and NGO
capacity building efforts, and even local-level melas (festivals) in collaboration with civic agencies, all
done "to spread the concept ofpeople'spartiapation in development planning." One must of course exercise
caution in taking official reports at their literal word, as the gap between rhetoric and reality can be
great. Taken alone, such statements may not mean much. However, combined with interviews of
public officials, direct observations as well as the accounts of citizens and civic agencies on the
ground, these documents provide supportive evidence for the bureaucracy's commitment to
promoting participation.
3.4.2. Outside the State
The second major stream of evidence for the presence of deliberative norms comes from the
experiences and understandings of Himachali citizens and civic agencies working at the grassroots
level. Civil society has occupied an important place in India's social development. Within the field
of primary education, a number of civic organizations emerged out of the central government's
efforts to expand literacy.87 India's education policies during the late 1980s and 1990s sought to
tackle rural illiteracy through a variety of community-based initiatives. Given weak administrative
85 Interview with Additional District Magistrate, Shimla, August 7, 2008.
86 Excerpt taken from Himachal Pradesh State Development Report (Planning Commission 2005: 259)87 The NGO sector has grown even more rapidly in recent years under generous financing by various state and non-state
agencies. On the relationship between Indian civil society and development policy, see Jenkins (2005; 2010).
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capacity within the state and other practical difficulties in reaching rural communities, these
programs relied on local, voluntary organization for support. More recently, the administrative
framework outlined under India's primary education policy calls for greater participation from non-
state actors, including NGOs and local communities, throughout the implementation process. With
the creation of Village Education Committees (VECs), parents are encouraged to participate in areas
like school enrollment, the provision of the Midday Meal, the provision and routine maintenance of
school infrastructure and other inputs, including the hiring of para-teachers.
Consider the case of Himachal Gyan Vigyan Samiti (HGVS), among the major civil society
organizations to evolve out of these programs. HGVS is a branch of a larger umbrella organization
known as Bharata Gyan Vigyan Samiti (BGVS), a nationwide movement to empower marginalized
citizens through literacy and scientific knowledge. BGVS was sponsored by the National Literacy
Mission of 1987, one of the central government's major policies to expand functional literacy among
adults. The organization has more than 300,000 members, with local units based in 350 districts
across twenty-three states." The success of Kerala's literacy programs, which were implemented by
Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parisad (KSSP), a pioneering branch of BGVS, drew national attention and
encouraged the National Literacy Mission to strengthen the participation of civic actors in other
states as well, including Himachal Pradesh. Formally registered in 1991, today HGVS has an
organizational presence in 45 administrative blocks spread across all 12 districts of the state. Its
network of around 50,000 members includes service professionals (e.g. school teachers, doctors and
scientists), social activists, rural youth, and even officers belonging to different state departments.
HGVS is organized into committees at the level of the state, district, block and village
panchayat and adheres to democratic organizational norms, holding elections each year for
committee leadership positions." Like the KSSP in Kerala, HGVS helped to spearhead literacy
campaigns in Himachal Pradesh. The state provided HGVS the mandate to oversee the State
Resource Centre (SRC) for literacy, the nodal agency in charge of carrying out adult literacy and
vocational skill development programs across the state. While fieldworkers within HGVS tend to
downplay the impact of the adult literacy program, it provided an opportunity to spread the message
about state efforts to expand education and establish local ties within villages, opening people's
receptivity to the state. The notion that "I may be illiterate, but my child does not have to be" was a
sentiment often expressed by parents to HGVS fieldworkers during the literacy program.' Through
its grassroots network and ties with the state, HGVS would convey such popular sentiments to
officials within the Department of Education. A highly decorated senior bureaucrat, who had spent
many years overseeing primary education, explained how state officials began working with HGVS:
Many people want to downplay the role of the NLM [National Literag Mission] program, since it
was immediately succeeded by SSA [Sarma Shiksha Abhyan], which is a World Bank program.
Sure SSA has had a big impact, but the NLM program was not chasing targets. It helped to build
institutions that tied the bureaucrag to people out in the field, and these are still around We
achieved this with supportfrom organizations like Himachal's branch of BG VS. Bureaucrats in
departments like Forestry and Education became involved with Himachal Gyan Vigan Samiti and
they saw the benefits of working with local people and institutions.
Il BGVS Website: http://www.bgvs.org/index.php/program.
89 Internal documents and interviews with officers, HGVS, Shimla.
90 Multiple interviews and focus group discussions with fieldworkers, HGVS, Shimla.
91 Interview with retired IAS officer, Shimla, July 18, 2008.
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By working with organizations like HGVS to identify public needs, the Himachali state was
effectively granting authority to citizens. Yet the sharing of authority also invited conflict. In
carrying out its mission to provide the public information regarding governmental policies, the
organization often found itself on the frontlines of public anger. On numerous occasions over the
course of fieldwork, I observed HGVS activists holding rallies and protests in District Shimla,
sometimes outside of government offices. In working with the state to promote public
participation, members of HGVS viewed these conflicts as par for the course. As an official within
the governing body noted:
What makes us diferentfrom other NGOs is that we work with the government but also put
pressure on the government. Actually, we do not even like to call ourselves a 'NGO', but instead a
mass-membership organih.ation. We work in the field but are also engaged directly with the
state... Sometimes we have had conflict but overall the state has been open to our support. And our
partiipation within the state has grown so much that by now not one state government committee or
pmgram can avoid us. We must be included in any poliy committee at the state level.'
The blend of engagement and conflict between the state and civic agencies is a common feature of
participatory governance. As Heller (2001) describes in the case of the KSSP's work in Kerala, for
example, the organization occupied a dual role, on the one hand enabling the state to reach citizens
in policy efforts, while at the same time stoking popular protest around particular policies and
government agencies. The fact that HGVS activists understand their engagement with the state
along similar terms suggests that deliberative norms involve more than the exchange of information,
but the sharing of authority as well.
The benefits of encouraging greater local participation become clear when considering the
challenges of implementing primary education across such a large, diverse territory like the hill
region. Even with the expanded resources under SSA, it would be impossible for bureaucrats to
visit every school, let alone solve local challenges as and when they arise. According to one official,
"If we can achieve even seven_'y percent of our monitoring target, we find that good" 9 3 Given weak administrative
capacity, civic agencies provides a resource for local bureaucrats to draw upon when conducting
routine tasks, such as identifying out of school children and motivating parents to participate in
school committees. They also provide feedback on how far primary education policies are reaching
local communities. A senior official, who volunteered with HGVS during the literacy movement,
and rose through the local bureaucracy to eventually become the State Project Director for SSA,
described his personal experience of working with civic agencies:
During the literag movement of the 1990s, I traveled to all parts of the state. I went to schools and
interviewed teachers. I don't think it succeeded in getting people literate, but indirecty, it helped
create a spaceforprimay schooling. When I was posted in districts throughout the state, we learned
to work with [localgroups] to understand the publics demands and what needs were unfulfilled,
especially the need to educate girls.. .In that way, broad participation has helped to ensure the
bureaucrag knows what is happening on the ground A system of quickfeedback also makes it
92 Interview with senior officer, HGVS, Shimla, July 25, 2008.
9 Interview with senior official, District Project Office, SSA, Shimla, March 5, 2010.
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easier to keep the local bureaucrats accountable, though sometimes it leads to very pety kinds of
interference. But in the end, that may not be a bad thing at all. 4
As he and others pointed out, encouraging civil society participation carries both benefits
and costs. On the one hand, it provides the state access to local knowledge and participation
from local communities. At the same time, societal groups can challenge the authority of
state and it can be difficult for local agencies to meet their demands. Public officials in
Himachal Pradesh embrace both sides of the deliberative coin.
3.5. Nested Cases of Implementation
Having established above the presence of deliberative norms within the state, I now turn to
showing how they drive policy implementation outcomes in Himachal Pradesh. The cases are
drawn from fieldwork conducted at the level of the state, district and village. I begin with school
planning and infrastructure development at the state-level. Next, I examine the local monitoring
process, and in particular, the role of women's groups (mahila mandals) that have been adopted by the
state in the form of Mother Teacher Associations (MTAs). The analysis then moves down to the
village-level, where I test further the mechanisms of my theory. in two separate village case studies.
The first case study analyzes the positive implementation outcomes primary education in the least-
likely setting of Dharmaur, a poor, predominantly lower caste village outside of Shimla. It
demonstrates how deliberative norms within the state help foster and sustain local collective action
in an otherwise unlikely setting. The second village case study of Kandhar Ghat analyzes poor
implementation in a relatively affluent, predominantly upper caste village located in the Apple Belt, a
region that has undergone rapid economic growth and privatization. The case helps press the limits
of the deliberative model, and in particular, identifies the importance of social cohesion.
3.5.1. Partipatoy Planning
In this section I present findings on school infrastructure planning and development. A
striking feature of the Himachali state is how participatory and broadly consultative the planning
process is, not only for primary education but other policy domains as well.95 In formal terms, the
planning process in Himachal Pradesh appears no different from that of other states. Like other
Indian states, planning in Himachal Pradesh is centrally administered through a State Planning
Board, which is headed by the Secretary of Planning, a senior bureaucrat. Individual departments
like Elementary Education submit their separate work plans and receive feedback and
recommendations.
In practice, however, the planning process in HP involves far more than the centralized
formulation of state plans. Informal "working group" meetings take place between the State
Planning Board and individual departments wherein officials discuss the practical hurdles that local
agencies face in providing public services. During these meetings state planners gain access to field-
94 Interview with senior official, Department of Elementary Education, Himachal Pradesh, July 1, 2008.
9-5 Multiple interviews with state planners, elected representatives and members of civil society.
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based knowledge regarding policy implementation, which allows them to tailor development plans
to better suit the varying needs of communities across the state. As one senior planning official
explained:
The partipatory planning process has been very helpful overall We have been able to allocate
funds andpoliies based on area specfic, local needs. Actually I can make a bold statement that we
have made a clear shiftfrom directive planning to more interactive planning, because there has been a
great deal offlexibiliy given to the departments. They can come back to us with their issues and
then also consult with the legislative side.96
These informal discussions help set the agenda for formal planning meetings. Importantly,
participatory planning in Himachal Pradesh is not just limited to interactions between state planners
and line departments. Along with bureaucrats, elected Members of the Legislate Assembly (MLAs)
and civic agencies are encouraged to participate in the planning process as well. Public officials I
interviewed see the engagement with elected representatives and civic agencies as essential for
ensuring that the planning process is responsive to the needs of citizens.97 As another senior
bureaucrat in the Planning Department described to me:
The level of consultation is a unique feature ofplanning here thatyou don'tfind in India. We
convene regular meetings with public representatives. We request the ML As to share their priorities
and other information about their constituents' needs that would be relevant for planning. Before
coming to these meetings, we ask ML As to discuss with their constituents and local administrators
at the district, block and panchayat level what they need'8
State planners in HP find it beneficial to work with elected representatives, who can provide input
on the needs facing their local constituents. The participatory approach helps address the varying
geographic and socioeconomic conditions across the state.
Turning more specifically to the domain of primary education policy, consider how
participatory planning has shaped school infrastructure development. According to India's SSA
policy framework, and more recently, the Right to Education Act, every village should have access
to a primary school within certain specified norms regarding school distance and child population
size. The criteria prescribed by the central government are a maximum of 1 km distance from a
village to build a primary school and 3 km for a middle school. Given the varying conditions across
India, state governments are afforded the opportunity to adjust these criteria to better suit the needs
of their populations.
Over the course of many formal and informal meetings, state planners in Himachal Pradesh
identified the limitations of working within the official norms handed down by New Delhi. In light
of the geography and settlement patterns within the hills, they chose to relax the official criteria, a
decision that reflected an understanding of the conditions facing hill communities across the state.
As it was declared in a planning report submitted to the central government:
96 Interview with official, Planning Department, Himachal Pradesh, June 28, 2008.
97 Multiple interviews with state officials across departments.
98 Interview with senior official, Planning Department, Himachal Pradesh, July 14, 2008.
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[I]t is felt that the distance norm prescribed by the Government of India does not
reflect the actual picture in the hilly terrain, as the real distance covered in hilly areas
is much more, as the habitations are scattered. Unlike in the plains, one to three km
in a hilly terrain often means climbing down one ridge and climbing up another
and/or crossing a rivulet. All this twice a day is not easy for elementary school-going
children. Hence it is felt that the government of Himachal Pradesh should formulate
its own policy of providing accessibility of schools keeping the hilly terrain in mind."
The decision to adapt the technical criteria for building new schools would seem little more than
common sense to officials in Himachal Pradesh. Such adaptations were necessary to meet the
objective of school expansion in the harsh physical environment of the hill region. Yet they
reflected the underlying value that public agencies placed on local knowledge in the implementation
process.
The negotiation around official policy for school planning and development did not end
there. Public agencies at the local-level would deliberate further, in conjunction with elected officials
and civic groups, to determine where new schools needed to be built. Although state planners had
modified the criteria for new schools to better suit the hill population, local public officials would
break even those, more relaxed, requirements. Take for example the primary school that had been
constructed in Shalai. A tiny habitation comprised of only eighteen families, Shalai was the last place
one might expect to find a primary school. To reach the village from the local education
bureaucracy in Shimla involved an hour and half long journey by bus, followed by an hour long hike
down a steep ravine.
When visiting the primary school in Shalai, I was surprised to find more staff than students.
The school had two teachers and a cook for the Midday Meal, all of whom catered to the two
children who were enrolled. Both students were in school the day I visited, along with a third child
who was actually of pre-primary age, just big enough to fit into the free uniform that was provided
by the state under SSA. Shalai's primary school had been built in 1998. Around that time,
enrollment was significantly higher, approximately 16 children according to the head teacher. A
highly active women's association within the village, which had been working on adult literacy under
the guidance of HGVS, helped organize families in Shalai to collectively demand local agencies to
build a primary school within the village. Prior to that, children from the village had to travel 4km
uphill to reach nearest school. Parents in the village were particularly concerned for small children,
who could not easily make the journey. Yet even with a population of 16 children, a primary school
that covered grades 1-5 implied only three children per grade.
In a matter of only ten years, the child population in Shalai dwindled ever further, as families
had fewer children and some even left the village to reside closer to Shimla proper. Both parents
and school teachers feared that local agencies might shut down the school. During routine
monitoring visits, local officials came to learn about the low student enrollment at the school, and
even warned the school headmaster that enrollment was too low to justify a primary school.
Curious as to how a school continued to operate with only two students and three staff members, I
met with the gram pradhan of the panchayat. He shared in my amazement:
() Excerpt taken from Himachal Pradesh State Development Report (Planning Commission 2005: 139).
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Even we are allpleasanty surprised to see the school is still running. The Department [of
Education] told us that the school was in good standing but that they could not send us additional
teachers because the enrollment was too low. So we put funds togetherfrom the panchayat to hire an
extra teacherfor oneyear.
The provision of primary schools for habitations with such tiny child populations clearly violated
official norms. Yet not only have such schools persisted in Himachal Pradesh, local agencies
continue to propose new ones. For officials in the education bureaucracy, the flouting of official
rules is understood to be a normal part of addressing community needs. Over many lengthy
conversations with local officials in Shimla, I raised the issue of infrastructure expansion and how
"need" was understood, particularly in relation to official rules regarding school provision. By and
large, they expressed the view that "need" was not defined by the rules, but by local conditions. As
one official explained:
Our mission is to ensure that every village should have a primary school as far as possible. With a
very scattered population, travel over long distance poses a challenge. No student should have to
walk more than 1-1.5 km to reach aprimay school.. .And in some places, we've opened primary
schools evenforfive students, like if there's a glacier point or unbridgeable river or stream that can't
be crossed in the monsoons. We take the view that we should open special schools there, even if it is
justforfive students.
The urge to carry out the mission of universal primary education, even when doing so violated
official rules, may give one the impression that public officials in Himachal Pradesh are somehow
intrinsically motivated to go beyond the call of duty. Indeed, over the course of fieldwork, I would
hear countless times that people in the hill region were naturally more "godfearing" than society in the
plains, and that officials were more inclined to carry out their duties, even when no one was
watching. Yet infrastructure development in Himachal Pradesh was not characterized by a close
adherence to official duty. To the contrary, public officials were largely engaged in collective rule-
breaking. In fact, many officials expressed to me privately the concern that local agencies were
accorded too much flexibility and that an excess of rules and regulations had been broken along the
way. According to a senior IAS officer who once served as the Secretary of Education for the state:
Schools have been opened where there is some need but not too much need... Often this has been done
without any proper planning or compliance with oficial noms. And nowyou cannot close schools
once they are already opened, otherniseyou get agitations from the public.
Others I spoke with expressed a related concern that policy implementation had fallen prey to local
politics, and as a result, school expansion had become "haphazard" and needed to be "rationali zced'
through tighter rules. Evidence that officials in Himachal Pradesh were intrinsically more motivated
to go beyond the call of duty, especially in comparison to their counterparts in other states, was
difficult to establish. Residents of the adjacent hill state of Uttarakhand were no less keen to
describe themselves as "godfearing," and yet bureaucrats there had a very different notion of what
their public duty required.
Rather than deliberative norms, might it be that officials in HP's education bureaucracy was
simply responding to local political pressures? Upon closer inspection, it would not be unfair to
characterize the process of educational planning in Himachal Pradesh as cientelist. The local
demands that public agencies are exposed can be characterized as political. Whether it was to
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identify the location for constructing a new school building, appointing additional staff, or even
upgrade existing facilities, public officials were subject to local political interference. Many officials
themselves characterized the system as patronage-based, involving a lengthy chain of political
influence from the state legislator down to the panchayat pradhan. As one senior bureaucrat put it:
With this whole decentralization push, wefindpradhans have become thekedars [contractors]. A
huge kind of a network has emerged in terms of contractorship, for the school building and other
facilities. Thenfor appointing the school teacher and cooking staff again it provides opportunities to
dispense patronage... That is how communities are involved in school development. That is whatyou
call a demand or need based system. ""'
The official's description accords with what I observed at the village-level. In Shalai, for example,
the women's association was quick to have the village pradhan appoint one of its members as a cook
in the primary school when the Midday Meal program started running in 2002. Soon thereafter, the
group pressed the local education bureaucracy to have a kitchen shed built in the school.
While I cannot reject the hypothesis that political pressures may have helped sustain the
deliberative practices within the state, to characterize the implementation process as cientelist does
not adequate capture the nature of relationships between bureaucrats and citizens. The notion that
public bureaucracies can work collectively to advance programmatic goals like universal primary
education while submitting to particularistic demands runs against the expectations of the literature
on clientelism and democracy within India. This literature tends to presume that clientelism
necessarily undermines the universal provision of public goods and services, particularly in light of
caste and other social divisions that prevail in India's Hindi belt (Chandra 2004; Keefer and
Khemani 2004; Stokes, Dunning et al. 2013).
In the face of a cientelistic system, it is through the tight observance of formal rules and
procedures that bureaucracies exert autonomy, protecting themselves from political interference.
Yet in the education bureaucracy of Himachal Pradesh, I find that prevailing norms led local
officials to break the rules and draw input from non-state actors in school planning and
development. Political interference was embraced as a way of identifying "needs." As a senior
official who helped lead the SSA State Project Office explained:
Elected leaders can be very effective in connecting us to people on the ground Some might see that as
interference, but what is 'interference'? It is just a word In the end, the MLA is a public
representative and we must seek them out to understand the people's voice on the ground And they
too have to cooperate with the bureaucray to get things done. 1()'
To be sure, public officials also had problems with political interference. With the expansion of
schooling across the state, the education bureaucracy was increasingly overrun by particularistic
demands. For example, MLAs and other local politicians would push for new schools, especially
around election time, inserting themselves in the decision-making process regarding the placement
and transfer of school teachers.1 12
100 Interview with senior official, Department of Education, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh.
101 Interview with Principal Secretary, Rural Development, July 15, 2008.
102 Senior officials in Himachal Pradesh have written on patronage politics and the problem of politically-motivated
teacher transfers within the primary school system. See for example: Sood (2003) and Sanan (2004).
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These sorts of problems notwithstanding, however, the participation of the public was
understood by bureaucrats as the appropriate way to identify needs and carry out the task of
education planning. In some cases, elected leaders would assist the bureaucracy without interfering
much at all. As one MLA from the Congress Party in Shimla pointed out:
Whenever there is an issue in the village primary school we stay alert to the activities of the PTA
[Parent Teacher Assodation] and panchayatpradhan. They tell us their problems and we can even
contact the CM [Chief Minister], but mor often we have them contact the concerned departments.
SSA is providing resources that they can access directly, and by now I would say that most are
capable of making demands on their own... Parties come and go with each election, so it doesn't
matter whether it is a Congress or BJP-led government. In the end, they have to work with the
administration.103
Even in a "patronage democracy" like India's, where both politicians and citizens view state
resources as a means to further their personal ends, policy implementation within HP sheds light on
how bureaucratic actors can mediate cientelistic processes.1 0 4 Deliberative norms encourage
bureaucrats to identify opportunities to coordinate implementation with elected leaders who they
may otherwise prefer to ignore or avoid.
Beyond infrastructure, the participatory approach to planning in Himachal Pradesh has
yielded other context-specific adaptations to improve the delivery of primary schooling. They have
led, for example, to the adoption of special educational sub-plans for interior regions that are
difficult to access, as well as for tribal populations like the Gujjars and other marginalized groups
who tend to be neglected by the state. Take for example the development of the annual academic
calendar. The varying altitudes and topography of the Himalayan region creates great disparities in
climate conditions across HP. Some regions of the state experience weather patterns more akin to
the plains while other parts can get snowed in for several months at a time, making it very difficult
for children to attend school on a regular basis. In addition, children tend to help their families with
agricultural labor and other domestic chores, especially during peak harvest months, which places
stress on school attendance.
To address regional variation in climate and agricultural seasons, the Department of
Elementary Education has created academic calendars specific to each region within the state. Local
district administration is provided further flexibility to make adjustments to the school calendar
based on prevailing weather patterns and agricultural seasons. The state's ability to plan for
something as mundane as climate may not seem worthy of mention. Yet such moves are rare within
India's highly centralized education system. Public agencies in adjacent provinces like Uttar Pradesh,
for example, have tended to overlook these aspects of education planning. By making simple, yet
critical, local adjustments to policy, like the flexible school calendar, public agencies in Himachal
Pradesh have helped mitigate regional disparities in primary school attendance.
103 Interview with MLA, Congress Party, March 6, 2010.
104 The characterization of India as a patronage democracy has been made forcefully by Chandra (2004). Although she
examines the role of patronage ties through the lens of the ethnic party system in Uttar Pradesh, even in states like
Himachal Pradesh where caste identities have not been so politicized, patronage networks remain a primary means
through which citizens access the state, which raises the following question: Why does patronage democracy reinforce
exclusionary tendencies within some states while facilitating the implementation of universal policies like primary
schooling in others?
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3.5.2. Mother-TeacherAssociations and LocalMonitoring
Among the most interesting and distinctive features of policy implementation within
Himachal Pradesh has been the ability of traditionally marginalized groups to make collective
demands on public agencies. In the case of primary education, women's groups have played a
critical role in collectively monitoring the delivery of services. Yet the question of how the state has
been able to evoke and sustain their participation, and why village women's groups have been much
more effective in monitoring primary education in Himachal Pradesh as compared to other north
Indian states, has not been explored. In this section I demonstrate how public officials in Himachal
Pradesh help foster the participation of women's groups in collective monitoring primary education.
Much has been written about women's associations in India's Himalayan Region. Whereas
today the creation of such associations, particularly in the form of Self Help Groups (SHGs), has
become a matter of public policy throughout India, the development of women's association within
Himachal Pradesh was often informal and organic. Known as mahila mandals, these groups have a
long history of working at the village level, effectively organizing around a wide range of issues,
including the management of forest resources, water and sanitation, women's justice and early
childcare. "5 In some parts of Himachal Pradesh, they have even formed activist networks that cut
across caste and class differences to address women's rights and other critical social issues. For
instance, a voluntary organization known as SUTRA (The Social for Social Uplift through Rural
Action) has helped organize a number of pilgrimages (padayatras) by women's groups across the state
to Shimla, where they have led agitations around public policies facing women, including domestic
violence laws, the sale of liquor and pension schemes for single women.
The active participation of women's associations in Himachal Pradesh in part reflects the
significant role played by women in the rural economy and society across the Himayalan region.
They perform the bulk of agricultural work and participate in household decision-making,
particularly in areas of child health and education. Their contribution to these and other policy
domains also reflects efforts taken by the Himachali state. Public agencies take a keen interest in
working with women's associations and have even tried promoting them further at the village level.
As a senior official working in the Department of Rural Development explained:
We have found the mahila mandals quite helpful in our Total Sanitation Campaign. Also we have
seen them work against alcoholism and other social issues in the village. They are active within the
communi_4 and we ty to rope them in more and more.
The active participation of women's associations is perhaps most evident in the sphere of primary
education. According to the PROBE report, which compared the state of primary education across
north India, these, largely informal, women's groups have been even more effective in collectively
monitoring their local primary schools than formal institutions like village panchayats and Village
115 For an extensive discussion on women's village associations in Himachal Pradesh, see Berry (1997). On the role of
women's village associations in natural resource management and other areas of development, see the following studies:
(Davidson-Hunt 1995; Bingeman, Berkes et al. 2004; Mendhapurkar 2004; Bandooni, Negi et al. 2005; Agrawal and
Chhatre 2006).
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Education Committees (PROBE Team 1999). Development experts have also pointed out their
impact on student attendance and delivery of the Midday Meal program.106
In light of their contributions, women's groups in Himachal Pradesh have been granted
official recognition and authority over primary schooling through the creation of Mother Teacher
Associations (MTAs). The Himachali state's ability to recognize the importance of women and
provide a space for them to participate in the education system reflects underlying norms that
encourage officials to incorporate local knowledge into the implementation process. According to a
senior official in the SSA State Project Office:
Over the course of the [school expansion across the state, we found that women contribute more to
the primary schools. The gents are distant, either buy working or doing something else. But the
women are empowered and show more concern on a day-to-day basis... Even far into the interior
areas, like Lahaul and Spiti. Thereyou willfind the women most active."7
The decision to adopt the MTA structure grew out of informal deliberations within the bureaucracy
and between the state and civic agencies like HGVS, who shared experiences working with women's
associations in the field with state planners. The education bureaucracy invested in the concept
further by having HGVS develop "model" MTAs that could serve as examples for public officials to
learn from. As a seasoned fieldworker from HGVS who had contributed to the MTA project
recounted:
We adopted model MTAs in the most backward villages. Over the course of afewyears, the
MTAs turned their schools around We showed the [Education] Department what they [the
women] are capable of achieving. And it was after seeing it work in a practical way that the
government came to embrace the MTA concept.""
The decision to institute MTAs within HP should also be seen in light of the fact that most other
states in India adhere to the administrative structure outlined by the central government under SSA.
As mentioned earlier, according to SSA's administrative prescriptions, the nodal agency for primary
schooling at the village-level is the Village Education Committee (VEC), a formal body that is
overseen by the pradhan of the gram panchayat. While panchayats and VECs are thought to be
more active in Himachal Pradesh as compared to other states, their efforts have largely been
restricted to school infrastructure and the expenditure of SSA school grants. As an official within
the Education Department explained:
The VEC was created because of the school grants that must be spent under SSA. So their main
focus from the beginning was driven by spending [kharcha] ... But the MTA is more involved as an
actual school committee. They [the women] make sure that the schoolfunctions, that children attend
and that the food thy eat is nutritious. They are more active.'"9
106 Based on their analysis of the data from the PROBE survey, Dreze and Kingdon (2001) find that that the presence of
women's groups in Himachal Pradesh help explain higher student enrollment and attendance, particularly for girls, as
well as better implementation of the state's Midday Meal Program.
107 Interview with senior official, State Project Office, SSA, Himachal Pradesh, July 8, 2008.
108 Interview with fieldworker, HGVS, Shimla.
109 Interview with senior official, State Project Office, SSA, Himachal Pradesh, July 3, 2008.
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While recognizing the importance of local democratic institutions like the gram panchayat, public
officials in the education bureaucracy also expressed the concern that panchayats may not have the
interest or capability of carrying out local monitoring of primary schools. The panchayat pradhan is
responsible for implementing numerous other governmental schemes, many of which are more
lucrative than primary education."" As a consequence, issues with service delivery in primary
schools can easily get crowded out by other policies and programs. By contrast, the MTA is
comprised of concerned mothers and has a very specific objective, which is to ensure the
functioning of the primary school.
A more pessimistic view might be that the creation of MTAs was yet another attempt by the
state to establish formal agencies without substantive rights. Yet efforts within the education
bureaucracy in Himachal Pradesh have gone far beyond just establishing these groups in name. As I
observed in Shimla District, local agencies carry out monthly meetings and capacity-building
exercises with MTAs at the block level."' Crucially, the local administration made it a priority to
ensure that female administrators, including the District Gender Coordinator under SSA, attended
these meetings since women were more likely to approach them.1 1 2 These engagements allowed for
the exchange of ideas and information, giving public officials exposure to problems on the ground,
while providing local communities access to the state. As a block-level official explained:
Our MTAs meet on the seventh of evey month. We encourage them to share any message they need
to give to the government. They can tell us about school repairs, problems with the Midday Meal,
and the teaching at the school. And we also pass along information on government programs and
any new schemes that are coming up in education. In that way, we stay connected to local
communities and they also maintain ties with the school system. 11
Consider for example the MTA meetings held in Chiyog, a large panchayat outside of Shimla
comprised of many scattered villages. Focus group discussion conducted with five MTAs from the
area revealed that their primary schools faced a common problem. School teachers had been
arriving late to school by an hour each day. In some of the villages they would arrive more than two
hours late, by which time the school children would already be having their midday meal. They
MTA members expressed these concerns during meetings, which were attended by local officials
and school headmasters. Over the course of their discussions, it emerged that most of the school
teachers working in the area took the same bus each day from the town center of Shimla. As the
school headmasters explained, the bus from Shimla would often depart late, which led them to miss
their connection to another bus that went to Chiyog. Seeing that the bus delay was severely
affecting a number of primary schools in Chiyog, officials from the education bureaucracy
approached the local transportation agency to discuss the matter. They found common agreement
in scheduling the bus to leave Shimla a half hour earlier each morning. Ever since then, the MTA
members reported, school teachers have been arriving on time.
The solution identified through the MTA meetings in Chiyog is one ordinary example of
how public officials working collectively with women's groups can solve implementation problems
111 Panchayats in Himachal Pradesh exercise control over village infrastructure projects, access to BPL (Below Poverty
Line) card and more recently, identification cards for MNREGA, India's national rural employment guarantee scheme.
I1 I attended one such meeting in Kotkhai Block, where close to 300 women attended to learn about India's Right to
Education Act.
112 Interview with local official, SSA, Shimla. March 8, 2010.
I13 Interview, Block Resource Coordinator, SSA, Shimla.
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effectively. No less important, however, is the space that such meetings create for women's groups,
and local communities more broadly, to learn the practice of citizenship. As MTA members
expressed during our focus group discussions, these meetings were among the few opportunities
they had to gain outside exposure, discuss issues with groups from other villages and connect
directly with public officials. Furthermore, the fact that public officials listened to their experiences
and responded with something tangible, helped generate confidence in their own collective
capabilities to organize around primary schooling. As one MTA members put it:
The men [in the village] are always saying to us, "You are all illiterate. What is the purpose ofyour
group?" And we have also asked ourselves that sometimes. But when the teachers started arriving
on time, we didn't have to explain anymore. So what if we are not as educated? Our voice also
reaches the state.
For marginalized citizens, the confidence in knowing that one's voice can reach the state is no small
matter. Beyond formal recognition, the practice of expressing local needs and concerns to public
officials during MTA meetings has shaped their understanding of how they, as citizens, relate to the
state. The women's groups in Chiyog credit their experiences with the local state for helping to
strengthen their collective participation in primary schooling. With the participation of women's
groups, citizens and local agencies have collectively solved implementation problems on the ground
and improved the functioning of primary schools.
3.5.3. Making Primary School Work: The Case of Dharmaur"
The findings so far have shown that deliberative norms lead public agencies to carry out
school planning and monitoring activities effectively with the support of civic agencies. To
investigate whether and how such norms shape governance further down the chain of
implementation, I now present findings from the village-level. As the following case study
demonstrates, local public agencies can help foster and sustain collective action, improving the
delivery of primary education, even in a least-likely setting.
Dharmaur is a relatively small village (pop. 384) located a few kilometers downhill from a
main road connecting Shimla to the rest of Mashobra Block. Despite being situated relatively close
to the state capital, socioeconomic conditions in Dharmaur were typical in many respects of more
far-flung villages. Families relied primarily on subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry. The
main crops were wheat, rice and a few vegetables (e.g. tomato and cabbage), which were grown for
household consumption. Proximity to Shimla provided economic opportunities for young men in
the village, some of whom earned supplementary income as taxicab drivers. The social composition
of Dharmaur was mostly lower caste with notable fragmentation alongjati (sub-caste) lines. There
was a village Devta Committee and a few auspicious sites for honoring the village Devta. However,
unlike wealthier villages, the Dharmaur did not have a temple association since residents lacked the
114 Focus Group Discussion, MTA and women's association, Chiyog Panchayat, Shimla.
I15 The findings of this case study are based on four weeks of fieldwork in Dharmaur, conducted in February-March
2010. During that time, I lived in rented accommodation nearby the village and visited daily, sometimes staying in the
village overnight.
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economic wherewithal to construct a temple. For a summary of village indicators, see the Table 3.1.
in the chapter Appendix.
I selected Dharmaur as a case study village for several reasons. First, given its small size and
considerable hiking distance from a motorable road, it was not a likely place to draw attention from
public officials. Nor was it a desirable location for school teachers to seek a posting.1 1 6 Second, the
economy of Dharmaur reflected the general pattern of subsistence agriculture and small land
holdings found across Shimla and other districts of HP, making it less of an exceptional case. And
finally, the caste composition of Dharmaur made it an unlikely candidate for local collective action
around primary schooling. Education in rural India has long been the province of upper castes, and
studies of Indian bureaucracy suggest that public agencies are less responsive the needs of lower
caste groups. In addition, the literature on ethnic divisions and public goods suggests that villages
that are more fragmented along caste lines are less likely to exhibit collective action around public
goods provision. Given the preponderance of lower castes (70%) and fragmentation into five sub-
caste groups, the social composition of Dharmaur would seem to pose a major hurdle to local
collective action around primary education.
For all the above reasons, Dharmaur presents a least-likely case for primary education to be
implemented effectively. To the extent that we find deliberative bureaucratic norms encourage
community participation around primary schooling in Dharmaur, we have greater confidence that
such norms are likely to produce a similar effect in other villages. To my surprise, I observed high
levels community involvement at the local primary school in Dharmaur, which in many respects,
was in better condition than schools I had visited in wealthier, upper caste villages. The school
building had been newly refurbished, the classrooms were well-lit and the walls were adorned with
materials for teaching and learning. The bathrooms were in working order and construction of the
kitchen shed for the Midday Meal Program was nearly complete. Based on my direct observations
and what parents reported, the two teachers posted at the school arrived to school on time daily, and
actually spent time in the classroom teaching. Based on a survey I conducted of households in
Dharmaur, all children of primary school going age had enrolled in school and not one had dropped
out. Notwithstanding several, relatively inexpensive private school options available nearby, all but
one family in the village were ending their children to the government primary school.
According to elders in the village, a women's association emerged in Dharmaur during the
late 1980s. At that time, it was an informal group of women from a few households who
participated in collective agriculture and labor sharing. The women would come together during
harvest season and combine their efforts to collect the harvest. They would also help each other on
a more spontaneous basis. For instance, they would all pitch in if one of their families needed help
rebuilding their home after a storm. In the mid-1990s, fieldworkers from HGVS began developing
a volunteer network in the village focusing on the state's adult literacy program. Volunteers drew
much support from the women's association and HGVS helped to get the group registered officially
by the end of 1996. By that time, the group had a core membership of approximately twenty-five
women from different households, though many more households were connected informally
through ties of kinship. The volunteer network established by HGVS helped set up an Adult
Literacy Center in Dharmaur and would routinely disseminate newsletters throughout the village on
16As village studies of primary education in India have shown, larger habitations that are connected to motorable
arteries are more likely to be monitored by the local bureaucracy. School teachers tend to prefer such postings as well.
See, for example, Dreze and Kingdon (2001).
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sustainable agriculture, education, maternal health, and other salient issues. The women's
association became the nucleus of the network and HGVS helped guide them on how to address
their developmental needs.
The women's association soon expanded its efforts to issues related to child welfare.
Members started coming together each year to clear village pathways of dangerous weeds that
caused children to slip on their way to school. Under guidance from HGVS volunteers, they also
began taking an interest in early child health, disseminating information on the state's immunization
campaigns and nutritional programs for infants. When local health workers conducted rounds at the
village, women from the group would volunteer to help them identify families requiring assistance
with deliveries and neonatal care. A focus on primary schooling was a natural extension of the
group's work. Early on when the group was still developing, parents faced many difficulties trying
to address problems at the school:
Before the mahila mandal [women's association] became active at the school, nobody raised their
voice. The school teachers used to come late, and when parents complained they would shoo us away,
telling us: "It's not our du_4 to teach."
Individual parents in Dharmaur, who found it difficult to work with teachers to address the
deficiencies at the primary school, turned to the women's association for help. After discussing the
matter collectively, the group decided to advance a complaint about the school teachers to the local
administration. Many were surprised to find officers at the district ready and willing to listen to their
situation, and after witnessing one of the teachers get transferred from the school for dereliction of
duty, they gained faith in the system. Expectations regarding the benefits of collective action around
primary education increased. As the head of the women's association retold their experience,
Initially, we were hesitant to work with school teachers, but the positive response from the
administration helped build our confidence. Now MTA members visit the school regularly and if
the teacher comes late, we tell them kindly, 'please should start coming on time"! And in that way
our relations with teachers have also improved One teacher even helped to enroll disabled children
in our village.'18
Local administrative support came in other forms as well. For example, the primary school
suffered initially from no electricity and children often had to work in dark classrooms. The lack of
electricity connections (and proper ventilation) is a common problem in rural primary schools
throughout India, and classes are often held outside in the school verandah or under a tree. Fierce
rains during the monsoon season can, however, make it impossible to hold classes outside for
several months out of the school year. To address this problem, the women's association in
Dharmaur came together, and with help from the school headmaster, petitioned the local education
bureaucracy to have a power line installed at the school. When officials came to survey the problem,
they learned that the school had been constructed too far downhill to reach the nearest power line,
but with the help of village residents, they found a way to connect the building safely. The women's
association held a celebration to inaugurate the primary school's first day with electricity, publicizing
their own efforts along with the support they received from local officials.
117 Interview with parent of school children and member of the village women's association, Dharmaur, February 17,
2010.
118 Focus Group Discussion with women's association, Dharmaur, February 9, 2010.
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Experiencing these positive returns to collective action was encouraging for the women's
association and helped them persuade families in Dharmaur to support the primary school further.
For example, families started making financial contributions to ensure that the electricity connection
continued to work and that routine maintenance on the school building took place. A mother
described how the women's group organized the community to make further investments in the
local primary school:
It was our mahila mandal [women's association] that got the wiring done for electricity at the
school.. .But the efforts did not end there. Oneyear, thg raisedfunds from within the village to hire
an additional teacher at the primary school, collecting more from the better-offamilies and less from
poorfamilies. They even got people together to help build an additional school room with their own
labor."9
By organizing funds and labor, the women's association was essentially complementing efforts by
the state, and in many ways, helped fill gaps in the state's primary education policy. School teachers
in Dhamaur drew inspiration from their efforts:
The women contribute in areas where we get less support [from the state]. Recently, they helped us
send children to represent the school at the district volleyball tournament. They also helped purchase
sporting equipment for the school and a carom board as well.
Eventually, the women's association gained official recognition as a Mother Teacher Association
(MTA). As a formal body, the MTA assumed a greater role at the school and the Department of
Elementary Education extended further support to the groups. For instance, the local Block
Education Officer organized meetings throughout the year with MTA members. These meetings
provided an opportunity for women to learn about various state policies as well as voice their
concerns back to the administration.
The MTA in Dharmaur, which for all practical purposes was embedded in the women's
association, expanded its efforts into new areas of policy implementation, such as mobilizing parents
to attend parent-teacher meetings and contributing vegetables to help make the Midday Meal more
enjoyable for the students. As the school headmaster described:
We hold quarterly meetings with the MTA. They focus more on the child and issues with teaching
and learning. The IVEC, meanwhile, only deals with school building-related expenses. But
actually, we find that the MTA oversees that as well, and we receive a lot of help from the women.
Whenever we ask, they get families to contribute two rupees each to help out children who can't
afford shoes or a thali [steelplate]. The women also keep a check on the midday meal to make sure
the food is good qualiy and hygenic.2 1
That the women's association played a greater role in policy implementation than the even the VEC,
the nodal agency mandated at the village-level under the policy framework of SSA, may not be
119 Interview with parent, Dharmaur.
1211 Interview with school teacher, Primary School Dharmaur, February 12, 2010. Carom is a popular India game played
on a plywood board and is similar in concept to billiards.
121 Interview with school headmaster, Primary School Dharmaur, February 10, 2010.
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surprising. Unlike the VEC, whose existence was in large part a formality under state policy, the
women's association had a history of organizing collectively and became involved at the school out
of a collective concern for the children of Dharmaur. Yet the dominant discourse around
decentralization, which has come to inform the administrative structure of India's primary education
system, fails to recognize the qualitative differences across groups. Informal associations like
Dharmaur's women's association may well have fallen through the cracks were it not for the
deliberative norms within the Himachali state, which encouraged local officials to encourage their
participation and work collectively to address their needs.
3.5.4. Particpation under Strain in Kandhar Ghat?2 2
The findings so far have shown that bureaucratic norms in Himachal Pradesh approximate
the deliberative model, and through the hypothesized mechanisms of bureaucratic behavior and
civic action, lead to the positive implementation outcomes.
The limitations of the deliberative model need to be taken into consideration as well. In this
final case study of Kandhar Ghat, I demonstrate the limitations facing the Himachali state with the
rise of privatization and changing social attitudes towards the public school system.
Notwithstanding the bureaucracy's responsiveness to local needs, it has been unable to keep pace
with these changes. The expansion of rural private schooling and dwindling status of the public
school system has contributed to social stratification, undermining efforts by the state to sustain
local collective action around primary schooling. These findings suggest that the deliberative model
in Himachal Pradesh has relied on the underlying fabric of social cohesion, which is now
increasingly under stain with economic growth.
Kandhar Ghat (pop. 657) is a relatively large village located in Shimla's Theog Block. It falls
within Himachal's "Apple Belt," a region famous for its lush apple orchards. Surplus apple
production had over the last decade come to replace subsistence farming as the primary source of
livelihood for residents of the region. Some households also produced off season vegetables
(cabbage, peas and tomatoes) to diversify their agricultural portfolio. New income growth in
Kandhar Ghat could be discerned immediately from the smell of fresh pine, used to construct
several brand new, multistory houses throughout the village. And although the steep, downward
sloping mud road leading to the village was hardly finished, expensive vehicles had already sprung
up next to houses. For a summary of village indicators in Kandhar Ghat, see Table 3.1. in the
Chapter Appendix.
In sharp contrast to Dharmaur, the village examined earlier, I selected Kandhar Ghat
precisely because it displayed many of the socioeconomic ingredients one would associate with
effective governance, particularly in the domain of education. A wealthy, largely upper caste
(Thakur) community, residents of Kandhar Ghat took pride in their educational achievements.
Many were employed by public agencies, as school teachers, policemen and even local
administrators. The prevalence of "servicemen" gave the village substantial access to the state.
Residents also displayed a capacity for collective action. During the time of fieldwork, a beautiful
122 The findings of this case study are based on close to four weeks of fieldwork in Kandhar Ghat, conducted in March-
April 2010. I spent most of that time living as a guest with a family in the village.
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new temple had been recently re-constructed through their joint efforts. Lower caste residents had
also contributed to the temple's construction even though prevailing caste norms forbade their entry
inside the building.' The temple association of Kandhar Ghat had a long history of collective
action. A much older structure (a few hundred years old at least) dedicated to Shambonath, the village
deity, had only recently been discovered by residents.
For the reasons outlined above, Kandhar Ghat would seem a likely setting for my theory to
hold. To the extent that deliberative norms do not encourage local community participation around
primary schooling, we are pressed to reevaluate and further refine the theory. Far from what I had
initially expected, there was little evidence for community involvement in the government primary
school in Kandhar Ghat. If anything, collective action around primary schooling had waned.
Although the school's physical infrastructure was adequate, the classrooms were poorly maintained
and few teaching-learning materials were on display. The school building's electrical connection had
not been repaired for years and there was no running water for the toilets. Through direct
observation, along with interviews of parents and school teachers, I found that teachers were often
late or absent and little teaching activity took place at the school.
A survey I conducted of households in Kandhar Ghat revealed that most families were
either educating their children in the urban center of Shimla or else sending them to one of two
private schools in the nearby town of Deha, approximately 10km outside the village. Out of 57
students enrolled in the government primary school, 35 belonged to Nepali families who were not
even residents of India. With high demand for agricultural labor in the Apple Belt, these families
engaged in seasonal migration to work in the orchards, and local teachers had enrolled their children
to ensure that the primary school would not be targeted for closure by the local administration. The
remaining 22 students belonged to Kandhar Ghat, 12 of which belonged to the SC (Aya)
community, while the remaining 10 came from upper caste (Thakur) families.
During another visit to the government primary school, I found most of the teachers sitting
together chatting and reading newspapers at the start of the morning session. They showed no sign
of alarm or hesitation when I entered their office and spoke candidly regarding the problems in
eliciting community participation, as well as their own delinquent behavior. One of the teachers
summarized their general perception:
We ty holding monthly meetings but no parents care to show up. The only reason they send their
children to this school is because they don't have to pay any fees. The 'cream'goes to private schooL
The rest who come here have no ability whatsoever.2 1
The movement away from the government school system was a relatively recent phenomenon. In
fact, it was only ten years prior that community members had come together to petition the state to
upgrade the primary school to the middle school level (grades 6-8). Yet enrollment in the middle
school dwindled quickly. There was some debate among the school teachers as to why parents in
Kandhar Ghat had come to prefer private schooling. After listening to the discussion, the middle
school headmaster shared his observations:
123 I was granted access to the temple in Kandhar Ghat only after confirming my upper caste status with the village priest
(pandi).
124 Focus Group Discussion with school teachers, Primary School Kandhar Ghat, April 15, 2011.
101
Why is enrollment in government schools declining? Why are so few children from the village coming
here? Are we not teaching? That must be it! The main issue is that we're not teaching. The
child's educational base doesn'tget developed and parents are seeing that. As teachers, our political
role has become the biggest obstacle. But these things we can't say out in the open. Hereyou'llfind
teachers who take one-and-a-half to two months offfrom work to educate their own children in
Shimla. Ifyou ask me, teachers' children should go to the government school Why do our kids go
to private school? It must mean that we have no any faith in ourselves!12 1
The headmaster's point was reiterated by residents of Kandhar Ghat, who expressed a clear
preference for private schooling. Many felt that the task of monitoring the teachers was too time
consuming and difficult, so they had come to rely on proxy indicators of quality. Chief among these
was the simple observation that no government school teachers in the village were sending their
own children to the government primary school.
However, it was not merely the lack of teaching that irked parents. There was also a growing
sense that the government primary school was catering more to children belonging to socially
disadvantaged groups, to the detriment of children coming from more affluent families:
No teaching goes on in the government primary school The only children that go there come from
families that don't care about their education. And that keeps other children behind Vikas'father
[a respected community member] was teaching there so I thought it should be good, but then I visited
the school and also saw the 'sodey' where the other children come from. I told my husband about it,
that the teachers don't assign homework, and the parents don't care and give less guidance. So we
had our children moved to the private school... But really, the private school is also nonsense. All
the government oficers in our village did their schooling from the government primary school But
when I saw the environment at the school and 'sode'y' of the children studying there, I dedded to pull
my son out infourth grade. Since then I have put him in the Saraswati Vidya Mandir [private
school].126
To be seen as part of the "good society" (uch varg) in Kandhar Ghat had become increasingly costly
with the accumulation of wealth, and residents were mindful of the changes that had taken place in
their village. A new culture of consumerism and material display had crept into social life. The
education of children, once the basis for collective action within Kandhar Ghat had become an
arena for social differentiation. Families sought distinction in the competition for social status.
According to a resident who had once served as the head of the PTA for the government primary
school:
People just want to show of that 'look I'm spending money on my kids.' If they paid attention to
the government school here rather than sending kids to private school it would run much better. But
people don't come togetherfor PTA meetings. Everyone is just busy with their own work. If we
came together it would help. Take the middle school We have five teaching posts but only one is
filled with a regular teacher. The rest are para-teachers. Nobody came together to discuss getting
another regular teacher. Instead of coming together people are running to private school'27
125 Focus Group Discussion with school teachers, Primary School Kandhar Ghat, April 15, 2011.
126 Interview with parent, Kandhar Ghat, April 8, 2011.
127 Interview with former head of primary school PTA, Kandhar Ghat, April 16, 2011.
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A desire for status not only drove some families to remove their children from the government
primary school but also contributed to the decline of the village women's association. As families
began to amass wealth from the apple industry, membership in the women's association dwindled
and attempts to revive it saw little success.
Recent efforts by the state to create women's associations in the form of a Self Help Group
(SHG) were similarly unsuccessful in Kandhar Ghat. The local Aanganwadi Worker, a health
extension worker, who was a resident of the village, experienced great difficulty trying to organize
women around early child health and education:
We used to have an active mahila mandal, but today nobody wants to come together and develop a
group. I tried to get women together to create a Seff Help Group, but they see no benefit informing
a group. People see it as something for the poor, and the wealthierfamilies do not like the idea of
their women leaving the home to sit together with others.2 8
The decline of the village women's association in Kandhar Ghat reflects the social changes taking
place in the high-growth Apple Belt region of Himachal Pradesh. The association had a long history
of collective action in the village and even worked to expand adult literacy with local volunteers for
the Adult Literacy Mission during the 1990s. In fact, compared to Dharmaur, the literacy program
in Kandhar Ghat had even deeper roots within the village community. Kandhar Ghat had many
committed social activists, including government school teachers, who eventually took on positions
of leadership within the Adult Literacy Mission and became active members of HGVS. However,
rapid income growth and the status distinctions that came with it led to the erosion of collective
action in the sphere of primary education, notwithstanding attempts by local officials to promote
community participation.
The breakdown of social cohesion in Kandhar Ghat highlights the limits of deliberative
norms and the conditions under which they do not lead to effective policy implementation in
Himachal Pradesh. Given its propensity to encourage local participation, the education bureaucracy
in HP had come to rely on the cohesiveness of societal groups and their ability to make collective
demands for education.2 2 A number of studies find that village social cohesion and collective
identity is strong in the Himalayan region (Berreman 1972; Sax 1991; Dr~ze 2004). Social cohesion
is reflected in multiple, overlapping social relations, including village women's groups, temple
associations and collective rituals around village deities.
When social cohesion is durable, even in unlikely settings like Dharmaur, deliberative norms
within the bureaucracy can help encourage and sustain local collective action around primary
schooling. In the absence of social cohesion, meanwhile, as observed in Kandhar Ghat, public
agencies face an uphill battle trying to encourage communities to work collectively towards policy
implementation. The deliberative model, which has proven effective for implementing universal of
primary education in Himachal Pradesh, must now cope with the strains of societal exit from
government schools. Private schooling has helped reinforce status distinctions, further
marginalizing those who cannot afford it. As economic growth and privatization continues apace in
128 Interview with local Aanganwadi Worker, Kandhar Ghat, April 12, 2011.
129 As one senior official within the state has pointed out, in delivering social services like healthcare and primary
education, the bureaucracy drew on existing norms of cooperation and interdependence within communities (Sanan
2004).
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regions like the Apple Belt of Himachal Pradesh, public agencies may need to identify new strategies
for encouraging local collective action around primary education.
3.6. Alternative Explanations Revisited
Before concluding this chapter, it helps to reexamine alternative explanations in light of the
findings presented. In this section I consider the possibility of reverse causality, as well as the role
of what may appear a particularly vexing alternative explanation, namely, the role of civil society and
social capital. Based on the findings presented here, one may have doubts over the direction of
causality. Can we be certain that bureaucratic norms have driven the implementation outcomes for
primary schooling in Himachal Pradesh, and not the other way around? Might it not be the case
that educational gains are what gave rise to deliberative norms within the bureaucracy? And if not
reverse causality, there could still be an omitted factor causing both bureaucratic norms and the
education outcomes we observe in Himachal Pradesh. Civil society and social capital would seem a
plausible candidate, particularly in light of the distinct social fabric and history of collective action in
the Himalayan region. In what follows, I take up these two issues in turn.
3.6.1. Reverse Causaliy
The problem of reverse causality is an empirical one, but there are also good theoretical
reasons for supposing that the spread of primary schooling may have helped foster deliberation
within the state. Deliberative democratic theorists argue persuasively for the importance of
education, particularly civic education at the primary school level, for developing the skills and
virtues associated with democratic citizenship (Gutmann 1999; Macedo 2009)." The spread of
mass education strengthens the capability of citizens to engage with public officials and participate in
public discussion, enhancing the quality of deliberation within the state.
To dismiss the role that education can play in enabling public deliberation would be a
mistake. However, the claim that the growth of primary education spawned deliberative norms
within the state of Himachal Pradesh is doubtful in light of the timing over which educational gains
took place. The most significant gains for primary education were registered in the late 1990s. In
their discussion of the "schooling revolution" of Himachal Pradesh, Dreze and Sen (2002:177-178)
point out that, as late as 1961, rates of literacy in HP were below average for India across every age
category, placing it in the same league as India's BIMARU states. The initial gains in education were
registered in the mid-1980s, more than a decade after state formation in 1971. The most rapid
progress for outcomes like student attendance was recorded in the 1990s.
Meanwhile, the deliberative processes that I document, such as informal working groups for
public agencies to assess needs and plan, were already in place by the early 1980s, well before HP's
most significant educational gains took place. Interviews conducted with state planners, local
130 Arguments in favor of civic education are also made by democratic theorists who disagree with the deliberative model
of democracy. On the role of civic education in advancing representative democracy, see Galston (1989).
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bureaucrats, school teachers and civic actors, revealed the presence of these processes over that
earlier time period. Senior bureaucrats who had risen up the ranks during the 1980s recalled their
initial experiences within the bureaucracy, and the learning process they had gone through over the
years while holding junior positions. These officials had learned how to engage in collective
discussion and coordinate efforts over time, particularly by watching the example of senior officials.
By the same token, civic agencies like HGVS, had already been working with the state by the
early 1990s. The networks that these agencies relied upon were not comprised of highly educated
citizens, but poorly educated women's groups, the majority of whom were functionally illiterate.
Furthermore, it is important to stress that implementation in Himachal Pradesh did not just target
the more educated segments of society, but was broadly inclusive. Many of the policy innovations
documented, such as mobile schools for the Gujjar tribe and home-based schooling for disabled
children, targeted communities that were outside the fold of education, and had no formal
representation of any kind within the state.
To be sure, early success in delivering education may have fed back to the bureaucracy and
helped consolidate the deliberative norms guiding public officials. Experiencing initial success from
their efforts may have motivated bureaucrats to continue along the deliberative path. In addition,
the targeting disadvantaged groups may have helped strengthen the civic capabilities within society,
allowing the state to draw further on civic input. For example, by targeting girls with education
policies early on public agencies may have helped develop the women's groups that later became
active participants in the implementation process. It is through such iterative feedback loops that
norms are theorized to produce durable effects on policy implementation over time (Ostrom 2000).
Having made that point, one should also bear in mind that initial success in policy implementation
does not by itself necessitate sustained achievement. As we shall see in the following chapter, the
neighboring hill state of Uttarakhand had superior initial conditions, and yet the educational
advantage it once enjoyed over Himachal Pradesh deteriorated over time.
3.6.2. Civil Society and Sodal Capital
Rather than bureaucratic norms, might theories of civil society and social capital better
account for the implementation outcomes observed in HP? A large body of research associates civic
engagement and social capital with positive outcomes for governance, including public goods
provision (Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Krishna 2003; Miguel 2004). Similarly, close observers of
the educational achievements of Himachal Pradesh have called attention to the distinct social fabric
of the hill region (Dreze and Sen 2002; Dreze 2004). Sociological studies conducted at the village-
level have found the absence of sharp social disparities across groups and more inclusive gender
norms, all of which appear to have allowed for a sense of village collective identity (Parmar 1979;
Saraswat and Sikka 1990). The harsh physical environment, moreover, is thought to have
necessitated greater economic interdependence between caste groups. In a similar vein, gender
norms in the hill region have also been found to be less restrictive than in the plains (Sax 1991).
Due to the peculiar conditions of the hill economic, women across caste groups assumed a greater
role in local agriculture, which in turn may have enhanced their freedom of movement and authority
over household decisions.
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The findings of this chapter do not dismiss the role of social norms encouraging cooperation
in the hill region. To the contrary, the comparison across the two villages of Dharmaur and
Kandhar Ghat suggests that social cohesion within communities is essential for ensuring that
schools function well. What the findings do question, however, is the assertion that societal capacity
for collective action is the product of some predetermined cultural propensity to cooperate. The
example of Kandhar Ghat in fact shows that a history of collective action around primary education
can itself dissipate as the nature of civil society undergoes rapid change.
The limits of the civil society and social capital thesis become most apparent, however, when
the implementation process in HP is analyzed in a comparative context. Other parts of India's
Himalayan region, which exhibit a similar social fabric and history of village collective action have
not had the same success as Himachal Pradesh in implementing primary education. The
neighboring hill state of Uttarakhand, which we will examine in the next chapter, exhibits very
similar caste and gender norms to HP. It shares a similar history of women's collective mobilization
and village religious and political institutions. Furthermore, unlike HP, Uttarakhand has a history of
social movements and collective resistance, which some have argued can provide a particularly
effective form of social capital for achieving social development outcomes in India (Heller 1999).
And yet, Uttarakhand has experienced markedly less success in policy implementation. " The
relatively poor performance of the public school system in that state may have contributed to the
much higher prevalence of rural private schools, twice that of HP.
Again, none of this is to discount the importance of village collective action. As we saw in
the case study of Kandhar Ghat, even affluent, modernizing villages that lack social cohesion can
experience poor policy implementation. The social fabric and history of collective action in the
Himalayan region may well have been enabling conditions, helping to facilitate the state's efforts in
policy implementation. The mere presence, however, of these supportive social ingredients can
explain neither why village collective action in HP was directed at public agencies, nor why it
sustained over time. The sequence of mechanisms observed in the village case study of Dharmaur
sheds light on how deliberative norms within the state can help "activate" latent forms of social
capital (Krishna 2003). Even traditionally marginalized groups, which comprise a substantial portion
of HP's population, have experienced the benefit of organizing collectively around primary
education, which would be difficult to sustain absent the bureaucratic norms promoting their
participation.
3.7. Conclusion
The findings from this chapter demonstrate that bureaucratic norms governing public
agencies in Himachal Pradesh help explain the state's exceptional performance in implementing
universal primary education. Notwithstanding the same formal incentives, administrative structures
and resources facing other states, the education bureaucracy in Himachal Pradesh operates
according to a distinct set of norms that closely approximate the deliberative model developed in
131 As a noted development scholar and member of the PROBE team has pointed out, "The catalytic role of state
initiatives helps to understand why some other areas, where gender relations and social conditions have much the same
features as in Himachal Pradesh, have failed to experience a similar transformation of schooling patterns" (Dreze
1999:16).
106
Chapter 1. An array of field-based evidence points to the presence of deliberative norms within the
education bureaucracy and their impact over policy implementation. Interviews and participant
observation within the state reveal that the bureaucracy has engaged in a participatory planning
process, working collectively across the organizational hierarchy, and alongside elected officials and
civic agencies, bending official rules to meet varying local needs. These practices have flourished
within the system of patronage politics in Himachal Pradesh, and yet contrary to expectations, they
have enabled the state to carry out implementation effectively, from school infrastructure
development to monitoring and service delivery.
These findings offer new insights on when and how public institutions govern effectively,
not only in India but across the developing world. Efforts to improve public services in developing
countries have focused largely on the formal design of agencies and institutions, as seen in the waves
of decentralized government and administration. As the above case demonstrated, however, formal
decentralization in Himachal Pradesh was underwritten by an informal process, a set of underlying
norms that shape how public officials understand their work and the duties required of them.
Deliberative norms in the education bureaucracy of Himachal Pradesh encouraged collective
behaviors across the hierarchy and divisions of the state, as well as between officials and citizens,
making agencies responsive to local needs in a way that formal decentralization by itself could not.
These findings also provoke us to think more carefully about the role of civil society in
governance. Public officials in Himachal Pradesh fostered participation not only from well-
recognized organizations but informal, often marginalized groups, in particular women's
associations. These informal groups provide local knowledge to the state and complement state
efforts through the collective monitoring of primary schools. Yet their involvement in policy
implementation did not occur without support from the state. The practice of collective
participation took place over time. It involved a learning process between public agencies and civic
organizations, which was sustained by deliberative norms.
Finally, the findings also suggest certain limitations of the deliberative model. In particular,
village-level fieldwork identified the importance of social cohesion. To advance universal primary
education, public agencies in Himachal Pradesh have come to rely on the participation of local
communities, benefitting in many ways from the relatively cohesive character of village society in the
Himalayan region. Local communities have responded to the initiative of public agencies with
complementary forms of collective action. Yet the state faces new challenges as rapid income
growth and privatization in some regions fragment village society and weaken collective ties around
primary education. Whether and how public agencies can operate effectively under these conditions
are among the critical questions I take up in the following two chapters.
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Chapter 3 - Appendix
Figure 3.1 Administrative Map of Himachal Pradesh
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Table 3.1. Summary of Case Study Villages in District Shimla
Village Dharmaur Kandhar Ghat
Administrative Block Mashobra Theog
Population 301 657
Caste Composition 30% General 78% General
(Thakur - Rajput/Kanait) (Thakur - Rajpu6)
70% SC 22% SC
Aya, Lohar, Moch) (Aya)
Distance to motorable road 2 2.5
(km)
House type* 75% pucca 100% pucca
(/o puccal 25% semi-pucca
semi-puccal kaccha)






*House type describes overall condition of houses in the village and is widely used in Participatory
Rural Appraisal (PRA) as an indicator of poverty. 'Pucca' is finished (made from stone or wood),
semi-pucca is half-finished, and kaccha is unfinished (made from mud).
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Chapter 4. Aspirations Unmet: The Burden of Legalism in Uttarakhand
4.1. Introduction
The previous chapter analyzed the exceptional performance of Himachal Pradesh in
implementing universal primary education. It connected the state's performance to bureaucratic
norms governing public agencies, analyzing the mechanisms through which they implement policies
on the ground. Bureaucratic norms in Himachal Pradesh encourage public officials to work
collectively to bend rules and policies, and promote civic participation in the implementation
process, thereby producing superior outcomes. At the same time, the analysis of Himachal Pradesh
raised some lingering questions regarding the role of civil society and social capital. In particular,
whether deliberative norms are the causal engine behind implementation, or maybe themselves a
consequence of the peculiar culture and social fabric of the Himalayan region, remained an open
question.
This chapter examines policy implementation in the neighboring hill state of Uttarakhand,
which was carved out of the hill region of Uttar Pradesh in the year 2000 to form a separate state.
At the time of India's independence, the hill districts comprising Uttarakhand enjoyed an
educational advantage over other parts of India. In terms of basic literacy, Uttarakhand was well
ahead of Himachal Pradesh. Having gained autonomy from UP, citizens and public officials held
high expectations for their newly established state. As Bhuwan Chandra Khanduri, senior BJP
leader and now twice Chief Minister of Uttarakhand remarked at the time, the new state was a
culmination of "the long-cherished aspirations of the people of the region."1 2 More than a decade
after Uttarakhand's formation, these aspirations remain largely unmet. Today, public agencies in
Uttarakhand perform significantly worse on several crucial dimensions of educational service
delivery.
The central purpose of this chapter is to analyze the mechanisms behind Uttarakhand's
relative underperformance in implementing primary education, particularly in comparison to
Himachal Pradesh. Notwithstanding very similar geographic and sociocultural conditions across
these two states, bureaucratic norms in Uttarakhand are very different. As the findings will
demonstrate, public agencies in Uttarakhand have inherited norms of legalism from their
predecessor state of Uttar Pradesh. Public officials in Uttarakhand tend to follow rules, procedures
and formal hierarchies strictly and apply policies uniformly across cases. Further, in attempting to
protect the state's autonomy from external influence, they marginalize citizens and civic agencies in
the implementation process, stifling local collective action around primary schooling. I connect the
mechanisms of legalism to poor outcomes for educational service delivery in Uttarakhand.
In analyzing the mechanisms behind implementation in Uttarakhand, this chapter also makes
two theoretical contributions. First, it shows that bureaucratic norms can persist over time, even
after a state undergoes dramatic changes to its political system. After switching from the highly
divisive, multi-party, coalition politics of Uttar Pradesh to the two-party system similar to Himachal
Pradesh, legalism persists in Uttarakhand and continues to shape bureaucratic behavior. This
finding suggests that bureaucratic norms can exert an independent effect on governance, separate
and apart from party politics. Second, the findings shed critical light on debates regarding the
132 "With Hopes and Fears," Fmntne, vol. 17, No. 17, August 19 - September 1, 2000. Access at:
http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1717/17170350.htm.
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efficacy of social capital and community participation for local governance. Given its relatively
inclusive caste and gender norms, and long history of local collective action and social protest,
Uttarakhand is precisely where one would expect theories of civic participation and social capital to
obtain. Yet the findings reveal that bureaucratic norms tend to undermine local collective action
directed at the state, discouraging citizens and civic agencies from participating in policy
implementation. These findings cast doubt on the conventional wisdom regarding civil society's
salutary role in governance. Instead, it suggests that the efficacy of civic participation is mediated by
bureaucratic norms within the state, particularly when it comes to the delivery of public services for
the poor.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the performance of
Uttarakhand within the domain of primary education. Notwithstanding its education head start, and
relatively high literacy vis-i-vis the rest of India, Uttarakhand's performance in service delivery is
significantly worse than neighboring Himachal Pradesh. After pointing out the limitations of
conventional explanations based on economic development and modernization, Section 4.3 presents
the conditions lead up to the separation of Uttarakhand form Uttar Pradesh in the year 2000 as well
as the political and administrative consequences. I then turn to a preview of the argument in Section
4.4, illustrating the mechanisms through which legalistic norms are hypothesized to produce
outcomes for policy implementation.
Sections 4.5 and 4.6 present the main empirical findings. First, I establish the persistence of
legalism within the education bureaucracy, from the perspective of actors inside the state as well as
citizens and civic agencies outside the state. I then present a series of nested case studies that
demonstrate how legalistic norms shape policy implementation across a range of tasks to produce
concrete outcomes for policy implementation. Section 4.7 reexamines the findings in light of
alternative explanations, showing the limit of civil society and social capital. I conclude the chapter
in Section 4.8, summarizing the main findings from the comparative analysis conducted within
India's Himalayan region.
4.2. The Educational Scenario in Uttarakhand
Located between Himachal Pradesh and India's border with Nepal and Tibet, Uttarakhand
(pop. 10.1 million) was carved out from the hill region of Uttar Pradesh on November 9, 2000 to
become the 2 7 h state of India. The state is organized into thirteen administrative districts that fall
under two administrative divisions: Garhwal and Kumaon (see Figure 4.1 in the chapter Appendix).
These divisions share broadly similar socio-cultural and geographic features, consisting primarily of
mountainous terrain with some plains areas in the terai region bordering Uttar Pradesh.
Uttarakhand occupies a noteworthy place in India's political and educational development."'
The hill region's political import dates back to colonial rule, when it played a crucial role in the
British military and administrative occupation of India. Two highly decorated contingents of the
133 Uttarakhand also carries immense religious significance within India. Known popularly as the "abode of the gods"
(dev bhumi), Uttarakhand boasts some of India's most ancient and celebrated Hindu temples, pilgrimage sites and
festivals. The Ganges and Yamuna, two of India's most significant rivers, originate in the Himalayan glaciers of
Uttarakhand, where they are met by a constant flow of tourists and religious pilgrims.
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Indian army, the Garhwal Rifles and Kumaon Regiment, were named after the two main regions of
the state, bestowing a lasting legacy for Uttarakhand within the armed forces.' Furthermore, some
of India's foremost political leaders hailed from the state. These include the likes of Govind Ballabh
Pant, a national freedom fighter and statesman renowned for his activist role in the independence
movement. Pant later went on to become the first Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, and later joined
the central government as a cabinet member under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Several
subsequent politicians came from the hill region, including the veteran Congress Party leader
Narayan Datt Tiwari, who served as chief minister of both UP and Uttarakhand, and was later
appointed governor of Andhra Pradesh.
Uttarakhand's political and administrative significance may have also contributed to the
growth of education across the state. It houses the foremost centers for training India's top military
and administrative brass. Prior to independence, nationalist leaders sought to create a military
institution for developing local armed forces in Uttarakhand. The Indian Military Academy, the
principal training institute for officers in the Indian army was established in 1932 in Dehradun, the
state's present capital city. In addition, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), the elite civil service
of the Indian state, had its center for professional training based in Uttarakhand. The Lal Bahadur
Shastri National Academy of Administration, the premier institution for training and research on
public administration in India was founded in 1959 in Mussoorie, a hill station located to the north
of the state capital Dehradun. Finally, the famous Doon School, a private boarding school akin to
the Eton and Harrow in the UK, was also established by Indian nationalists in Dehradun in 1935.
Its alumni include some of India's most influential politicians, bureaucrats and business leaders,
including former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.
The educational development in Uttarakhand was not limited to a small circle of political
elites. Owing perhaps to the region's strong Brahmanical traditions and high concentration of upper
caste groups, who attached significant value to learning, Uttarakhand also displayed a strong demand
for mass education. While literacy in India's Hindi belt is below the national average, Uttarakhand
has outperformed most other states (see Figure 4.2 in the chapter Appendix). Around the time of
independence, the erstwhile hill region of Uttar Pradesh was ahead of the plains and even
neighboring Himachal Pradesh, in terms of literacy." 5
To be sure, literacy was extremely low back then. Comparatively speaking, however, some
parts of the hill region such as District Almora were far ahead. The significance attached to
education was further reflected by the growth of high quality academic institutions. The city of
Roorkee in Haridwar District, home to several universities and research institutes, attracted students
from across India. The state's leading university, the University of Roorkee, was established in 1847.
Later it was upgraded into the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Roorkee in 2001, joining India's
most prestigious network of academic institutions.
With its rich educational heritage and decade of autonomous statehood, Uttarakhand's
recent performance in primary education has been mixed, if not disappointing. On the one hand,
134 The British colonial government declared the hill people of Uttarakhand a "martial race" in recognition of their valor
in warding off the Mughals and other invaders, and recruited them heavily to join the Indian army.
Is According to the first Census of India (1951), Uttarakhand had a literacy rate of 19 percent, slightly above the
national average of 18 percent. At that time, the UP plains had a literacy rate of 12 percent, while Himachal Pradesh was
at 7 percent.
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the pace of school infrastructure development and gains in access to schooling has been impressive.
Yet the quality of education remains very poor, and appears to be declining. Compared to
neighboring Himachal Pradesh, educational service delivery in Uttarakhand is significantly worse.
And while the two hill states tend to outperform the rest of India in primary education, on some
crucial indicators for service delivery, Uttarakhand's performance is below average for India as well.
4.2.1. SchoolAccess and Infrastructure
Data from a number of different sources indicate that Uttarakhand has achieved near
universal access to schooling. The official data show that 1,659 new government primary schools
and 1,385 new middle schools were opened across the state between the years 2002-2011, an
expansion of more than 24 percent within a decade (NUEPA 2012). That is no small achievement
in a region where infrastructure projects face significant delays due to unfavorable geography and
climate. The investments in infrastructure have helped increase school enrollments across the state.
According to data from the ASER survey, only one percent of children in the age group 6-14 were
not enrolled in school during the 2011 academic year (ASER 2012). Gains in access to schooling
have also helped close the gender gap in Uttarakhand and improve the enrollment of rural girls, a
vulnerable group that faces significant socioeconomic and cultural barriers to education.1 3 6
Along with enrollment, student attendance rates are also comparatively high in Uttarakhand.
The latest National Family Health Survey (NFHS), one of India's most comprehensive and reliable
household surveys, shows that 90.4 percent of rural children ages 6-14 were attending school during
the 2005-06 school year, against a national rural average of 68.8 percent (NFHS-3 2007).
Uttarakhand is among a small handful of states that have crossed the 90 percent line. Others
include neighboring Himachal Pradesh and the educationally advanced southern states of Kerala and
Tamil Nadu.
Uttarakhand tends to outperform the majority of Indian states in the provision of physical
infrastructure and facilities. Table 4.1 summarizes the 2010 ASER Report data on school facilities
and physical inputs in government primary schools in Uttarakhand. Data for the other two states
included in this study are given for comparison. As mentioned earlier, these data are drawn from a
random sample of approximately 30 primary schools per administrative district within each state.
Many of the facilities listed in Table 2, including classrooms and school boundary walls, are provided
by SSA, India's flagship education program. The provision of these facilities has been deemed
mandatory by the central government under India's Right to Education Act, which carries an
implementation deadline of March 2013.
116 According to the ASER data, the proportion of rural girls of age 11-14 years who were out of school in Uttarakhand
declined from 3.4 percent in 2006 to 1.2 percent in 2011.
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Table 4.1 School Facilities and Physical Inputs
(% of schools that have the following)
At least one Office / Boundary Drinking Toilets Kitchen
classroom per Storage Wall water shed
State teacher space facility
Himachal Pradesh 76.7 75.5 37.3 87.5 89.2 82.0
Uttarakhand 81.6 87.9 67.0 77.9 94.2 96.3
Uttar Pradesh 87.4 88.6 44.4 93.1 93.3 89.3
All India 75.6 74.5 52.2 82.6 89.9 81.3
Source: ASER Report (2011).
As the data from the ASER Report show, a greater proportion of primary schools in
Uttarakhand possess the mandatory facilities in comparison to other Indian states, with the
exception of drinking water facilities. Interestingly, Uttarakhand even outperforms neighboring
Himachal Pradesh in the provision of these facilities. While the latter state has received much due
praise for its achievements in primary education, less attention has been given to the fact that
Uttarakhand has caught up in terms of school infrastructure development over the last decade.
4.2.2. Serv'ie Delivery
In contrast to school infrastructure and access, the indicators for service delivery in
Uttarakhand paint a dismal picture. Apart from the provision of school lunches under the Indian
government's Midday Meal program, the remaining indicators reveal the state's poor performance.
According to the ASER Report, the school lunch program was found to be operational in 95
percent of schools during unannounced visits, well above the national average of 81 percent (see
Table 4.2).
Table 4.2 Provision of Midday Meal
Midday Meal








First among these is a very high rate of teacher absence. According to the most
comprehensive field survey of teacher absence in primary schools across India, Kremer et al (2005)
find that approximately one third of school teachers in Uttarakhand are absent on any given day (see
Table 4.3). While teacher absence is a nationwide phenomenon in India, the rate of teacher absence
in Uttarakhand is fifty percent higher than the neighboring hill state of Himachal Pradesh. Among
the 20 states covered under the Kremer et al study, Uttarakhand factors among the bottom five
states while Himachal Pradesh falls in the top five. The variation between the two is striking for a
region facing comparatively high literacy. Uttarakhand performs worse than even some poorer,
BIMARU states like Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, which are considered among India's most
educationally backwards states.
Needless to say, little learning can go on in a school system in which teachers routinely fail to
show up to school. Yet conditions in Uttarakhand are even grimmer due to the uneven distribution
of school teachers across the hill region. According to official reports, close to 20 percent of
primary schools in Uttarakhand are manned by just a single teacher. That is almost twice the
national average and many times higher than its parent state of Uttar Pradesh (see Table 4.4). The
situation is mitigated somewhat considering that the proportion of students enrolled in single-
teacher schools is much lower. Most of Uttarakhand's single-teacher schools are located in the
interior hills, which are sparsely populated and difficult to reach. While it is true that hill states face
a certain disadvantages for policy implementation, in part because they must cater to so many small
and dispersed habitations, geographic conditions alone cannot account for the failure to allocate
school teachers more evenly across the state. Neighboring Himachal Pradesh, which has even lower
population density and equally scattered habitations, has gone much further to reduce regional
imbalances in the placement of school teachers.








Source: Kremer et al. (2005)
Table 4.4 Single-Teacher Primary Schools
% Primary schools % Students enrolled
Himachal Pradesh 7.9 4.6
Uttarakhand 19.5 10.6
Uttar Pradesh 3.0 2.3
All India 11.8 6.1
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Source: ASER Report (2011).
The poor quality of education in Uttarakhand's primary school system is reflected further in
the lack of adequate teaching and learning materials within schools. According to the ASER Report,
less than half of primary schools surveyed had library facilities for students, significantly worse than
Himachal Pradesh and even well below the national average (see Table 5.5). While school libraries
are not mandatory according to India's primary education policy, many states have made provisions
for them anyhow. In practical terms, a school library facility is a collection of books made available
for students to read in school or borrow and take home. For a high literacy region that attaches
much cultural importance to learning, the lack of library books in primary schools further reflects
the state's inability to provide a modicum of quality education. The ASER Report also finds that
close to one fifth of primary schools surveyed in Uttarakhand do not have the teaching-learning
materials that are provided under India's universal primary education policy. On that measure of
implementation, Uttarakhand's performance is slightly above average for India, though again worse
than Himachal Pradesh.
Table 4.5 Library and Teaching-Learning Materials
(% of schools that have these available)
Library Books Teaching-Learning Materials
Himachal Pradesh 80.3 91.5
Uttarakhand 48.6 82.4
Uttar Pradesh 47.7 73.5
All India 63.1 80.4
Source: ASER Report (2011).
Taken together, these quality indicators reflect systematic gaps in service delivery for primary
education. Notwithstanding gains in infrastructure provision and improved access to schooling, the
state has been unable to ensure that students attending primary schools receive a quality education.
Poor education quality may also have contributed to poor retention of students, particularly those
coming from underprivileged backgrounds. Table 5.6 shows official dropout rates for boys and girls
at the primary school level.'37 With an official student dropout rate of seven percent, Uttarakhand
performs better than average, though still significantly worse than Himachal Pradesh. Dropout rates
offer a further window into education quality as they partly reflect the experience students have after
attending school. As a number of studies show, students are more likely to dropout when they are
not learning, become discouraged and no longer find their time at school worthwhile.
Table 4.6 Student Dropout Rate
(% students in grades 1-5)
137 Given pressures to inflate official statistics, actual dropout rates are likely to be higher.
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Boys Girls All
Himachal Pradesh 2.6 2.7 2.6
Uttarakhand 7.4 6.3 6.9
Uttar Pradesh 17.4 15.0 16.2
All lndia 10.15 9.75 9.95
Source: Mehta (2011)
The lack of teaching activity within in government primary schools is evidenced further by
data on learning levels. The latest ASER Report reveals a bleak picture for Uttarakhand: 42 percent
of fifth graders surveyed cannot read from a second grade textbook, while 31 percent of them
cannot do basic arithmetic involving two-digit subtraction (ASER 2012). To be sure, poor learning
levels are symptomatic of a more general crisis in India's government school system, as discussed
earlier in Chapter 2. Even in Himachal Pradesh, which possesses significantly better learning
outcomes than Uttarakhand, performance is extremely poor by international standards.
Nevertheless, Himachal Pradesh has made slow but steady gains in student learning. Uttarakhand,
meanwhile, appears to be following the alarming trend in the plains region of north India, namely,
the steady decline of student learning levels."' The quality of educational service delivery seems to be
going down in Uttarakhand, even while the state continues to expand school access, and provide
new infrastructure and facilities. The dismal quality of educational services is puzzling given the
educational legacy and value parents attach to education. While it continues to perform better than
UP and other states in the plains region, the educational aspirations of citizens in Uttarakhand
remain largely unmet.
4.2.3. The Limits of Conventional Explanations
Before moving ahead, it helps to point out that the underperformance of public agencies in
Uttarakhand is not well-explained by conventional variables. The comparison with Himachal
Pradesh brings out the limitations of factors such as geography, economic development and social
structure. Conventional wisdom suggests that the performance of public agencies improves with
economic development and modernization. As incomes rise, both the aspirations of citizens and
their ability to make demands on the state are thought to increase concomitantly (Lipset 1959;
Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Processes of modernization, which include urban growth and
industrialization, also help fuel demands for social mobility and public services like education
(Smelser and Lipset 1966). Within the Indian context, structural features of society are also thought
to shape public service delivery, perhaps even more so for a public good like education, caste
composition is perhaps the most frequently cited explanation in India.
The comparison suggests that economic development and social structure cannot fully
account for poor service delivery in Uttarakhand (see Table 4.7 in the chapter Appendix). If
anything, these conventional variables lean in favor of Uttarakhand. As Table 4.7 indicates,
Uttarakhand has a similar population size and composition to Himachal Pradesh. Uttarakhand also
131 Data on learning levels need to be interpreted with some caution due to problems of measurement and comparison
across regions and time
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has a smaller share of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, groups that traditionally have been
marginalized by India's education system (Gupta 1992). The remaining population in both states
consists primarily of Brahmins and Rajputs, upper caste groups that historically dominated the
education system. To be sure, the peculiar caste composition in these two states may help account
for why the Himalayan region overall tends to outperform other parts of India. Yet it is not by any
means a sufficient explanation. Uttarakhand also registers a slightly higher per capita income and is
considerably more urbanized than Himachal Pradesh, which suggests that levels of economic
development and modernization cannot account for the variation across these two hill states.1 3 9
4.3. The Creation of a New State
The discussion up until now has concentrated on the nature of the empirical puzzle that
Uttarakhand represents. Notwithstanding the infrastructure development and improved access to
schooling, the state underperforms significantly in the delivery of educational services. These poor
implementation outcomes are puzzling given the region's venerable educational legacy, strong
societal demand for schooling, and in light of conventional economic and structural factors. Before
moving on to the explanation put forward in this chapter, which centers on the role of bureaucratic
norms governing public agencies, we must take fuller account of the political context in which
public agencies operate.
In this section I discuss the conditions leading up to Uttarakhand's separation from UP, and
the political opportunity it presented for improving the quality of governance. With a new state
government and public administration, the hill region was liberated from the clutches of political
neglect under UP. Dependent no longer on absentee leaders who spent a majority of their time in
UP's distant capital city of Lucknow, the hill residents (paharis) of Uttarakhand finally had a state
whose express political purpose was to work for them. Moreover, Uttarakhand was no longer
subject to UP's divisive political system comprised of multiparty coalitions, regional parties and caste
politics, which some have associated with weak governance and inferior public goods delivery (Kohli
1987; Keefer and Khemani 2003). Like Himachal Pradesh, the new state enjoyed a two-party system
consisting of the Congress Party and the BJP, India's two national parties.
4.3.1. The Movementfor a new State
The political movement behind a separate state of Uttarakhand grew out pahari
dissatisfaction with governance under Uttar Pradesh. Yet a sense of regional autonomy had
emerged even before India's independence. Owing to its unique culture and economic system, the
hill region administered its own set of civil and revenue laws. Furthermore, in contrast to the UP
139 Himachal Pradesh has admittedly made greater strides than Uttarakhand in developing its rural economy, particularly
in regions like the apple orchard belt. Yet development emerged well after the state began making strides in primary
education (Dreze and Sen 2002). High economic growth regions of the state perform no better in primary education
than poorer regions. Much the same holds true for Uttarakhand.
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plains, where the exploitative amindari system of land ownership prevailed, Uttarakhand enjoyed
separate legal and institutional arrangements for governing village land and revenue.
As part of Uttar Pradesh, however, the hill communities were subject to an administrative
and political system that did not respond to their needs. According to a leading scholar of region,
the alienation of hill residents stemmed from "[t]he callous attitude of Lucknow in imposing every
plan formulated without any consideration to the topographical distinctness of the hills" (Kumar
2000: 93-94). Their grievances found an early outlet in the call for statehood by Puran Chand Joshi.
A veteran Communist Party of India (CPI) leader from District Almora, P.C. Joshi raised the issue
of autonomous statehood for Uttarakhand on multiple occasions with the central government's
State Reorganization Committee during the 1950s.
Popular demands for separation continued to take place sporadically in the decades
following independence as paharis grew increasingly dissatisfied with governance under UP. Political
agitations were led by the Uttarakhand Kranti Dal (UKD), a regional party that formed in 1979.
The party was concerned with the weak political representation for the hill population within UP.
At the time, Uttarakhand sent only 19 representatives (out of 424) to the UP state legislative
assembly. Concerns over political representation were further brought to light by successive UP
governments as well. In 1991, the UP legislative assembly passed a resolution for the creation of a
hill state of 'Uttaranchal,' a popular name given to the hill region by residents in the plains.
However, the central government's First State Reorganization Commission turned down the
proposal on the grounds that the state would not be economically viable (Krishna 2002).
The movement for Uttarakhand reached a critical moment in 1994 when the UP
government, led by Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav, passed a new reservation policy that
extended quotas of 27 percent for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in government jobs and
educational placements. The caste groups comprising OBCs, who were based predominantly in the
plains areas of UP, and made up only 2.5 percent of the hill population (Aggarwal, Agrawal et al.
1995: 7). The policy stoked fears amongpahais that plains residents would further infiltrate local
public agencies and educational institutions, eating into scarce economic opportunities and further
marginalizing their access to the state.14 0 The UKD led demonstrations against the policy, and while
many were brutally suppressed, they helped foster broad-based public support for a separate hill
state (Mawdsley 1996).
To be sure, state planners in Lucknow did not fully neglect to appreciate the developmental
needs of the hill region. Special planning efforts for Uttarakhand were initiated in 1974 with the
establishment of the Uttar Pradesh Hill Development Department. The Department enjoyed its
own ministry within the government, along with a separate bureaucracy and its own budget known
as the Uttarakhand Sub-Plan, which formed a component of the state's five-year and annual plans.
Compared to the rest of UP, public expenditures in the hill region were in fact much higher on a per
40 The new reservation policy followed the central government's ratification of proposals made by the 1989 Mandal
Commission for extending quotas for governmental posts and educational placements to OBCs. In a region with a high
concentration of upper caste groups-85 percent as compared to 16 percent for the UP plains-and few economic
opportunities outside of subsistence agriculture, OBC quotas would have effectively excluded a significant percentage of
the hill population from access to education and government posts, two primary mechanisms for upward mobility.
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capita basis (approximately three times that of UP as a whole) and increased significantly with each
successive plan (Mehta 2000: 83-84).'14
The provision of developmental infrastructure within the hill districts was actually quite high
by relative standards, not only for mountainous regions within India but even in comparison to the
heavily populated plains of Uttar Pradesh. Table 4.8 in the chapter Appendix presents comparative
indicators for physical and social infrastructure in 1991-92, around the time when political agitations
for a separate state began to peak. As the table illustrates, Uttarakhand benefited from greater public
infrastructure development on a per capita basis vis-a-vis the UP plains.
The above data should be interpreted within the context of the hill region, where topography
and dispersed settlement patterns make public infrastructure difficult to develop and maintain.
Himachal Pradesh, which by the same time had enjoyed its own state government for twenty years
along with generous financial assistance from India's central government, enjoyed better physical
infrastructure. Nevertheless, along some indicators, such as school infrastructure provision,
Uttarakhand fared just as well, if not better. Moreover, public expenditures according to the
Seventh Plan (1985-1990) were actually higher on a per capita basis for Uttarakhand (Rs. 2,223) than
for Himachal Pradesh (Rs. 2,171), which is somewhat surprising given that the former had weak
representation in the UP state assembly (Kumar 2000: 63). As a close observer of development in
Uttarakhand noted soon before the state's formation:
The basic problem with development plans for Uttarakhand is not the lack of general
awareness of the problem of hill areas, nor the lack of sincerity on the part of the central and
state planners, but rather the absence of an integrated and region-specific approach to
thinking about, planning for, and implementing these development programs.142
In contrast to the argument for creating the state of Himachal Pradesh, which highlighted the hill
region's social and economic backwardness vis-a-vis the plains of Punjab, the hill districts of
Uttarakhand were already well ahead of the UP plains along many socioeconomic indicators.
Governance under UP failed to meet the needs of hill communities, and developmental
progress was believed to have been stifled by administrative indifference and weak political
representation within the state. The system of decentralized planning under the UP Hill
Development Department failed to address these concerns. Annual plans drafted in Lucknow were
applied to Uttarakhand as if it was just an extension of the UP plains. Scant attention was given to
the distinct ecology, culture and local institutions. The demand for Uttarakhand therefore rested on
the political argument that the hill region required "autonomy to plan for its own development"
(Joshi 1995: 46). To work more effectively on behalf of citizens, public institutions had to be more
in touch with pahari needs and aspirations.
4.3.2. Political changes
141 Funding for social services, including education and health facilities, grew significantly over each successive planning
period, and by the Ninth Plan period (1997-2002) comprised the highest share (30 percent) of the overall Uttarakhand
Sub-Plan budget.
142 Mehta (2000: 87).
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To address the deficiencies of governance under UP, the creation of Uttarakhand brought
significant political changes for the state. When it was part of Uttar Pradesh, the hill region had only
19 legislators in the Vidhan Sabha (State Assembly), accounting for less than five percent of the 424
representatives. With the formation of a new state, the political map for Uttarakhand was redrawn
into 70 constituencies, each with its own elected MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly). In
addition, the two-party political system that characterized the hill region freed the state from UP's
highly divisive political system. Politics in UP was characterized by fragmented, multi-party
coalitions, and with the growing influence of regional parties that drew support from lower caste
groups residing in the plains, paharis had become marginalized by the system. Studies associate these
features of UP's political system with poor governance outcomes (Kohli 1987).
In contrast to their neighbors in the plains, the hill population identified more strongly with
the BJP and Congress, India's two national parties. That fact was born out in the 2002 state
election. The Congress Party won 36 of the 70 seats in the Vidhan Sabha, while the BJP took 19.
Even the UKD, the regional party that helped spearhead the political movement for statehood,
fared rather poorly, winning only 4 seats. Subsequent state and national elections saw even stronger
political support in Uttarakhand for the two national parties.14 3 The electorate, moreover, expressed
a strong desire for development and had high expectations for its new political leadership. 4 4
According to exit poll surveys taken for the first state assembly election, more than half (57 percent)
of voters in Uttarakhand considered development the primary electoral issue, while another 12
percent gave primary importance to electing a good Chief Minister (Kumar 2002: 82).
As Uttarakhand's political system experienced a major break from the past, the
administrative system also underwent some important changes. The original eight districts that
comprised the hill region were reconfigured into thirteen administrative districts with new
subdivisions. The capital city of Dehradun housed the new offices of the public administration,
including the state Secretariat, which consisted of senior bureaucrats charged with managing
departments like education, health, public works, and other policy domains. New officers were
selected from among the residential population through a merit-based examination system
administered by the Uttarakhand Public Service Commission. Importantly, the state no longer had
to rely on the service of bureaucrats from the UP plains, who did not identify with the local
population and came to view being sent to the hill region as a "punishment posting."' 45 Officers
from the hill region who had originally been hired by the UP civil service had the option to be
transferred to Uttarakhand, placing them closer to home. In the case of the IAS and other senior
officers, additional incentives such as opportunities for promotion were given.146
Even with these changes, however, one should bear in mind that the formal structure of the
bureaucracy remained largely unaltered. Like public agencies in other states, Uttarakhand's
Department of School Education consists of a Principal Secretary, whose office oversees planning
and implementation, an Education Directorate in charge of managing routine operations, and local
administrative teams responsible for implementation within each district. In addition, Uttarakhand
adopted the standard organizational blueprint for Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), India's flagship
143 To be sure, caste still played a role in Uttarakhand politics. The BJP drew a majority of the Brahmin vote while
Congress saw more support among lower caste voters.
144
145 "IAS officers reluctant to opt for Uttaranchal," The Hindu. September 9, 2000,
http://hindu.com/2000/09/09/stories/02090007.htm
146 Interviews with multiple IAS Officer, Dehradun, Uttarakhand.
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primary education program. Like other Indian states, Uttarakhand created a State Project Office to
oversee the implementation of SSA, established similar administrative offices within each district,
and hired bureaucrats from within the Education Department to undertake various official roles and
functions. Finally, the state adopted systems for monitoring and evaluation identical to those in
Himachal Pradesh and UP. Local district and block officials were in charge of conducting school
inspections and a school grading system was developed based on similar standards for infrastructure
and academic performance.
4.4. Mechanisms Illustrated
The above discussion provides the political context for policy implementation within
Uttarakhand. With its newfound political autonomy, and a political party system thought to be
more conducive to good governance, Uttarakhand was perhaps set on a similar path to Himachal
Pradesh. And yet public agencies in HP have proven to be far more effective primary education
policy, notwithstanding very similar geographic, economic and sociocultural conditions. The
relatively poor implementation outcomes in Uttarakhand are even more puzzling in light of the
region's venerable educational legacy. In this section, I offer a preview of the argument centered on
the persistence of bureaucratic norms within the state, which approximate the legalistic model
theorized in Chapter 1. To motivate the discussion, I begin with a puzzling vignette taken from a
village in District Almora. I then lay out the mechanisms by which legalistic norms are theorized to
produce inferior outcomes for policy implementation in Uttarakhand.
4.4.1. Motivating Vignette: TeacherAbsence in Pujari
The condition of primary schooling in the village of Pujari epitomized in many ways the
larger puzzle in Uttarakhand. Pujari was a place one would expect primary education to be well-
implemented. The village-level factors shown to influence education outcomes, such as proximity to
roads and caste composition, pointed in its favor. Just a short bus ride from the town center of
Dwarahat, Pujari was located along a major roadway that cut through the rural hills of Almora.
Famous for its ancient Mahadev Temple, the village consisted entirely of a high-ranking Brahmin
priest (pujar) community. The Pujaris held education in high regard. The community took pride in
producing many respected school teachers, army officers and other public servants. The village also
had a history of collective action around education. As village elders recounted, the community
came together to build one of the area's first schools, attached to the hermitage (ashram) of the
village temple. A full decade prior to India's independence, residents of Pujari came together to
demand a government primary school inside their village, which was established in 1938.
Residents owned small, fragmented landholdings that were large enough to maintain a
subsistence livelihood around agriculture and animal husbandry. The main local crops consisted of
wheat, rice, madua (a local buckwheat), and a variety of pulses. A common pattern across District
Almora, young men (and increasingly their families) had migrated out of the Pujari. Based on a
survey that I conducted covering every household, close to 90 percent of the new generation had
moved out of the village. Some relocated to the district center of Almora, many others to the city of
Haldwani located in the plains, and still others moved even farther away to New Delhi. In a pattern
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common to the hill region, the majority of men lived outside while their wives stayed behind with
their parents, performing agricultural work and tending to the household. Most households relied
on income from remittances, and a considerable number of them had family members employed in
government services, including education, forestry and the military.
Notwithstanding the high demand for education, the conditions of primary schooling in
Pujari left much to be desired. Soon after Uttarakhand achieved statehood, the local education
bureaucracy upgraded the government primary school to a new building. As I observed during
fieldwork, the physical facilities mandated under SSA, from classrooms to a school boundary wall,
had been constructed. Brand new bathrooms were recently installed as well, and as the school's
head teacher pointed out to me, the local education bureaucracy had asked her to submit
photographs documenting their completion. Parents in Pujari were deeply dissatisfied with the
quality of education at the school. The head teacher, who lived only a few kilometers away in the
town of Dwarahat, was routinely late or absent from the school. When she did come to the school,
parents usually found her seated in the office while the children sat alone in the classrooms working
on the assignments she had given them that morning.
These results were all the more puzzling given the presence of community groups involved
in education. A women's association (mabila mangal da) was established in the village in the early
1990s with the support of a local grassroots NGO. The association organized around a variety of
local needs, including early child education, environmental sustainability, alcoholism and other
issues. The group helped establish a local preschool, known as a balwadi, which not only attracted
students but also served as a community center for women and other residents to hold meetings and
voice their common needs. The balwadi ran for more than ten years before being converted into a
sandya kendra, an afterschool center that provided local school children with educational support with
an emphasis on environmental learning.
The problem of poor quality education came up many times during meetings held by the
women's association. A few of them, who were also members of the Village Education Committee
(VEC) in the government primary school, tried raising the issue at quarterly school meetings as well.
The head teacher complained about the difficulties of having to teach five grades on her own, in
addition to all the administrative duties under SSA. She had requested the Department of Education
to send an additional teacher to the school, but teacher rationalization policies prohibited the
posting of new teachers at roadside schools. Moreover, the primary school had a total enrollment of
only 21 students, since the majority of families from Pujari had relocated outside the village. Being a
roadside school with relatively few students, the local bureaucracy denied the request for an
additional teacher.
The women's group decided to take matters in its own hands. They organized funds from
within the community and appointed a local teacher to assist with teaching at the school. While that
helped raise the level of teaching activity, parents were still unhappy with the head teachers' repeated
absence and community-school relations deteriorated even further. Concerned mothers from the
women's group came together to lodge a formal complaint with the local education bureaucracy.
Meanwhile, the head teacher, who belonged to a lower caste community, filed her own complaint
against the group under the SC Act, a law that protected Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
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from atrocities and harassment committed by upper castes.'47 Meanwhile, officials from the local
education bureaucracy extended little support to the women's group, stating that the group was not
recognized by the state and that members could not set foot on school premises unless they were
parents and had been called for an official meeting. With the fear of having to face the legal system,
and that too with little bureaucratic support, the women's group decided to withdraw its complaint
on the head teacher. Faith in the government school system had reached an all-time low.
The situation in Pujari may sound exceptional, yet similar observations emerged throughout
the course of my fieldwork. Parents in villages across Almora expressed an overwhelming desire to
educate their children. In many cases, local communities had mobilized collectively and made
sacrifices on behalf of their primary school. Local officials, meanwhile, displayed dedication to their
work and went to great lengths to open new schools, upgrade infrastructure and conduct routine
school inspections. And yet the system fell apart when it came to the delivery of education. Even in
villages where teacher-community relations were excellent, parents felt that the primary school
system was not working on behalf of their children. To better understand the puzzling
implementation outcomes in Pujari, I shift our attention to the bureaucratic norms operating within
the state.
4.4.2. TheoreicalArgument in Brief
The condition of primary schooling in Pujari in many ways epitomizes the broader puzzle of
policy implementation in Uttarakhand. How do we account for a system that appears to perform
quite well in the provision of school infrastructure and yet flounders in the delivery of educational
services? This section offers a preview of the argument centered on bureaucratic norms governing
public agencies in Uttarakhand. According to the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter 1,
bureaucratic norms shape policy implementation through two channels (see Figure 3.1). First, they
influence the behavior of public officials in carrying out the administrative tasks underlying universal
primary education. Second, bureaucratic norms structure how public agencies relate with civic
actors, and thereby influence the nature of civic participation during the implementation process.
The combination of bureaucratic behavior within the state and civic action outside of the state
produce outcomes for policy implementation.
As I elaborated in Chapter 1, legalism aims to promote rule-following behavior. Bureaucrats
subject to legalistic norms adhere to official rules and procedures. They learn to apply policies
uniformly a without making exceptions for particular cases. Bureaucrats abide by official hierarchies
and resist input from outside agencies that may interfere with the state. Legalism aims to prevent
interference or capture by societal groups, while ensuring the integrity of the state in carrying out its
official mission. Bureaucrats tend to exclude citizens and civic agencies from decision-making. In
areas where civic participation is mandated by law, local bureaucrats work through official channels,
marginalizing the participation of informal or unrecognized associations.
147 The Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act was enacted in 1989 by India's Central government
to prevent atrocities against Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs).
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- - - - - - - - Civic Exclusion - - - - - - - -
To connect bureaucratic norms to outcomes for policy implementation in Uttarakhand, it
helps to break apart the activities involved in delivering universal primary education. Table 3.1
provides a summary of the critical administrative tasks involved in administering India's primary
education policies along with a brief description of the associated bureaucratic behaviors prescribed
by legalistic norms."' These tasks are divided into three broad categories of activities: (1) school
planning and provision, (2) delivery of educational services, and (3) system monitoring and feedback.
While the first category involves activities related to the quantitative aspects of universal primary
education, like the provision of physical infrastructure and school facilities, the latter two sets of
activities are more likely to influence the quality of education. System monitoring and feedback in
particular influence education quality, since the daily functioning of primary schools is largely out of
the hands of state planners as well local bureaucrats stationed in a district office, which can be hours
or even days away from villages.
Figure 4.4 Policy Implementation: Tasks and Behaviors
Administrative Tasks Bureaucratic Behaviors
School planning and provision
School infrastructure development -Conduct planning process within dedicated agency and restrict
outside input or interference
Regional planning and policy targeting -Apply policies uniformly across regions and social groups
Educational service delivery
Teacher posting -Apply uniform, rational procedure for allocation of teachers
across schools
Academic support -Provide academic resources in uniform, top-down process
Community support -Work with officially-recognized school agencies within the areas
mandated by policy
48 As discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, the list of critical tasks was compiled after conducting extensive interviews
with public officials, nongovernmental agencies, education experts and school teachers across north India.
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As a preview to the detailed case studies presented in the following section, let us briefly
consider a few examples of how legalistic norms shape bureaucratic behavior around these activities.
Take first the task of infrastructure planning and development. India's SSA program aims to
achieve universal access to primary schooling through the construction of new schools. Public
agencies have, in theory, a diversity of methods at their disposal for carrying out that task. They
could, for instance, call on elected officials to identify villages in their constituencies that require
school buildings, or at an even more local level, encourage gram panchayats (elected village councils)
to come forward with proposals for new school within their areas. They could work with
community groups to identify buildings that require remodeling and additional facilities like school
classrooms and kitchen sheds for cooking the Midday Meal.
Faced with these options, Uttarakhand's education bureaucracy tends to confine the task of
infrastructure planning and development within a dedicated sub-division of the education
bureaucracy, in this case the Civil Works wing of the SSA State Project Office. In carrying out their
responsibilities, bureaucrats follow official mandates for new school construction closely, avoiding
local demands and political interference. For instance, when deciding where to construct a school
building, they adhere to rules regarding school distance, which requires that villages have access to a
primary school within one kilometer of their habitation, whether the local community expresses the
need for a school or not. By overriding local demands, bureaucrats attempt to steer clear of local
politics and ensure that policies under SSA are administered uniformly across all communities.
Consider further the activities around monitoring and feedback, the mechanisms by which
public agencies try to ensure that the education system is functioning well. Bureaucrats have in
theory a range of possible methods at their disposal for monitoring the education system. Operating
under legalistic norms, officials in Uttarakhand's education bureaucracy tend follow a standard, top-
down model of school inspections. The inspection model requires local administration to conduct a
set number of school visits per month and run through a checklist of items, particularly for
infrastructure and other inputs like the Midday Meal. These monitoring visits are supplemented by
official surveys conducted by school teachers to identify out-of-school children and other potential
gaps in policy implementation.
Meanwhile, the same norms compel bureaucrats to disregard feedback from outside
agencies, such as local NGOs and community groups. Bureaucrats have reason not rely on these
informal channels. For one, information produced by agencies outside of the state does not carry
official recognition, making it difficult for local bureaucrats to justify using it for planning purposes.
Moreover, non-state agencies may possess vested interests in exposing the problems at a particular
school or exaggerating a particular set of local conditions, which renders their input illegitimate in
the eyes of public officials. By following standard, rational monitoring procedures and limiting the
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Monitoring and feedback
System monitoring -Follow top-down school inspection model and identify gaps
through official surveys
Local feedback -Incorporate local feedback through official channels
range of feedback to official information sources, bureaucrats avoid outside interference and ensure
the integrity of the public system.
The above examples help illustrate the connection between the bureaucratic behaviors
induced by legalistic norms and the implementation outcomes observed in Uttarakhand. In the
domain of school planning and provision, cordoning off the project office in charge of school
infrastructure planning and development from other agencies, the education bureaucracy has been
able to avoid local political interference while expanding access to schooling. By adhering to official
rules and procedures for the provision of school facilities, bureaucrats effectively override varying
local needs and demands. Yet the same bureaucratic norms that may enable school infrastructure
provision are in many ways ill-suited to the more complex tasks associated with delivering
educational service delivery.
The standard methods of school inspection and official channels of feedback tend to sideline
local knowledge and participation. Alternative sources of feedback, which may include grassroots
NGOs as well as informal, community-based organizations, can identify routine problems facing
primary schools. Bureaucrats themselves point out during interviews that civic participation is
critical to monitor and correct for deficiencies. Yet incorporating community feedback exposes the
state's rational administrative processes to local politics. Faced with the tradeoff between
community support and the potential for political interference, local bureaucrats in Uttarakhand will
tend to marginalize community participation. In so doing, they undermine their own ability to
monitor primary schooling and redress critical gaps in implementation. This can lead to outcomes
as observed in the case of Pujari, where teacher absence persists even in the face of local collective
action directed at the state. As the subsequent case studies will further demonstrate, the tendency to
exclude non-state actors in the policy implementation process tends to undermine collective action
around primary schooling, leading to further deterioration in the quality of educational services.
4.5. The Persistence of Legalism
Having now reviewed the mechanisms through which bureaucratic norms are theorized to
operate in Uttarakhand, this section presents the main empirical findings of the chapter. It begins
by establishing the existence of legalism within the state, drawing on examples taken from different
divisions and levels of the education bureaucracy as well as the experiences of civic agencies
involved in primary schooling. Contrary to the expectations for this new hill state, legalism norms
continue to guide bureaucratic behavior in Uttarakhand, even as state planners attempted to learn
from neighboring Himachal Pradesh and adopt a similar approach to policy implementation.
One might have expected Uttarakhand's newfound political autonomy to bring about
significant changes in the operation of the bureaucracy. Chief among the arguments for creating the
new state was that public institutions would be more responsive to the needs of the hill population.
With the groundwork for better governance in place, public agencies in Uttarakhand could focus
attention and resources on fulfilling their raison d'dtre, namely, the social and economic development
of the hill state. As discussed earlier, the problem of governance was not simply a dearth of policies
and public investment, but a governance process that failed to account for the region's geographic
and cultural complexities. Political autonomy was meant to bring about a change in how that
process took place.
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Yet the new state was not a tabula rasa. Having spent the first fifty years of post-independent
history as part of UP, public agencies in Uttarakhand inherited a bureaucratic legacy. Fieldwork
conducted in Uttarakhand provides strong evidence for the persistence of legalism within the state.
This section is divided into two parts. The first part presents a perspective from inside the state. It
draws on in-depth interviews of bureaucrats who spent much of their careers in UP, offering unique
insight on how administrative systems operate within each state. In addition, it draws on participant
observation conducted within public agencies in charge of primary education. The second part
presents a set of perspectives from outside the state, based on interviews and participant observation
with non-state actors, including civic agencies, citizens and social activists.
4.5.1. Inside the State
The first stream of evidence for the persistence of legalism within the state comes from the
experience of state planners and other senior public officials. Soon after Uttarakhand's formation,
these officials were searching for new ideas and strategies to develop the hill region. With strong
political will and commitment within the bureaucracy, they believed the opportunity was ripe to
consider novel approaches to governance. Many saw Himachal Pradesh as a model of hill region
development and looked to the bureaucratic leadership there for new ideas. As a senior official
from the Department of Health recalled:
There was afeeling among the leadership that we wanted to implement policies in a new way.
Though initially we followed the same structure as in UP, the discussion came up that we should do
things differenty. Teams were put together to visit other hill states like Himachal Pradesh and
Jammu-Kashmir, and they came back with some new ideas.'"
Bureaucrats working in the Education Department were especially keen to learn how education
policies could be adapted to better serve the hill region. Among the lessons they took away from
Himachal Pradesh was the importance of having an "integrated approach" to bureaucratic governance,
one that involved greater coordination between organizational levels and across different
departments within the state. Within the domain education, an integrated approach meant lifting the
traditional barriers between public agencies in charge of different aspects of education policy, as well
as improving coordination across departments like education and health.
With these ideas in mind, state planners in Uttarakhand tried to change how public agencies
operate by altering their formal design. They gave the Department of School Education a unified
mandate to cover both primary and secondary schooling. At the local level, each district was
assigned an official known as the District Education Officer (DEO) who would oversee the
administrative teams in charge of primary and secondary schooling. The reasoning behind the
change was to encourage greater coordination across subdivisions of the state, which would remove
inefficiencies and streamline the process of service delivery.
By lifting the formal barriers to coordination, state planners believed the bureaucracy could
more effectively tackle problems that cut across departments, such as students dropping out after
"4 Interview with Senior Official, Department of Health, Dehradun, Uttarakhand.
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completion of primary school. A similar change involved the integration of primary and pre-primary
education, the of latter which had previous been under the Department of Health. The new
administrative mandate required that centers for delivering early child health policies, known as
Aanganwadi Centers, within or very close to primary schools and utilizing them for the delivery of
preschool education. The idea behind the integration was to improve the readiness of young
children to participate in formal schooling, provide a base level of learning among entering students,
and to streamline enrollment into the primary school system. As one officer remarked, these
changes were an attempt to work beyond standard organizational divisions:
Since our UP days, there was no integration across departments, so everyone would work in
isolation. What we saw in Himachal Pradesh was that different offices worked closely together...A
new organitational structure was established [in Uttarakhand to coordinate between child health
and education. Instead of breaking them apart like before, we adopted a structure that tied the
diferentfunctions together. ""
While the integration of child health and education through preschool centers had taken place many
years prior in Himachal Pradesh, for Uttarakhand the new system called for some changes to the
routine of school teachers and health workers. Primary school teachers were now asked to
coordinate with Aanganwadi workers, the frontline staff in charge of early child health services, to
implement the new preschool centers. Aanganwadi workers, meanwhile, were asked to work with
local communities to enroll young children in the preschool centers. To carry out their new roles
and responsibilities, the Aanganwadi workers would receive special training from the Department of
Education.
The attempt to reorganize the delivery of education made sense to state planners in theory,
yet proved difficult to institute in practice. As several officials pointed out to me during interviews,
the concept of "convergence" across functions had become the rallying call within the state to lower
organizational barriers and improve the efficiency in public services. For these senior bureaucrats,
the idea of convergence made perfect sense. As officers in the IAS, they spent most of their careers
rotating across departments. That experience gave them with a bird's eye view of the state, the
overlap across functions, and potential gains of coordination. Yet there were doubters even among
the IAS ranks in Uttarakhand. Some believed that convergence was not only practically difficult, but
potentially dangerous for the orderly operation of the state. As part of the UP administration, the
different departments of Uttarakhand's bureaucracy had grown accustomed to operating in
organizations silos and would fight vigorously to retain their autonomy.
The worries expressed by these officials were borne out as the education and health
bureaucracies attempted to coordinate efforts for the new preschool centers. As senior officials
explained, the preschool centers were not functioning well due to the lack of coordination between
local health and education officials, and poor cooperation between frontline employees, the primary
school teachers and Aanganwadi workers. During focus group discussions with Aanganwadi
Workers in District Almora, many expressed the belief that managing preschool centers was a
diversion from their official mandate, which was to provide child health services. As one worker
summarized it, " Teaching the preschool children is the duty of the Education Department, not ours ."'' That
frontline workers should resist unwanted changes to their routines may come as little surprise to
ISO Interview with Education Official, SSA, Dehradun.
1s Focus Group Discussion with Aanganwadi Workers, District Almora, Uttarakhand.
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those who have studied organizations. Yet the reason behind the resistance was not obvious. At
first glance, one might presume that the problem was one of incentives. Had state planners
provided the appropriate mix of economic rewards and sanctions to these frontline workers, they
would have been more likely to adopt their new roles and responsibilities.
While can hardly deny that incentive problems exist across public agencies in India,
incentives alone cannot account for the behavior of frontline workers. In practice, Aanganwadi
workers were evaluated based on meeting certain performance targets. The targets relate to the
delivery of child health services, including immunization, the provision of nutrition programs,
assisting with births, measuring infant birth weights, and so on. The incentive-based view may treat
the preschool program as a case of failure by design. Aanganwadi workers were not evaluated on
the attendance or learning levels of preschool students. However, the pressure to achieve child
health targets, and thereby obtain positive performance reviews, could not by itself dictate how one
ought to go about meeting those targets. Some health workers actually preferred running the
preschool centers. For one, having centers that operated at a fixed day and time each week gave
them the chance to plan their village visits ahead of time. Moreover, the preschool center provided
them access to children without having to hike through an entire habitation and visit families door-
to-door. 152
These findings are not meant to suggest that the design of incentives does not matter. The
point, rather, is that public employees look to more than just incentives in determining how to carry
out their duties. The discontent expressed by the Aanganwadi Workers in Uttarakhand regarding
the preschool program reflected a deeper concern over preserving the organizational rules and
boundaries. Many expressed concern that the preschool policy would create a slippery slope,
encouraging the government to continue redefining their official responsibilities, to the point where,
as one Aanganwadi worker put it, "Our basic duty is no longer recognirable to us."' 53 A similar view was
maintained by senior officials in the Department of Health. According to a bureaucrat in charge of
overseeing the preschool centers, the new system had the potential to undermine the health
bureaucracy's primary mandate:
The [preschoo4 centers are fine in theory, but our mission here is not to teach the children. I would
not expect the Aanganwadi Worker to interrupt a school teacher who is running a class to askfor
help with the preschool.. .In the same way, I would not expect my fellow colleague in the Education
Department to interfere in our work.' 4
The official quoted above did not fail to appreciate the linkages between early child health and
education. He cited with approval, for instance, the success of India's Pulse Polio campaign, which
calls for primary school teachers to help organize monthly child immunization drives on school
premises. Yet even that effort, he believed, could lead to confusion between the two departments.
Similarly, his counterparts in the Department of Education felt that school teachers already had too
many responsibilities and should not be engaged in public health work, as it may detract from their
1 As I discussed in the previous chapter, Aanganwadi Workers based in District Shimla of neighboring Himachal
Pradesh found it advantageous to run the village preschool centers. Faced with the same formal incentives as their
colleagues in Uttarakhand, they viewed the state's preschool program as an opportunity to establish community ties and
thereby achieve their monthly child health targets.
153 Focus Group Discussion with Aanganwadi Workers, District Almora, Uttarakhand.
1s4 Interview with senior official, Department of Health, Dehradun, Uttarakhand.
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teaching duties. These officials expressed a larger concern shared by their colleagues and junior
staff, namely, that the attempt to merge duties across departments violated the norm to maintain
official boundaries between divisions of the state.
Further evidence for the persistence of legalistic norms in the Uttarakhand bureaucracy
comes from fieldwork conducted inside the Department of Education. Recall that India's central
government rolled out SSA, the country's flagship policy for universal primary education in 2001,
around the same time that Uttarakhand achieved statehood. These two concurrent events brought a
set of common changes to the education bureaucracy, namely, the decentralization of the political
system and administrative structure for primary schooling. These conditions offer a test for whether
bureaucratic norms persist in a bureaucracy subject to new formal institutions. The SSA program in
Uttarakhand was comprised of officials promoted from within the Education Department, many of
whom had experience working in both the hill region as well as the plains of Uttar Pradesh. That
experience placed them in a unique position to reflect over whether and how institutional changes
affected the bureaucracy and their day-to-day work.
According to interviews conducted with officials from SSA and the Education Department,
the most palpable change experienced was decentralization, or as some put it, the "closing of distance"
within the state. How they came to understand and respond to decentralization offers insight on the
norms governing the education bureaucracy. On the one hand, many saw tangible benefits to
having a smaller, more decentralized system of government. Public officials at various levels of the
state were more accessible, making it easier to communicate with each other and carry out routine
work. As an official from the SSA State Project Office noted, the degree of communication had
improved across the education bureaucracy:
Things are dferent now that we have a small state. Information from here can go straight to the
offidals at the top. During UP days, nothing ever reached Lucknow or Allahabad But today, if
something is needed, I have direct links to the Directorate. I can even tellyou what the district
officer in Pithoragarh [District] is doing right now.
Decentralization allowed for greater contact between seniors and subordinates, even those based in
far-flung districts like Pithoragarh. As a result, administrative procedures like the release of funds to
local districts and the dissemination of reports and guidelines, could take place more quickly with
fewer bottlenecks. Local bureaucrats, who at one time could not expect to interact with top-ranking
officials like the Secretary of Education, felt that organizational barriers had been lowered and a
direct link between their offices and the senior administrators in Dehradun had been established.
Yet decentralized system exposed an underlying tension between the "closing of distance" and
bureaucratic norms that compelled officials to uphold official procedures and hierarchies. Lower-
level bureaucrats, who in the past had little access to upper echelons of the Education Department,
found themselves in greater contact with senior officials. Senior officials, meanwhile, who had been
steeped in the hierarchical system of the UP state, increasingly had to address the needs of
subordinates. While officials acknowledged certain benefits such as improved information flow
within the bureaucracy, many felt that procedures and hierarchies were under threat and had to be
preserved. As a senior official from the education bureaucracy explained:
155 Interview with Education Official, State Project Office, SSA
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We separatedfrom UP, why? Because we were geographically diferent, and we were kind of tail-
enders, far away from Lucknow.. .And a small state means what? It should mean better
administration. Now there is greater access to oficials like the Director and Secretary. That is
helpful up to a limit. Having more access is not positive when procedures and chain of command get
broken. And in that way, Ifeel we were much better off as part of UP."'
Other officials expressed a similar worry that access to the state could be misused. Rules and
procedures had to be tightened or else the bureaucracy would fall prey to politiical interference, or
worse even, capture by elites. The new political system-the new Vidhan Sabha was comprised of
70 MLAs as opposed to 19 under UP-gave people "too much access" to the state, creating the
potential for corruption. According to another official working in the education bureaucracy:
Before when we had our Education Directorate in UP, no teacher would think to approach us. All
their concerns wouldflow through ofidal channels. But with greater access to the state, things can
happen backhandedy.'57
Knowingly or not, these bureaucrats had articulated prime arguments for legalism. In contrast to
their colleagues in Himachal Pradesh, who came to understand the (albeit problematic) participation
of local communities and their elected officials as critical to good governance, bureaucrats in
Uttarakhand treated the participation of non-state actors with suspicion. A retired IAS officer
residing in Dehradun who had held several seniors positions in the UP state put it to me starkly.
Unless the Uttarakhand bureaucracy upheld measures to protect itself from outside interference, a
"breakdown of order' within the state was inevitable.
To include non-state actors in the policy implementation process was seen as a violation of
legalism, and local officials that attempted to work outside these norms faced sanction. As the
nested case studies will show in greater detail, it was not for a lack of motivation or ideas that local
officials in Uttarakhand failed to adapt policies in creative ways like their colleagues in Himachal
Pradesh. Rather, it was the overriding pressure within the state to follow procedures tightly. In the
words of a local bureaucrat who tried bending the rules regarding the geographic placement of
school teachers to better suit what he thought were the needs facing primary schools in his local
administrative block:
Now if I ty to press the matter [of teacher placement], district ofidals will question me. Why
aren'tyou following the rules? And if we share some ideas, thy respond by throwing more
paperwork [kagaji kaam] at us.'5
In their attempts to bend rules, local bureaucrats like the one quoted here faced sanctions.
Questioning by senior colleagues within one's district was an indication of having upset officials
further up the hierarchy. And the assignment of additional paperwork, something that local officials
often demanded form school teachers, was also taken as a sign of one's lower status within the
bureaucracy. Through these subtle mechanisms, local officials in Uttarakhand learned to carry out
the demands of legalism.
156 Senior Official, Department of Education, Dehradun, Uttarakhand.
157 Senior Official, Department of Education, Dehradun, Uttarakhand.
158 Interview, Block Resource Coordinator, District Almora.
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4.5.2. Outside the State
The second stream of evidence for the prevalence of legalism within the state comes from
the experiences of individuals and groups outside the state. The perspective of non-state actors is
particularly important policy areas like primary education, which rely on civic input and community
oversight. Participant observation and in-depth interviews conducted with citizens, social activists
and civic agencies working in early child education and related policy domains shed further light on
how non-state actors understand the internal workings of the state. Their high hopes for change
notwithstanding, these stakeholders found the new administrative system a continuation of the "UP
style" of governance, one that gave full authority to senior bureaucrats while marginalizing local
communities and civic agencies in the policy implementation process.
Consider first the experiences of Uttarakhand Seva Nidhi (USN), a well-regarded NGO that
has worked for more than 25 years in the areas of early child education, community empowerment
and environmental sustainability." 9 Based in the hill district of Almora, the organization was
founded by Dr. Lalit Pande1, a mechanical engineer hailing from a Kumaoni family belonging to
the upper echelons of Uttarkhand's intellectual class. The son of a highly decorated civil servant in
the IAS, Dr. Pande completed his education at the Doon School, IIT-Delhi and MIT in Cambridge,
Massachusetts. Dr. Pande and his organization were well-versed in the vernacular of public agencies
and officialdom. Under India's New Education Policy of 1986, the Department of Education
appointed USN a nodal agency for advancing environmental education in the hill region of erstwhile
Uttar Pradesh. The organization worked with the Department of Education to create textbooks,
teaching manuals and activities around environmental education in government schools.
Along with its activities in the formal education system, USN had also engaged in less
formal, community-based activities around education, community empowerment and environmental
sustainability. These activities were conducted primary through a voluntary network of women's
groups (mahila mangal dai) operating in more than 1,000 villages in Uttarakhand. Working through
local NGO partners across the state, USN provided the mahila mangal dals with support and guidance
to organize collectively around a multitude of issues affecting their communities.
Back in the early 1990s, women's groups began to express an interest in early child
education. USN responded by helping to establish informal, locally-managed preschool centers
(balwadis) across the state. Communities took charge of the centers on their own, providing land,
labor and other forms of voluntary assistance. Meanwhile, USN provided technical inputs, including
training to local instructors, routine monitoring of the centers and local capacity-building for the
women's groups. Although the state had not granted the balwadi centers any formal recognition,
they often served as the primary educational institutions within the villages, as universal education
policies like SSA had not yet been implemented. Importantly, they also served as community
centers, a public space for women and other community members to come together and discuss
their collective needs.1 6 '
159 More information on Uttarakhand Seva Nidhi is available at: http://www.ueec.org.in.
160 Dr. Lalit Pande agreed to have his identity disclosed for the purposes of this study.
161 To learn more about the balwadi program and its role in helping to forge communites, see Uttarakhand Seva Nidhi
(2001).
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Like many other civil society groups, USN had high aspirations when Uttarakhand was
established in 2001. Yet they found the bureaucracy even more stifling than under Uttar Pradesh.
Because the balwadi program was supported directly by the central government's Ministry of Human
Resource Development (MHRD), the education bureaucracy of UP was in some ways sidelined
from process. Dr. Pande and his colleagues at USN found that to be a blessing, as they did not have
to face the routine scrutiny of local officials, which could have been debilitating for their work. The
UP administration was, in their words, "neither a support to us nor a hindrance." Officials from Lucknow
would visit every now and again, but did not pay much attention to the organization's work.
With the creation of Uttarakhand, the education bureaucracy took a renewed interest in local
civic agencies and began scrutinizing organizations whose work did not conform to official rules and
procedures. One of the challenges facing the balwadi program was that it did not meet the rules
regarding the timing and location of preschool centers. As I mentioned earlier, the Aanganwadi
Center program instituted by the state required preschools to be located within or beside the
government primary school. By contrast, the placement and timings of the balwadi centers were
decided by way of deliberation by local communities. With the strict enforcement of rules by the
state, the balwadi centers could not continue operating under the state's new preschool program. As
Dr. Pande explained, USN faced questions regarding its balwadi program:
The balwadis went on for 20years. Though we experienced some hiccups along the way, the
program worked When Uttarakhand broke offrom UP we were very positive. We wanted to
work more closely with the state and tried being more proactive. But instead of supporting our work,
we found the bureaucray questioning us. They would come up with any number of technicalities
about our approach that did notfit with official nies and requirements.'12
While the bureaucracy was guided by a concern for official rules, USN operated according to a
different set of principles that took local knowledge and community participation as paramount.
The balwadi program was implemented according to the needs of target communities. When it came
to decisions around the timing and location of the balwadi centers, women's groups enjoyed the full
authority and would arrive at a collective understanding. The flexibility built into the deliberative
model allowed the women's groups to establish the location and timings that best suited their needs.
Typically, the centers were placed in a common location that was suitable for all community
members to attend meetings, and one where mothers would also feel comfortable leaving their
young ones for a few hours each day. As I observed in several villages, the women's groups had
come to rely on the balwadi as a safe place of learning and childcare for their children. Each
morning, they would leave their young ones at the center on their way out into the fields to perform
agricultural labor.
The flexibility built into the balwadi program came into conflict with official rules and
procedures, which required the centers to be relocated to the nearest primary school or else closed.
By applying the same rules designed for the government's preschool program to USN's balwadi
program, officials in Uttarakhand's education bureaucracy believed they were carrying out their
duties. Meanwhile, according to USN and its grassroots network of local NGO partners and village
women's groups, the state was effectively undoing twenty years of local collective action around
early child education. Notwithstanding their praise for the USN's work, public officials were
162 Interview with Dr. Lalit Pande.
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compelled to apply the preschool policy even-handedly, with no special consideration for the quality
of the organization and its work.1 6 ' The employees at USN understood that as a normal feature of
doing business with the state. According to one of the managers of the balwadi program at USN:
The bureaucracy cannot say that 'your organihation is good or different.' They have to follow a
standard rule... And onceyou get kicked out of the system, thatS it.16 4
Given the bureaucracy's tendency to apply rules uniformly, organizations like USN drew the
lesson that public officials in Uttarakhand possessed "no concern about the quality ofNGOs." In
their eyes, the community-based nature of their work made no difference to the state. Public
officials in Uttarakhand gave civic agencies like USN were accorded scant recognition for
their grassroots credentials. Unlike their counterparts in Himachal Pradesh, who encouraged
civic input into the planning process, civic agencies in Uttarakhand were effectively
marginalizd. As a result, officers at USN chose to avoid working alongside public agencies,
and instead redirected their efforts towards working with communities more directly.
These findings are not unique to USN and its interactions with the education bureaucracy.
Civic actors working across different policy domains shared similar experiences and perceptions
regarding the state. Consider the experience of Mr. Dangwal, a retired school teacher and activist
from Almora who had spent more than 25 years working on rural literacy and natural resource
management with hill communities. An active participant of the Uttarakhand statehood movement
during the 1970s, Dangwalji identified strongly with his village, the local environment and the hill
region more generally. In 2001, Dangwalji and his collaborators formalized their efforts by
establishing a grassroots NGO. The organization worked with communities to address critical
issues such as water and forest management, early child education, and livelihood enhancement for
the poor. As a former high school teacher, Dangwalji knew the challenges of building community
ties with public agencies. Having been promoted through the organizational ranks, he ended his
career as a lecturer and administrator at a leading government high school in the district. He thus
possessed an insider's grasp of how the local bureaucracy worked, both before and after Uttarkhand
split from Uttar Pradesh.
Among Dangwalji's first community mobilization efforts was for the World Bank's
Swajal project, a village water management and sanitation program. The program was first
implemented during the 1990s under the administrative aegis of the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam
(Water Corporation). Against the top-down model of service delivery that prevailed within
the state, the program advocated a more decentralized, participatory approach to water
management. As part of the implementation effort for the Swajal project, Dangwalji and his
associates worked with villagers to identify sustainable water sources and plan for the
installation of safe water lines through their villages. When the time came, however, to carry
out the installation of water lines, public officials disregarded the input of local communities:
The Jal Nigam had demarcated the forests and water sources according to maps that did not fit with
the situation we saw on the ground As a result, 90 percent of the water lines they created in our
163 It helps to point out that officials in the education bureaucracy recognized the contributions of USN and viewed it as
a dedicated civic agency working on behalf of underserved communities. Virtually every bureaucrat I interviewed
praised the organization for its work in environmental education.
164 Interview with program manager, Uttarakhand Seva Nidhi, District Almora, Uttarakhand.
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villages did not work. Instead of listening to communities, they pushed the people aside and worked
by their own rules.'
While this is not the place to evaluate the performance of Swajal, Dangwalji's assessment of the
program sheds light on how public agencies relate to everyday citizens.16 6 Similar findings have been
reported in studies of water conservation and forest management in Uttarakhand (Agrawal 1999;
Bose 2000; CDS 2000). The state showed indifference, if not outright hostility, towards local
communities in the governance of local natural resources.
Long before the state had any claim over Uttarakhand's forests, hill communities collectively
governed forest land through informal forest councils. 167 Other local activists I interviewed had
experience working with the forest bureaucracy, particularly in its program for Joint Forest
Management, which was another attempt at participatory governance with World Bank support.
The program aimed to protect forest land while strengthening the ties between hill communities and
the state. In practice, however, the Forest Department became the dominant partner, unilaterally
imposing rules and disempowering communities in the process.'16
Governance in the domain of primary education revealed similar pattern of exclusion by the
state. Through their local NGO, Dangwalji and his associates had spent more than a decade
organizing women's groups and working to strengthen community participation in village primary
schools. As a school teacher himself, he understood the importance of establishing ties between
community groups and village primary schools. Given the broad of male out-migration in much of
the hill region, this meant establishing ties with mothers, who performed the majority of domestic
duties such as water collection and agricultural labor, as well overseeing their children's' education.
In contrast to Himachal Pradesh, however, the pattern of behavior in Uttarakhand's bureaucracy has
been to ignore and override local demands and marginalize women from the implementaoni
process. 16 9 As Dangwalji put it, the very idea of "people's participation" within the state became
little more than a catchphrase:
Now every official talks about 'beople'spartidpation." But the administrative structure tells the
people something else. It tells them, 'You stay seated, we are running eveything'... And so
communities have become hesitant to step forward They have come to believe that their partidpation
is not needed 1,0
It is important to emphasize once again that the education bureaucracy Uttarakhand were subject to
the same formal accountability structures and had the same administrative blueprint for SSA and
other primary education policies. These policies explicitly called for decentralization and the
165 Interview with social activist, District Almora, Uttarakhand.
166 According to a report commission by the World Bank evaluating the Swajal program: "Software, i.e., community
development activities, tend to be totally ignored from the implementation phase onwards" and operation and
maintenance are "viewed and addressed as a hardware issue to the neglect of its serious software implications." (CDS
2000:2)
167 For a history of peasant resistance and the emergence of forest councils in Uttarakhand, see Guha (2000). On the
social and political processes underlying collective forest management by van panchayats, as well as their relationship to
the state, see Agrawal (2001) and Agrawal and Ostrom (2001).
168 On Joint Forest Management's failure to empower local communities in Uttarakhand, see Corbridge and Jewitt
(1997) and Sundar (2000).
169 The bureaucracy's indifference towards the needs facing women, has also been well-documented (Joshi 2005).
170 Interview with social activist, District Almora.
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participation of local communities. As the following case studies will show, however, public officials
adopted a narrow, legalistic interpretation of what participation meant. Local communities were
welcome to participate in primary schooling so long as their influence over implementation was
contained.
4.6. Nested Cases of Implementation
Having established above the persistence of legalism within the bureaucracy, I now turn to
showing how norms drive policy implementation outcomes in Uttarakhand. This section analyzes
two nested case studies of policy implementation. The first case involves the implementation of
teacher placement and monitoring policies. The findings are drawn from multi-level fieldwork
conducted within the state bureaucracy, local district bureaucracy and primary school. The
bureaucracy's legalistic application of teacher rationalization and monitoring policies encourages
both school teachers and parents to circumvent the bureaucracy and identify informal channels for
addressing their respective needs. The second case tests the mechanisms of my theory at the village
level. I examine community governance over primary schooling in the village of Silam Ghat, a
setting where one would expect primary education to be well-implemented. The case probes
whether and how legalism weakens local collective action to produce worse outcomes for
implementation. The case also helps us understand the phenomenon of exit from the government
primary schools in Uttarakhand. Taken together, these two cases aim to demonstrate that the
bureaucracy's legalistic approach to implementation produces inferior outcomes, and may even
undermine its long-run capacity to govern the education system.
4.6.1. The Legalistic Danda: Monitoring School Teachers from Dehradun to Almora
Against the backdrop of its noteworthy school infrastructure expansion, the primary
education system in Uttarakhand suffers from severe and persistent gaps in service delivery. These
gaps are reflected in the high rate of teacher absence, high incidence of single-teacher schools, and
poor student learning outcomes, which were presented earlier. Yet the depressing statistics
associated with outcomes may even not scratch the surface of how poorly Uttarakhand's school
system actually functions.
Intensive qualitative fieldwork conducted in District Almora, located in the high literacy
Kumaon region of the state, revealed a breakdown in governance. Cases included routine teacher
lateness and absence, along with a failure to keep watch over school children, let alone teach. Some
violations were even more egregious. During unannounced primary school visits conducted across
the district, I observed teachers intoxicated during school hours on three separate occasions.'
Alert to these deficiencies, senior officials within the education bureaucracy responded by imposing
tighter rules and additional checks on both school teachers and local officials. As some of these
171 That the teachers involved showed little sign of hesitation or alarm when approached by an external researcher raises
the question of how far such behaviors have become normalized within Uttarakhand's primary school system. During
fieldwork, I was alerted to many more such cases by parents residing in other villages, many of whom felt incapable of
doing anything.
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officials put it, the state needed to "appy the danda [stick]" over the school system to improve the
delivery of primary education.
Stricter monitoring procedures notwithstanding, the state has proven incapable of addressing
the root causes underlying poor service delivery. After separating from Uttar Pradesh, one might
have expected Uttarakhand's education bureaucracy to govern the primary school system more
effectively. Strong demand for education combined with a history of local collective action across
the state would suggest a high degree of public vigilance as well. Yet in contrast to the pattern
observed in Himachal Pradesh, where the education bureaucracy actively promoted input from local
communities in the monitoring process, parents and community groups in Uttarakhand report
exclusion from the state and a strong sense of disempowerment.
The findings presented in this section show how legalistic norms within the state shape
bureaucratic behaviors and civic action in the monitoring process within the primary education
system. Data gathered from interviews with public officials, participant observation within the
education bureaucracy and village-level ethnography reveal a system of top-down monitoring that
relies mostly on school inspections and other official feedback channels, while marginalizing
feedback from local communities and civic groups.
Chief among the problems facing Uttarakhand's primary school system is the prevalence of
schools staffed by only one school teacher. According to the ASER survey data presented earlier,
single-teacher schools account for approximately one fifth of government primary schools in the
state. That is more than twice the proportion in neighboring Himachal Pradesh, which faces very
similar geographic conditions. One might suppose that the problem reflected a numerical lack of
school teachers in Uttarakhand, in which case the gap could be filled by recruiting more teachers.
However, the aggregate ratio of students to teachers, Uttarakhand performs nearly as well as
Himachal Pradesh. The difficulty lies in the skewed distribution of school teachers across primary
schools. A senior official in the Department of Education explained the problem:
In remote areas, people say there are no teachers, whereas in the plains area there is a surplus of
teachers. But this is not because we face a shortage. Ifyou look at it closely, our [teacherstudent]
ratio is one of the best in the country. At the primary school level it is 1 teacher per 14 or 15
students. So the number of teachers here is more than in other states. Now our objective is to
rationalfire these teachers. Andfor that we have a poliy to send teachers to defidt regions.1,2
The majority of single-teacher schools in Uttarakhand are located in villages far from major towns
and motor roads. Many are scattered across the upper hill region of the state, locations that school
teachers find unattractive. By comparison, the primary schools serving roadside villages, the lower
hills and the plains region bordering Uttar Pradesh exhibit an overflow of school teachers. To
reverse the tide in favor in favor of underserved regions and villages, the education bureaucracy
attempted to implement a teacher rationalization policy. According to the same official:
Most teachers want to get transferredfrom the interior hills to the lower hills and plains. Transfers
are not happening from the plains back up to the hills. We felt that teacher transfers must be two-
way. It should not be like rain waterflowing down the hills... We instituted a rationalization
poliy barring teachers from migrating from the upper hills down to the plains. We also prepared a
172 Interview with Senior Official, Department of Education, Dehradun, Uttarakhand.
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list of teachers who have been serving in prime locations like Dehradun and Haridwar continuously
for last 15years. These individuals were asked to serve in more remote are next. We also blocked
any movement of teachers to dty centers and schools located in roadside villages.
The attempt at teacher rationalization was not unique to Uttarakhand. A similar policy was
instituted in Himachal Pradesh, which also faced a similar challenge of serving the remote hill
regions of the state. Yet the process of implementation there was different in important respects.
Recall that in Himachal Pradesh, rationalization took place gradually and in a phased
manner, through joint consultation with local bureaucrats and MLAs. Drawing on local bureaucratic
input, senior officials mapped out regions of the state where the bureaucracy had greater support
from school teachers and local communities. They targeted those regions on a pilot basis first and
drew lessons for how to extend the policy statewide. Importantly, local bureaucrats identified the
political barriers and logistical challenges to enforcement within their respective districts, sharing
critical information to senior officials, which then fed back into the implementation process. The
gradual and broadly consultative approach enabled the state to learn over time and adapt the
rationalization policy based on varying local conditions. The initial phase of implementation also
gave school teachers and other stakeholders an opportunity to observe the policy's practical
consequences.
The attempt at teacher rationalization in Uttarakhand took a very different turn. The policy
was instituted uniformly across the state with little deliberation. Apart from high-level policy
discussions with political leadership in Dehradun, senior officials within the education bureaucracy
saw little need to incorporate broader participation from within the bureaucracy. No consultation
took place with local officials and those closer to the ground had no opportunity to share their
perspectives over the challenges of implementation. According to senior officials, the gaps in
service delivery had come about because the system was too "loose" (dhila) and the state too porous
to outside influence, allowing local politics to infect the lower echelons of the bureaucracy.
Meanwhile, primary school teachers, upon whom the danda of rationalization was to be applied, had
little input over the proposed changes. Senior officials sought to contain the influence of school
teachers, whose "malfeasance" they associated with the gaps in service delivery. For example, some
officials cited the prevalence of bogus medical claims made by school teachers seeking to obtain
transfers to more comfortable locations. As another senior bureaucrat explained:
The teachers have become so smart. They get afakeparchee [injury slip] made by the doctorfrom a
recognized medical institution in New Delhi. They frign illness and submit the investigative paper
of the doctor to ask for a transfer. That is the kind of malfeasance we wanted to stop. A local
oficer who does not understand the game may unknowingly accept the doctor's injury slip. Or worse
even, he may be part of the game. So we took the matter out of their [local offidals'I hands. We
informed school teachers and their doctors that they must appear before a medical board at the state
level So transfer requests based on medical grounds would be subject to the state medical board
This sent the message that they cannot evade our scrutiny.74
173 Interview with Senior Official, Department of Education, Dehradun, Uttarakhand.
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Senior officials in Uttarakhand sought to tighten the state's grip over the education system through
the institutions of more rules and even heavier top-down monitoring. The allocation of school
teachers would only become more balanced with pressure for clear and consistent rule enforcement.
A legalistic approach was also taken to address problems of teacher absence and poor quality
teaching. By tightening formal checks and monitoring procedures, senior officials believed the
school system could be made more accountable. Recognizing that local bureaucrats could not
realistically inspect every classroom within an administrative district, senior officials developed what
they believed was a simpler and more effective method for monitoring. Primary school teachers
were required to maintain an official diary, which detailed their daily lesson plan and what was
covered in class. The diary would be maintained by teachers, checked over by the school
headmaster, and made available at any time for inspection by local bureaucrats. According to senior
officials, the diary was not only more efficient, but also provided a fair and impartial method for
monitoring school teachers:
The purpose behind the diag is twofold First, to make them [school teachers] more accountable at
the school, they have to fill the diary every day. And the school headmaster has to note down their
remarks every two weeks. Now suppose I [a local ofida4j want to go and inspect a school I don't
have to ask the teacher, 'What haveyou done?" I can go straight to the diary. Fabricated entry in
a daily diary is tough to do, like say on a monthly basis. So we instructed all the [locaI officers to
check the daily diay. And if the teacher has notfilled it, they should report that to us as per the
results of their inspection. The second point is that the system also protects school teachers. If they
are abruptly absent orfor some reason unavailable on the day of inspection, their diary is still there
for checking. This protects themfrom suspension.'5
The monitoring system in Uttarakhand gave priority to official documentation, removing the need
for any dialogue between local officials and school teachers. In addition to daily diaries, the
education bureaucracy instituted a formal complaint system for parents. The contact number for
local officials in the education bureaucracy was painted visibly outside every primary school, and
similarly, the phone numbers of every school headmaster and gram pradhan of the village panchayat
was made available to the local officials. The purpose behind the system was to enable parents to
inform the bureaucracy immediately if anything went wrong at the school, allowing local officials to
confirm any reports and respond quickly.
Once rationalization was instituted, senior officials remained alert to the possibility that
some school teachers may find ways to circumvent the policy at the local-level. Their concern was
not without substance. Consider findings from the local education bureaucracy in Dehradun
District, where officials enjoyed close physical proximity to bureaucratic leadership in the state
Secretariat. Several months after teacher rationalization was instituted, I observed the daily influx of
school teachers at the local education bureaucracy in the attempt to secure a transfer. Local officials
stationed in Dehradun lauded the effort by senior officials to tighten the state's control over the
school system, and believed that consistent application of the policy helped protect them from the
vagaries of local politics. As one official observed:
Ever since it [rationalization] was announced, we've had a long line of teachers coming here every
day askingfor a transfer... They are using any means possible to work around the poliy. But I
175 Interview with Senior Official, Department of Education, Dehradun, Uttarakhand.
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keep telling him that my hands are tied The orders are for me not to conduct any transfers except
those directedfrom above... Teachers are unhappy with it, but they see that I am only applying the
polig given to me. Nobody can blame me for doing my job.76
For these local bureaucrats, teacher rationalization offered a safeguard against complaints. By
deferring to the authority of officials stationed higher up the bureaucratic hierarchy, they no longer
had to exercise judgment over individual cases. Consistent enforcement from above also made it
more difficult for school teachers to level charges of prejudice or preferential treatment against local
bureaucrats.
Rationalization did not discourage school teachers from attempting to secure desirable
teaching posts. According to local officials in Dehradun, their office faced a backlog of transfer-
related requests from school teachers, many of whom resisted being transferred by the bureaucracy
without at least making their case. On several occasions, I observed teachers arrive at the district
office accompanied by relatives and other associates claiming to have an "approach," local parlance
for political connections. In one typical case, a school teacher arrived at the district office in the
morning accompanied by her brother. He tried to persuade the local officials there to transfer her
from a rural primary school to one based closer to the capital city center of Dehradun. Later that
afternoon, one of the concerned officials narrated the case further:
You saw that brother and sister sitting here earlier? She is a school teacher, and he came along
doing netagiri [playing politics] on her behalf Last time she was here asking for a transfer on the
grounds that her children were studying in Dehradun. Now this time, her bother shared his political
contacts with us and asked againfor her transfer. I sent them away, but how long can that
continue? This is the third time I have seen her this month... Youjust watch, next time they come
he will have found a way to get the transfer order made, and someone on top will instruct me what to
do.177
Having handled cases like this on a routine basis, local bureaucrats were also aware of various
loopholes in the system. Some teachers, for instance, had found a way to delay a transfer order by
lodging a formal petition with the state. These delays came at a great cost. Local communities that
expressed the demand for an additional teacher could be left waiting for months at a time. Given
the educational cycle for primary schooling, that would imply the loss of a full academic year.
Manipulation of the system by school teachers connected to politicians posed a threat to effective
implementation.
Yet manipulation was not the concern on the minds of local officials in Dehradun. As
rationalization proceeded across the state, cases had come up in their office involving school
teachers with disabilities who had been transferred to interior villages. Such cases left local officials
in a quandary. While they wanted to help school teachers with legitimate needs, they risked censure
for not abiding by official procedures. As one local bureaucrat in Dehradun explained:
They [senior officials] have come up with a goodpoliy. But I doubt it can work across the entire state.
Already we are seeing problems... We are out here explaining to the school teachers that we cannot
make any concessionsfor anyone... But how do I explain to a sixtyyear old headmaster who has
176 Local official, District Education Office, Dehradun.
177 Local official, District Education Office, Dehradun.
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dificuly walking why he was transferred to a school in some farflung village? How do I tell him
that I cannot do anything for his case? And there are many, many cases like his.'78
Unable to adapt the policy to address such cases and meet the needs of school teachers frustrated
local officials. News of such cases also spread among the school teacher community in Dehradun,
raising the risk of local political backlash. While local officials understood the purpose behind
tightening the transfer system, the pressure for uniform implementation made it difficult for them to
distinguish between cases of manipulation and genuine needs facing some teachers.
One might suppose that the conditions facing the local education bureaucracy in Dehradun
were driven by idiosyncratic factors. As the administrative capital of the state, local officials there
may have faced inordinate pressure to demonstrate that they were implementing policies in a fair
and consistent manner. To probe the mechanisms of my theory further, I conducted local-level
fieldwork away from the state capital in District Almora. I selected District Almora for a few critical
reasons. First, Almora was historically considered one of India's most educationally forward
districts. The district's triumvirate of Brahmins-Pant, Pandy andJoshi-were renowned for their
attachment to education. Second, as I discussed at the outset of the chapter, Almora was also a
historical center of political consciousness within erstwhile Uttar Pradesh. The national freedom
fighter and first Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Govind Ballabh Pant, came from this district, as
did several other senior statesmen. Finally, the British had a significant presence in District Almora
and the Kumaon region more broadly. The region was the recruitment grounds for the Kumaon
Regiment of the Indian army, a factor that some suggest helped further the demand for schooling.'79
The above considerations generate the expectation that local public agencies should be
effective in implementing education in Almora. Although they were relatively far from the capital
Dehradun, local officials in Almora's education bureaucracy articulated similar pressures to apply the
danda on school teachers while implementing rationalization and monitoring policies. There were
penalties involved in attempting to intervene on behalf of individual school teachers. In Dwarahat, a
far-flung administrative block of Almora, education officials discussed the pressures they faced to
implement teacher rationalization in a uniform and consistent manner. As one block-level official
explained:
The fact is that teachers come to us for help. Even to expedite theirpay, they ask us if we can get it
done for them. They have less direct contact with the district [administration], and even less with the
state. Since we are the local people, naturally they approach us first. But sometime they don't
realize that we can't bend the rulesfor them. Take the primary school at the end of that road It
has 96 children, but only one person teaching The headmaster has been asking us to send an
additional teacher, again and againfor the lastyear. But it is on the roadside, so the same issue of
'sugam-durgam' [accessible versus remote location] comes up, and rationali ation [polig] doesn't
allow it. I brought this issue up before at the district, but ifIpress it again and again, it draws too
much attention.
178 Focus group discussion, District Education Office, Dehradun.
179 These factors also make District Almora comparable to District Shimla of Himachal Pradesh, examined in the
previous chapter.
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The same office shared with me the list of accessible (sugam) and remote (durgam) primary schools
within their administrative block. The classification was based on the walking distance between the
school and a motor road. The primary school that referred to above had only recently been
connected to a road. Notwithstanding the official student enrollment of 96, the school's proximity
to a road made it unqualified to receive new school teachers. While they expressed the importance
of applying the rules, local bureaucrats were also concerned that certain ground realities of
implementation in Dwarahat were not reaching senior officials.
I later visited the same school and found the enrollment rate to be 94 students. The school
headmaster, who had been teaching there for close to six years, discussed with me his immense
frustrations with having to run the school by himself. He also recognized the pressures that local
officials faced to apply teacher rationalization without exception.
Officers have come here regularly for monitoring visits. And each time I have told them that we need
another teacher.. they can see that themselves. But what can they do? This area is considered
sugam. Rules come from above, and they mustfollow that. They have to send their monitoring
report back up [the hierarchy]. I can't blame them... You see the newly built room back there?
They [local offidals] came and had it built. Plus we got a new kitchen shed, and water...all these
things are part of their duy.
According to this school teacher, the education bureaucracy's monitoring system operating the same
way whether the issue was school infrastructure, the Midday Meal program, or even teaching. Local
officials had inspections to conduct and a duty to make sure that certain official criteria were met.
Action taken beyond that could not be expected.
Yet many school teachers in Almora raised objections to the monitoring process and the way
rationalization was being carried out by the education bureaucracy. As part of fieldwork in Almora,
I conducted ethnographic interviews and group discussions with school teachers. These often took
place at local tea stalls based near bus stations. School teachers would often gather at tea stalls
before leaving for school in the morning, and again unwind together over a cup of chai in the
evenings after work. The conversations with school teachers shed much light on the frustrations
they had with the bureaucracy, as well their attempts to work around them. Although the state had
an official set of rules, which most teachers could easily recite, most school teachers felt that the
implementation process lacked transparency. The bureaucracy's uniform approach to
implementation was not seen as particularly fair either. Many believed the system favored those
who were well-connected or adept at finding official loopholes to circumvent the policy. Over the
course of one conversation, a school teacher expressed the sentiments shared by his fellow
colleagues:
They tell us the polig is transparent. But how do we know that? They make all the decisions in
Dehradun. Nobody asks us what we think about it. Even those in the union have no say. Only
the one's involved in politics [netagir], they seem to benefit. The eveyday teacher [aam adhyapak],
he has to face the rules no matter what... So that means we should also look outfor ourselves.182
181 Interview with Primary School Headmaster, Dwarahat, District Almora.
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Many school teachers approached rationalization with skepticism. Stories had circulated of young,
able-bodied teachers obtaining desirable posts, while those suffering from disability or other serious
ailments such as cancer were being sent to teach in far flung villages. The extent to which these
stories were true is unclear. Yet the frequency and intensity with which they came up during
interviews suggests that these stories were high on the minds of school teachers. The local
bureaucracy was unable arrest these concerns and articulate to them how decisions were actually
being made, leaving many uncomfortable.
Unable to address their needs with the local bureaucracy, school teachers in Almora came to
view the policy with distrust. Concerns regarding the state's inflexibility went beyond rank and file
school teachers. Interviews conducted with local leaders of the teachers' union in Almora revealed
wider misgivings with the state's approach. Union leaders experienced difficulty maintaining unity
among school teachers, who sought their individual means to secure their teaching posts.
The problem is like this.. .I am the local head of the union. I want to unite the teachers andform a
single voice. The government order said no new transfers for threeyears. But then justfour months
later we saw those who are connected getting transfers. The 10-15 percent involved in netagiri
[politics], those teachers are able to get things done. The rest are affected by this. They are all left
wondering "Who is listening to us?" And when we can't get things done for them, they look for
other ways. "
The concerns expressed by union leaders were not without merit. School teachers I interviewed felt
that the bureaucracy failed to distinguish between the genuine needs of some teacher and cases
involving netagiri. To add to that, school teachers did not believe they could make their case directly
to the state. Similar to what I observed in District Dehradun, school teachers who came to the local
bureaucracy in Almora seeking information regarding their transfer cases would often be turned
away.
What appeared from inside the bureaucracy to be consistent rule application was to many
school teachers an inaccessible and opaque administrative process. The education bureaucracy's
legalistic approach to implementation left teachers in Almora insecure about their positions. While
local bureaucrats were explicit about not having any authorization to discuss individual cases, it was
unclear when and how transfers decisions were being made. The bureaucracy offered little insight
on the decision-making process, which seemed to rely heavily on senior officials in Dehradun.
Meanwhile, the lack of transparency gave local politicians the opportunity to manipulate school
teachers. As I learned over the course of interviews and focus group discussions, teachers would "tie
up" with local politicians in the hopes of gaining input on their transfer cases. As one school teacher
explained:
Vidhayakji [local elected ofiiaA came around asking us to get things done for him. We agreed since
we may get transferred otherwise. We don't know what the status of our [transfer] cases really is.
So we tied up with him in the meantime. We are hoping that that, one way or another, it will
he.p... Our transfer hasn't happenedyet, so maybe it is helping.
183 Interview with Local Union Official, District Almora.
184 Focus Group Discussion, Government school teachers, Dwarahat, District Almora.
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The relations between teachers and local politicians ranged from (illegal) campaigning to paying
outright bribes. Although it was difficult to assess from my fieldwork the full extent of such
practices, teachers across Almora mentioned the importance of maintaining connections to local
politicians (neia log), if for no other reason to at least have some recognition (/an-pahchan) within the
state. That said, school teachers found political tie-ups no less murky, as it was unclear who among
them who truly was benefitting. Consequently, school teachers pursued whatever means possible
to work around the state, which in turn made it even more difficult for public officials to decipher
between cases.
School teachers were not the only stakeholders that viewed the implementation process with
skepticism. Parents and local communities found it even more difficult to voice their concerns to
the state. The process for school monitoring took on a legalistic mode that marginalized local
participation. Focus group discussions conducted with parents and village community groups across
Almora, revealed that they rarely made use of the official complaint process. Parents believed the
system carried too many risks and offered few rewards. Lodging an official complaint was a lengthy
process and the end result was not guaranteed. In the meantime, the day-to-day relations between
parents and school teachers would come under strain. Parents felt it was better to avoid creating
hostilities, since teachers might even take their frustrations out on the school children.
If the official complaint system was non-ideal, how then did local communities respond to
problems like teacher absence? Take the case of the primary school in Danoli, a village located far
from a motor road in the administrative block of Dwarahat. Danoli was a considerable journey
from the town center of Dwarahat, involving an hour-long bus ride followed by an hour and a half
hike through the hills. Yet even in this far-flung village of Almora, parents were eager to educate
their children. Danoli's primary school had only one officially appointed school teacher, who was
also the school's headmaster. The headmaster had been due to retire soon, and according to
parents, he had increasingly been ignoring his teaching duties. Often, he would arrive to school late,
fail to monitor what students were doing, and sometimes even drink during school hours.
On my first visit to Danoli, I asked residents to direct met to the primary school. A mother
who was outside performing agricultural work gestured towards a white building uphill. As I turned
towards the path heading uphill, a few young men alerted me to the fact that the school headmaster
was not there. When I asked where he was, they smiled and pointed towards a construction site
where the village temple was being renovated. Making my way to the temple, I found the school
headmaster sitting inside a tea stall, sipping on chai and smoking bhang, the local marijuana. After
introducing myself as a researcher, the headmaster's bloodshot eyes lit up and he began sharing with
me various details about the primary school. He recited to me the standard information that local
officials typically inquire about when conducting school inspections-the school's enrollment rate,
number of classrooms and infrastructure, the condition of the Midday Meal program, and so on. He
even offered to share with me his daily diary, the latest monitoring mechanism that had been
instituted by the state.
While the young men working at the temple were amused by the headmaster, parents in
Danoli expressed serious dismay. They later narrated to me their various attempts to curb the
headmaster's dereliction. A group of concerned mothers, who had formed a women's association in
the village, first tried reasoning with him. They organized meetings at the primary school between
the headmaster and all the parents, but the headmaster showed little interest. Before the education
bureaucracy had instituted the official complaint line, some parents brought up the idea of going to
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the block administration to complain and request a new headmaster. In a focus group discussion,
one of the mothers recounted their experience:
That old headmaster, he just remains intoxicated He wouldfall asleep in school while the students
were running around, breaking things. You will see the roof is broken because kids threw stones at
it while he was sleeping... We held charcha [discussions] about this with the other parents... Dealing
with the administration is full of roadblocks. First we must get there, which can take half the day.
By the time our number is called, we may have to stay overnight. And then we may have to go back
again andfile more paperwork, and wait longerfor the administration to respond Still, we used all
means we had to request a new school teacher. Bichara Gram Pradhan [Poor village council head],
even he grew tired of writing letters!"'
After a full academic year had gone by, the news finally reached back that Danoli's primary
school qualified for an additional teaching post since it was classified as remote according to
the rationalization policy. However, the timeframe was unclear, as there were other schools
in the area that may have been ahead in the queue. I asked the parents if anyone among
them knew about the official complaint (shikayal) system. A few of the mothers pointed
towards the primary school building, where the local education bureaucracy's phone number
had been painted on the wall outside. Though they had not made use of the system before,
parents had little faith in its effectiveness. As one father went on to say:
I have heard how this happens in other schools. Guardians can call to make a complaint. But then
the teacher can also complain against us and say that he is being harassed How will the
administration decide who to side with? Why will they take our word over the teacher? One pary
complains and then another complains... These cases can drag on at the administration. And
anyhow, who wants to make enemies?"
The hesitation around using the official complaint line had substance. Disputes between parents
and school teachers could take time to resolve. In some cases, legalism gave teachers a clear
advantage, like in the example of Pujari, where the school teacher belonging to the Scheduled Caste
(SC) community registered a harassment case against the parents, in violation of the SC Act. Rather
than take on the risks associated with a legalistic complaint process, parents in Dahal decided to
address the matter informally within the village. The women's group mobilized families come
together and raise funds to appoint a local high school graduate as a second teacher. While the
government school teacher spent his mornings at the tea stall, the informal teacher appointed by the
community effectively ran the government primary school.
The above findings demonstrate how legalistic norms shape the implementation process for
teacher rationalization and school monitoring. Bureaucrats abide by official rules and procedures in
carrying out these tasks, while school teachers and parents learn to adjust their expectations and
strategies accordingly. In cases like the Village Danoli, communities pursue alternative strategies to
work around the state. However, we have yet to fully test the mechanism through which legalism is
hypothesized to produce poor quality education, namely, the obstruction of local collective action.
Does legalism counteract the collective efforts of local communities around primary schooling? The
village case study of Silam Ghat takes up this question.
185 Focus Group Discussion with Parents, Village Danoli, Dwarahat, District Almora.
186 Focus Group Discussion with Parents, Village Danoli, Dwarahat, District Almora.
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4.6.2. Collective Action Falls Apart: The Case of Silam Ghat
The findings presented so far have shown that legalistic norms influence how public officials
carry out school monitoring and teacher rationalization. The mechanism of bureaucratic behavior to
outcomes associated with poor implementation. In this section, I test the mechanisms of my theory
further down the chain of governance. Does legalism weaken civic participation, as hypothesized, to
yield inferior implementation outcomes? To test whether and how legalistic norms discourage local
collective action around primary education, I now turn to findings from the village level. As the case
study of Silam Ghat will demonstrate, local public agencies in Uttarakhand undermine the
participation of local communities weakening the delivery of primary education. In contrast to their
counterparts in neighboring Himachal Pradesh, local officials in Uttarakhand thwart the collective
demands of women's associations organized around education. Their behavior marginalizes local
communities, encouraging families to exit the government school system.
Silam Ghat (pop. 503) was in many ways a typical village within Almora District. Residents
relied on a combination of subsistence agriculture and financial remittances. I selected Silam Ghat
as a fieldwork site because theoretically, it was setting where one would expect primary schooling to
be implemented well. A predominantly upper caste village situated only 12 km from the market
center of the administrative block of Dwarahat, the village was accessible by local bus, making it
well-connected to the administrative block, where local public agencies were based. The primary
school in Silam Ghat was located just a short walk uphill from the main road leading to Dwarahat,
and thus offered a highly accessible (and desirable) posting for school teachers. Based on the village
population, caste composition, and its favorable location, Silam Ghat's primary school was also
more likely to receive attention from public agencies.
According to residents of Silam Ghat, the village had historically shown strong demand for
education. Many of its residents were employed by local public agencies, including some high
school teachers, military officers, and a handful of private business owners. A household survey I
conducted in the village found that every family had access to agricultural land, and there were no
cases of landless laborers. Nevertheless, landholdings had become increasingly fragmented as
inherited land had been divided up among siblings over each successive generation. Residents of
Silam Ghat found that agriculture was no longer a sustainable source of livelihood and that
employment prospects were much better outside of Almora District.
In line with the broader pattern in the Almora District, Silam Ghat had been undergoing
rapid out-migration. The same village survey revealed that close to 40 percent of households that
once resided in the village had either moved out or were in the process of relocating outside Silam
Ghat. In many other cases, younger men had migrated with one or more of their children, while
their wives and the elderly stayed back to tend to the house and farmland. The remaining 60 percent
of households that continued to reside in Silam Ghat had at least one (usually male) family member
living outside the village and sending money back to support the family. Migrating households
resettled in nearby cities such as Haldwani and Rudrapur, located in the plains areas bordering Uttar
Pradesh. Some went as far as the National Capital Region (NCR) around New Delhi.
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Silam Ghat also had favorable community characteristics and relations. The village was
divided into two toks, or hamlets, each belonging to a different caste community. An upper caste
Thakur community, who made up 70 percent of Silam Ghat's population, lived in a much larger
hamlet on one side of the village, while a Dalit community (Arga) resided on the opposite side.
Between the two hamlets ran the main road connecting the village to the center of Dwarahat.
Notwithstanding their physical segregation, relations between the two caste communities in Silam
Ghat were by all accounts harmonious, and they had history of cross-caste cooperation. For
example, when deciding where to place the village primary school, residents from both hamlets
worked together to identify a location that was mutually accessible. And contrary to what one might
have expected, they collectively agreed to place the school much closer to the Dalit hamlet, which
made it easier for children from that community to reach the school. 187
Silam Ghat's favorable civic characteristics were further evident in the number and quality of
local associations within the village. Silam Ghat boasted a women's association (mahila mangal das
that had been operating for nearly twenty years. In addition, a much older village forest council (van
panchayar) had been involved in managing the collection of firewood and preservation of forest land
and resources. Finally, two women's Self Help Groups, involved in collective savings, had been
recently established in the village. At the time of fieldwork, all four of these organizations were
active and well-functioning.
Notwithstanding the favorable conditions of Silam Ghat, parents in the village were deeply
distressed with the educational scenario at the government primary school. In terms of physical
infrastructure, the primary school appeared to be excellent condition. A freshly painted building
housed on a pretty campus, the school possessed all of the physical facilities provided under India's
education policy. Although the school was originally established in 1958, the building had been
upgraded with the construction of three brand new classrooms, a kitchen, campus boundary wall,
and separate bathrooms for boys and girls. Official enrollment at the school was 38 students,
though I counted ten additional children below primary school age who attended daily."
Meanwhile, there was only one teacher posted at the school, who was also the school's headmaster.
In addition to administrative work, he was in charge of teaching all five grades, which he found next
to impossible. A second teaching post for the school had been sanctioned but remained vacant. As
the school teacher explained: "We have tried again and again, but we are unable to do anything about the lack
of teachers."
By the time I arrived for fieldwork in Silam Ghat, collective action around primary schooling
had also been on the wane. Some families addressed the teaching gap by sending their children to
private tutoring during after-school hours. Others had placed their children in a private school that
had opened nearby. The school ran for a few years but then closed down recently after the school
headmaster moved out of Silam Ghat. As one father explained,
Ourprimary school is in a bad state. The shishu mandir [private schoo4 was better. At least it
had afull staff offour teachers. It ran for only twoyears and then stopped because Masteji moved
187 To reach the primary school, children from the Thakur community had to hike down from their hamlet and cross a
narrow stream, madua (buckwheat) fields, and the major roadway, before hiking back uphill.
188 According to the school teacher, some families sent their little ones there for preschool, which according to official
policy was supposed to be integrated with the primary school. In reality, however, the preschool continued to operate at
its original location on the other side of the village.
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from the area... So now I'm sending them [the children] once again to the [governmen] primary
school But the teacher hardly has time to teach. The kids run around here and there. And he's
too busy doing paperwork to pay attention to them.'" 9
A few of the wealthier families in the village, particularly those who had experienced life outside of
Silam Ghat, chose to exit the government system altogether. They began sending their children to a
private school located further away from Silam Ghat.
The poor educational services could not be attributed to a lack of civic engagement by the
community. If anything, local collective action is what kept the government primary school afloat.
Silam Ghat had an active women's association (mahila mangal da) that helped organize parents in the
village around early child education for close to two decades. The group first took shape organically
in 1990, as women from the village faced a common set of environmental challenges related to water
and forest resources. With the depletion of local water sources, the scarcity of water was acutely felt
throughout the hill region. Yet the burden fell disproportionately on women, who had to traverse
long distances through the hills to fetch water. As one of the group members explained:
We faced big problems with water. Many of the sources around us were drying up and we lookedfor
alternatives. Depending on the rains, the water would get dried up in some fields within our village
while in other places it would oveflow. So as a group we discussed how to address this problem.
We figured out a way to coordinate and jointy manage water .. If there was too much water in one
person's farm, others with less water would go collect waterfrom there, and next time when that
person had less water she could collectfrom others'farms. That way we set rules amongst each
other.1"
The women came to similar informal arrangements for the collection of grass from the forest. Used
primarily as fodder for livestock, forest grass around Silam Ghat had undergone rapid depletion,
which affected not only the forest ecosystem but the daily lives of women and young girls, who
faced the burden of grass collection, and had to walk ever longer distances into the forest to find
suitable grass. To allow the grass to regenerate in the forest, the women's association developed
informal regulations for how much grass could be collected by each family, and from which areas of
the forest. The responsibility for enforcement was shared by the entire group. Taking turns on a
monthly basis, each group member and her family was responsible for monitoring forest usage and
report cases to the group if anyone broke the rules. Over the years, this informal system of
collective forest management helped to sustain Silam Ghat's forest while enabling the women to
spend less time on wood and grass collection.
By the mid-1990s, the women's association in Silam Ghat assumed a more formal identity.
The group came in contact with a local NGO that had been working with women's groups in other
villages nearby. The Society for Environmental Education and Rural Development (SEED) was a
grassroots body consisting of community organizers and concerned citizens (including some school
teachers) who belonged to villages in the surrounding area.'' The members of SEED had
witnessed the growth of informal women's groups across Dwarahat and aimed to strengthen their
189 Interview with father, Silam Ghat.
190 Focus Group Discussion, Women's Association, Silam Ghat.
191 SEED was formally registered as a nonprofit organization in 1992. To learn more about the organization and its
work, see: http://seedsunadi.blogspot.com.
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organizational capabilities. SEED conducted meetings in Silam Ghat, helping the women mobilize
collectively around various policy domains such as labor, environment and education.1 9 2 The issue
of early child daycare and education was especially salient for young mothers, as they faced the
strenuous demands child rearing while also having to perform the full gamut of domestic labor and
agricultural work. The organizers at SEED were also in partnership with Uttarakhand Sewa Nidhi,
the environmental NGO that ran a balwadi (preschool) program mentioned earlier in the chapter.
With guidance from SEED and Uttarakhand Sewa Nidhi, the women's association in Silam
Ghat developed a balwadi in their village. The center offered preschool education and daycare for
young children. Residents of Silam Ghat saw the balwadi as a community center and ran it
collectively. A physical space for the center was donated by an elderly resident of the village, whose
sister-in-law belonged to the women's group. Meanwhile, the women donated theirlabor
(kshramdan) to build and decorate the center so that it would be attractive for the children. The
preschool was staffed with two young women from the village who were in the process of
completing high school.
Almost a decade prior to the Indian state's adoption of universal primary education policy,
families in Silam Ghat were educating their children at the balwadi. Once policies like SSA came into
being, funding for Uttarakhand Sewa Nidhi's balwadi program was shut down by the state
government. The women's group then converted the balwadi into an afterschool and recreational
center (sandya kendra) for young children. The afterschool program was run by a young woman from
the village, who at the time was completing her college degree. Through activity-based learning,
educational songs and games, the center brought children of different ages together. Mothers in the
village were content knowing that their children were spending time after school in a safe,
educational environment.
Village collective action soon spread to Silam Ghat's primary school. That had not always
been the case. With the creation of a Village Education Committee (VEC) under SSA, school
meetings would take place between the headmaster and pradhan of the gram panchayat, with little
input from parents. As the women's group became more active at the school, they learned to
participate in VEC meetings. As one of the mothers recollected:
Before our group became active in through balwadi, women didn't sit together. We would never
attend offidal meetings or sit alongside the men. We didn't even know that meetings took place at
the primary school. But now the situation has reversed We all come forward and attend school
meetings. Now the women don't let the men speak!
With the collective vigilance of the women's association, residents in Silam Ghat were able to
identify problems at the school and achieve some positive changes. As several parents reported, the
school headmaster would often arrive late and sit in his office, failing to look after the children, let
alone teach. He would also levy fees on the students to maintain the school computer, which was
192 Consider a more recent example of collective action from the domain of labor. When the Indian government
launched its National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), a scheme that provided 100 guaranteed days of
employment to rural households, the women came together to decide how NREGA should be allotted among families.
Since a full 100 days of work for each family was unavailable in practice, they agreed to distribute NREGA work evenly
across families. For a given NREGA project, each family in the village would get the opportunity to perform six days of
work on a rotating basis.
193 Focus Group Discussion, Women's Association, Silam Ghat.
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hardly ever used. The women's association came together to discuss these issues and organized
residents to put pressure on the school headmaster to abolish the fees, and make sure he arrived on
time and looked after the school children.
The women's association also took the initiative to monitor the Midday Meal program at the
primary school. Food grains and other essential supplies for the lunch program would fail to reach
the school regularly. On some occasions, the headmaster would have the students go collect food
grains from the ration house and carry them back to the school, much to the dismay of parents.
Members from the women's association began to collectively monitor the school lunch program,
taking turns to make sure that the food was prepared daily under hygienic conditions, and that the
school children were no longer being enlisted in collecting food grains. Meanwhile, complaints
about the meal program had reached the local education bureaucracy as well. As the school
headmaster pointed out, local officials paid unannounced visits to the school. Their inspections
followed the general pattern described earlier, consisting of standard checklist of items, which
included physical infrastructure, student attendance and provision of the Midday Meal.
With heightened community vigilance, the Midday Meal program improved significantly in
Silam Ghat. Yet parents' aspirations went beyond the provision of school lunches. They wanted,
above all else, a high quality education for their children. With only one school teacher in charge of
running the school and teaching 40 students across all five grades, parents felt their children were
being shortchanged by the government school system. In the words of some parents, what should
have been a "school" (vidyalay) had become an "eatery" (bhojanalay). The Midday Meal program
became a symbol for all that was wrong with the education system. While most parents in Silam
Ghat approved of the school lunch program, at least in theory, some thought it posed a distraction
from teaching.
Fed up with the poor quality of education at the school, parents voiced their concerns to
local officials. The women's group organized parents and staged a peaceful demonstration (dharna)
outside the local education bureaucracy. They demanded additional school teachers and a more
effective teaching curriculum. Local officials turned them away, stating that the group had no
standing within the state, and that such decisions were made higher up in the bureaucracy. As a
stopgap measure, the women's group in Silam Ghat organized funds from families in the village to
staff the primary school with an additional teacher. A young high school graduate, the informal
teacher had been working on and off at the school for the last five years, with no official training of
any kind. She was soon to be married and would leave Silam Ghat to live with her husband and his
family, once again reopening the gap. The lack of adequate teaching staff combined with poor
quality teaching was high on the minds of parents in Silam Ghat.
Unsatisfied with the makeshift teaching arrangements at the school, the women's association
came together to voice their demands once again with the local education bureaucracy. They
demanded additional school teachers, particularly those who could teach math and English, subjects
that were critical for succeeding in a competitive labor market. The group met with local officials
over the course of several months, taking time away from their agricultural work and other
responsibilities to visit the administrative block. Yet their demands fell on deaf ears. As the head of
the women's group recounted:
We went to the [administrative] block to complain about the lack of teaching going on at the
primary schooL But not one oficer came to help us. Nobodyfrvm the Education Department listens
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to what we say. We even had the gram pradhan [village coundil head write letters to the
administration, but we received no response. The situation became hopeless at the government school
so now everyone is looking at private school.'
These findings may lead one to suspect that local officials in the education bureaucracy were
indifferent towards their work or shirking their duties. However, participant observation and
interviews with local officials revealed quite the opposite. Rarely did I find local officials in charge
of implementation sitting at their desks. On most days, they were out in the field conducting school
inspections and planning for new implementation. Local officials actively surveyed villages that
required new infrastructure and other inputs. In the case of Silam Ghat's primary school, local
officials initiated the construction of new infrastructure after identifying the need for an upgrade
during their routine inspections. Both parents and the school headmaster credited the local
bureaucracy for the school's brand new campus.
The bureaucracy was engaged in carrying out the mission to achieve universal primary
education, and local officials showed dedication to their work. As they explain during interviews,
local officials could not respond to the demand for additional school teachers in Silam Ghat because
it would have gone against state policy. As they so often put it, the bureaucracy were simply
"applying the rules' that covered the allocation of school teachers. As per the Department of
Education's teacher rationalization policy, examined in the section prior, schools based in accessible
locations could not receive additional teachers. The primary school in Silam Ghat was on the
roadside, and the community would have to wait until the needs of other schools were met first, no
exceptions. Nor was there any official policy in place for communities to request teachers
specializing in math or English. To override local demands was a necessary part of consistent rule
enforcement.
Added to this was the worry that community groups like the women's association in Silam
Ghat were too enmeshed in local politics. During interviews, local bureaucrats cited various
examples of how women's associations engaged in political activities, such as mobilizing votes
during village panchayat elections, collecting funds to support a favored candidates, or in one case,
laying the groundwork for one of their own leaders to run as a candidate for the state legislature. As
some of these officials put it, women's associations and other community groups were subject to
"misuse" by politicians to obtain votes. For example, these groups would get prodded by local
politicians to make demands on the bureaucracy around the time of elections, without any due
regard for official policy or the true needs facing their communities. While recognizing the
importance of community involvement during school enrolment campaigns and other areas, they
believed community groups had to be kept at bay, as their demands were seen as a threat to fair and
consistent rule enforcement. To protect bureaucratic decision-making from political interference,
local officials had learned to override community demands. And in so doing, they discouraged
village collective action around primary schooling, generating poor implementation outcomes.
4.7. Alternative Explanations
194 Interview with head of women's group, Silam Ghat.
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Before concluding the chapter, it is important to reassess the main findings in light of
alternative explanations. Apart from bureaucratic norms, there may be other plausible factors that
account for the comparatively poor delivery of primary education in Uttarakhand. In addition to
conventional variables, such as levels of economic development and caste composition, which we
considered at the beginning of the chapter, other plausible alternatives include: (1) civil society and
social capital and (2) democracy and political development. In what follows I consider each of these
in turn.
4.7.1. Rethinking Civil Soiety
Recall from the previous chapter that we ended our analysis of implementation in Himachal
Pradesh with the question of whether these alternative arguments centered on civil society could
better account for the remarkable results observed in that state. Some argue that a culture of civic
engagement and vibrant associational life produces superior outcomes for governance (Putnam,
Leonardi et al. 1994). Civic associations are thought to provide a form of social capital-norms and
networks of trust and reciprocity-that enables citizens to overcome problems of collective action
and hold public agencies accountable. A more nuanced approach may go further to examine how
the quality and inclusiveness of civic associations shapes governance (Cohen and Rogers 1992;
Berman 1997). I suggested that the limitations of these arguments would be made apparent with the
comparison between HP and Uttarakhand. The two states share strikingly similar social fabric and
history of village collective action. However, as the findings in this chapter demonstrate, local
communities in Uttarakhand have not experienced the same kinds of positive returns to local
collective action, particularly when directed at the state.
Still, one may be concerned, quite reasonably, that the selection of nested cases within
Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand do not adequately capture the variation in civil society across
these two states. Might the relative paucity of civic resources explain Uttarakhand's worse
performance in implementing primary education? The available evidence strongly suggests not.
Neither the somewhat crude method of counting of civic associations, nor a more nuanced
assessment of the quality of civic mobilization lend support to the civil society thesis. That is not to
say that civic participation does not matter. Rather, as I argue later in the concluding chapter of this
dissertation, a careful analysis of how public agencies relate to citizens and civic groups, and the
conditions under which they mobilize societal resources during policy implementation can help
refine our understanding of both the promise and limitations of civil society.
Close observers of Indian civil society have pointed to the importance of India's NGO
sector for governance outcomes like (Jenkins 2010). Yet the quality of data on the NGO sector in
India is exceedingly poor. Be that as it may, the data that are available on the number of NGOs in
Uttarakhand compared to Himachal Pradesh point in favor of the former state. Figures 4.5 in the
chapter Appendix shows the raw number of NGOs registered with India's Population Commission
in either state. Figure 4.6 adjusts that value for population size. In either case, Uttarakhand has a
significantly higher number of NGOs, which would suggest a greater level of civic resources.
Based on these data, one could argue that civil society in either state is weak given the
exceedingly low number of NGOs per capita. That assessment would align with the findings of
survey research, which finds low levels of reported membership in formal associations, suggesting
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that Indian civil society is far too thin to even have a plausible effect on governance (Chhibber 2001;
Chhibber, Shastri et al. 2004). It may also be the case, however, that our understanding of civil
society, drawn primarily from the experience of Europe and the United States, does not provide an
adequate basis for conceptualizing and measuring civil society in developing countries. It may also
be the case, however, that survey instruments are too blunt to capture the informal networks and
associations that operate in rural India (Krishna 2003). Another set of studies call attention to social
movements and other varieties of informal, bottom-up collective mobilization (Heller 1999; Ray and
Katzenstein 2005; Agarwala 2013). These suggest the need examine the nature and quality of civil
society and its relationship to the state, particularly in the case of marginalized group that may not
have access to the same formal associations counted in our standard measures of civil society.
Based on qualitative historical and anthropological research on civic life in Uttarakhand,
village communities have long displayed cohesiveness and a capacity for collective action. In a
pattern similar to neighboring Himachal Pradesh, the scarcity of agricultural land in the hill region
and centrality of natural resources to local livelihood strategies, provided the material basis for social
cooperation among village communities. In his classic anthropological study of village life in the
Garhwal region of Uttarakhand, Berreman's (1972) observed that economic and social life in the
hills tended to promote social cooperation. Land ownership and the performance of agricultural
labor cut across caste groups, and religious life centered on the worship of a common local deity
(devta), cohesiveness of village communities. That is not to deny, once againm the presence of caste
divisions and socioeconomic inequalities. However, these cleavages have been shown to be far less
pronounced compared to other parts of north India, where caste exclusion and economic
inequalities are stark.
The prevalence of social norms facilitating collective action in Uttarakhand is most evident
from the research on community governance of local forests. Approximately 63 percent of
Uttarakhand's land is covered by forest, and hill communities have long relied on forest resources
such as fertilizer, fodder and fuel, along with medicinal herbs and fibers (Mehta 2005). Informal
institutions to manage forest land and resources operated according to a broadly inclusive
consensus-based system (Agrawal 2001). In the early 2 0 h century, formally elected forest councils
(vanpanchaya) came to be recognized by the colonial state. British encroachment on forest land for
timber along with restrictions imposed on hill residents provoked a flurry of collective resistance and
protest across the hill region (Somanathan 1991; Guha 2000). Unable to enforce restrictions upon
hill residents or manage their rebellious outbreaks, the colonial government moved to formalize
forest councils, granting them official recognition with passage of the Forest Council Rules of
1931.19' Forest councils continue to play a significant role in governing forest land, albeit with
varying levels of effectiveness (Agrawal 1999; Agrawal 2001; Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). As one
study finds, close to three thousand formally-elected forest councils are active in just the Kumaon
region of Uttarakhand, which translates to roughly a quarter of villages across the region (Agrawal
2001). These official estimates do not capture the informal institutions that continue to operate.
The richness of civic life in Uttarakhand is evidenced further by its more recent spates of
social activism. Unlike neighboring Himachal Pradesh, where broad-based social movements did
not take hold, Uttarakhand carried forward the legacy of collective resistance well into the post-
independence period. The most dramatic display of this was the Chipko Andolan of the 1970s.1 9 6
19s The deliberate setting of forest fires was among the most effective tactics of resistance used by hill residents.
196 For a historical account of the Chipko Movement, see Guha (2000).
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The Chipko Andolan, or "movement," emerged in response to the state's attempt to manage forests.
The state was seen to favor private contractors and firms exploiting the forests for lumber, to the
neglect of local communities. With economic livelihoods at risk due to deforestation, social activists
threw themselves in front of the trees that were being axed. Their actions inspired a spate of similar
grassroots protests across the state. Clinging firmly to trees as a form of protest gave the movement
its name chipko, which is the Hindi term for "adhere" or "stick to" (Mawdsley 1998). Importantly,
women played a prominent role in the Chipko Movement, demonstrating that civic life was not only
the province of men. The felling of trees affected women's economic lives most directly, as they
were primarily responsible for collecting firewood and performing forest-related labor. Apart from
Chipko, Uttarakhand has been home to other forms of collective mobilization.' The motion for a
separate state of Uttarakhand itself drew on popular protest, in contrast to the elite-driven path to
statehood in Himachal Pradesh. If anything, the historical and anthropological evidence points in
favor of there being a culture of civic engagement in Uttarakhand.
As a final point, if civil society were correct, then the bureaucratic norms documented in this
chapter would not be the driving force behind poor service delivery. Rather, society's poor civic
endowments would be driving the inferior implementation outcomes observed. Yet the sequence of
causal mechanisms shown in above findings showed that the opposite was true. The gaps in
implementation were observed in precisely those steps of the chain in which state action was
required, not societal action. In the case of Silam Ghat, collective action by the women's association
preceded the state's implementation of primary education policy. And it was only after their
collective demands were effectively blocked by local officials that parents in Silam Ghat adjusted
their expectations and turned away from the primary school system."' These findings suggest that
social capital does not on its own produce good (or bad) governance, but is mediated by the
bureaucratic norms governing public agencies.
5.5. Democray and Political Development
A second alternative explanation we must factor centers on the role of democracy. A
growing body of literature on clientelism in developing democracies contends that party
organizations and the political ties between voters and politicians drive governance outcomes
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes, Dunning et al. 2013). Clientelism is thought to work against
the implementation of programmatic policies like public education and health by promoting the
distribution of particularistic goods in exchange for votes. In the Indian context, political parties are
known to compete for particularistic access to state resources, often mobilizing caste and other
identities to secure votes (Chhibber 1995; Chandra 2004). Moreover, the extent of clientelism itself
may vary across India. As Heller (2000) demonstrates, political parties in Kerala tend to compete on
more inclusive policy platforms and make programmatic appeals to voters.
Taking the above literature as a starting point, one may hypothesize that the relatively poor
performance of public agencies in Uttarakhand is driven by party politics and the nature of
197 These include a series of environmental protests against large dam projects, including the relatively recent protests
against Tehri Dam.
198 A similar sequence of events unfolded in the village Pujari, where parents struggled to hold the absentee school
teacher to account. In that case as well, parents had organized around education well before the arrival of the state. It
was only when collective action was directed at public agencies that difficulties came to surface.
155
clientelistic ties. Put more forcefully, cientelism may explain not only the poor outcomes for service
delivery, but also the behavior of public officials documented above. Bureaucrats subject to
particularistic interference from society may face pressure to uphold official rules and procedures
while marginalizing the influence of communities and civic agencies. Meanwhile, bureaucrats that
attempt to coordinate across the hierarchy and work beyond official rules and procedure may be
seen as a potential threat to politicians that want to maintain tight control over state and provide
their constituents with particularistic benefits. What I describe as legalistic norms may in turn reflect
the bureaucracy's way of handling this highly politicized system of governance.
Compelling as these ideas may be, little empirical evidence has been offered to establish the
presence of clientelistic ties, let alone the highly organized vertical networks of votes in exchange for
material goods that this literature theorized. To pinpoint the mechanisms by which clientelism
shapes bureaucratic behavior would require nothing short of a field-based study of the relations
between voters, elected officials and bureaucrats. Pending the availability of that evidence, what we
do know about democratic politics in Uttarakhand does not seem to suggest that it can fully account
for the poor quality of implementation observed in that state. For one, the party system in
Uttarakhand is virtually identical to that of Himachal Pradesh. Both states display high rates of
political participation in state elections. In the last state assembly elections, voter turnout was 70
percent for Uttarakhand and 74 percent for Himachal Pradesh. Both states possess what is
effectively a two-party system consisting of India's two national parties. Meanwhile, regional parties
that make overt caste appeals, such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in Uttar Pradesh, have made
few political inroads in either state. As discussed earlier in the chapter, voters in Uttarakhand have
cited the importance of development and good governance, according to exit poll data taken after
state elections.'99
Consider, finally, the evidence on political influence over the bureaucracy. The handful
existing studies conducted on linkages between bureaucrats and politicians have focused primarily
on the phenomenon of bureaucratic transfers, the process whereby bureaucrats get reassigned to
new posts, particularly within the Indian Administrative Service (IAS)."' Yet as Mani and Iyer
(2009) show in their careful study of reassignment among IAS officers, the probability of being
transferred was not significantly different across these two states. Their observations are further
supported by my own findings from the education bureaucracy. Over the course of fieldwork, I
found that senior IAS officers occupying the position of Secretary of Education, the highest post in
the education bureaucracy, had been reassigned twice in both Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand.
Meanwhile, the second more significant post, State Project Director for SSA, had been reassigned
four times in Himachal Pradesh and twice in Uttarakhand. Interview with officials in the SSA State
Project Office lamented the instability of leadership in their agency.
There is a clear need for more research on the nature of clientelism in India. Based on the
evidence available, we cannot reject the possibility that the political ties between voters and elected
officials are different in important ways across Indian states. However, we should also be careful
199 Preferences around education are also unlikely to vary much between the two states. Both display strong demand for
education according to independent household surveys, as well as qualitative evidence based on interviews and focus
group discussions with parents (PROBE Team 1999; De, Khera et al. 2011).
200 In one of the few studies on the subject, Iyer and Mani (2009) observe significant political influence over the
bureaucracy through the transfer and reassignment of officers. They find that officers that exhibit high ability are no
more likely to be rewarded with assignments to prestigious posts than other officers, and that transfers may also lead
bureaucrats to invest less in skills, which can undermine the quality of administration.
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not to draw inferences about clientelism based on policy implementation outcomes. While much of
the cientelism literature draws a sharp distinction between programmatic politics on the one hand
and cientelistic politics on the other, there is no reason to assume apriori that these are mutually
exclusive categories, or opposite ends of the political development spectrum. Elected officials and
bureaucrats in both Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand states described their education systems to
be rife with patronage, whether in the form of employment for school teachers or contracts for
school infrastructure projects. School teachers in both states carry a great deal of political clout,
through union organizations as well as informal campaigning. And yet, outcomes for policy
implementation vary significantly. Whether and how variation in cientelism can account for
disparities in policy implementation demands further investigation.
6. Conclusion
The findings from this chapter demonstrate that bureaucratic norms governing public
agencies in Uttarakhand help explain the state's relatively poor performance in educational service
delivery. As we saw, Uttarkhand's education system is largely dysfunctional, even though the state
began at a higher rate of literacy in comparison to Himachal Pradesh. Notwithstanding high
aspirations for an autonomous Uttarakhand, public agencies have yet to fully deliver on the promise
of good governance, which their newfound political autonomy from Uttar Pradesh was meant to
bring.
A new state and political system characterized by enhanced decentralization and two-party
politics does not appear to have altered the norms governing the bureaucracy. An array of field-
based evidence points to the persistence of legalism, which continues to guide bureaucrats and
structure their relations with citizens and civic agencies outside the state. Officials within
Uttarakhand's education bureaucracy adhere strictly to official rules, procedures and policies, while
discouraging input from civic actors, which together yields worse outcomes for policy
implementation. We analyzed the effects of legalism over the implementation of teacher
rationalization and monitoring policies and community governance of primary schooling in Simal
Goan. In both cases, we found that the bureaucracy's legalistic approach produced inferior
outcomes.
These findings also provoke us to think more carefully about the role of civil society in
governance. Public officials in Uttarakhand effectively block citizens and civic agencies from
participating in the implementation process. And these non-state actors have responded by
circumventing the state and pursuing alternative means to address their needs, including outright exit
from the government school system. To be sure, Uttarakhand remains a fledgling state and it may
take time for the bureaucracy to adapt to its new sociopolitical environment. Insofar as norms
evolve over stages through repeated interactions, one may have to resist drawing firm conclusions
about Uttarakhand's bureaucracy until sufficient time has passed.2"1 That said, one has to wonder
whether public agencies in Uttarakhand have the luxury of time under conditions of fast-paced
economic growth and rapid privatization of the education sector.
201 To that end, Uttarakhand may offer a theoretically rich case of bureaucratic norm evolution and hold promise for
future research.
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As a final point, the findings presented thus far have analyzed policy implementation within
India's Himalayan region. The careful matching and contextualized comparison of Uttarakhand and
Himachal Pradesh allowed us to identify the role of bureaucratic norms and the mechanisms
through which bureaucratic they operate across these two different states. Owing to the careful
comparison, however, our theory has so far been restricted to a region of India that possesses a
distinct geography, social composition, and caste and gender norms. One may question whether the
theory advanced here can obtain in other places, and what the scope conditions of the mechanisms
might be. To further assess when and how bureaucratic norms shape policy implementation, the
following chapter takes us down to India's Gangetic plains, in the very different setting of Uttar
Pradesh.
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Chapter 4 - Appendix
Figure 4.1 Administrative Map of Uttarakhand









1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011












Table 4.7 Economic and Structural Indicators
Himachal Pradesh (HP) Uttarakhand (UK)
Population (million) 6.9 10.1
Sex ratio (females per 1000 males) 974 963
Annual per capita income (Rs.) 50,365 55,877
% Urban 9.8 30.6
% Scheduled Caste 24.7 17.9
% Scheduled Tribe 4.0 3.0
Source: Census of India (2001; 2011).
Annual per capita income: Reserve Bank of India Handbook of Statistics
on Indian Economy, 2010-11).
Table 4.8 Infrastructure Development in Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh (1991-92)
Uttar Pradesh Uttarakhand
Metalled road per 1000 sq. km of area
(km) 256 227
No. of schools per 100,000 people
* Primary 57 144
" Senior basic 11 30
" Higher secondary 5 19
Medical facilities per 100,000 people
" Allopathic hospitals/dispensaries 3.4 12.4
" Hospital beds 50.3 121.8
" Primary health centers 2.4 3.6
" Sub-centers/maternity service centers 16.0 27.5
Electricity
* Per capita consumption 170.5 217.10
* % Villages electrified 73.9 73.5
Soune: Papola (2000)
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Figures 4.5 - 4.6. Registered NGOs in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand
Figure 4.5. Total NGOs Figure 4.6. NGOs Per 100,000 Population
700 9












Himachal Pradesh Uttarakhand Himachal Pradesh Uttarakhand
Source: Population Commission of India (http://ngo.india.gov.in/ngo-stateschemes-ngo.php)
Population in Figure 4.6. based on 2001 Census of India.
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Chapter 5. Legalism, Inequality and Educational Miscarriage in Uttar Pradesh
1. Introduction
The previous two chapters analyzed the implementation outcomes for primary education
policy in the two hill states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. Through a carefully matched
comparison I traced the variation in implementation outcomes back to the informal bureaucratic
norms that govern public agencies across these two states. However, the analysis thus far has been
limited to policy implementation within India's Himalayan region, a region with distinct geographic,
socioeconomic and cultural conditions.
This chapter examines the case of Uttar Pradesh (UP), widely regarded as one of India's
poorest performing states in the field of primary education. The study of UP allows us to extend
the scope conditions of the theory centered on bureaucratic norms by testing whether and how the
mechanisms obtain in a very different environment. In sharp contrast to the Himalayan Region, UP
is ranked near the bottom among Indian states across virtually every indicator of human well-being.
To underscore the range of subnational variation across India, scholars often place Kerala and UP
on two opposing ends of the social development spectrum. With social indicators that rival some
advanced economies, the southwestern coastal state of Kerala represents the promise of a better
quality of life under conditions of relatively low income. UP, meanwhile, whose woeful
performance in early child education and health rivals the poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa,
stands out as the dark, cautionary tale of all that can go wrong with India's developing democracy.
A theoretically least-likely setting, a study of policy implementation in UP is compelling for a
few reasons. First, a variety of explanations have been put forward for UP's poor performance in
social development-crippling poverty, a history of social divisions and inequality, and divisive caste
politics, just to name a few. Yet many of these conditions are observable in other Indian states as
well, many of which have outperformed UP in primary education. Second, these explanations face a
difficult time accounting for the changes one can observe within UP. Against an overall bleak picture,
UP has made noteworthy gains in primary education over the last decade, with a significant
expansion in provision of school infrastructure, student enrollment and access to schooling.
The central objective of this chapter is to explain the puzzle of how UP has managed to
achieve notable gains in school infrastructure, while continuing to perform poorly on other crucial
dimensions of policy implementation. It also seeks test the mechanisms through which legalism
shapes policy implementation under conditions of entrenched social hierarchy and caste politics, a
sociopolitical context that would seem to militate against rule-following.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses UP's educational
performance. Against a dismal picture overall, the state has made significant gains in school
infrastructure and enrollment. Section 5.3 anchors the analysis of policy implementation within the
sociopolitical context of UP, one marked by deeply entrenched social divisions and inequalities and a
political system that promotes particularism and caste politics. I then motivate the argument in
Section 5.4 with vignette illustrating the mechanisms through which legalistic norms are
hypothesized to produce outcomes for policy implementation. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 present the
main empirical findings. Section 5.5 establishes the presence of legalism within UP's education
bureaucracy, drawing on interviews and participant observation conducted with public officials at
various levels of the administrative hierarchy, as well as with civic agencies outside the state.
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I present a series of nested case studies in Section 5.6, testing the mechanism through which
legalistic norms produce implementation outcomes in UP across the tasks of infrastructure planning
and development and the delivery of the Midday Meal Program. I analyze these mechanisms at the
state and local district level against alternative hypotheses that center on particularism and
bureaucratic capture. Finally, I bring the analysis down to the village level to determine whether and
how legalism produces school dysfunction in the village Pundail, comparing the mechanisms of the
theory against alternative hypothesis centered on UP's social divisions and public apathy. Section
5.7 reexamines the findings in light of alternative explanations.
The findings from UP's education bureaucracy leave open the question of whether public
agencies governed by a different set of norms could produce better results for educational service
delivery in UP. I explore that question in Section 5.8, which analyzes the implementation of a
residential school program for disadvantaged girls by Mahila Samakhya, a quasi-public agency for
women's empowerment instituted in select states across India by the central government. I connect
the outcomes of Mahila Samakhya's school program to deliberative norms governing the behavior
of officials within the agency and its relationship to marginalized communities. The analysis
suggests the possibility and limits of this alternative model in the challenging sociopolitical
environment of rural Uttar Pradesh. Section 5.9 concludes with a summary of chapter's
contributions.
5.2. The Educational Scenario in Uttar Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh (pop. 200 million) is widely regarded as one of India's great laggards in terms
of social development. It consistently ranks near the bottom among Indian states on outcomes for
primary education. In the area of child health and nutrition, it performs worse than some of the
poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank's 2004 World Development Report paints a
grim picture of India's most populous state, comparing UP's appalling performance on virtually
every other indicator of human well-being against Kerala's remarkable triumphs. The failures of
governance in UP have weighed heavily on India's overall progress.
To be sure, the initial conditions in UP were not the most favorable. Administering such a
large and diverse state was never easy, and regional disparities in social and economic development
are striking.202 The significant variation across these regions notwithstanding, it is widely believed
that poor governance exacerbated regional inequalities, so much so that there have been repeated
proposals to divide Uttar Pradesh into four separate states (see Figure 5.1 in chapter Appendix).2 03
The separation of the hill state of Uttarakhand, which we examined in the previous chapter, grew
out of local alienation with the governance process under UP (Kumar 2000).
202 UP can broadly be divided into four regions based on their distinct cultural-linguistic and geographic characteristics:
western (Paschimanchal), central (Awadh), eastern (Purvanchal) and southern (Bundelkhand)
203 The most recent of these was made by Mayawati's BSP government in November, 2011: "Mayawati cabinet proposes
division of Uttar Pradesh into four states," Times of India, November 15, 2011,
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ 2011-11-15/india/30401294_1_mayawati-poorvanchal-upa-government.
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UP's dismal social progress has placed it prominently among Indian states in the BIMARU
region.2 0 ' Around the time of independence, close to 90 percent of the population was illiterate (see
Figure 5.2 in chapter Appendix). Yet many states, including Himachal Pradesh, faced similar or
worse conditions and still managed to make significant social progress. For the majority of India's
post-independence history, the literacy gap between UP and other states would only widen. While
the educational scenario in UP remained appalling at an absolute level, it grew increasingly worse in
comparison to the rest of India. By the year 2000, a time when school enrollment rates in Kerala
had already crossed the 90 percent mark, close to a third of rural girls (age 10-12) in UP had never
even set foot in a school (World Bank 2003: 44).
Based on the past, one may think that there is no hope for UP. However, recent
developments within the state paint a picture that is far more complex. For one, UP has been
catching up quickly with other states in terms of literacy, and is now less than five points below the
national average. According to India's most recent census, UP overtook the state of Rajasthan,
albeit by a small margin, in just the last decade. That is a significant achievement. Rajasthan's
progress in poverty reduction, improved literacy and other areas of social development has gained
scholarly attention, prompting some to call for its removal from the 'BIMARU' category of Indian
states (Sinha 2005; Debroy and Bhandari 2007). The fact that Rajasthan, which appeared to
observers to have a clear lead over other Hindi belt states well into the future, was overtaken by
Uttar Pradesh within such a short period of time, casts doubt on our understanding of social
development. It offers a sobering reminder of not only the possibilities, but also the precariousness
of developmental gains, and compels closer study of the mechanisms through which such gains are
(not) sustained over time.
5.2.1. School Access and Infrastructure
Embracing the full complexity of UP's current education scenario, I examine a
comprehensive set of indicators for the implementation of universal primary education policy.
While major gaps remain, close observers agree that UP has made significant progress in terms of
school infrastructure and access over the last decade. With the introduction of SSA policies by
India's central government, the state opened 19,179 new primary schools and 28,034 new middle
schools between the years 2002-2011, which corresponds to a growth rate of more than 45 percent
within a decade (NUEPA 2012).205
Perhaps more impressive than the sheer magnitude of UP's school expansion is the
provision of infrastructure and facilities within each school. Table 5.1 summarizes the data from
Pratham's ASER Report on the presence of school facilities and physical inputs in government
primary schools in rural UP. Data for the other two states included in this study are provided for
comparison. The facilities listed in the table, such as classrooms and school boundary walls, are
provided by SSA, the central government's flagship education program. The provision of these
204 BIMARU is a popular Hindi acronym standing for the (literally "sick") socioeconomically backward states -Bihar,
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh-that are located in the northern Hindi belt region of the country.
205 These achievements have also been recognized by India's central government, which has sanctioned the release of
funds for the UP government to open an additional 10,000 new primary (and middle) schools: "New Schools Approved
for UP," The Hindu, http://www.thehindu.com/education/article2500828.ece.
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facilities is deemed mandatory under India's recently passed Right to Education Act. As the data
indicate, primary schools in UP tend to have the required school facilities. With the exception of
school boundary walls, Uttar Pradesh performs significantly better than average, and interestingly,
even better than the educationally advanced state of Himachal Pradesh.
These school infrastructure statistics are further supported by qualitative studies of schooling
in UP. During my own visits to more than 50 primary schools across the state, I found most
schools equipped with three or more classrooms, kitchen sheds, water pumps, and other facilities,
even in the most economically deprived regions of the state. An official from Pratham's head office
in Lucknow similarly noted, "Actually, :fyou observe the schools in UPyoufind that they generally good
buildings that are well-painted Compare this to Andhra Pradesh, where we have also done work. Thereyou won'tfind such good infrastructure and well-painted buildings." That is not to say the school infrastructure in UP
is not lacking in many respects. For one, how sustainability of much of this newly built
infrastructure is open to question given the inadequate maintenance of school buildings.
Table 5.1 School Facilities and Physical Inputs
(% of schools that have the following)
At least one Office / Boundary Drinking Toilets Kitchen
classroom per Storage Wall water shed
State teacher space facility
Himachal Pradesh 76.7 75.5 37.3 87.5 89.2 82.0
Uttarakhand 81.6 87.9 67.0 77.9 94.2 96.3
Uttar Pradesh 87.4 88.6 44.4 93.1 93.3 89.3
All India 75.6 74.5 52.2 82.6 89.9 81.3
Source: ASER Report (2011).
With these infrastructure investments, UP has improved access across the state, raising
student enrollments significantly. The most recent data available from Pratham's ASER survey,
which is carried out annually across rural India, found that only 6.1 percent of children in the age
group 6-14 were not enrolled in school during the 2011 academic year (ASER 2012). The gains in
school enrollment over the last decade are notable. Yet growing enrollment masks persistent
problems of student attendance and retention. Vulnerable groups in particular, such as rural
adolescent girls, continue to remain outside the school system. According to the ASER data, the
proportion of rural girls of age 11-14 years who were out of school in UP declined only slightly from
11.1 percent in 2006 to 9.7 percent in 2011.
The gains in school enrollment, while noteworthy, mask ongoing problems with student
attendance. The National Family Health Survey (NFHS), one of India's most comprehensive and
reliable household surveys found that 77.2 percent of children ages 6-14 were attending school
during the 2005-06 academic year, slightly below the national average of 79.6 percent (NFHS-3
2007). The discrepancy between student enrollment and attendance data reflects the fact that a
significant proportion of students that have formally signed up for school, often through enrollment
drives and other campaigns, do not attend on a regular basis. Even the NFHS attendance data are
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likely to mask the true attendance rates, as they do not decipher between students who go to school
occasionally and those who attend on a more regular basis. Factoring in the irregularity of
attendance could significantly raise the percentage of students effectively not receiving an education.
5.2.2. Service Delivery
The infrastructure and enrollment gains in UP, significant as they are, do not in any way
detract from the appalling quality of service delivery across the state. Take first the Indian
government's Midday Meal program, a major policy for improving child nutrition and school
attendance. According to the latest ASER Report, close to 30 percent of schools in UP were not
serving the meal on the day of the survey visit (see Table 5.2). These numbers fail to capture the
exceptionally poor conditions of the school lunch program in UP. Apart from not providing meals
on a daily basis, both official and media accounts find the meals lacking the minimally required
amount of nutrition, a lack of menu options and poor quality food. According to officials
overseeing the program in UP, cases of children falling ill due to food spoilage happens with
regularity.2 "6
Table 5.2 Provision of Midday Meal
Midday Meal Served






Source: ASER Report (2011).
More than even the Midday Meal program, the condition of educational service delivery in
UP is dire. The rate of teacher absence in UP is only marginally above average, and the percentage
of single teacher schools is below average for India (see Tables 5.3-5.5). Yet these data mask the
dismal state of affairs inside UP's primary schools. For one, given UP's relatively high fertility rate,
primary schools have to cater to a much larger child population than in most other states.
According to the latest ASER Report, nearly 95 percent of primary schools (Grades 1-5) surveyed in
UP have more than 60 students, and almost half have more than 150 students. Meanwhile, the same
survey found that in 70 percent of the schools, three teachers or less is the norm. Under these
conditions, even the occasional absence of a teacher can greatly impact student achievement. In
addition, even when teachers are present, the inadequate provision of basic academic resources
within each school makes the possibility of learning further distant. Less than half of UP's primary
206 "IIM-Lucknow study points to poor nutrition levels of mid-day meals," Indian Express, Sunday, November 30, 2008,
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/iimlucknow-study-points-to-poor-nutrition-levels-of-midday-meals/392396/0.
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schools are equipped with library books (see Table 5.5). More than a quarter of them do not even
have the essential teaching-learning materials provided under the SSA program.








Source: Kremer et al. (2005)
Table 5.4 Single-Teacher Primary Schools
% Primary schools % Students enrolled
Himachal Pradesh 7.9 4.6
Uttarakhand 19.5 10.6
Uttar Pradesh 3.0 2.3
All India 11.8 6.1
Source: DISE (2012).
Table 5.5 Library and Teaching-Learning Materials
Library Books Available Teaching-Learning Materials
(% schools) Available
Himachal Pradesh 80.3 91.5
Uttarakhand 48.6 82.4
Uttar Pradesh 47.7 73.5
All India 63.1 80.4
Source: ASER Report (2011).
The absence of teaching activity taking place in UP's government school system has been
well-documented in qualitative studies as well (PROBE Team 1999; De, Khera et al. 2011). To find
teachers arriving late, sitting idle at their desks all day long, and sometimes even showing up to class
drunk is not out of the ordinary. The consequences for student learning are quite clear. According
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to official data, nearly one out of six children in UP drop out of the primary school system by fifth
grade (see Table 5.6), in many cases because they lack any meaningful skills and/or lose interest in
continuing with school. The latest ASER Report reveals an alarming picture of student learning in
UP. More than half of rural fifth graders surveyed in the state cannot read from a second grade
textbook or do basic arithmetic involving two-digit subtraction (ASER 2012). Successive ASER
surveys administered over the last few years document a decline in learning outcomes in government
primary schools. It is perhaps no surprise then that the rate of privatization in UP is quite high
given its level of income and in comparison to other Indian states (Kingdon 2007; ASER 2012).
Table 5.6 Student Dropout Rate
(% students in grades 1-5)
Boys Girls All
Himachal Pradesh 2.6 2.7 2.6
Uttarakhand 7.4 6.3 6.9
Uttar Pradesh 17.4 15.0 16.2
All India 10.15 9.75 9.95
Soun-e: Mehta (2011)
5.3. Social Inequality and Caste Politics
The educational conditions in UP examined above are complex. While the expansion of
physical infrastructure and improved access to schooling has been significant, the quality of service
delivery in UP's primary schools is abysmal, and stubborn inequalities across region and social
groups continue to pose a serious challenge for achieving universal primary education. How can we
make sense of these poor, though somewhat mixed, outcomes? In what follows, I offer an
explanation that centers on the presence of norms within the education bureaucracy. Before
moving ahead, however, it helps to ground the findings within the social and political conditions
facing UP, the environment in which the education bureaucracy operates. Public agencies do not
operate in a sociopolitical vacuum, particularly those in charge of delivering public services like
education.
5.3.1 Sodal Inequality
In contrast to the Himalayan region, Uttar Pradesh is a far more unequal and divided society.
Sociologists have written extensively about the oppressive nature of caste hierarchy in UP. Though
it is common to make broad-based differences between upper castes and lower castes, the nature of
caste divisions in UP is far more subtle. Forms of caste exclusion and untouchability continue to
pervade UP society. Here I will just touch upon the domain of education. Few educational
opportunities were traditionally available to lower caste groups, particularly Dalits, who were barred
altogether from attending school. Studies document the indignities experienced by Dalit children at
the hands of upper caste communities, including school teachers (Govinda and Diwan 2002). A
similar set of observations has been made regarding the unequal and highly restrictive gender norms
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in UP, which prioritize the male child and limit the physical movement, education and economic
opportunities available to girls (Dreze and Sen 2002).
Beyond outright discrimination, caste divisions and inequalities in UP are thought to
undermine social cooperation more broadly, leading to public apathy and neglect around services
like primary education. The "public apathy" thesis has prominent followers, including Dreze and
Sen (2002), who argue that traditional divisions in UP impede collective action around basic services
like education and health. So tight is the grip of social divisions in rural UP, they argue, that it is not
uncommon to find schools closed for days on end, and teachers persistently absent or even showing
up to class drunk, with little collective protest from the public. 2 17 By contrast, primary schools in the
state of Kerala are thought to function much better due to greater collective vigilance by local
communities, whose efforts go above and beyond state initiatives. Along the same lines, the World
Bank's 2004 World Development Report attributes the dysfunctional conditions within UP's primary
schools and public health centers largely to collective neglect at the community level (World Bank
2003).
The above research offers important insights on the relationship between social inequality
and collective action. Missing from the analysis, however, is an account of how public agencies bear
on social relations when implementing policies on the ground. What are the ways in which public
officials transact and negotiate in a highly divided and unequal society when carrying out policy
implementation? One often reads that state-society relations in UP are in effect clientelistic
exchanges, either of the monetary or identity-based variety.2"' That is, they are relations of
corruption for those who can pay, and (often caste-based) particularism for those who have a
"known and recognized" (janpabchan) official within the state (Jeffrey and Lerche 2000: 866).
Although I was alerted to both types of exchanges over the course of fieldwork, these two forms of
exchange do not exhaust the range of interactions between public officials and citizens. Nor do they
apply across many of the tasks required for implementing universal primary education. Moreover,
this literature leaves open a critical question: what of those who have neither the economic resources
norjanpahchan within the state? The reality facing most Dalits and other marginalized groups is
precisely that, one of economic and social exclusion. How do public agencies (not) work on their
behalf?
5.3.2. Caste Politics
The rise of lower caste politics over the last few decades has fundamentally altered the shape
of democracy in Uttar Pradesh. Regional political parties targeting lower caste voters have gained
ascendance and compete vociferously for political control over the state. The Bahujan Samaj Party
(BSP), with its loyal Dalit vote bank, caused ripples through the UP political system in 2007 when it
achieved the first state majority government in 26 years. The BSP head, Mayawati, made political
history in 1996 after becoming the first Dalit (and female) Chief Minister of UP. She again made
history again in 2007 after leading her party to win a major victory in UP state elections, forming the
207 Cases of non-functioning schools abound in UP. For example, in their longitudinal study of Palanpur Village, Dreze
and Gazdar (1996) persistent teacher absenteeism rendered the local primary school non-functional for ten years.
20 On the relationship between caste, clientelism and corruption in Uttar Pradesh see Jeffrey and Lerche (2000), Jeffrey
(2002), and Dutta (2012).
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first majority government in 26 years. Notwithstanding these remarkable political achievements, the
BSP's commitment to improving the quality of life for Dalits has been called into question (Pai
2002). The same goes for its rival, the Samajwadi Party (SP), which has a strong following among
OBCs, particularly the Yadav community. Mostly recently, SP continued the trend towards regional
party domination in UP when it won a majority government in 2012.
Though the political mobilization of lower castes in UP is an accomplishment in its own
right, the extent to which it has improved their socioeconomic status is an open question. One
might have expected the quality of governance for the disadvantaged to improve in such a highly
competitive political landscape, especially in policy areas like primary education, which would benefit
economically deprived, lower caste voters. Yet neither the BSP nor the SP has offered much in the
way of a programmatic policy agenda. Instead, these parties are known to advertise the caste
identities of their candidates around election time (Chandra 2004). The policies they do advance
come in the form of narrow, targeted benefits such as extending caste-based reservations, a form of
affirmative action in employment and education. Within the domain of development, the BSP's
most visible policy initiative has been the Ambedkar Village Scheme, which (claims to) target villages
having a high concentration of Dalits with new roads, sewage lines, electrification, and other
infrastructure projects. 209 Some criticize the program for dividing the poor along caste (and
religious) lines."
If not development, these parties have advanced a politics of dignity. The BSP in particular
engaged in a highly visible cultural project, constructing parks and memorials for Dalit leaders across
the state. The party has erected thousands of statues across UP commemorating Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar, Dalit national icon and architect of India's Constitution, along with other Dalit leaders,
included Mayawati herself. With no development agenda to speak of, not even a party manifesto,
some doubt the motives behind the BSP's political rise, as the party appears to be working not for
the socioeconomic upliftment of Dalits, but instead for control over public resources (Pai 2002;
Chandra 2004).2" These scholars find little support for mass education among regional party
leadership, contrasting their political projects in UP with the lower caste movements in south India,
which tied Dalit social upliftment to the spread of literacy (Mehrotra 2006). Some go so far as to say
that lower caste political mobilization within UP has only strengthened social cleavages, reinforced
cientelism and undermined any sense of the common good (Chandra 2004). Whatever one may
think about the BSP policy agenda, as the first Dalit (and female) Chief Minister of UP, Mayawati's
achievements in politically mobilizing one of India's most downtrodden populations in a caste-
ridden society like UP are nothing short of extraordinary.
209 I say "claims to" because it is unclear who in fact actually receives these infrastructure projects. According to the
official list of Ambedkar Villages that I obtained during fieldwork in District Saharanpur, which is where Mayawati's
own constituency is based, the villages had mostly non-Dalit populations.
210 Critics argue that the Ambedkar Village Scheme has generated ill will between Hindu Dalits and other economic
downtrodden groups, particularly poor OBCs and Muslims, who may have even greater need for governmental support.
See, for example, "Progress in a Dalit Village Creates Ill-will in Muslims Nearby," India Real Time, The WallStret Journal,
http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/ 2 012 /03/02/progress-in-a-dalit-village-creates-ill-will-in-muslims-nearby.
211 As Pai (2002) observes, the BSP operates according to a theory of change "from above," that is, to gain political
power and rework the bureaucracy in favor of Dalits and other disadvantaged groups. In that sense, it is fundamentally
a "statist" party, one whose agenda for social justice does not amount to a rejection of the state, but instead involves
control over the state apparatus. How far the BSP has succeeded towards that goal is an open question.
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The rise of caste politics in UP is thought to undermine the operation of the bureaucracy
(Jeffrey, Jeffery et al. 2008). Targeted policies like the Ambedkar Village Scheme are understood to
reinforce particularism within the state and obstruct the delivery of universal public goods like
education and health (Keefer and Khemani 2004). These studies make critical observations about
the influence of caste politics over the state. Yet they tend to paint the bureaucracy as a victim,
captured by corrupt principals. They raise the question of how bureaucratic norms operate under
conditions of caste politics and clientelistic interference. How do public officials negotiate these
political conditions as they carry out various their responsibilities? As I will aim to show in the
empirical case studies, even particularistic policies like the Ambedkar Village Scheme can be
reformulated on the ground according to bureaucratic norms.
5.4. Mechanisms Illustrated
Having taken account of the educational conditions in UP as well as the sociopolitical
context facing the bureaucracy, I now turn to the explanation put forward in this chapter. Using a
combination of field methods, including in-depth interviews, participant observation and village
ethnography, I find that legalistic norms governing public agencies in UP lead to very poor delivery
of educational services, while at the same time enabling school infrastructure development to a large
degree. Legalistic norms lead bureaucrats to interpret rules and procedures strictly, apply policies
uniformly across cases, and effectively marginalize citizens and civic actors in the implementation
process. Public officials engage in these behaviors to carry out the mission of universal primary
education while protecting the state from societal interference. In so doing, however, they
undermine service delivery and reproduce social inequalities on the ground. To motivate the
analysis, I begin with a short vignette, taken from urban UP, which illustrates how infrastructure
provision, a task that may appear "easy," can pose serious challenges for the state. I then turn to a
preview of the mechanisms in my argument, the pathways through which legalistic norms operate
and yield the poor (albeit mixed) outcomes for implementation in Uttar Pradesh.
5.4.1. Motivating Vignette: No SchoolforA-am Nagar
On a warm afternoon, I made my way through the narrow gullies of Azam Nagar, a slum
located in Agra. A city of great historical and cultural import-Agra once served as capital of the
Mughal Empire and was later a significant base of government for the British-it is possibly the
most prominent tourist destination in Uttar Pradesh, if not all of India. Among other attractions, it
is home to the Taj Mahal, the country's preeminent architectural wonder. Yet even the impressive
tourist sites of Agra could not conceal a town crumbling from decades of urban decay. In many
ways, the conditions inside Azam Nagar were emblematic of Agra's broader public neglect. An
illegal settlement, Azam Nagar consisted of 2,500 houses sprawled across ten small habitations
(bastis). Walking along windy footpaths marked with potholes and cow manure, I tread with caution,
skipping over open sewage lines and dodging live electrical wires hanging from rickety poles.
Pratham, a renowned education NGO, had been working in Azam Nagar for several years and ran a
library program for children.
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Residents of Azam Nagar recounted their experience migrating there from villages around
Agra and the bordering state of Rajasthan. Most men worked as rikshaw pullers, and in many cases,
their children also worked for supplementary income. A conservative Muslim community, many
families were wary about educating their daughters outside the neighborhood, especially upon
reaching adolescence. The nearest government primary school was a long distance away, and few
could afford the monthly fees at nearby private schools. Pratham fieldworkers, with support from
influential community members, mobilized families to educate their children and press public
agencies to build a new school within the slum. Over the course of three years, residents of Azam
Nagar came together and wrote letters to various concerned departments, made frequent visits to
the education bureaucracy, and even contacted their local MLA (state legislator), who responded
affirming that he would take the necessary steps to help them. Notwithstanding their collective
efforts, no school had been built.
I inquired further about the case at the office for the Department of Education. There I was
cordially greeted by Mr. Mian, a local official who had been in contact with Pratham fieldworkers
and community members in Azam Nagar. When I asked about the proposal to build a new school,
he recounted his frustrations: "We have tried repeatedly, but nothing can be done. We have to work according to
the guidelines given to us by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari [District Education Officer]. We can't change any of the
rules on their [the community's] behalf" He was referring to rules regarding construction on illegal
settlements. While Mr. Mian was able to obtain clearance and funds for the school building by the
Department of Education, to actually build the school, he would have to coordinate with multiple
agencies to gain the requisite approvals. "I tried approaching my seniors about this, but I got little response in
return. After much complaining by me, they forwarded the proposal higher up. But nothing has come of it. Instead,
we are told to focus on our routine work."
The example of Azam Nagar presents a puzzle. One might suppose, on the one hand, that
public agencies in Agra were neglecting the town's poor, minority Muslim population, a charge often
leveled against the Indian state. Yet there was no lack of public support for the new school. In
UP's fiercely competitive local elections, a community of more than 2,500 households could not be
brushed aside so easily. Nor was there a dearth of public resources; funding for the school building
had been released, but was sitting idle. Perhaps this was a case of bureaucrats shirking their official
duties. According to my interviews with Pratham's fieldworkers, individuals within the local
bureaucracy supported their efforts to enroll out of school children across Agra on several
occasions. It was not for a lack of will or resources that no school had been built in Azam Nagar.
The reality, as Mr. Mian put it, was that "Even f we want to do something here, we can't do it."
5.4.2. Mechanisms
The above is a small example of how legalism influences the functioning of public agencies
in UP. Recall from the theory developed in Chapter 1 that legalism promotes rule-following
behavior (see Figure 5.3). Bureaucrats subject to legalistic norms interpret rules, roles and
procedures strictly. They tend to apply policies uniformly across cases without making exceptions
for particular individuals or groups, and try to work within the lines of their official mandate.
Legalistic norms lead bureaucrats to resist the input of civic actors, whose influence can affect the
internal affairs of the state. In areas where civic participation is prescribed by policy, bureaucrats
choose to work through official-recognized agencies and channels, excluding unrecognized
172
associations. Taken together, these bureaucratic behaviors produce a rational implementation
process, one that aims to preserve the integrity of the state while limiting the scope for societal
interference. As a consequence, however, legalism tends to favor privileged citizens, who enjoy
multiple levers of access to the state, while further marginalizing the disadvantaged.
Figure 5.3 Theoretical Process
Legalistic Protective Rational
Norms Behaviors Implementation
L- - - - - - - -> Civic exclusion --- - - - - - - JI I
The process I describe above is entirely theoretical, but consider how it helps illuminate the
case of Azam Nagar. Building a school in Azam Nagar epitomizes the challenge public agencies
face in meeting the needs of communities living in informal settlements. For agencies governed by
legalistic norms, however, the problem takes on a whole new form. Officials tend to work within
their official mandates and interpret policies in a strict and uniform manner across cases, making no
exceptions for particular individuals or groups. To commence construction for a school within the
slum area, the Agra Nagar Nigam (Municipal Corporation) would first have to approve the use of
land. Environmental and safety clearances would also have to be obtained. Coordinating these
activities for a new school in Azam Nagar did not fall within the mandate of the education
bureaucracy, and Mr. Mian's seniors made that clear to him. In his repeated requests to Agra's Basic
Shiksha Adhikari (District Education Officer) for permission to build a school in the illegal slum,
Mr. Mian exposed himself as someone who interpreted the rules too liberally:
The more I push to do something different, the more I'm viewed with suspicion. My office will begin
to question me, that, 'What is his motive behind asking again and againfor a speial concession?
They would think that 'He must be gaining some personal benefit (phaida)from the deal.
To coordinate with other municipal agencies to obtain the necessary permits within an illegal
settlement was to work outside the rules and make an exception for a particular community. Yet
Mr. Mian was doing precisely that: interpreting the rules loosely to accommodate local needs. That
he was closely involved with Pratham, and appeared to be trying hard to build the new school in
Azam Nagar, raised suspicion among his colleagues. What phaida was in it for him? Was he trying
to benefit monetarily from the transaction? Those were the questions looming in his office, and so
he felt compelled to back down. In UP, cases like Mr. Mian's abound. Public officials who attempt
to work beyond the rules and interpret policies in a flexible manner raise suspicion and are quelled,
while those who adhere firmly to procedure are seen favorably. In what follows, I attempt to
demonstrate how this normative mechanism operates across a range of cases and situations.
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To understand how legalistic norms connect to the implementation outcomes observed in
Uttar Pradesh, it helps to break apart first the various activities underlying the delivery universal
primary education. Table 5.4 summarizes some of the main administrative tasks required for
implementing universal primary education policies. A brief description of the associated
bureaucratic behaviors prescribed by legalistic norms is provided side-by-side. These tasks can be
divided into three broad categories of activities: (1) school planning and provision, (2) delivery of
educational services, and (3) system monitoring and feedback. While the first category involves
activities related to quantitative improvements, like the development of physical infrastructure and
school facilities, the latter two sets of activities are more closely tied to the qualty of service delivery.
System monitoring and local feedback is particularly relevant to education quality, since the daily
functioning of primary schools is largely out of the hands of state planners in Lucknow, and even
local bureaucrats stationed in a district office.
Figure 5.4 Policy Implementation: Tasks and Behaviors
Administrative Tasks Bureaucratic Behaviors
School planning and provision
School infrastructure development -Conduct planning process within dedicated agency and
restrict outside input or interference
Regional planning and policy targeting -Apply policies uniformly across different regions and social
groups
Educational service delivery
Teacher posting -Apply uniform, rational procedure for allocation of teachers
across schools
Academic support -Provide academic resources in uniform, top-down process
Community support -Work with officially-recognized school agencies within the
areas mandated by policy
Monitoring andfeedback
System monitoring -Follow top-down school inspection model and identify gaps
through official surveys
Local feedback -Incorporate local feedback through official channels
As a preview to the detailed case studies presented in the following section, let us consider
briefly here a few examples of how legalistic norms shape bureaucratic behavior around these
activities. Take first the task of infrastructure planning and development. India's SSA program aims
to achieve universal access to primary schooling in large part through the construction of new
schools. Public agencies have, in theory, a diversity of methods at their disposal for carrying out that
212 As I discussed in Chapter 1, the list of tasks was compiled after conducting extensive interviews with public officials,
nongovernmental agencies, education experts and school teachers across north India.
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task. They could, for instance, call on elected officials to identify villages in their constituencies that
require school buildings, or at a more local level, encourage gram panchayats (elected village
councils) to come forward with proposals for new school within their areas. They could tie up with
local community groups to determine which buildings require remodeling and additional facilities
such as school classrooms and kitchen sheds for cooking the Midday Meal. Faced with these
options, the education bureaucracy in UP will tend to confine infrastructure planning and
development within the dedicated sub-division of the education bureaucracy, in this case the Civil
Works wing of the SSA State Project Office.
In carrying out their responsibilities, bureaucrats would follow official mandates for new
school construction closely, overriding local demands and interference. For instance, when deciding
where to construct a school building, they would interpret rules narrowly, like those regarding
school distance, which require that primary schools must be built within one kilometer of a
habitation, whether the local community expresses a need for it or not. By overriding local needs,
bureaucrats attempt to steer clear of local politics and ensure that the policies under SSA are
administered by the book. The outcome, one should expect, is primary schools built uniformly
across all communities, according to official standards and with all facilities deemed mandatory
Consider now educational service delivery. Across these tasks, bureaucrats face significant
variability in terms of the particular needs and context facing local communities, schools and school
teachers. They cannot, however, show favor to any particular case. Instead, they will tend to apply a
uniform policy across cases, for instance, the official requirement for no single-teacher schools.
Anything beyond that, such as addressing the needs of school teachers, providing academic support
to schools and engaging in community outreach will tend to be applied uniformly and not according
to the needs of each case. As a result, the outcomes in individual cases will tend to vary
significantly depending on factors external to the bureaucracy, including geography and community
relations. In a socially divided an unequal society like rural UP, the process will tend to favor groups
that dominate, including upper castes and school teachers, while disempowering marginalized
citizens. As a consequence, we can expect service delivery to work against the needs of lower caste
communities, generating worse classroom experiences for students, and encouraging dropouts.
Finally, the activities around monitoring and feedback aim to ensure that the education
system is functioning well. Public agencies operating according to legalistic norms will tend to apply
a standard, top-down model of inspections and rely on official surveys to identify out-of-school
children and gaps in service delivery. Meanwhile, the same norms compel bureaucrats to downplay
and disregard feedback from outside agencies, including local NGOs and informal community
groups that have no official standing. As a consequence, the process of verification and redress will
again favor more privileged actors, who have greater capacity and political wherewithal to defend
themselves, and in some cases, even manipulate the rules in their favor. As a result, we can expect
local conflicts over teacher absence, problems with the Midday Meal, and so on to work against
marginalized groups.
5.5. Legalism in Uttar Pradesh
Having offered a preview of the mechanisms by which legalistic norms in the bureaucracy
lead to the implementation outcomes observed in Uttar Pradesh, this section turns now to the main
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empirical findings of the chapter. I begin by establishing the presence of legalism within the state,
drawing on examples taken from different divisions and levels of the education bureaucracy as well
as the experiences of civic actors involved in education. The section then turns to a series of case
studies that demonstrate how legalistic norms lead to implementation outcomes across the different
tasks associated with primary education policy. These cases are drawn from fieldwork conducted at
the state, district and village-level. They offer fine-grained evidence for how legalistic norms shape
bureaucratic behavior across a variety of contexts, how civic actors respond to these behaviors, and
how the combination of bureaucratic and civic action lead to observed outcomes for primary
education in rural Uttarakhand.
5.5.1. The Legalistic Bureaucray
The bureaucracy in Uttar Pradesh presents a conundrum. On the one hand, UP has one of
the most venerable bureaucratic legacies in the country. Under British rule, UP was often
considered the best-administered province in India. In the decades following Independence, a
bureaucratic posting in UP was among the most highly-coveted positions within the Indian state.
The high status accorded to UP's bureaucracy was tied in many ways to the state's significance for
national politics. Since Jawaharlal Nehru onwards, eight of India's fourteen prime ministers came
from UP. The prestige associated with working in UP attracted exceptionally skilled public servants,
as reflected in earlier studies of the Indian state.21 With his penchant for centralized planning,
Nehru was considered an architect of India's secular, modern state and UP's bureaucracy the
exemplar of his vision (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987; Frankel 2005).
The National Academy of Administration was established in the town of Mussoorie in 1959,
a remote Himalayan hill station that belonged to UP until the hill region separated in 2000 to form
the state of Uttarakhand. The Academy was the primary training site for each new batch of IAS
officers, an experience that would leave them with a shared professional identity as members of "the
service." The exalted status of the UP cadre of the elite Indian Administrative Service (IAS) was
further reflected in the fact that it was given charge of training bureaucrats from other states. For
example, when the state of Himachal Pradesh was formed in 1971, it was bureaucrats from UP who
were called upon to help guide, train and lead the Himachalis on how to administer the new state. A
senior bureaucratic posting within UP thus continues to be seen as an important milestone on the
road to New Delhi and the upper echelons of the Indian state.2 4
For these reasons, the UP bureaucracy may have at one point been the closest
approximation to the Weberian ideal of a rational-legal state in India. Set against this image of a
Weberian state, however, is a diametrically opposed view. The bureaucracy in UP is also
characterized as deeply politicized, corrupt and weak, incapable of governing a sprawling society.
Apart from the IAS, the rest of the bureaucracy is thought to be incapable of governing. Some
suggest that UP's bureaucracy operates under two distinct logics: the modern-rational logic of India
213 For example, a study conducted in the 1960s analyzing the behavioral orientation of Block Development Officers
found bureaucrats in UP far better-suited to the task of development than those in the neighboring state of Rajasthan
(Mathur 1972)
214 Interviews with IAS officials within UP and New Delhi revealed a common belief that a position within the UP IAS
cadre offered a major advantage for career mobility.
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at the top, and a traditional, backwards logic of Bharat (Hindi for India) on the bottom; a
concentration of committed, skilled professionals trying to implement policies through a mass of
incompetent and corrupt petty officials."' This dichotomous portrayal of the state in UP suggests
that patterns of organizational behavior aross these two levels of the state should be distinct.
Fieldwork conducted inside UP's education bureaucracy suggests an element of truth to
both of these views. I observed patterns of unified action as well as variation in behavior across the
organizational hierarchy. Underlying this discontinuity, however, I find a common set of norms that
are reflected in the shared expectations of public officials and non-state actors. As the findings will
show, these bureaucratic norms approximate the legalistic model theorized in Chapter 1. Legalism is
a conservative principle, whose aim is to preserves the letter of the law. Under legalism, bureaucrats
that follow a strict interpretation of rules and procedures are viewed favorably. Action taken beyond
a narrow interpretation of the rules, meanwhile, draws suspicion and reproach. Public officials in
UP's education bureaucracy tend to view legalism as the ideal of a well-functioning state. This rest
of this section is divided into two parts. The first part presents establishes legalistic norms inside the
state, drawing on in-depth interviews and participant observation of bureaucrats located in different
positions and functions across the administrative hierarchy. The second part draws on the
experiences outside the state, based on interviews and participant observation with non-state actors,
including citizens and civic agencies working in the education sector.
5.5.2. Inside the State
The first stream of evidence for legalism within the state comes from the interactions across,
the bureaucratic hierarchy. In stark contrast to the broad promotion of discussion across the
bureaucratic chain in Himachal Pradesh, in UP, local officials learn not to raise questions or
concerns with their senior colleagues in Lucknow. Consider a case from the local administration in
District Sitapur. Local officials there faced a problem. With a population of almost 4.5 million,
Sitapur is the eighth most populous district of Uttar Pradesh. The average district in UP,
meanwhile, is just a little over half that size. To collect survey data on schools across the district, an
activity that is required for annual district planning under SSA, officials in Sitapur had to cover
essentially twice the population within the same timeframe as their colleagues in other offices. In
addition, because part of the district is located in a flood-prone region, further delays and disruption
during school data collection often ensued. Yet according to district officials, these ground realities
were effectively suppressed, as they di not carry weight in the state office.
In one of many routine visits to the local education bureaucracy in Sitapur, I inquired about
the official data on out-of-school children in the district. To my surprise, an officers who overheard
my request answered back, "We don't have time to produce real data. Even if we had the time to produce the
data, I still wouldn't believe it." I paused and thought for a moment about what he was saying. Here I
stood in the office dedicated solely to the production of education statistics for one of the largest
districts of Uttar Pradesh, and the bureaucrats in charge did not have the slightest conviction in the
data their office was producing. Our conversation went on and the purpose behind the data
production process became clearer. As another official explained to me:
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215 See, for example, Jeffrey (2002).
Everyone here faces dabav [pressure] from the state ofice. We have to have all kinds of data
prepared, and that too upon immediate request... The reality is that it would take months of regular
work to produce the data they want in Lucknow. So we have to cut corners. Everyone knows these
numbers are false. Nobody's afool We're aware that the system is riding on thin air. But still,
we need to create a base upon which to plan. And if we don't show these numbers on time to the
state ofice, we get in trouble. I'llget a callfrom someone saying that I'm being derelict in my duties.
So we produce the data as requiredfor the planning process.2
This official was articulating the pressures he and his colleagues faced to meet the requirements of
SSA's reporting and evaluation policy. Data for official reporting had to be produced for higher ups
in Lucknow and New Delhi by whatever means necessary, since that was the standard by which
bureaucratic performance was assessed. Throughout our conversations, local officials in Sitapur
shifted between fits of exasperation and humor over the apparent senselessness of having to
generate reports that did not correspond to ground realities in their district. The data production
process offered a particularly vivid glimpse of norms in UP's education bureaucracy. The local
officials in Sitapur all chimed in, each taking turns describing to me how data production took place:
To meet the 'targets'for SSA, bureaucrats from the top all the way down do a dance. First, sitting
inside his classroom the headmaster makes up numbers... The realio is that teachers aren't going to
go to each house to identifi the out of school children. The highl motivated ones may t j to do a
quick survey of the school's catchment area [1 km radius]... Then those numbers arrive at the Block
Administration, where the BRC [Block Resource Coordinator] handles them. He compiles the
data and tries to make sure that enrollments are not declining or else he willface censure from his
superiors. Sitting in his office, he adjusts the child enrollment data to meet his requirements. Then
he submits the data to us here [the district office] ... And in the same way, we report to the state
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Their mocking tone aside, these officials did not fault their seniors in the SSA State Project Office
for the "dance" around data production. They understood official reporting to be a critical part of
implementing any major central government policy. One of the officials later went on to defend the
relevance of the reporting process:
It is understandable. Like us, they [SSA State Project Office] too have to answer to someone above
them. They face demands from Delhi to show that they are keeping a watch over things and
conducting the polig transparently.18
Like the demands placed on them, local officials understood that similar demands were placed on
their seniors by the Ministry of Human Resource Development in New Delhi. Yet demands of this
kind were hardly unique to Sitapur, or even to UP for that matter. They were a constant across my
fieldwork. In other UP districts, in Uttarakhand, and even in the educationally forward state of
Himachal Pradesh, officials described the pressures they faced to produce reports for SSA, and the
consequences that arose from doing the dance. They too had little faith in the surveys carried out by
school teachers and the numbers produced for official reports. One may characterize the "dance" as
a normal feature of systematic pressures within the state.
216 Field Visit, SSA Project Office, District Sitapur.
217 Field Visit, SSA Project Office, District Sitapur.
218 Focus Group Discussion, District Officials, SSA Project Office, District Sitapur.
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What varied across public agencies, however, was the parallel, informal "dance" that took
place alongside the official data production process. In Himachal Pradesh, the dance was
deliberative, involving discussion and interrogation of what was happening in the field, separate and
apart from the generation of reports. In UP, meanwhile, the dance was legalistic. Local officials
were pressured to carry out implementation more strictly, not to question policies or debate ground
realities with their seniors. Those who demonstrated an understanding of "theprocess' involving close
adherence to procedure, generating official reports when asked, answering official information
requests on time, and the like, were viewed favorably by their seniors. Those who raised questions,
meanwhile, about SSA policies and tried to communicate local problems of implementation were
seen to be acting out, and in some cases, even reprimanded.
Consider the case of Ms. Tyagi, a local official in the education bureaucracy of Saharanpur
District, where I conducted fieldwork over the course of several months. Saharanpur is a district
located far from Sitapur, in the northwestern corner of UP, yet there too I found similar norms at
work. I first met Ms. Tyagi during a routine monitoring visit she had been conducting at a village
primary school. She examined the official school records and went through a checklist of items with
the school principal, including student enrollment, school infrastructure and provision of the midday
meal, an exercise that in many ways resembled a financial audit. A few weeks later, Ms. Tyagi
recounted with me her experiences implementing SSA policies. The conversation returned to her
school monitoring visit, and she went on to describe one of her formative experiences:
From the very start [of SSA], we've been unable to monitor the schools in our [administrative] block
on our own. I have a babu [clerk] under me, as well as some staff But they cannot effectively
monitor, because there are too many schools. And anyway, they themselves are school teachers.
Everyone knows this. How can someone from within the communiy of teachers control others? I
brought this issue up with the district [administration] and other higher ups. I suggested we hire
outside monitors from other agencies, but my seniors scolded me. I was told I had to "stick to the
annual work plan." I have learned that it is better not act independently or challenge the rules. So
here I am today, conducting school inspections on my own. 9
To the external observer, Ms. Tyagi's actions (and omissions) during her school inspection
visits may be misconstrued as evidence for her being apathetic or unmotivated to go beyond
the bare minimum of effort. Yet a more sustained conversation revealed that her personal
preferences ran in the opposite direction of the observed behavior. Her idea to enlist the
support of outside agencies for school monitoring was the correct response was based on a
belief that it would help to ensure that standards of quality were met in the implementation
of primary schooling. She even tried communicating these ideas to her co-workers and
senior officials in the office. Yet her attempt to question and go beyond the official rules
was taken as a sign of deviance, a break from the standard process, which was in turn
greeted with suspicion from her colleagues. The experience only helped reinforce Ms.
Tyagi's narrow interpretation of the rules and procedures.
This administrative "play" (khe) or "dance" (naach), as various local officials referred to it, was
seen as an integral part of carrying out their work. Whether it was school planning meetings,
monitoring visits or the production of official statistics, organizational rituals provided an
219 Interview with Block Education Officer, Saharanpur District, Uttar Pradesh, May 11, 2009.
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opportunity to develop and convey an understanding of the legalistic norms governing the
bureaucracy. Senior officials in Lucknow were no outsiders to this process. Much to the contrary,
they provided the behavioral model and conducted the ritual-setting that allowed their subordinates
to learn what was required of them. As a senior official from the SSA State Project Office
explained:
There are lots ofpolitical and sociocultural problems at the local level, but ifyou work according to
the process outlined by SSA, thenyou can achieve results. We call in the poor performers to explain
their difficulties and get them to focus on the process. I believe that if a clear process is established,
then the end product will be of qualiy.22
What this official meant by having poor performers "explain their difficulties" was not to have them
share their experiences from the field, but rather to have them answer for why they could not follow
the rules and meet their targets, as I observed directly occasions in the same office. The emphasis
placed on the "theprocess" reflected norms for how a public agency ought to function. While the
formal decentralization under SSA called for greater participation of local officials in the planning
process, it also opened up the Department of Education, especially senior levels of bureaucracy, to
interrogation. Yet the notion of engaging local officials in a broader discussion regarding how to
conceptualize and carry out implementation was seen as peculiar, far from the norm.
The understanding maintained by senior officials was that, so long as local bureaucrats were
abiding by the rules, there was no need for further questions. To the contrary, too much discussion
was a sign of problems in the system. A highly decorated IAS officer, who spent several years as the
Secretary of Education in Uttar Pradesh, the highest ranking post within the bureaucracy, described
to me the "problem" of opening the floodgates of discussion with local bureaucrats. As he saw it, the
role of senior officials was to delegate mandates, not to promote conversation with lower levels of
the bureaucracy. An orderly system had no space for a give and take of questions and experiences
around policy implementation. Instead, he took the upward flow of questions to be a sign of poor
governance. As this official elaborated on the "problem" of engaging local officials:
Why do your local offidals and school teachers have questions about the rules? Apparently it is
because the system is not delivering. Before any question reaches us [the Secretariat], it should be
addressed at the block or district level. I would expect the subject matter of every question to be
sorted out that way first. And if the number of questions and concerns does not come down, then the
Basic Shiksha Adhikari (District Education Oficer) should have to answerfor it. "
For the highest ranking official of the education bureaucracy, deliberation across the hierarchy was
taken as a sign of confusion, an absence of clarity regarding the rules. The upstream flow of
questions also reflected the inadequacy of officials at the district to impose a similar order on their
subordinates. The ritual "dance" across the hierarchy offered a way for local officials like those in
Sitapur to show that they work according to the rules, meet their targets and do not raise questions
about procedures and policies with others.
220 Senior Office, SSA State Project Office, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh.
221 Interview with former Secretary of Education, Uttar Pradesh.
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5.2. Outside the State
The second stream of evidence for the prevalence of legalism within the state comes from
the experiences of individuals and groups outside the state, including those working in the education
sector. If bureaucratic norms tend to promote a strict adherence to rules hierarchies within the
state, for individuals and agencies working outside the state they tend to promote a sense of
marginalization. In their dealings with bureaucrats-both local administration and senior officials-
civic actors face an uphill battle gaining a platform to discuss their needs.
Take the case again of Pratham, the education NGO introduced earlier in the motivating
vignette on Azam Nagar. Pratham is among most respected NGOs working in primary education
across India. The organization's staff and includes noted scholars, educationists, researchers and
local fieldworkers across India. Within UP, Pratham run library programs, alternative schools and
other interventions for out-of-school children in urban slum communities across the state.
According to the organization's senior staff based in Lucknow, the kind of support and cooperation
the received from local officials in Agra District was an exception. As one staff member reported:
Support from the state for our work has been negligible.. .And we see little variation in that across
the districts we have worked in ... Though we have found that district leadership can make a
diference, like say in Agra, or in Bahraich. The officers there were eager to work with us. But
these are rare cases. And anyway, the people [officials] who try to work differently don'tget any
support. They are the first to get kicked out of the system.22 1
Pratham's fieldworkers in UP also tend to see themselves as "outsiders' in their interactions with the
local state. As they expressed during interviews, tasks that required cooperation with the local state,
such as enrolling children into the formal school system, would immediately hit a roadblock.
Consequently, they learned to adjust their strategies and concentrate effort on program areas that did
not require direct input from or engagement with the state. During focus group discussions with
Pratham staff working in different parts of UP, another common thread emerged. They described a
system in which each bureaucratic division operated like an independent fiefdom jagir), with little
coordination or communication across them:
At the local-level if we need something from one division, we first have to get clearance from whoever
sits at the very top of that subdivision. And across the subdivisions there is no coordination...this
goes down to the local-most level They are all running in parallel And this makes it twice as
difficultfor us to get anything done at the local level. 2 1
More often than not, Pratham's field staff experienced little cooperation and high organizational
barriers to entry, across subdivisions and levels of the UP state.
One may suppose that these experiences were unique to Pratham. As a high-profile NGO
whose work garners much attention from the media and researchers across the world, perhaps the
education bureaucracy was threatened by the organization's status. However, fieldwork conducted
222 To learn more about Pratham, visit: http://www.pratham.org/.
223 Interview with senior staff member, Pratham, Lucnow, Uttar Pradesh.
224 Focus Group Discussion, local field staff, Pratham, Uttar Pradesh.
181
with local, far less prominent NGOs across UP revealed similar experiences with the state. Public
agencies, including those working in domains outside of education, would often fail to cooperate or
support their work. According to a staff member of a local NGO with a rural health mission in the
far-flung district of Lalitpur:
When a public offidal here [in Lalitpur] sees that a NGO is working in the same field as them, at
the district or block level, he immediately expresses reluctance to work with them. '"f we are doing
this work then why do we needyou?' they will say to us.225
Both he and the senior staff at Pratham described situations of public officials in UP "bossing
around" (dadagir) their fieldworkers. Local bureaucrats would try to dictate the rules and procedures
that these organizations had to follow in carrying out their work if they wanted cooperation from
the local state.
In their relations with agencies outside the state, these officials were reproducing the
legalistic norms governing relations within the state. As outsiders trying to work alongside the
bureaucratic system, these NGOs developed their own coping strategies. For example, they learned
to seek out individual allies within the state who may be willing to break from standard practice now
and again, as was the case for the block official who coordinated with Pratham's fieldworkers in
Agra District. Yet these instances of going beyond standard practice were rare because they carried
risks for the bureaucrats involved, who faced pressures within the state to conform.
A final stream of evidence for legalistic norms within the state comes from the experiences
of Mahila Samakhya, a quasi-public agency devoted to women's empowerment in Uttar Pradesh.
Mahila Samakhya operates according to a very different set of norms from the education
bureaucracy. In contrast to the legalism that predominates within UP's education bureaucracy, the
norms governing Mahila Samakhya more closely approximates the deliberative model expounded in
Chapter 1. The normative clash between these organizations provides some of the clearest evidence
of the nature of bureaucratic norms governing the education bureaucracy.
Mahila Samakhya is a quasi-public agency for women's literacy and empowerment. It was
launched as an experimental program by India's central government as part of India's 1986 National
Policy on Education, which articulated the need to redress gender imbalances in education.
Informed by the view that India's bureaucratic approach to planning was ill-suited to the task of
redressing inequalities facing women from disadvantaged backgrounds, planners in New Delhi
launched the program as an alternative, bottom-up model of governance on behalf of women.227
Mahila Samakhya is financed by India's central government and overseen by a committee
comprised of central and state government officials. Crucially, it is an autonomous organization that
has formal recognition within the state while also enjoying the flexibility to determine its own
internal procedures and strategies for carrying out its mission. Mahila Samakhya technically falls
225 Interview with local NGO, Lalitapur District, Uttar Pradesh.
226 As the 1986 National Policy on Education declared, "The empowerment of women ispossibly the most criticalpre conditionfor
the partiipation of girls and women in the educationalprocess."
227 Mahila Samakhya began as a pilot in three states (Uttar Pradesh, Gujurat and Karnataka), in a handful of districts
having low rates of female literacy and school participation amongst girls. The agency is now active in nine states,
covering 12,000 villages across 60 administrative districts of India. Mahila Samakhya Uttar Pradesh operates in 4,700
villages spread over seventeen districts of the state, and has a network of more than 4,300 women's groups.
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under the Department of Education in Uttar Pradesh and aids in the implementation of critical
programs for disadvantaged girls. Instead of pursuing the policy targets enforced by public officials
in Lucknow, Mahila Samakhya operates according to a different set of norms and objectives.
Norms governing Mahila Samakhya promote participation among local field staff and village
women's groups, encourage communication and interrogation of the rules and hierarchies, and
encourage flexibility in the interpretation of policies.
Notwithstanding its formal autonomy from the rest of the state, Mahila Samakhya's
deliberative approach to governance has often put it at odds with other public agencies. While the
organization has received accolades in the media for the work it has done, particularly in the domain
of girls' education, the Department of Education has come in conflict with Mahila Samakhya over
how it conducts its internal operations. As a senior official within the education bureaucracy
explained:
Mahila Samakhya UP has done a lot, but still lots ofgaps remain. You can't segregateyourself
from the mainstream system. The government's education scheme providesyou with aframework to
elaborate on and experiment. But the point is thatyou need to implement things as per the scheme.
Don't deviate from the scheme.2
The 'scheme' this official was referring to had to do with policies surrounding an alternative schooling
program for out-of-school girls. The Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya (KGBV) scheme, as it is
officially known, targets girls from disadvantaged communities who have dropped out of school and
provides them with a special, residential education program for two years. In its implementation of
the KGBV scheme across select districts of UP, Mahila Samakhya had, in the bureaucracy's view,
'deviated' by not applying official standards related to school infrastructure, teacher hiring
procedures, and the like.
At a more mundane level, Mahila Samakhya staff would often question what they interpreted
as the 'rigid' policies and procedures of the state, raising the ire of officials inside the bureaucracy,
who were not accustomed to such norms. Meanwhile, officials in Mahila Samakhya, the legalistic
norms of the education bureaucracy stifling:
Resistance is very stiff to the way we work. In the state ofice we are here networking with
Government agencies, trying to orient the bureaucracy about our work. We have to interact with
people at different levels throughout the administration. At times we are able to get support from a
District Magistrate, who might personaly just want to support innovations. But then maintaining
their support is never easy.229
Although intermittent conflicts would erupt at the state-level, more often the conflict with public
agencies would occur at the local-level, in the course of carrying out field operations. Through its
district-level field offices, Mahila Samakhya oversees a network of (largely Dalit) women that come
from disadvantaged backgrounds. It organized the women into associations (mahila sanghas). As
Mahila Samakhya's local staff have attempted to guide and support the women's associations to
organize and make collective demands on the state, conflicts with local district officials have often
taken place.
228 Interview with senior official, Department of Education, Uttar Pradesh.
229 Interview with Senior Official, Mahila Samakhya Uttar Pradesh.
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Consider the Midday Meal program operated by Mahila Samakhya. As part of a government
order, Mahila Samakhya was given official charge of running the school lunch program through its
women's groups in thirty villages in each of twelve districts across the state. At the start of the
program, conflicts often would take place between the women's groups and the school headmaster
and gram pradhan of the village panchayat. In some cases, school headmasters would not cooperate
with the women in charge of cooking the school lunches. They would arrive to school late and fail
to provide the daily student attendance numbers on time, which would lead to delays in cooking.
But when local field staff would report such cases to local officials, they were usually turned away.
The district head at one of Mahila Samakhya's field offices put it aptly when she said, "They [local
administration] have a problem with us because we don't bow infront of them."
The failure to observe officials rules and hierarchies was taken as an affront by local officials,
evidence that Mahila Samakhya was operating according to another set of rules. Moreover, the
agency's official status as a separate women's empowerment program within the education
bureaucracy did not confer it authority within the state. As a local official in the education
bureaucracy put it brashly during an interview: "Mahila Samakhya... What is this Mahila Samakbya?'
We are not required to work with them. They have no standing within the state."2 3 ' The problem, as I detail
later on, was not merely that Mahila Samakhya was organizing Dalit women against traditional
gender norms and caste hierarchies. That too was a challenge. But even more than that, Mahila
Samakhya's field staff did not adhere to norms within the local education bureaucracy. They failed
to follow appropriate the rules and hierarchies governing the system. Having developed a more
deliberative, participatory approach to organization, Mahila Samakhya had effectively rejected
legalism. By normatively segregating itself from the rest of the education bureaucracy, the agency
became an outcast within the state.
5.6. Nested Cases of Implementation
In the previous section, I established the presence of legalism within the education
bureaucracy of Uttar Pradesh. I showed that officials across the bureaucratic hierarchy adhere
tightly to official rules and procedures while upholding organizational hierarchies. Further, I
explored how civic actors outside the state understand and respond to legalism. This section now
turns to a series of case studies demonstrating how legalism within UP's education bureaucracy leads
to the implementation outcomes in Uttar Pradesh. They offer fine-grained evidence for how
legalistic norms influence bureaucratic behavior across a variety of contexts and situations, how civic
actors respond to these behaviors, and how the combination of bureaucratic and civic action leads
to various outcomes of interest.
The cases examined here analyze the following three implementation problems: (1) school
infrastructure planning and provision, (2) the Midday Meal program, and (3) the functioning of
schools and educational services. The cases are drawn from fieldwork conducted within the state,
district and village. I analyze the mechanisms through which bureaucratic norms generate outcomes
for each case, and test those mechanisms against alternative hypotheses. Specifically, I analyze the
230 Focus group discussions with women's groups in multiple districts of Uttar Pradesh.
231 Interview with local official, Saharanpur District, Uttar Pradesh.
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role of (1) particularism and capture by the political system and (2) public apathy brought about by
social divisions and caste inequalities. Once we take account of these alternatives, bureaucratic
norms continue to show their impact over policy implementation.
5.6.1. School Infrastructure Provision
In this sub-section I examine the problem of school infrastructure planning and
provision, which is overseen by the State Project Office for SSA. Opening new school
buildings might appear relatively straightforward, especially in comparison to more complex
tasks such as monitoring school teachers and ensuring the quality of educational services.
However, we should not be quick to dismiss the challenges public agencies face in expanding
school infrastructure. Government schools in rural Uttar Pradesh have long been politicized
spaces (Kingdon and Muzammil 2003). They are typically the only government buildings
within walking distance of a village, and serve as prime local real estate for holding "official"
meetings between the village panchayat and other state functionaries. Crucially, they also
operate as voting booths for elections. For these reasons, dominant upper caste groups
historically exerted influence over the placement of government schools, even if their own
children may have attended private schools. Meanwhile, the habitations that truly needed
schools were often the last ones to receive them.
Central government programs like SSA gave state officials significant resources to
help undo the historical inequities associated with uneven school placement. With a
dedicated SSA project office in charge of infrastructure provision, independent of other
divisions, the education bureaucracy in UP also had the autonomy to carry out school
infrastructure expansion with presumably less interference. A former State Director for SSA
in Uttar Pradesh described the benefits of having a separate project office that was free from
other subdivisions of the education bureaucracy:
Planning under SSA has taken a project mode, almost like an autonomous organiZation. That
organikational divide has protected us from the routine politics facing the Department of Basic
Education, allowing us to focus on the development side. The Directorate [of Basic Education] has
kept up that part of the routine. And to our benefit, we have been insulatedfrom various political
demands. That space has been criticalfor planning We could stay busy expanding infrastructure
without being bogged down by systemic issues.23
As this senior official pointed out, the organizational autonomy enjoyed by SSA planners
gave them the space to concentrate efforts on infrastructure expansion. The adherence to
divisional boundaries helped shield bureaucrats in charge of infrastructure expansion from
the routine pressures facing other subdivisions of the state.
Yet the organizational autonomy experienced by the SSA State Project Office did
not translate down to the local level, and officials in Lucknow were well aware of that fact.
In villages across UP, upper caste groups continued to exert influence over school placement
decisions. To provide marginalized communities with access to primary schooling, the local
232 Interview with former State Project Director, SSA, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh.
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bureaucracy would have to find ways to circumvent the pressure of dominant groups.
Another senior official within the SSA State Project Office described these local challenges:
Providing socially disadvantaged groups access... now that is always a tough issue. The fact lies that
the elementary school is not only place of learning but also the election booth. And that has always
played a very crucial role in planning--which village, majra [section] and basti [hamle] to target.
These things are vey politically decided The entire system is politicied, down to the gram pradhan
[village council head.
While recognizing the continued influence of local village politics, the same officer stressed the
importance of official rules and procedures in school infrastructure planning. The strict adherence
to these rules was understood as the bureaucracy's first line of defense against outside interference.
According to the SSA policy framework, and more recently, the Right to Education Act, every
village is required to have access to primary schooling in accordance with certain criteria regarding
school distance and child population size. For example, villages are required to have access to a
primary school within 1 km distance.
The strict interpretation of schooling "needs" based on the official criteria allowed the
education bureaucracy to plan school infrastructure expansion efficiently. However, senior
bureaucrats were wary of the possibility that local bureaucrats would be unable to carry out school
construction in accordance with these criteria. As one official explained:
From the point of view of SSA, providing access to education is the only relevant issue, and as long
as we can show that a habitation has the needfor a new school building, then our requirements for
planning are met. At the grassroots level, my guess is that politics still plays a veg important role.
But we avoid that at the planning stage by sticking to our own needs-based assessment.
The narrow interpretation of needs within the planning process allowed officials to bypass any
discussion or debate around what the actual needs facing particular regions or districts may be. A
similarly strict adherence to official criteria characterized the process for charting the progress of the
local bureaucracy. Senior officials applied a standardized checklist to monitor district-level
performance and match (reported) outcomes against administrative goals and targets.
According to senior bureaucrats, the review of official targets at regular intervals provided an
efficient way to determine how well infrastructure development was taking place across the state. It
also provided a means to evaluate the performance of local officials. A senior bureaucrat in the SSA
State Project Office described how his office carried out performance appraisals:
We check to see if what they [local administrators] tell us about the schools is correlated with the
oficial data. We ty to make the evaluation objective. We say to the district oficers that, ifyou
visitedfory schools over the last month, show us the record and outcome of those visits. We have
made a targetfor the BSA [Distridt Education Oficer] andABSA [Block Education Officer] to
visitfory schools per month. Twelve officers multiplied overforpy schools meansfour hundred and
eighty school visits per month in each district. And the outcomes need to be appropriately
233 Interview with senior official, SSA State Project Office, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh Lucknow234 Senior Official, SSA State Project Office, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh.
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documented andforwarded to us. Based on that assessment, we can say that 15-20% are doing
excellent work, 15-20% are doing badly, and rest we consider average, or medium, quali y.23
Instead of adjusting the evaluation process to the varying conditions across regions and localities,
senior bureaucrats applied of a uniform set of standards to all 71 districts of the state. Officials took
that to be a "rational' approach to implementation, and a more "objective" and "fai/' basis for
evaluating performance. These observations at the state level compel one to ask: how far down the
chain of infrastructure development does legalism travel? How do local bureaucrats carry out the
provision of school infrastructure given the realities of local politics? Even senior officials in
Lucknow were skeptical that the strict, "needs-based" approach they took for planning school
infrastructure expansion corresponded to ground realities.
To further assess the mechanisms of implementation, the analysis now moves to the local
level. Does legalism carry forward to influence the behavior of local bureaucrats as they implement
school infrastructure projects? Or alternatively, do the particularistic pressures of local politics in
UP lead to bureaucratic capture? Recall from the earlier discussion that existing scholarship suggests
that the particularism in cientelistic settings like UP undermine the implementation of universal
policies like primary education. According to that view, public agencies are effectively captured by
clientelistic politics, which redirect public resources like infrastructure projects to their constituents
(Keefer and Khemani 2004; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Within UP, targeted programs like the
Ambedkar Village Scheme are thought to reinforce particularism based on caste and obstruct the fair
and even delivery of public goods. How does the legalistic portrayal of the bureaucracy, which
suggests that public officials adhere strictly to rules and procedures, square against the dominant
discourse of particularism and capture?
To test the theoretical mechanisms of legalism against the hypothesis of political capture, I
conducted fieldwork in two very different districts of Uttar Pradesh: District Saharanpur and
District Sitapur. Saharanpur is a wealthy district in fast-growing agricultural belt of Western Uttar
Pradesh, which is close to New Delhi. It is also a political stronghold of the BSP and its party chief
Mayawati. Sitapur, meanwhile, is a much poorer district in central UP that is closer to Lucknow,
the state capital. Political control in Sitapur is divided evenly between the BSP and its competitor,
the Samajwadi Party (SP). A summary of district socioeconomic indicators is presented in Table 5.7
in the chapter Appendix. Contrary to the image of capture, evidence from local-level fieldwork
across these two districts reveals a more complex dynamic. While the particularistic pressures of
caste politics set constraints on what public agencies can do, local bureaucrats appeal to official rules
and procedures to assert their authority over process of school infrastructure development.
When planning school infrastructure projects, officials in both districts adopt a strict
interpretation of rules and procedures, overriding the demands of local communities. The
adherence to the official "needs-based" criteria, allows local officials to eschew community
involvement, and the politics that comes with it. As an official from Saharanpur explained:
Our infrastructure targets come from above [the Education Department]. For new schools, we must
ensure that each school is at a maximum 1 km distance from the village and serves a child
population of no more than 300. Sometimes the gram pradhan [village council headl tries to push
235 Interview with Senior Official, State Project Office, SSA, Lucknow.
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us to build the school closer to his supporters and interfere with our inspections, but we have our
norms to stand by, andfor that we have the backing ofthe Department.2 11
As this official pointed out, village leaders often try to influence the placement of schools. They
may even try to capitalize on school infrastructure projects and pilfer funds. To encourage
community participation over school placement invites unwanted interference in the process. The
close adherence to official standards allows the bureaucracy to work around community demands.
That is not to say that local agencies do not face political interference. As part of local-level
fieldwork, I examined how bureaucrats responded to the particularistic requirements of the
Ambedkar Village program while implementing school infrastructure projects. The Ambedkar
Village Scheme is characterized by many as a prime example of particularism, by which the pro-Dalit
party captures public goods provision by redirecting infrastructure projects in favor of its political
base (Jeffrey, Jeffery et al. 2008). The Ambedkar Village program may "capture" influence school
infrastructure development in two ways. First, the policy requires certain school facilities, such as
girls' toilets and school boundary walls, to be provided to schools located in politically designated
Ambedkar Villages on a first priority basis. Second, the policy calls for additional monitoring of
village infrastructure and inspections of school facilities within these villages, again on a priority
basis.
The political pressure to target Ambedkar Villages with school infrastructure may appear to
be a textbook case of capture. However, local officials in both districts assert bureaucratic authority
over the policy's implementation. They do so by interpreting the policy legalistically, treating it as
just another, narrow criteria to follow alongside SSA's standard criteria for school infrastructure
development. The room for bureaucratic control over what theoretically should be a politically-
controlled process stems in part from the practical realities of implementation. In practice, the list
of priority villages is quite long, and gets updated annually, providing space for the bureaucracy to
make its own decisions. As part of my fieldwork, I collected the Ambedkar Village list for the
previous three years (2007-2010) from local authorities in District Saharanpur. For any given school
year, the list covers between 1,000-1,500 villages. In many cases, primary schools on the Ambedkar
Villages list meet the education bureaucracy's own criteria for infrastructure development under
SSA. The practical overlap allows the bureaucracy to apply its own narrow interpretation of "need"
on top of the Ambedkar Village list. As one official explained:
For school building improvements, we are given afull list of villages to inspectfirst, which includes
the Ambedkar Villages. We can also take proposalsfrom the village pradhan as well, but only
after our norms are met. In the end, the work has to be done according to our norms. On this we
don't budge. 23 ,
The same official went on to describe the Ambedkar Village scheme in similarly legalistic terms. In
his mind, it was not a program to assess and improve public infrastructure for Dalit communities 23 ,
but instead, a narrow directive for the bureaucracy to pursue infrastructure development without
236 Interview with local education official, District Saharanpur, Uttar Pradesh.
237 Block Education Officer, Department of Education, Saharanpur.
238 In fact, from my fieldwork it is not clear that the Ambedkar Village Program actually targets Dalit communities as
advertised. I matched the Ambedkar Village list provided to me by local authorities in District Saharanpur with India
Census data. Based on the matching, I found that the average Ambedkar Village in District Saharanpur had a SC
population of 26 percent, not a majority of Dalits as the official version of the policy declares.
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having to consult the panchayat, local communities or civic agencies. With that narrow mandate in
mind, local officials in the education bureaucracy have used the Ambedkar Village Program as an
opportunity to concentrate further authority in their own hands, conducting school inspections and
targeting infrastructure according to the "official needs" of SSA.
Consider the case of Rajori, an Ambedkar Village located approximately 25 km from
Saharanpur district headquarters. Village infrastructure in Rajori had recently been upgraded at the
time of fieldwork, including new village footpaths and electrical poles. The primary and middle
schools in the village also had good infrastructure: large, freshly painted classrooms, clean kitchen
sheds and a working water supply. A specially designated girls' bathroom (balika sauchalay) was
newly built, and according to several female students at the school, was in full working order.
Rajori's primary school headmaster described recent monitoring visits by the local bureaucracy:
We receive monitoring visits from officials about once a month. Sometimes it is from within the
Education Department, but it can be oficials from other departments as well... The school boundary
wall and girls' bathroom were recently constructed under the Ambedkar Village Scheme. Anyone
can come at any time to inspect us. It is time-consumin& and takes away from our teaching time,
but it also keeps us on our toes. They [the monitors] are especially concerned to know whether the
girls' bathroom is working.2 1
Both teachers and the village gram pradhan credited the local education bureaucracy for initiating
the infrastructure improvements at the school. According to the school headmaster, the Ambedkar
Village program had initiated an "inspection regime" in which local bureaucrats would pay routine visits
to make sure the infrastructure was at par with official standards. Yet these official inspections were
not confined to Rajori. Participant observation with local officials along with fieldwork conducted
in non-Ambedkar villages at some distance away from Rajori revealed that the local bureaucracy had
carried out similar school inspections in those villages as well. For example, during my stay in
Pundail, an interior village not too far from Rajori, I observed local officials from the education
bureaucracy make routine monitoring visits on the same days that they visited Rajori, inspections
that led to the construction of girls' bathrooms in Pundail's primary and middle schools as well.
One might suppose that the implementation of these infrastructure projects and school
inspections was simply the result of political pressures from BSP leadership in Saharanpur. Given
the high concentration of support for the BSP within the district, including Mayawati's own electoral
constituency, Saharanpur occupies a most-likely setting within UP for the bureaucracy to be
responsive to political pressures. To test whether local political domination by the BSP was driving
these behaviors, I conducted similar fieldwork in District Sitapur. As I mentioned before, Sitapur is
a much poorer district that is politically split between the BSP and the Samajwadi Party (SP), its
main political rival in UP.
In District Sitapur, the local education bureaucracy was instructor to prioritize the
construction of boundary walls and conduct follow-up inspections in primary schools based in
designated Ambedkar Villages. Yet there too, the local education bureaucracy took a narrow
interpretation of the SSA mandate and applied it to the school infrastructure and monitoring
directives of the Ambedkar Village program, overriding the particular needs or demands of local
communities. In some cases, after seeing the boundary wall constructed, local leaders based in
239 Primary school teacher, Saharanpur.
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Ambedkar Villages would make demands for additional infrastructure. As a local official from
district headquarters in Sitapur recounted:
The pradhan of Khanpur [an Ambedkar Village] caught hold of us as we were approaching to
assess the school's bounday wall He started making demands asking for an additional hand
pump and classroom, even though the school had the fullfadities. I explained that we have strict
guidelines for all school infrastructure. Even the bounday wall I told him was being provided only
after an assessment by the [education] department.2
For this official, the "assessment" of school needs came not from the community itself, but from
the official directives of the state. School inspections, according to him, were an opportunity to
impose "order" on the chaotic demands of local communities. In some cases, however, the rigid
adherence to official norms and mandates led the bureaucracy to impose an order that failed to meet
the legitimate infrastructure needs in schools. Take for instance the case of Primary School Arthana.
On my very first visit to the village, construction had been taking place for new bathrooms at the
primary school. The school teacher, Mr. Dubey, greeted me outside and explained how the local
bureaucracy came to "assess needs" at the school:
The local officials came and told us that girls' bathrooms were being implemented across the block
and that our school was on the list. I showed them that we had bathrooms in place, built by the
gram pradhan. Instead, I explained that we needed a boundary wall to protect the schoolfrom all
the animals and vehicles that would cross through the mainyard. There is a backlog for the
boundary wall' they told me, because Ambedkar Villages hadfirstpriority. In the meantime, we
were told to have the girls' bathrooms built.2 11
In fairness to local officials, the original set of bathrooms in Arthana was in desperate need of repair.
Based on that criterion, the decision to upgrade the bathrooms may have been justified. More
importantly, however, the narrow interpretation of need-based policies by local bureaucrats led them
to pursue school infrastructure development in a uniform manner without local input.
Nearly eight months after my initial visit, a boundary wall had been built for Primary School
Arthana, though Mr. Dubey was no longer teaching there. According to local officials in Sitapur,
the wall had been initiated after an assessment based on a later round of inspections for the
Ambedkar Village Program. Like SSA policies, the Ambedkar Village policy in Sitapur provided
another means by which the local state could impose a legalistic order over the implementation
process. Schools that "needed" girls' bathrooms would get them, whether or not that corresponded
to local demands, and boundary walls would get built, but only when the local bureaucracy identified
a requirement on its own.
The above findings offer little evidence of outright capture of the local state. Public officials
working in these two very different districts carried out the task of school infrastructure provision in
similar ways. In both cases, officials took a legalistic approach to infrastructure development,
adopting a narrow interpretation of "needs" as part of planning and inspection. To be sure,
particularism in UP's political system has set important limits to how fair and consistent a legalistic
bureaucracy can be. Schools that were not on the Ambedkar Village list are likely to have missed
240 Interview with local official, District Education Office, Sitapur, Uttar Pradesh.
241 Interview with primary school teacher, Sitapur, Uttar Pradesh.
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out on necessary infrastructure improvements. Yet the dominant metaphor of capture does not
adequately describe the nature of political influence over the bureaucracy. Local public agencies in
UP adopted a narrow, legalistic interpretation of the Ambedkar Village Scheme and carried it out as
part of their official mandate for infrastructure development under SSA. Particularistic constraints
notwithstanding, bureaucrats have implemented school infrastructure expansion with remarkable
consistency across an exceptionally large and diverse state.
5.6.2. Midday Meal Program: From Lucknow to Langra
The above case study analyzed the mechanisms through which UP's education bureaucracy
has carried out school infrastructure projects. Contrary to expectations, public official effectively
worked around particularism, abiding by official rules and procedures to carry out a remarkable
school expansion. We also saw that particularistic pressures set certain limits to what the
bureaucracy could accomplish. In this section I turn to the task of service delivery, specifically the
delivery of midday meals. In contrast to school infrastructure expansion, which requires
comparatively little community input, the Midday Meal program demands repeated interaction
between public agencies and local communities. As I find, however, the bureaucracy's legalistic
approach to implementation dampens the participation of parents, particularly within the context of
entrenched social inequalities and exclusionary practices based on caste. Local public agencies are
unable to support marginalized groups in their efforts to monitor the school lunch program, which
leads to irregularity and poor quality in service delivery. Instead, local agencies tend to reinforce
social inequalities based on caste and gender, which further disempowers marginalized segments of
society. The case highlights the mismatch between legalistic norms, which promote a rigid
application of rules, and the
Senior officials within the state are cognizant of the many problems that plague the Midday
Meal program in UP. From the pilferage of food grains to cases of children falling sick from rotten
food, local media across UP has shown no mercy in its coverage of the program's failures. Yet how
officials in Lucknow understand the "problem" of implementing the Midday Meal program, what
the policy is and what actions it demands of them sheds light on the mechanisms through which
public agencies in UP marginalize citizens in the implementation process. First, in a pattern much
akin to infrastructure provision and regional planning, the Midday Meal program in UP is again
governed by a separate sub-division of the state that has little practical interaction with the rest of
the education bureaucracy. In fact, officials in the Midday Meal program office do not understand
their roles in terms of education policy at all. As one of the senior officials in the office helped
clarify for me:
The administration of the Midday Mealprogram... it is basically afinandal management scheme.
The state government (our office), gives the funds to the District Magistrate (DM), who is the nodal
officer at the local level And under him, the Basic Shiksha Adhikari [District Education Office],
he is the real person responsible. Andfor that he has his own team."
242 I call it a "metaphor" of capture because studies of cientelism often assert state capture without demonstrating it
empirically.
243 Interview with senior official, Midday Meal Program, Uttar Pradesh.
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Effectively, officials in Lucknow have interpreted the policy as a financial hand-off from the state
office down to district headquarters. Once the hand-off is made, local district administration was
placed in the drivers' seat and officials in Lucknow were there tally the results of implementation on
the ground. Beyond the financial transaction, the Midday Meal Program also carried a set of rules
that had to be enforced:
The Government of India (GOI) provides strict norms for the Midday Meal Program. There has to
be a kitchen shed, which is financed through a one-time grant of Rs. 60,000. Also, there must be
containers for the food, utensils, etc. Then cooks must be hired at the local level We don't need them
to be full time cooks, but we do require hygienic conditions. 4
The interpretation of the policy in terms of financial transfers and the application of rules
concerning infrastructure, cooking supplies and "hygiene" were essentially the same terms that local
officials used when discussing the policy. Unlike their counterparts in Lucknow, however, they had
to attend to the trials and conflicts around the maintenance of hygiene and other such matters,
which took place at the level of the panchayat, village and primary school. Senior bureaucrats,
meanwhile, were wary of the reliability of information they received regarding the actual position of
the Midday Meal program:
How do we know how many students are actualy availing of the MDM? We have designated a
school, block and district-level Midday Meal register. Student attendance is filled by teachers, so
exactly along those same lines we have our own school-level register.2
These data carry much of the same problem as all other official school data. They call for the
"dance" that I described in previous section, where public employees, starting with the school
teacher, all the way up to the IAS official who heads the division, have to adjust the numbers to
meet their requirements. Problems with the Midday Meal are further complicated by the fact that
school teachers and the gram pradhan of the panchayat, who officially oversee the program, have
opportunities to collude. A common story across UP is the inflation of the Midday Meal attendance
registers by teachers and the gram pradhan, who work "hand-in-glove" together to siphon food grains.
Another senior bureaucrat working in the Midday Meal Program office explained what he thought
needed to be done to address that problem:
Problems take place at the panchayat level because there is no computeriation. Right now we get
the information from the district electronically. However, the actual information goes this way:
[drawing in my field notebook] 'Village & Block 4 District 4 State.' So we get the data on a
monthly basis. But we arefaing problems here because the 'real' data we are unable to get. Once
we are able to get this information at the village level, then the scheme will run better.246
For officials in Lucknow, the problem of implementing the Midday Meal program effectively
is essentially a problem of information. Even with the decentralized planning model under
SSA, gaps in implementation can take place, particularly between the nodes 'Village 4
Block'. As the official explained, once transactions across those two notes were digitized,
244 Interview with accountant, Midday Meal Program, Uttar Pradesh.
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then many of the problems facing the Midday Meal program would correct themselves.
Decentralization, in its ideal form, meant digitization.
Yet even with digitized information fed by each panchayat to the state office,
problems may well continue. If the school headmaster and pradhan had opportunities to
collude when providing hand-written forms to the block-level official, what was preventing
them from colluding while entering data directly into a computer? The task implementing
the Midday Meal program involved determining what was actually taking place inside village
primary schools and responding to that information in real time. That is precisely why such
programs were placed in the hands of local communities:
Unless the scheme is communiy owned, it can't run. The Government can ty to push only so far.
But the communiy has to take ownership. Unless and until the communiy takes ownership, it
cannot be successful.24,
Yet the understanding of "community" here was again narrow. What officials in the Midday Meal
Program office meant by "community" was not the plurality of social groups in a UP village, with all
their attendant conflicts. Instead, they were referring to a particular local agency, the official Village
Education Committee, and that too, not the entire "committee" but the village pradhan, who was
officially head of the committee, and the one community member whose signature on the Midday
Meal register was required for local officials to complete the transaction, and thus, discharge their
duty:
Wherever local parficpation is strong, by that I mean the pradhan, there the Midday Meal is
running beautifully. Cooking utensils, high qualiy food grain, and other requirements are all there.
If the Pradhan is very active, then it means a lot. 24
However, activating the pradhan in the appropriate way was not a straightforward matter, and
certainly not something that could be done from Lucknow. Moreover, as others in the office had
pointed out, collusion between the pradhan and headmaster was a persistent problem. When I
asked state officials what had to be done in cases where the school teacher or gram pradhan did not
cooperate with local officials, they offered legalistic solutions. As one official explained:
The Supreme Court made a clear norm that teachers should not be involved in MDM. All of it is
left to the village Panchayat or SHGs [Seff Help Groups] ... The MDM should be implemented via
the panchayat, who can then delegate responsibilities to SHGs.. .If they face any problems with
Midday Meal, then in each school we have painted on the wall the contact numbers of the District
Coordinator and Basic Shiksha Adhikari [District Education Officer]for the communiy to
call.249
Their suggestion opened the door to several questions and possibilities. In cases where a problem
came up, did the "community" call the relevant officials? Do local agencies respond to SHGs,
women's Self Help Groups that were given the task of overseeing the Midday Meal? How was a
typical response carried out, and what did it consist oP Having exhausted the governance resources
247 Interview with senior official, SSA State Project Office, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh.
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of the Midday Meal Program office in Lucknow, I followed the implementation of school lunches
further down the chain of governance.
Consider the case of Langra, one of the villages where I conducted fieldwork. The primary
school in Langra had been having problems with its Midday Meal Program. As part of a recent
government order, Mahila Samakhya, the quasi-public agency I introduced earlier, had been given
the mandate to implement the Midday Meal Program through its women's groups in select villages.
The women's group in Langra had recently taken charge of the program. One afternoon, I arrived
at the primary school in Langra to find the headmaster along with the other teachers visibly irked by
a women's group, which they felt was a breach of their control. Ironically, the same set of teachers
had previously complained to me the Midday Meal program took time away from their teaching.
Meanwhile, parents in Langra explained to me problems they had been facing with the Midday Meal
program in their school:
Sometimes the children tell us they have not gottenfood or that it was too much less.. .Meanwhile,
we see the headmaster invites hisfriends to play cards and they all eat the food"
As the women's association recalled during one of our focus group discussions, the headmaster
would often inflate the student attendance register, diverting the extra food for his friends and other
visitors. When the women's group took over the program, Mahila Samkahya's field office explained
to them the official policy of the state, which required student attendance records to match the
official register of food grains and other inputs used for meal, which could be inspected at any time
by the local bureaucracy. Still, the women, who were Dalit and mostly illiterate, had to rely on the
headmaster to provide the official attendance figure each day, which was then used to ensure that
the correct amount of grain was being applied for cooking the meal.
Illiteracy did not prevent the women from keeping a check on the headmaster. Some had
their children, who were enrolled at the school, count the student attendance each day, which they
could then match with the official figure provided by the headmaster. They found that was
continuing to inflate student attendance records, having the women make extra bread (chapatis),
which he would then serve to his visitors. Unwilling to participate in the headmaster's scheme, the
group devised their own plan to retaliate. Instead of making extra chapatis that would go to his
friends, they starting using the same amount of grains to make thicker chapatis, which they provided
to the school children to enjoy during lunch.
Notwithstanding their attempts to subvert the headmaster, the women were at a significant
disadvantage. The headmaster, who knew how to navigate the official system, lodged a formal
complaint with the local bureaucracy against the group for mismanaging the Midday Meal and
maintaining "unhygienic" conditions. He enlisted support from the gram pradhan, who was also
head of the Village Education Committee (VEC), the formal village body for primary education
recognized by the state. When officials came to inspect the school, the pair had the evidence ready
to support their case. The women's group struggled to explain that the headmaster had been
inflating the daily attendance register. Their poor literacy and lack of confidence in speaking to a
public official made it difficult for them to present their case convincingly. Unable to reach a final
verdict, local officials from the education bureaucracy left the women's group with a stern warning.
250 Focus group discussion with parents in Langra.
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That experience was enough to discourage the women from calling the local bureaucracy
back again. Meanwhile, the headmaster took matters one step further, and with support of the
panchayat pradhan, lodged a case against the women's group for cooking the Midday Meal under
"unhygienic conditions." Given the backlog facing the local judiciary, the case would not be heard
for several months, and in the meantime, a judicial stay order was placed against the women's group,
effectively removing their official authority over the Midday Meal. The women's group had the
option to file a complaint against the headmaster, which would have been in line with the approach
to community governance that bureaucrats in Lucknow had envisioned: "If there are any problems with
MDM, in each school we have painted on the wall the contact numbers of the District Coordinator and BSA
[District Education Officer]for the community to call"
The women's group made a courageous attempt to try out that approach. They protested at
the district office of the local education bureaucracy. They even pointed out that the headmaster
was discriminating against them based on caste, as he had organized group of upper caste residents
to file complaints against the Dalit women. Yet even in District Saharanpur, where Dalits have
unrivaled political representation within the state, claims about casteism did not carry weight outside
the formal judicial system. To claim caste discrimination, they would have to file an official case was
lodged against the headmaster. Meanwhile, the school headmaster, who was familiar with the ins
and outs of the official system, knew how to frame his complaint regarding poor hygiene with the
local bureaucracy, and also had the confidence to pursue legal recourse against the women's group.
Rather than engaged in a lengthy legal proceeding that they understood little about, the women's
group decided to drop the matter and focus their attention on other pressing issues in their village.
The situation in Langra might appear to be a straightforward case of upper caste domination
in a highly unequal society, which in many ways it was. The practice of caste inequality and
exclusion within rural UP society has shown little sign of retreat. To find poor Dalit women
marginalized by upper castes is hardly surprising. Yet the actions and omissions of the local
bureaucracy in Saharanpur were not merely a consequence of structural inequalities. Indeed, in the
case of school infrastructure projects, the local bureaucracy often exerted itself over upper castes,
overriding their demands. Nor was it necessarily the case that all local officials were personally
biased against (Dalit) women's groups. Though some may have held such attitudes, participant
observation and interviews with the local bureaucracy in Saharanpur suggested otherwise. Some
bureaucrats even expressed a positive disposition towards the women's groups. In the above case,
the block-level official who oversaw Langra Primary School was strongly infavor of having women's
groups participate in the Midday Meal program:
Ifyou ask me, the Midday Mealprogram under Mahila Samakhya has gone well The women are
doing agoodjob. But what happens is that the competing par goes against the Dalit women, and
they know we have strict rules covering the Midday Meal, so that becomes the locus of their political
battles.251
By the officer's own admission, the women's groups organized by Mahila Samakhya were effective
in implementing the Midday Meal program. Personally, she preferred working with them rather
than the gram panchayat and Village Education Committee, as they had stronger ties to the Dalit
community, which utilized the primary school. Most of the women in Langra's women's association
had children attending the primary school, which raised their personal stakes to ensure the food was
251 Interview with local education official, Saharanpur District, Uttar Pradesh.
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properly cooked. Notwithstanding her positive disposition, however, norms within the local
bureaucracy encouraged a rigid adherence to official rules and hierarchy. In the case of Langra, she
had to answer formal complaints that the meals prepared by the women's group were "unhygienic."
The rules regarding hygiene came straight from Lucknow, and their strict enforcement was
considered paramount within the bureaucracy:
We are told to go through all the registers. But the most emphasis is on the Midday Meal. The
Midday Meal has become god... news of any problem goes straight to Delhi now, or it goes directly
to Lucknow... The quality of the food isfrequenty bad, and so we are told to inspectfor hygiene.2 12
Yet the issue of "hygiene" in rural UP is more sensitive than meets the eye. In the case of Dalit
women cooking the Midday Meal, it immediately draws in the currents of caste, and the rituals of
purity and pollution that come with it. For the school headmaster and panchayat pradhan at Langra,
local support to combat the women's group on the grounds of "hygiene" was not difficult to gather.
By village norms, the food cooked by the women's group was anyhow ritually polluted to start with,
and upper caste groups were willing and able to mobilize collectively around that when local officials
arrived. The women's group in Langra might have tried discussing the various issues at hand with
the local official, how caste and gender dynamics in their village worked against them, but that
would have required her do something very different from just applying the rules. The same local
official in charge went on to describe how a similar case had unfolded at another primary school:
I received the complaint [about the Midday Meal] one afternoon at 3:30pm. Igot to the school by
4pm. The lentils (dal) were sitting in a bucketfilled with maggots. When I inspected it more
closely, it looked like someone had thrown the maggots on top. I doubt women could have done that.
But the school headmaster and gram pradhan want to remove them [the women]from the school,
and they find ways to seize control And as officers, ourfirstprioriy is to enforce the rules.53
Legalism, as this official articulated it, curtailed the range of possible actions that she could take.
When it came to areas of policy like the Midday Meal, which involved community dynamics within a
highly unequal society, a strict adherence to the rules did not permit her to pursue the kinds of
actions that may have helped the women's group effectively monitor the Midday Meal program.
Neither could she attend to the special needs facing marginalized communities nor bend policies in
their favor. Following the norms of the local state, she had to enforce the judicial stay on the
women's group until a decision was reached in court. The outcome for Langra, according to many
parents interviewed, was the ongoing pilferage of the Midday Meal program by the school
headmaster and panchayat pradhan.
Before moving ahead, let us reconsider a plausible alternative explanation for the outcomes
observes. Perhaps it was not legalism within the state that produced poor implementation of the
Midday Meal program, but capture by members of the dominant, upper caste community. In
contrast to school infrastructure projects, which were largely under the control of the bureaucracy,
the Midday Meal program appears to be far more embedded in local communities, making it well-
nigh impossible for any bureaucracy to intervene effectively. Given the realities of social exclusion
and inequality across villages in UP, it would be hard to reject the hypothesis that dominant groups
exert control, if not outright capture, over the Midday Meal program. However, that these findings
252 Interview with Block Education Officer, Saharanpur District, Uttar Pradesh.
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are drawn from District Saharanpur, a high growth region that is also the political epicenter of Dalit
politics and a stronghold of the BSP, makes it difficult to overlook the bureaucracy's inability to
implement the program more effectively.
Yet the bureaucracy's legalistic approach to implementing the program seems not to have
worked against elite domination. Senior bureaucrats in Lucknow, who oversee the program, take a
very narrow understanding of "community" monitoring. As one official put it: "The best is if the
community monitors the program itself Second best is inspections.' By "community," this official meant the
pradhan of the panchayat. In villages of Uttar Pradesh, however, "community" oversight implies
local conflict, and the Midday Meal program is just one of its many sites. In its legalistic
interpretation of the policy, the education bureaucracy is unable to recognize and respond to the
conflicts underlying service delivery.
While this case helps us understand how marginalized citizens are disempowered by a
legalistic state, it still raises some important questions. Can we attribute patterns of poor service
delivery to norms governing the education bureaucracy? Or, are these outcomes the result of social
divisions and inequalities in UP, divisions that, many argue, impede sustained collective action and
generate a culture of "public apathy" around public services (Dreze and Sen 2002)? The next and
final case study takes on the "public apathy" thesis by analyzing more closely the mechanisms
through which legalism within the state affects policy implementation at the village level.
5.6.3. School Dysfunction in Pundail
The implementation outcomes in Pundail reflect the broader pattern observed in
Saharanpur: good physical infrastructure yet very poorly functioning schools with low student
retention. The case provides an opportunity to trace these outcomes back to specific behaviors
undertaken by bureaucratic and civic actors. I selected Pundail as a case study village because it was
precisely where one might expect social divisions to produce public apathy around primary
education. A village highly fragmented along caste and economic lines, the study of Pundail also
provides an opportunity to analyze the role of social inequality and local caste politics in more detail.
As the findings demonstrate, notwithstanding local collective action and political representation by
the BSP, legalistic norms within the local state marginalized the majority Dalit community in the
village, contributing to the dysfunction of primary schooling in Pundail.
Located five kilometers off the main artery connecting Saharanpur to the adjacent district,
Muzaffarnagar, the long, windy road leading to Pundail (pop. 2,500) had yet to be finished. Though
not the most far-flung village, at about 30 km from district headquarters, it was not an easy place for
bureaucrats to pay frequent monitoring visits. With the nearest bus stop was an hour by foot,
reaching Pundail took some effort. Socioeconomic inequalities combined with highly fragmented
caste composition made Pundail a highly unlikely candidate for local collective action around
primary schooling. The village had a large population of Dalits (550/), Brahmins (20%), a handful of
Baniyas (merchants) and multiple OBCs (Lohar, Kumhar and Saini).
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Each of these groups lived in a separate section or neighborhood (mohalla) and had its own
place of worship. The upper caste temple, the oldest in the village, was frequented by Brahmins and
other upper castes, and was also the original site of the first local school. OBCs, meanwhile, had
built their own temple near a lake at the opposite end of the village. Dalits, who were barred from
entering either place of worship, had recently built their own temple, which bore a photograph of
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on the gate outside. Finally, the village also had a few lower caste Sikh (sardar)
families who had migrated relatively recently from Punjab, and were in the process of building a
temple (gurudwara) for their own religious community. Within each category were multiple sub-caste
groups.
Layered on top of caste divisions were growing socioeconomic inequalities. Pundail's
economy centered on agriculture, mostly sugarcane and wheat production; local farms supplied a
large sugar mill close by. The more affluent, upper caste landowners had their wealth on display
with large, newly renovated houses and flashy motorcycles. Some boasted working in service
professions, including a handful clerks, school teachers, a policeman and a lawyer. Meanwhile, most
Dalit families had marginal landholdings and relied on physical labor to earn a living. The men
worked as mechanics (mistrees), specializing in hand pumps, a village trade that had been passed on
across generations. They travelled near and far in search of maintenance work, going as far as Delhi
and other major cities. The women, meanwhile, stayed inside the village, performing most of the
agricultural labor while at the same time managing the household.
Social distinctions across caste groups were most visible in the domain of education. The
wealthiest families were educating their children in large private schools located in the market areas
outside the village. Each morning, their children would stand outside dressed and ready-ties and
slacks for the boys and sweaters and skirts for the girls-as they waited for their daily conveyance to
and from school. The remaining upper caste families as well as some OBCs were sending their
children to the local Saraswati Vidya Mandir, a private school that Mr. Sharma, an educated
Brahmin, ran (illegally) inside his home. Among the lower castes, some Dalits (particularly the
Chamars) were sending their children to a state-assisted private school bearing Dr. B.R. Ambedkar's
name. Run by two local high school graduates, the school was held inside a barn. The most
disadvantaged families were sending their children to the government primary school, a clear marker
of low status.
Social divisions in Pundail were so intense that even private schools were partitioned along
caste lines. Upper caste parents were eager to tell me that their children were studying under the
tutelage of the village Brahmin. Only a few relatively wealthy Dalits were educating their children at
the school. Most of their children attended the Ambedkar private school, which they clearly
identified as their own. In a village that took no more than ten minutes to cover by foot, clear
geographic lines had been drawn separating the different communities. As one father put it:
"Children from here go to this school, and children from that neighborhoodgo to that school." Meanwhile, there
were divisions even among Dalits. The Ambedkar school was attended mostly by the Chamar caste,
the most dominant Dalit group in western UP. The Balmikis, meanwhile, refused to send their
children to the "Chamar school," instead preferring to send their children to a private school outside
the village. Pundail thus had all the trappings of social fragmentation that the literature associates
with public apathy and neglect.
Still, it was unclear why the government primary school was hemorrhaging students. First
established in 1955, the school had undergone several renovations as part of SSA, including a brand
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new school building, two additional classrooms, a kitchen shed and bathrooms, which were
completed by 2006. The building had freshly painted walls, running water and working toilets. It
even had an entry ramp for disabled children to access the building. The newly built government
middle school also had excellent infrastructure, with a large playground and cricket field that was
well-protected by a boundary wall. The gram pradhan, who had overseen the renovations at the
primary school, credited the local education bureaucracy for providing the Village Education
Committee funds and guidelines on how to carry out the building improvements. Yet student
enrollment was on the decline. School teachers complained of having to artificially inflate the
enrollment registers to fend off criticism from the local education bureaucracy, who came every now
and again to conduct inspections.
Though it had vastly superior infrastructure, the quality of teaching at the government
primary school was by all accounts abysmal. The absence of learning was evident from the fact that
fifth grade students could not complete elementary, double-digit addition problems that I posed to
them in class. The school had three teachers-one headmaster along with two para-teachers, who
did most of the teaching. It became clear from my visits each day that only the para-teachers
engaged in teaching, while the headmaster spent most of his time basking in the sun. On some
occasions, he would arrive to the school drunk, barely able to maintain his balance while riding
through the village on his bicycle. Pundail had a Village Education Committee to address such
issues, but like in so many villages across UP, it rarely met. Few parents I interviewed were aware
that the committee existed, and those who did know about it anyhow felt the government system
was beyond repair. As one parent from the Dalit community explained:
Just look at the condition of the primary school There is no education happening at all And
people here don't raise their voice. Anyone with means (Yugar) has taken the private school option.
Ourfamiy doesn't have any land and we can't afford the private schoolfees. We are just sending
them [the children] to the government school out of compulsion. Many are sending their children to
the Ambedkar school, but even that place is no good Those with money educate their children in
private schools outside of the village. The big contractor who lives back there, he can afford to send
his children to private school because he receives government contracts for his work.
Conditions were so bad that many parents chose to send their children to very low quality private
schools. Students at the Vidya Mandir school sat on the ground in highly cramped conditions,
without even a blackboard to follow the daily lesson. Conditions at the Ambedkar private school
were even worse. Children there were sprawled across a barnyard, sitting on strips of cloth (taat-
patti) thrown on top of hay and manure. With the growth of private school options, there appeared
to be little motivation to organize collectively around primary education.
Yet a closer examination of Pundail's history reveals that the onslaught of private schooling
was quite a new phenomenon. Prior to that, the village had a history of collective action around
education. Well before SSA policies went into effect, most of residents had completed their early
childhood education at the local primary school itself, from day laborers to the more highly educated
service professionals in the village, including the gram pradhan, Mr. Gupta. The original primary
school building was first established in 1955; community members provided their own resources,
255 And that too knowing full well that I was visiting the school as part of a study on primary education. From what I
could glean, drinking among government school teachers was apparently common in Saharanpur. Residents I met from
several villages across the district reported a similar state of affairs in their primary schools.
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including land, labor and funds to build and maintain it. The middle school in Pundail, formally
recognized in 2006 under SSA policy, stood next to a much older, now decrepit structure that
community members constructed on their own many decades prior. A group of Dalit laborers
recounted how the middle school in Pundail first came to be:
Our middle school has a long story behind it. A Harijan [Dalit] girlfrom our village had been
married off to someone in Muaffarnagar... She was killed and herfamiy received money from the
government on her behalf They wanted to use the money to build a school in her memoy, so
everyone in the village came togetherfor that. Some of the more wealthy people [bade log] donated
the landfor the school, and we [Dalits] helped construct the building... The school started out on a
temporay basis, but eventually it caught on. Eachfamiy donated some money to hire teachers and
maintain the school's upkeep. And like that, the middle school went onfor manyyears in the same
building.256
The middle school in Pundail ran informally for close to two decades, with virtually no
governmental input. Problems of aging infrastructure and makeshift teaching arrangements became
apparent over time, and community members came together to seek support from the local
bureaucracy. To improve the quality of schooling, they needed regular, trained teachers as well as
building repairs and improvements. Community members took turns writing letters and visiting the
local education bureaucracy in Saharanpur. As the gram pradhan of Pundail recounted:
For a while the middle school ran without any oficial recognition, and we saw the problems with
this. Students faced difficulties with the teachers being irregular. Sopeoplefrom the village got
together and made a big effort in Saharanpur to get regular teachers. But the Education
Department could do nothing for us. They told us that the school was unrecognized by the
government and it was not their dut y to provide teachers. Instead of receiving help we were sent away
with a warning. Because the school was running informalLy we could get in trouble f oficers came
for inspections.257
After several unsuccessful attempts to gain support from the local bureaucracy in Saharanpur,
efforts to upgrade the middle school lost steam. The school eventually gained official recognition by
the state in 2005, and the school building was upgraded under SSA soon thereafter. Even to
accomplish that, local residents recalled having to travel as far as Lucknow to demand provision of a
new building. Because the original school was unrecognized, and the local bureaucracy did not have
any official policy in hand for upgrading previously unrecognized school buildings, officials in
Saharanpur were wary to provide new infrastructure without official clearance from Lucknow. By
the time any tangible results came out from these collective efforts, families of means in Pundail had
already removed their children from the village school system and began sending them to larger,
more established government institutions at the district center.
Residents in Pundail had yet another path available to them: democratic institutions. And
notwithstanding an otherwise bleak picture, they showed a remarkable capacity to overcome the grip
of social fragmentation and divisive caste politics. They voted across caste lines to support Mr.
Gupta, an unlikely candidate for gram pradhan. A well-educated lawyer belonging to the tiny Baniya
community of Pundail, Mr. Gupta was determined to improve conditions in his village. By contrast,
256 Group discussion with village residents, Pundail. Uttar Pradesh.
257 Interview with panchayat gram pradhan, Pundail, Uttar Pradesh.
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the previous pradhan, who belonged to the majority Chamar community, earned a reputation for
getting houses built for himself and his close supporters. He also ran a large liquor stand.
Going against the pressure of caste-based voting, many within the Chamar community chose
to support Mr. Gupta, as they felt he was a fair man and more qualified to get things done for the
village. Their efforts bore fruit, as the Mr. Gupta had new village footpaths built and sewers cleaned
up during his first year in office. He also moved to install new bathrooms and hand pumps
throughout the village. A resident from the Chamar community expressed the general sentiment
towards Mr. Gupta:
As far as pradhansgo, the Baniyapradban is a good guy. The Chamarpradhan wasn't helping
anybody except for himself and his immediate family. He didn't do anything for the village. The
new pradhan is better educated, and he's done more for the village. He had a brick lane (kharanja)
built throughout our hamlet. He also got the sewage lines (nalas) cleaned out, and new bathrooms
built.258
Even though the Chamars held a majority of votes in the village, residents across caste groups were
keen to point out that they supported the Baniya pradhan because they felt he was better qualified.
Mr. Gupta's efforts in improving village sanitation were recognized through an award, the Rashtriya
Nirmal Gram Puruskar, conferred by India's Total Sanitation Campaign. With the award, Pundail was
named a "Clean Village" (nirmalgram), one that was free from the scourge of open defecation. Many
took pride in the achievement.
When it came to panchayat elections and village infrastructure projects, residents of Pundail
showed little sign of public apathy. To the contrary, they took an avid interest in local politics and
displayed a high degree of vigilance around the upcoming elections. Yet they also expressed a sense
of futility with regards to local democracy. Beyond getting some classrooms renovated, the village
panchayat did not appear to have much effect on the quality of primary schooling in Pundail. The
notion that "our vote doesn't count," was a common refrain during conversations with residents,
regardless of caste or socioeconomic position. As one father explained during a group discussion:
Village elections have nothing to do with education. They are about handing out booze and
drinking. The public here isn't motivated by things like education. And there's a reason for that.
On the one hand the government says 'Abolish Poverty" (Garibi Hatao), but then it does nothing
to help us get out of it. There is no value to our vote.2 9
Rather than improving matters, many felt that local elections were a nuisance, as they tended to
divide people, promote alcoholism and other social ills. As I observed firsthand during the run up
to India's national elections in 2009, party workers from across the political spectrum in Saharanpur
would each set up liquor stands in or around villages prior to elections. Women in Pundail were
particularly outspoken against the menace of a locally-produced country liquor (kaccha daru), which
had come to plague the village. There were several ongoing cases of domestic violence in the village,
a phenomenon that appeared to be on the rise during election time.
258 Interview with village resident, Pundail.
259 Group discussion with men, Village Pundail.
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Perhaps the nature of the public good or service in question is what mattered most. As the
literature on social fragmentation suggests, caste divisions tend to hinder collective action around
universal public services like education. Village footpaths and toilets, meanwhile, are more like club
goods, which can be divided across groups. Moreover, given the social status attached to school
choice, perhaps the educational arena was by its very nature too divisive to generate cooperation
across social groups. Yet the history behind the middle school shows that residents in Pundail
possessed the capacity to engage in collective action around education. Contrary to what the
literature on social fragmentation might suggest, even in the face of intense caste divisions, public
apathy was not the natural order of things.
Residents in Pundail continued to organize collectively around education during my
fieldwork. It had become apparent that students at the middle school were unable to compete with
their private school peers in critical subjects like math and science. Since neither of the two teachers
allotted under SSA had the appropriate educational background to teach these subjects, a group of
parents came together to draft a proposal to the local bureaucracy requesting additional teachers.
Sitting alongside a group of residents, Mr. Gupta recounted their collective efforts:
For some time we only had one teacher. After we made countless demands, they transferred one
additional teacher to the school We sent further requests to the Basic Shiksha Adhikaari [District
Education Office] for math and science teachers. Infact, Ipersonaly wrote letters to officials from
the District Magistrate all the way up to the Education Minister... T hey told us that there is no
poliy to guarantee math and science teachers... By now they have stopped responding to our letters.
Ifyou ask me, there is no will to implement education policies in a way that truly benefits people.
The Departmentjust wants to show that World Bank funds are being properl utililed26
The move to obtain additional teachers at the middle school was still underway in Pundail during the
course of fieldwork. Even parents sending their children to private schools were involved in the
effort. Many I interviewed lamented having to spend money to send their children to private
schools when a perfectly fine government school with brand new infrastructure and trained staff was
just a stone's throw away from their homes. While some felt that collective action to press the state
could still be worth a try, their expectations were dampened. During interviews with a local official
who conducted school inspections in Pundail, I learned about the challenges she faced in responding
to local needs:
The children in Pundail really want to study. During my school visits, they will often say to me,
'Please send us a mathematics teacher!' But there is no specialprovision for that, and I cannot
make an accommodationforjust one school... It was hard enoughjust getting their middle school
fully recognized after it ran informaly for so long.'
Unable to make an exception for Pundail, she felt it was only a matter of time before the wealthier
families exited the system. Still, disadvantaged residents continued to come together again to
improve conditions at the primary school. Pundail had an active women's association that
participated in literacy campaigns and worked to advance girls' education. Organized in the early
1990s by a local NGO, the association had twenty members, most of who belonged to the poorest
Dalit households in the village. Well before SSA policies were enacted by the state, the group took
260 Interview with panchayat gram pradhan, Pundail, Uttar Pradesh.
261 Local education official, Saharanpur District, Uttar Pradesh.
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on numerous barriers to education within their community. For example, they helped organize
residents to abolish the illegal fees that school headmasters would charge during the annual exam
period.
With the arrival of SSA policies, the women's association in Pundail took a renewed interest
in monitoring primary schooling. Members of the group would take turns visiting the primary
school to check whether school teachers had arrived on time. They would also monitor the Midday
Meal Program, checking to see that the food was healthy and nutritious before it was served to the
children. In light of their previous interest and involvement at the primary school, the women's
association was given the opportunity to manage the Midday Meal as part of the Mahila Samakhya
program. Two members from the group would visit the school each day to cook and administer the
meal, which gave them ample opportunity to observe the school headmaster's behavior. Yet their
ability to address critical problems facing the primary school, particularly poor teaching quality and
student retention was limited. As the head of the women's association recounted:
The education at the primary school is nil The headmaster shows up drunk. Sometimes he even
drinks at the school You can see foryoursef .. He keeps apawwa [quarter-measure] with him in
his office. Our group tried to get him to understand that this is wrong. Eventually, wegotfed up.
We locked the gate of the school one morning until he agreed to stop. But instead, he threatened to
call the Education Department and have our cooks removedfrom the Midday Meal.2 12
Underlying these difficulties were prevailing norms of casteism. In a pattern similar to other cases I
observed across UP, non-Dalits in Pundail were not pleased to learn that the women's group was
involved with managing the Midday Meal. Many families I interviewed felt it was an affront to
village caste norms. A father from the Nai (barber) community, whose children were attending
private school, engaged me in a conversation about local customs:
Father: Kids belonging to higher castes would obviousy not like the food cooked by those
women... Look, you are a Baniya. Nowyou tell me, wouldyou eatfood made from the hands of a
Chamar? Wouldyou drink their water?
Me: Well, things are very different now, espetialy in the cities...
Father: Yes times are changing in cities, but in the village these traditions still matter.
Facing the insults of upper caste school teachers and families head on, the women's association
continued to administer the Midday Meal. They even used their precious group savings to finance
the meal for the first two months, purchasing food grains and fuel, and paying the cook's monthly
salary. Delays in reimbursement were common a problem with the Midday Meal program; several
school teachers I interviewed complained of having to cover the first month or two of the program
from their own pockets. However, unlike government school teachers, the women did not enjoy a
public salary to keep them afloat. Seeing their hard earned group savings fast diminishing, they
decided to visit the local education bureaucracy in Saharanpur to request that payment be expedited.
They would have to wait to receive funds, they were told, just like everyone else. These experiences
reminded them that the local state was not working on their behalf.
What options were left for the disadvantaged in Pundail? According to officials in the local
education bureaucracy, parents had the recourse to file a formal complaint against school teachers
262 Interview with women's association head, Pundail.
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who were not performing their duties. The complaint system allowed either a guardian of a child or
village official to file a written order against a teacher, after which an investigation would be
launched by the local administration. Yet rarely did they find parents using the system, except on
occasion for the most egregious circumstances, such as cases of sexual abuse. As one of the officials
explained:
Iget calls all the time that teachers are coming late or not showing ... the teachers here are fully
into politics. But we have a complaint system in place for matters like these. Of course if we see
something wrong happening we can act on the teacher right there and then. But if the parents are not
going to ipeak up, then how can we take action against someone? The parents have to take some
interestfirst. They have to comeforward and take responsibiliy.2 11
For these officials, the failure of parents to "take responsibility" was reflected in their not utilizing
the complaint system the state had in place for them. Meanwhile, for the parents belonging to the
Dalit community in Pundail, the idea of going ahead with a formal complaint against the primary
school headmaster was practically a nonstarter. By and large, parents expressed a sense of fear over
what might happen if they did file a complaint. Some were hesitant to speak out about the
headmaster in public, as they believed their children might endure the brunt of his reaction later,
through mistreatment in class or even physical abuse. Moreover, they explained to me, when
educated, upper caste residents led by the gram pradhan-a man who in this case was a legal
advocate and familiar with the administrative system-could not overcome bureaucratic hurdles in
the past, then what could they as illiterates expect to accomplish now?
Neither did Dalit parents see democratic politics as a viable mechanism for pressing the local
education bureaucracy to act against the headmaster. Some called attention to the fact that they had
an active BSP party worker living among them in the village, whose daughter also happened to be
enrolled in the government primary school. Yet even he was unwilling to file a formal complaint or
pursue the matter through his political network. As a pair of sisters in the village joked, "He says
'Bhenji, Bhenji' all the time...but what has his Bhenji been able to do about it? Nothing at all, 264
Although many Dalit residents of Pundail felt that Mayawati's political ascendance provided
them degree of recognition (pahchan) within India's political space,6 few expressed the belief that
the BSP was working to improve the quality of public goods and services within their village. Some
pointed to changes happening outside the village, such as the establishment of a new police precinct
in the market center nearby and a secondary school for girls bearing Mayawati's name. Yet beyond
the school's symbolic value, most Dalit parents in Pundail felt that their children would not likely
benefit from the school. Still others pointed out that Mayawati was dealing with the same unequal
structure (dhancha) inside the state that they had to face in Pundail.
The case of Pundail provides a grounded view of the social and political realities facing local
public agencies. It also calls attention to the gross mismatch between the norms governing those
agencies and the task of implementing universal primary education. The mechanisms behind the
persistence of school dysfunction in Pundail can be traced back to the interaction between
263 Interview with local official, Department of Education, Saharanpur, Uttar Pradesh.
264 "Bhenji,"meaning "sister" in Hindi, is the popular name given to Mayawati by her supporters in Uttar Pradesh.
265 As one Dalit father expressed to me over a conversationO, "Now itfeels like we ar also someone [of worth] berr... this space is
also for us."
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entrenched social inequality and the local education bureaucracy's legalist approach to
implementation. Even after several significant bouts of local collective action, the bureaucracy was
unable to adapt policies to meet the needs of Pundail's Dalit families. In carrying out a strict
interpretation of the rules, local bureaucrats effectively dampened their collective voice. As one
member of the women's group put it to me, "The [Education} Departmentjust doesn't recognir.e us. We
have no standing in their eyes."
A cynical reading of the events that unfolded in Pundail might suggest that public officials
were indifferent to the needs of marginalized communities. Yet the findings presented based on
participant with the local education bureaucracy in Saharanpur, presented throughout this chapter,
demonstrated quite the opposite. A more likely explanation is based on the governing the local
education bureaucracy, which promote strict rule following, discouraging officials from attempting
anything beyond that. The same local official who could not provide a math teacher for the school
in Pundail shared her experiences of trying to work outside the rules, particularly alongside school
teachers:
In my last posting, I took the most good-for-nothing (nalayak) teachers and tried to motivate
them... the ones who are most influenced by local politics in Puvarka [administrative block]. I
worked with them, and through them we helped improve their schools. And we got the best work
done together. But for this the Department showed no appreciation. This kind of work doesn't cany
any value. What matters are the oficial duties, the physical school building register, the attendance
register, andfollowing the processfor SSA. But this other work isjust seen as 'extra' and we get no
recognition for doing it.2 6
The same official went on to describe the scant emphasis her office placed on the "quality" aspect of
universal primary education, and the risk that, with the growth of privatization, the poorest students
would not be able to keep pace with their peers. She then recalled how recently the official target
provided by the SSA State Project Office for school distance had been changed from 2 km distance
to 1 km: "I would say that this is a good step. The problem is that now the school is built infront of his house and
kid isn'tgoing. And we are not able toface thatfact." While we should not expect every local official in UP
to display the same degree of initiative as this one, bureaucratic norms are unlikely to help advance
such initiative.
7. Alternative Explanations
The findings above demonstrate that bureaucratic norms governing public agencies in Uttar
Pradesh have contributed to the poor yet mixed performance of the state in implementing universal
primary education. To complete the analysis, however, we must account for additional factors that
can explain the poor, though somewhat mixed, outcomes for policy implementation in UP. As I
mentioned at the start of the chapter, there are variety of explanations that can account for poor
implementation in UP, which make it a least-likely case for our analysis. However, some of these
explanations face a difficult time accounting for the changes that have taken place in UP, especially
in the area of school infrastructure development.
266 Interview with local education official, Saharanpur District.
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Perhaps the most obvious explanation for UP's poor performance in education is its low
levels of income and relatively slow economic growth. Similarly, poverty has persisted at a much
higher rate in UP compared to the rest of India. Yet it is important to recognize that UP was not
always among the poorest states in India. As Kohli (2012) notes, UP's economic performance
during the colonial period was about average and the economy continued to perform respectably up
until the 1990s, after which time investment declined considerably. While we cannot dismiss the
importance of economic development, the fact that several Indian states, many of which were
historically poorer than UP, have moved ahead in terms of social indicators, suggests the limits of
the economic explanations for poor governance (Dreze and Sen 2002).
Another plausible explanation for poor implementation in UP has to do with its historical
institutions, in particular the institution of Iamindari. Zamindari is a system of revenue collection
imposed by the British, which gave upper caste landlords (the 1amindars) full authority to impose
taxes on cultivators and landless peasants. Although the stronghold of upper castes in UP broke
down considerably in the decades following Independence, especially with the rise of middle caste
farmers who benefitted from India's Green Revolution policies, Iamindari continued to form the
basis for highly exploitative economic relations well after the institution was abolished, giving rise to
social conflicts whose impact continues to be felt today.267 Some find that districts that experienced
-amindari under British rule have continued to show lower levels of public goods provision several
decades later, as recently as the 1990s (Banerjee, Iyer et al. 2005).26' However, the historical
inequality in public goods access has also declined considerably over the last few decades, suggesting
that history does not fully dictate the future (Banerjee and Somanathan 2007). Although it would be
a mistake to discount the pernicious effects of Iamindaii, particularly in exploiting lower caste groups
abetting social conflict in rural UP, it cannot account for the abysmal quality of education today.
With the mobilization of lower caste across the state, the political changes in UP have been nothing
short of remarkable.
Others argue that the divisive nature of caste politics in UP led the state to underinvest in
social policies like education and health, and that underinvestment explains UP's lagging educational
performance (Dreze and Gazdar 1996). There is no denying that UP's low investment in areas like
education and health have contributed to the state's woeful record of social development. However,
given the increasing role of India's central government in the sphere of primary education, the
resources and policies made available to UP have exceeded what the state has been able to utilize
effectively. Still, the observation that divisive caste politics has led to weak political support for
education is important to bear in mind. Even with the mobilization of traditionalized marginalized
voters, none of the political parties in UP have taken up education as a public issue (Pai 2002;
Mehrotra 2006).
267 Although Zamindari was abolished immediately after Independence, upper castes landlords continued to wield
significant authority at the local level. Maintaining the support of landed elites was the dominant political strategy for
Congress and other political parties in UP, which in turn, contributed to poor implementation of land reforms, further
reifying their local control (Kohli 1987).
268 At the same time, the study also finds a high degree of convergence across Indian districts in the provision of public
good.
269 Starting with the World's Bank's UP Basic Primary Education Program (UPBEP) back in the early 1990s, UP has
been the recipient of relatively generous external and central government programs. As Kingdon and Muzammil (2009)
note, the problems of equity and efficiency in policy implementation far exceeds the problem of financing.
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Insofar as the UP state lacks the political will to see universal primary education
implemented, the education bureaucracy may be irrelevant. Yet the political will argument raises the
further puzzle of why UP has been relatively effective in expanding primary school infrastructure,
and that too in accordance with the requirements of India's Right to Education Act. Without some
role for the bureaucracy, the remarkable growth in access to primary schooling would be hard to
imagine. That said, the failure of UP's education bureaucracy to achieve anything beyond improved
access may well have political roots. Moreover, as I showed in the case of infrastructure expansion,
in the case of policies that have been proposed by UP's political class, such as the Ambedkar Village
Scheme, the bureaucracy can still exert influence over implementation.
The alternative explanations analyzed here help us understand why education remains within
UP remains so stubbornly difficult to implement. They do not, however, fully account for when and
how positive outcomes emerge. To understand policy implementation within UP, we must factor in
the bureaucracy. Yet one may still question whether the outcomes observed within the UP context
can be explained by norms within the bureaucracy, or perhaps the norms are themselves part and
parcel of a political system that undermines the quality of service delivery. Could a bureaucracy
governed by a different set of norms produce better results in UP? I take up this question in the
next section, where I explore the case of Mahila Samakhya, an agency that offers an alternative
model for policy implementation. Although the lessons from this case study remain tentative, they
can point to the bureaucratic paths through which educational service delivery can effectively reach
even the most marginalized communities within UP.
5.8. Mahila Samakhya: Exploring an Alternative Model
The cases we examined previously show how legalism in UP's education bureaucracy shapes
implementation. The analysis so far leaves open the question of what an alternative path for
bureaucratic agencies within UP might look like in practice and achieve. Could public agencies
governed by a different set of bureaucratic norms generate better outcomes for the delivery of
educational services within UP? I probe this question through the case of Mahila Samakhya's
KGBV program. As I discussed earlier in the chapter, the Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidayalay
(KGBV) program is an initiative under the central government's SSA policy to provide alternative,
residential schooling for girls from disadvantaged backgrounds who have dropped of the regular
school system. Within UP, Mahila Samakhya manages 33 KGBV schools, while most of the
remaining 746 KGBV schools are run by the state.
5.8.1. An Island of Deliberation: Mahila Samakhya's KGBV School Program
Mahila Samakhya's KGBV school program has gained wide praise from the local press and
India's central government. 27) The program has been exceptionally well-implemented, with student
enrollment up to full capacity, high rates of completion, and strong quality indicators. This is a
remarkable achievement given that the girls come from the most disadvantaged backgrounds. In
270 See, for example: "Full marks for changing lives," http://infochangeindia.org/education/stories-of-change/full-
marks-for-changing-lives.html.
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participants observation conducted in four KGBV schools located in three districts across UP
(Mathura, Saharanpur and Sitapur), I found well-managed, highly-functioning residential learning
environments. As a participant observer, I found the students confident and highly engaged, and
the residential teachers and staff worked with dedication.271 Interviews and focus group discussions
with parents also revealed a rate of satisfaction among families. In its recommendations to the
central government regarding the KGBV program, a consortium headed by India's preeminent
educationists declared "There is a need to adopt the gender sensitive approach of Mahila Samakhya to the
KGBV schools." 2,2
What has not been examined as closely is the norms governing Mahila Samakhya in the first
place, which helped produce the "gender sensitive" approach to its KGBV program. As I show
here, the outcomes associated with the program can be traced back to the norms that guide action
within the agency and shape its relations with parents and local communities outside the agency.
Earlier in the chapter, I explained how Mahila Samakhya operates very differently from the rest of
the education bureaucracy in UP. The norms governing Mahila Samakhya are deliberative-they
encourage participation, discussion and collective problem-solving across the organizational
hierarchy. The organization's staff is encouraged to adapt rules, policies and procedures to meet
situations on the ground: "We are constantly planning revising and adapting, so our work stays engaged with thefiled... and in thefield, new challenges keep coming. " While Mahila Samakhya's State Project Office in
Lucknow offers broad policy and managerial guidance, district offices are given the flexibility to
adjust strategies according to varying local needs and contexts across UP. The organization also
promotes constant, upward communication and feedback.
The norms governing the internal operations of Mahila Samakhya in turn shape how it
relates with marginalized communities, and in particular, its network of more than 4,300 women's
groups. Women's empowerment occupies the core of Mahila Samakhya's work at the village-level.
However, field staff do not dictate what empower hast to mean in practice. As a former State
Project Director explained to me:
When we wouldfirstgo into communiy, we would have no agenda. We wouldjust ty to understand
the system within the communiy. If we started talking about gender,' 'education'and 'rights' they
would throw us back out... So we would go there and ty to understand the communi_'y and its needs
first. Suppose they were fadng a water crisis, we would 'enter' through water crisis needs... But each
area has its own needs... In Chitrakoot there's a water crisis. In Bharaich the problem isflood
mana t.273
management.
The same kind of flexibility that is built into the program's community entry strategies continues
later on, well after groups women's groups have been formed. Official policy laid out in the Mahila
Samakhya program calls for the women's groups to organize into "core teams" around each of four
activity areas-education, health, panchayat, and law. In practice, these program areas are
interpreted broadly and are adapted to suit the context within each region and village. At the
regional level, for example, the "law" teams in Saharanpur tend to focus on issues of alcoholism and
271 As a participant-observer in each of the four KGBV schools, I engaged with the students directly, leading classes on
English as well as activity sessions on self-defense and north-Indian classical music.
272 "National Consortium on Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalay: A Visionary Initiative", Department of Women's Studies,
National Council of Education Research and Training, August 11-12, 2008.
273 Interview with former State Project Director, Mahila Samakhya, Uttar Pradesh.
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domestic violence and operate an informal women's court (nari adala) that hears cases at fixed
intervals and makes collective decisions. The "law" teams in Mathura, meanwhile, focus on issues
of child marriage and try responding to cases as they arise on the field through various forms of
persuasion.
Perhaps the best evidence for the existence of deliberative norms within Mahila Samakhya
comes from the manner in which meetings are held and decisions are reached. In sharp contrast to
the routine dismissal of questions and upward communication in UP's education bureaucracy,
Mahila Samakhya's field staff is encouraged to speak up, share ground-level experiences and
interrogate existing policies. In most of the meetings I have attended across the state, local staff
would sit together on the floor in a circle, regardless of official position or rank. After the
introduction of the meeting agenda by a senior staff member, they would each take turns sharing
their experiences from the field, highlighting the program areas that were working, and questioning
the one's they felt were not. The meeting arrangement was no different when senior staff from
Lucknow would come and visit a local office. Nor was it any different when local staff would hold
meetings with the women's groups in a village. Although in villages, hierarchical arrangements can
be stark-few women's groups would permit me to sit on the floor with them, unless I insisted-
the challenge, norms inside the organization encourage two-way conversation between community
members and field staff outside the organization.
Before going any further, it is important to underscore the content of deliberation. After all,
the norms governing Mahila Samakhya do not encourage just any kind of exchange, let alone a
"value-neutral" transfer of "information." Rather, the content of deliberation explicitly promotes
the interrogation of and resistance to traditional forms of power and discrimination, which in rural
UP include patriarchy, casteism and economic inequality. Discussion between field staff and
community members, while initially centered on seemingly harmless and encompassing issues of
"need," such as water, slowly but surely inch their way towards issues of intense social conflict-
child marriage, domestic violence and untouchability. Importantly, the women's groups in Mahila
Samakhya are not conceptualized in the same way as the standard 'Self Help Groups' promoted by
the UP government, which possess a narrow objective of group savings. Rather, they are
understood as "pressure groups," collectivities of countervailing power and resistance.
At the village-level, mahila Samakhya field workers tied the issue of women's literacy to the
real social and economic concerns facing disadvantaged women, from exploitative agricultural wages
to domestic violence. Literacy centers (mahila saksharta kendra) provided mothers (and their
daughters) the opportunity to leave the restrictive confines of the home and discuss in a group their
most salient concerns, which would often involve state policies around issues like local water supply,
childcare and education. These meeting spaces were also used to discuss primary schooling,
provisions like scholarships and free uniforms, participating in student enrollment campaigns and
working to ensure that girls in the village attended school.
In that way, it is critical to distinguish between deliberative norms as they operate in Mahila
Samakhya and formal decentralization. Insofar as formal organization goes, both the education
bureaucracy of UP and Mahila Samakhya are decentralized. In fact, one may even consider the
education bureaucracy to be even more decentralized-it has formally-recognized Village Education
Committees within each school and operates through the democratically-elected village panchayat
system. However, it is the informal processes and content of exchange among and across levels of
organizational hierarchy that distinguish deliberation from decentralization. Within the education
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bureaucracy, as we saw earlier, the content of exchange is quite tapered indeed, reflecting a narrow,
legalistic interpretation of rules, procedures and policies. District officials provide the state office in
Lucknow information about the Midday Meal program, but hardly discuss the local conditions and
conflicts surrounding that information. Within Mahila Samakhya, meanwhile, local staff cannot but
engage with broader issues of geography, gender and caste when discussing the Midday Meal
program with their senior colleagues.
The deliberative norms that guide Mahila Samakhya have helped the organization achieve
positive outcomes in the KGBV program. Consider first the task of student enrollment. Getting
adolescent girls from marginalized communities who have dropped out from the formal school
system to re-join a residential school is among the most difficult tasks within education. They or
their families may have had unpleasant experiences with the formal school system, and they may
have little confidence placing their children in the hands of public agencies. Furthermore, the
reasons for girls not participating in the formal school system can vary across local contexts, making
it more difficult for agencies to identify effective strategies that can be applied universally.
By discussing issues with parents and local community members, Mahila Samakhya's local
staff was able to tailor school enrollment strategies to address varying local conditions. For example,
in one of the KGBV schools in Saharanpur District, local staff identified ways to address the special
concerns facing families belonging to the area's conservative Muslim community. Parents in many
instances had removed their daughters from the formal school after reaching a certain age as they
believed it might infringe on their practice of religion. Field staff in that district identified the need
to interact with male members of the household first and underscore the freedom the girls would
enjoy to practice their religion in school. They also highlighted the school's offering of Urdu
language as an elective subject, which parents found attractive. In some cases, they would even send
female staff members who were Muslim to visit the families and serve as role models of educational
achievement.
Meanwhile, Mahila Samakhya field staff in District Mathura faced a very different set of
sociocultural conditions. There, the reason for girls dropping had less to do with religious practices
and more squarely to do with economic inequalities associated with gender. A persistent problem
affecting the education of disadvantaged girls in the area was the high incidence of "double marriage"
cases. Double marriage is an illegal practice in which families marry both their daughters off at
once. It provides a way for families to save money on costs associated with the marriage ceremony
and payment of dowry, another illegal practice that remains widespread. The younger of the two
daughters, who may be too young to even realize she is being married off, is compelled into the
marital arrangement that requires her to give up schooling.
The Mahila Samakhya field staff and KGBV principal described how their enrollment efforts
required a series of targeted interventions, which involved explaining to parents the illegality of the
practice. During a particularly egregious case in which a twelve year old girl was being married off to
a middle-aged man, the field staff threatened to lodge a complaint against the girls' relatives with the
local police until they agreed to cancel the wedding. The ability for field staff to adapt strategies to
these varying local contexts has enabled the schools to achieve full enrollment.
Mahila Samakhya's KGBV program also provided flexibility to adapt rules and processes
inside the schools themselves. The ability to adjust the program to the needs facing rural girls and
their families helped raise parental participation and reduce the odds that students would drop out.
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As an example, to facilitate greater parental engagement, the KGBV schools in Sitapur District
changed their weekly holiday from Sunday to Monday, which is the day that the local market is
open. That way, parents could make a stop to the market on the same day they came to visit their
daughters, thereby saving an additional journey from their villages and increasing the likelihood that
they could interact with their children and the school's staff. In the words of the school principal:
"We bring the community to the KGBV."274 According to parents, small changes in policies like this
went a long way to strengthen their confidence in program and the education their daughters were
receiving. What were seen as sacrifices on the part of the KGBV staff raised their willingness to
make financial contributions and assist the school in other ways.
While breaking with rules like the official weekly holiday appear rather mundane,
adjustments like that are rare in the standard education system. In other cases, policy adaptation
implied a major break from official rules. In one KGBV school, the students recounted how they
wanted to learn math and science but did not have any teachers available for those subjects. The
district staff took an alternative approach:
We wanted to have allfemale teachers, but our girls demanded subjects like science and math, and
often we can'tfind any. Espedaly in the most educationally backward neighborhoods, it can be
hard. The warden running the school has to be a woman, but in some schools we have accepted male
teachers, though the place of residence for them has to be different.
In light of the value the girls and their families placed on subjects like math and science, Mahila
Samakhya staff carried out a major break from policy. The standard KGBV program run by UP's
education bureaucracy face an acute shortage of math and science teachers for the very reason that
they are unable to find female teachers. The flexibility built into the Mahila Samakhya program,
meanwhile, enabled their district staff to find a compromise that satisfied the needs and desires of
the students and their families.
Last but not least, consider how the norms governing Mahila Samakhya influence the quality
of teaching itself. Officially speaking, policies for recruitment of school teachers for the KGBV
program managed by Mahila Samakhya are no different from that of the education bureaucracy.
They involve an "aptitude" component that include one's academic qualifications as well as a
somewhat vague component on "gender." Within the education bureaucracy, "gender" has been
interpreted narrowly to mean "female." And to its credit, the state has gone to great lengths to
ensure the recruitment of women within the KGBV program. Meanwhile, in Mahila Samakhya's
KGBV program, "gender" is interpreted in more capacious terms to include gender sensitivity and
an awareness of gender inequalities, which the local district staff assess informally during interviews.
After the recruitment phase, teachers in the Mahila Samakhya KGBV program go through
training cycles. Mahila Samakhya officials refer to these as "de-learning," or learning to discard the
standard, "top-down" methods of dictation that characterize teaching across much of India. It is
during these training sessions that new teachers come to experience the organizational practices
within Mahila Samakhya, particularly the strategies of community and gender empowerment and the
forms of upward communication, deliberation, and listening, across the organization. For school
teachers at the KGBV program, beyond the subject matter itself, it is the participatory approach to
274 Interview with School Principal, KGBV School, Mahila Samakhya, District Sitapur, Uttar Pradesh.
275 Focus group discussion with teaching staff, KGBV School, Uttar Pradesh.
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teaching, which involves listening, instilling confidence in the girls, and helping them find their own
"awaaw' (voice), that has helped transform the girls, both in the classroom and outside.
5.8.2 Enabling Factors
The analysis above would be incomplete without consider additional factors that may have
enabled Mahila Samakhya's KGBV program to be so effective. Consider first the role of formal
incentives and organizational structures. Unlike the education bureaucracy of UP, Mahila Samakhya
staff (both state and local) do not enjoy civil service protection and are on significantly lower pay
scales than regular government employees. These incentive differences may, in turn, account for
variation in behavior. While it would be a mistake to deny the importance of incentives, there is
good reason to think that incentives alone do account for the variation across public agencies in
India. Public agencies facing with the same formal incentives structures operate very differently,
which suggests that incentives within the state, while important, are insufficient for explaining
variation in bureaucratic behavior.
Second, the overwhelming majority of non-state agencies working in education across UP
offer nothing close to the pay scales or civil service protections available to public employees, and
yet they too vary significantly in quality. Many employees at Mahila Samakhya would describe the
differences they experienced working in other organizations. As an experienced member of the field
staff from Sitapur put it: "Other NGOs I've worked with do not focus as much on process. Here Ifind an
apnapan [we-ness] in the way we do things."27 From the reports available on KGBV schools managed by
NGOs in UP, there is no evidence to suggest that they perform better than the one's managed by
the state. This raises important research questions around the conditions underlying organizational
performance and the quality of service delivery across both public and nongovernmental agencies.
A second factor relates to Mahila Samakhya's organizational autonomy and human resource
practices. As a mission-driven agency that operated outside of the legalistic stranglehold of the state,
Mahila Samakhya enjoyed the flexibility to recruit and train employees in novel ways. Hiring
procedures were based not only on merit, but an interview process that gauged the commitment and
experience candidates had working in the field of gender and women's rights. Beyond employee
selection, the process of training employees to participate in decision-making was also critical.
To identify effective ways to adapt policies on the ground, employees had to learn first how
to engage in deliberation and joint problem-solving. These were practical skills that many had come
across for the very first time. Here it helps to consider the experiences of employees when they first
joined Mahila Samakhya. The field staff at Mahila Samakhya shared their experiences of having to
"adjust' to the way things were done in the organization. Many recalled having to develop new
"habits ofspeaking' (bolne ki aadal) during meetings, which they little experience doing prior to joining
the organization. These habits developed over time in tandem with the "de-learning' of traditional
methods and habits.
A third factor relates to leadership quality and skills. As with other public agencies, UP's
education bureaucracy was led by senior IAS officers who were trained as generalists that could
276 Interview with local field staff, Mahila Samakhya, District Sitapur, Uttar Pradesh.
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rotate across functional divisions of the state. Meanwhile, the State Project Director for Mahila
Samakhya was staffed by someone with commitment to its mission and specialized skills to carry it
out. It is hard to downplay the importance of these leadership skills, especially given the social
forces acting against gender equality and universal primary education in UP. Mahila Samakhya's
local staff would often point to the leadership and example set by state-level officers, whose
commitment helped carry them through daily struggles in the field. In the traditional education
bureaucracy, meanwhile, top posts such as Education Secretary and State Project Director for SSA
in UP changed very frequently due to reassignment. Over the course of my fieldwork, the officers
in these top positions changed every six months. Leadership instability within the state is a daunting
challenge, though one that is not unique to UP's education bureaucracy. It is a problem across
India, even in high-performing states like Himachal Pradesh.
The observation that leadership can matter does not necessarily challenge the significance of
bureaucratic norms. Insofar as subordinates turn to leaders for cues on how to behave, leadership
may well be a mechanism driving the transmission of norms within an organization. At the same
time, however, for bureaucratic norms to carry the causal weight I accord them, they ought to
persist irrespective of the individual personalities of those in charge. And on that point, I can offer
two pieces of evidence. First, out of last four State Project Directors to lead Mahila Samakhya, two
were public officials selected from within the education bureaucracy. One of them was a senior
IAS officer who at one time was also Education Secretary of UP.
According to Mahila Samakhya's local staff, the alternation of leadership between public
officials and individuals from outside did bring some corresponding changes in the agency's focus,
though significant changes in organizational processes. While they found that leaders from within
the education bureaucracy tended to apply rules and procedures more rigidly, district offices
continued to enjoy flexibility in carrying out their duties. Second, I had the opportunity to observe
the impact of leadership change within Mahila Samakhya as an alternation took place over the
course of my fieldwork. Although local staff reported differences in the leadership style of the new
head, they experienced little variation in how they carried out their work. Having said that, we
cannot rule out that leadership change may affect organizational norms and processes, especially
since as the impact may face a lag. In that case, it may just be a matter of time before more durable
changes in Mahila Samakhya begin to appear.
9. Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to explain UP's poor yet mixed performance in implementing
primary education policies through the lens of legalistic norms. As I have tried to show, bureaucrats
guided by legalistic norms adhere strictly to official rules and procedures, shield the state from local
demands and marginalize civil society participation, which produces inferior outcomes for policy
implementation. Legalism makes it difficult for the state to address in particular the distinct needs
facing marginalized communities that depend on the government school system.
At the same time, the findings also showed that legalism can, within certain limits, produce
positive outcomes for school infrastructure development. In a setting where caste politics runs rife,
the strict adherence to rules and procedures allow local officials to work around particularistic
policies like the Ambedkar Village Scheme. Contrary to our prevailing theories about cientelism
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and bureaucratic capture, public agencies based in very different political settings of District
Saharanpur and Sitapur developed strategies to maintain authority over school infrastructure
development. While they did not achieve complete bureaucratic autonomy, legalism provided some
a degree of protection from outright capture. These findings resonate with other ethnographic
studies of local bureaucracy in UP, which find that public officials appeal to official rules and
procedures as a way to maintain discretion over the implementation process (Gupta 2012).
When it comes to service delivery, however, public agencies in UP were far less capable of
addressing the needs facing marginalized communities. While one may suppose that the Midday
Meal program and educational services were over-determined to fail given the entrenched social
division and inequalities, legalism nevertheless did not provide any mechanisms to mitigate the
domination of privileged groups. If anything, the strict adherence to rules and procedures
advantaged those who already had access to the official system. Moreover, the case of school
dysfunction in Pundail showed that public apathy was not a necessary outcome of social divisions in
the village, but the emergent result over a process of interaction between marginalized groups and
local public agencies. The attempt to engage in collective action around primary schooling was
dampened when these marginalized citizens found that the bureaucracy would not work on their
behalf.
These results may lead one to think that there is no possibility that public agencies in UP
could operate effectively on behalf of marginalized groups. The case of Mahila Samakhya, however,
stood out as an alternative model that offered some promise. In a sea of legalism, Mahila
Samakhya's field staff was engaged in deliberation, both across the organizational hierarchy and with
the target communities. There are, of course, some important differences between the formal
structure of Mahila Samakhya and the education bureaucracy. Yet the norms that helped guide
critical processes of hiring, training and collective problem-solving offered some insights for how a
deliberative approach within the UP context might work effectively.
The adaptive capacity of Mahila Samakhya was built on a process of de-learning, which
effectively meant undoing habits that were inculcated within the traditional school system.277 These
same processes operated inside the KGBV schools that Mahila Samakhya has managed so
effectively, helping to transform some of the at-risk segments of UP's child population. These
findings suggest a relationship between the quality of agencies that deliver education and the quality
of education itself. However, we must still contend with the question of why it was that UP's
education bureaucracy developed norms that militate against such an adaptive learning process,
while norms within HP's education bureaucracy make it far more capable of learning. In other
words, what sets a public agency along its normative path? I take up that question in the concluding
chapter.
277 A similar observation has been made by Freire (1972).
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Table 5.7. District Socioeconomic Indicators
Saharanpur Sitapur Uttar Pradesh
Demographic lndicators?
Population 2,896,863 3,619,661 166,197,921
% Urban 25.8 12 20.8
% Scheduled Caste 21.7 31.9 21.1
% Muslim 39.1 19.2 18.5
Economic Indicators
Income Per Capita 16575 9494 11477
% Below Poverty Line* 24.6 57.5 39
Deprivation Index 37.77 70.55 54.53
Social Indicators *
Literacy Rate 61.2 48.3 56.3
Gender Gap in Literacy 20.9 25.4 26.6
Sex Ratio 868 862 898
Human Development Index 0.6173 0.5143 0.5709
# Census of India 2001
* Uttar Pradesh BPL Census 2002
^Uttar Pradesh Human Development Report
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Chapter 6. Conclusion: Bringing the Bureaucracy Back In
6.1. Introduction
This dissertation analyzed when and how the Indian state implements universal primary
education. The overwhelming majority. of governments, India included, have enacted laws making
primary education universal, free and compulsory. There is widespread primafacie agreement, at the
international level, among policymakers and everyday citizens that states ought to provide children
with a basic education. Many countries declare education a fundamental right. The policy
consensus notwithstanding, public institutions across the developing world continue to face
significant hurdles in securing these rights on behalf of children. While much existing scholarship in
the political economy of development and social welfare has analyzed the conditions under which
governments enact and finance social policies, far less attention has been devoted to the problem of
implementation. What explains the variation agencies vary in their ability to implement universal
primary education? In exploring the above question, this dissertation aims to advance our
understanding of the conditions under which public institutions function effectively, especially on
behalf of marginalized citizens.
The empirical analysis began with an examination of India's policy framework for primary
education and sociopolitical context of implementation. India's large, multiethnic, federal
democracy displays significant subnational variation in the implementation of primary education.
Public agencies operating under the same national policy framework, democratic institutions and
administrative structures, vary remarkably in how well they implement universal primary education.
Conventional wisdom has it that policy implementation, particularly in a sector like education,
should expand with economic development and processes of modernization. Yet upon closer
inspection, we observe significant variation left unexplained by income levels, urbanization and
other conventional variables associated with the modernization thesis. The remainder of the
dissertation analyzed the variation in policy implementation processes and outcomes across three
north Indian states. Based on carefully-selected subnational comparisons and nested case studies,
this dissertation developed an explanation for implementation centered on bureaucratic norms, the
informal rules that govern public agencies, analyzing the mechanisms that shape bureaucratic
behavior and structure state-society relations on the ground.
This concluding chapter's main objective is to review the findings and discuss the argument's
broader theoretical significance and policy implications. The remainder of this chapter goes as
follows. Section 6.2 puts the cases together to summarize the main empirical contribution of the
dissertation. I then discuss both the innovations and limitations of the research methodology
adopted. Section 6.3 engages one particular concern facing the dissertation, which is to establish the
causal primacy of the explanatory variable. The central findings of the study, that bureaucratic
norms influence the effectiveness of public agencies, raise natural questions regarding the origin of
bureaucratic norms. I first consider a plausible alternative explanation based on political culture. I
then go on to explore the political foundations of bureaucratic norms. In particular, I examine the
role of political leadership across the case study states. Very preliminary evidence suggests that the
interaction between political leaders and bureaucrats around the time of state formation, a period
when the unwritten rules of the state were yet to be established, may have helped set in motion the
bureaucratic norms that we now observe today.
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In section 6.4, I discuss the broader relevance and theoretical contribution of the argument
advanced in the dissertation. I examine other cases of policy implementation, first within India and
then across other country and policy contexts, illustrating how a theory of bureaucratic norms can
help illuminate these other cases. The section ends by revisiting the literature on state capacity and
development to discuss how the study of bureaucratic norms can advance our understanding of
states and their capacity to achieve their objectives. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter with some
policy implications that arise out the dissertation.
6.2. Review of Findings and Contribution
When do public agencies effectively implement policies on behalf of marginalized citizens?
More specifically, why, operating under the same national policy framework, democratic institutions
and formal administrative structures, do some public agencies in India implement universal primary
education more effectively than others? The theory advanced in this dissertation draws our
attention to the significance of bureaucratic norms, unwritten rules of conduct that guide the
behavior of public officials inside the state and structure their relations with citizens and agencies
outside the state. In this section I review the main findings of the dissertation, putting the different
cases together. I then summarize the methodological contributions of the project, which arise out
of the subnational comparative approach combined with a multi-level research design. Finally, I end
this section by discussion some important limitations of the dissertation and how the findings can be
bolstered in future research.
6.2.1. Empirics: Putting the Cases Together
Our empirical analysis of policy implementation began in the state of Himachal Pradesh, one
of the top performers in with respect to primary education. Findings based on a combination of
field research methods, including in-depth interviews, participant observation and village
ethnography, revealed the presence of deliberative norms within the education bureaucracy of
Himachal Pradesh. Notwithstanding the same formal administrative structure and procedures,
bureaucrats across the organizational hierarchy learned to work collectively to solve problems and
bend official rules. Local bureaucrats in particular enjoyed the support of their seniors, who
promoted their participation in decision-making. Norms that drove behavior within Himachal
Pradesh also led officials to promote participation from citizens and civic agencies to identify and
solve problems on the ground.
We may have thought at first glance that these "deliberative" norms, as I call them were
simply a reflection of social norms in the Himalayan region, which encouraged interdependence and
cooperation among local communities. However, the comparison with Uttarakhand brought the
differences in bureaucratic norms across these otherwise similar states into sharp relief.
Notwithstanding remarkably a similar geography, social fabric and a history of collective action, a
very different set of norms evolved within the public agencies of Uttarakhand. There, public
officials were guided by legalism, clinging firmly to official rules, policies and procedures. Local
bureaucrats in Uttarakhand were not prompted by their seniors to solve problems by bending the
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rules. Rather, they learned to maintain rules and protect the state from societal groups, the very
same kinds of groups that the bureaucracy in Himachal Pradesh actively promoted.
I went on to analyze a series of nested cases of policy implementation in Himachal Pradesh,
connecting outcomes like school placement and targeting of marginalized groups with special
programs to the participatory behaviors within the bureaucracy. Bureaucrats in HP systematically
adapted policies and bent rules, such as hiring contract teachers for the nomadic Gujjars and
adapting the school calendar around local geography and climate to promote student attendance.
Meanwhile, women's groups like the one in the village Dharmaur learned to work with the state to
collectively monitor primary schooling and make private investments in their schools that
complement state efforts. By contrast, the education bureaucracy in Uttarakhand, which had the
political opportunity to adopt new strategies and attempted to copy the organizational blueprint for
coordinating pre-primary education and health, found it difficult to put these ideas into practice.
Instead, officials sought to tighten the rules and promote official procedures, such as teacher
rationalization and official monitoring. As we saw in the case of Silam Ghat, however, women's
groups that were quite active in promoting early child education were effectively disempowered by
local officials.
Again, upon inspection one may have thought that the variation was driven by the greater
quantity and/or quality of civil society in Himachal Pradesh. Yet the limits of civil society
arguments became apparent once again with the comparison with Uttarakhand, where the history of
collective institutions such as forest councils and social movements like the Chipko Andolan
provided strong evidence for societal capabilities within the hill state. Further, the persistence of
legalism within Uttarakhand after its breakup from UP suggests that, if not bureaucratic norms, then
at least some enduring behavioral mechanism that operates like norms, continues to shape how
public agencies operate. The enduring pattern offers some confidence that what we identified was
norms, and not, for instance, a different set of ideas about implementation, which could presumably
have been adopted at the time of state formation.
Still, one may question whether there might be a larger political process behind the
endurance of legalism in Uttarakhand, which the analysis, based on a cross-section of time, was
unable to identify. For example, it may have been that citizens of Uttarakhand developed different
kinds of political relations to their elected officials, perhaps more like the clientelistic relations that
many suggest obtain in Uttar Pradesh (Chandra 2007). Although we have some reason to believe
that is not the case given the very similar party systems across HP and Uttarakhand, it may be that
the Congress Party and BJP, while sharing the same formal platforms and programs, informally
connect to voters and bureaucrats in different ways across these two states. Nothing short of a
systematic field study of cientelism can truly answer that question.
After analyzing policy implementation across the Himalayan region, our analysis shifted to
Uttar Pradesh, a very different setting from our previous two cases. The study of Uttar Pradesh
helped put the theory of bureaucratic norms to the test once again. An oft-cited case of governance
failure, UP offered the least-likely conditions for effective policy implementations, and yet we
observed some positive change in terms of school infrastructure development, which was not well
accounted for by existing theories. Moreover, unlike the Himalayan region, UP is a setting in which
governance is most often associated with criminal activity and "lawlessness" (Hasan 1994). To find,
then, that public agencies in UP operate in a legalistic fashion, and that too in ways that were similar
to its hill neighbor of Uttarakhand is quite remarkable. Indeed, the only features that Uttarakhand
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and UP share is their political and administrative history, which helps establish that what we
identified were norms and not just a different organizational blueprint for implementation.
The analysis of implementation in UP revealed that public agencies are not mere victims of
capture, but can exert a degree of agency. In the case of the SSA infrastructure development office,
autonomy from other units of the state allowed officials to carry out school expansion rather
efficiently. At the local-level, we saw that the BSP and other regional parties used particularism to
redirect state resources to Ambedkar Villages, which might have been an example of capture. Or if
not outright capture, then certainly it involved political interference over the fair and even policy
implementation. Local officials worked within the bounds of the Ambedkar Village Scheme and
applied rules and procedures to target schools with new infrastructure. In the area of service
delivery, however, the results from Uttar Pradesh were far worse, and in some ways, more
complicated to analyze.
A history of social divisions and entrenched inequalities made the delivery of Midday Meals
and monitoring of primary schools quite challenging for local officials. One could argue that these
factors are what dominated the implementation process, and that legalism perhaps had a moderate
effect insofar as it made it harder for marginalized communities to demand better services.
However, the explanation based on social divisions, and public apathy that is thought to come with
it, had a difficult time account for the process observed in the village Pundail, where marginalized
groups were active at the school, and against all odds, came together but then broke away from the
school when the local bureaucracy did not support them. This case points to the need for more
active and sustained engagement by the state on behalf of marginalized groups in UP, something
that legalism does not encourage.
Finally, I analyzed the case of Mahila Samakhya's KGBV program, an alternative model of
organization that appeared strikingly close to the deliberative model theorized earlier. Unlike the
legalistic approach taken by the education bureaucracy, Mahila Samakhya was able to adapt policies
according to varying contexts across districts and communities with which it worked. The
autonomy Mahila Samakhya enjoyed from the rest of the education bureaucracy was a crucial factor
that enabled the organization to evolve along a distinct normative path. Yet the case also leads one
to question whether Mahila Samakhya was in some ways over-determined to succeed given the
organizational leadership's strong commitment to gender equality, which suffused many of its
policies, from hiring new staff to the training of KGBV school teachers. Still, the conventional
theories considered in this dissertation, including the role of formal organizational structure, civil
society and clientelism cannot account for the observed behaviors and outcomes of implementation
associated with them. As with the previous cases, the Mahila Samakhya case raises important
questions regarding where norms come from, and whether committed leadership is a necessary
antecedent to norm formation.
6.2.2. Methodologv: Subnational Comparative Method
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To analyze policy implementation, this study employed the subnational comparative method,
an approach that has gained much favor in comparative politics.278 Subnational comparative
research has the advantage of allowing one to control for a whole host of explanatory factors, which
aids in the identification of causal mechanism. In a large, federal democracy such as India's
subnational comparison allows one to control for the design of formal political and administrative
institutions. However, the subnational comparative methodology employed here was self-conscious
in adopting what Locke and Thelen (1995) refer to as "contextualized comparison." The
comparison between Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand went beyond standard matched-pair
analysis. These contiguous states within the Himalayan region, controlled not only for conventional
variables like population, geography, development and social structure. Importantly, the comparison
took account of complex sociopolitical processes-norms and practices associated with caste and
gender, parental demand for education, and the nature of party politics. These processes refract
universal primary education in similar ways across these two states. On the basis of that
contextualized approach to subnational comparison, this dissertation was able to identify how, in a
region often portrayed as homogeneous, similar types of local communities experienced the local
state in such divergent ways.
This dissertation took subnational comparative analysis one step further by employing a
multi-level research design. In his anthropology of the state, Migdal (2001) makes a convincing case
for a multi-level, process-oriented approach to studying governance. Between the administrative
and political nerve centers based in capital cities and the frontline bureaucratic trenches at the
bottom of the state hierarchy one finds multiple points of pressure that can impinge on policy
implementation. Within the Indian case, the cumulative findings of research on governance and
social development suggests the importance of both "top-down" processes within the state
alongside "bottom-up" processes from society (Heller 1999; Banerjee, Iyer et al. 2007; Iyer 2010).
Yet with only a few exceptions (e.g. Kohli (1990), existing studies of governance in India develop
and test theoretical propositions at either the level of the state, ignoring local problems of
implementation, or else at the local district and village-level, ignoring the role of state.
Consequently, we have little understanding of how implementation actually takes place, how
different units of the state relate to one another, and how these units relate to society more broadly.
Through a multi-level design, this dissertation traced the full chain of governance from the
state capital where plans are drafted down to the village primary school, where outcomes are
produced and recorded. The approach allowed us to establish rigorously that bureaucratic norms do
in fact operate across units of the state, and to probe the mechanisms through which they operate by
testing their observable implications at various levels. We saw, for example, that legalism in
Uttarakhand undermines local collective, even in villages like Silam Ghat that are rich in civic
resources. By the same token, we also found that deliberative norms in Himachal Pradesh help
facilitate and sustain local collective action, even in the unlikely setting of the village Dharmaur.
278 As I discussed in Chapter 1, the logic behind the subnational comparison has been elucidated by Locke (1995) and




Methodological innovations notwithstanding, this dissertation faces important limitations as
well. Some of these limitations are inherent to small-N research, while others have to do with the
particular qualitative methods used. As Sartori (1970) has pointed out, the strong internal validity of
concepts and mechanisms derived from carefully-controlled comparisons often comes at the price
of external validity. The closely matched contextualized comparison of Himachal Pradesh and
Uttarakhand produced natural question regarding the applicability of the findings to other parts of
India. How after all can the mechanisms through which bureaucratic norms operate in the
Himalayan region obtain to other parts of India? To mitigate the problem of external validity, or as
Slater and Ziblatt (2013) more precisely put it, the "transferability" of the mechanisms in my theory,
the incorporation of Uttar Pradesh was critical to the research design. However, that does not
remove the problem of transferability.
The subnational comparative method allowed us to control for variables and processes that
operate within India, in particular federal democracy. It is not obvious that the same results would
obtain in non-democratic settings, where citizens do not have the same kinds of electoral
mechanisms available for expressing preferences to political leaders. In addition, the selection of
cases took explicit account of economic, structural and political features operating at the state and
local level within India. The extent to which conditions similar to those in India obtain must be
examined on a case-by-case basis before drawing any inferences regarding the impact of bureaucratic
norms.
Third, the qualitative methods employed in this study implied a necessary tradeoff between
depth and breadth. The use of qualitative interviews, participant observation and village
ethnography allowed for triangulation across methods, ensuring the validity of the findings.
However, using these methods, the dissertation could not establish broad patterns of behavior based
on quantifiable measures of bureaucratic norms. Nor could these methods capture alternative
sources of variation in the quality of the bureaucratic organizations studied. These factors may
include, for example, the average age, gender and formal education and training of bureaucrats.
Some of this is mitigated by the fact that senior bureaucrats at the IAS level are recruited nationally
according to merit-based procedures, trained at same national academy and then assigned to states
according to need. The same goes for lower-level bureaucrats, who are hired through similar, merit-
based procedures conducted by state public service commissions. Still, even if procedures are
followed perfectly, there can be unobserved differences in quality. For example, some bureaucracies
may recruit better individuals and train them more effectively than others. 7  I plan to address this
limitation in future research by conducting a survey of bureaucrats across these states.
Finally, one must be careful not to misconstrue or overstate the impact of bureaucratic
norms on education outcomes. The results of this study are drawn from India, which remains at an
early stage of educational development in comparison to many other developing countries. Even
with recent policy efforts in place, India continues to fall on the very low end of global performance
279 That observation does not necessarily conflict with the explanation centered on informal bureaucratic norms. It may
be the case that bureaucratic norms shape the effectiveness of recruitment and training procedures.
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for student learning outcomes.2 1 1 Insofar as gains in education take place non-linearly, then the
same mechanisms for implementation can have varying magnitudes of impact over outcomes
depending on where a country falls along the performance frontier."' It may be that the impact of
bureaucratic norms is relatively high at the lower range of performance, where India currently lies
but then attenuates at higher levels of performance. In short, one cannot generalize indiscriminately
the mechanisms of a theory of policy implementation drawn from one context to other cases
without first taking careful note of where the cases fall along the (in this instance educational)
development trajectory, both in historical and comparative terms. This last point is a limitation
common to most single-time and single-country studies in the political economy of development,
though again, it is somewhat attenuated here given the wide range of variation in outcomes for the
cases analyzed within India.
6.3. The Political Origins of Bureaucratic Norms
The findings of this dissertation provoke the question: what explains the variation in
bureaucratic norms across public agencies? Perhaps there is another variable that can explain the
variation in bureaucratic norms observed across states and account for outcomes associated with
policy implementation. Here I analyze the one a plausible explanation the centers on the role of
political culture, which draws on Weiner's (1991)thesis regarding the beliefs of political and
bureaucratic elites. After pointing to the limitations of that approach, I explore an alternative
explanation that repeatedly came up over the course of fieldwork: the role of political leadership.
The political economy of development pays scant attention to the role of political leaders. Serious
methodological challenges of identifying the causal impact of leadership may be among the reasons.
In this section I explore some (tentative) ideas on the possibility that political leadership may have
shaped the bureaucratic norms documented in this dissertation.
6.3.1. Political Culture
In his influential study on child labor in India, Myron Weiner (1991) argued that the failure
to institute universal primary education in India was due not to material conditions such as low per
capita income or public resource constraints. Rather, it reflected what he called the "attitudes of
officialdom"-bureaucrats, religious leaders, school teachers, and the Indian middle class-
condoning child labor and social inequality more broadly. These prevailing attitudes were anchored
in the caste system, a set of "deeply held beliefs that there is a division between people who work
with their minds and rule and people who work with their hands are ruled, and that education
should reinforce rather than break down this division" (Weiner 1991:5-6). The failure of public
agencies to implement universal primary education could be explained by a political culture that
justified inaction, what Weiner referred to as the "politics of doing nothing." (1991:195).
280 Recall the results presented in Chapter 2 from the latest PISA evaluation on student learning outcomes in 74
countries and subnational units. The two Indian states included in the study, Himachal Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, ranked
dead last or very close to last for reading, mathematics and science. Only the country of Kyrgyzstan appears to do worse.
281 In his comprehensive study of primary education across the world, Prichett finds that learning outcomes tend to
develop non-linearly.
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The virtues of Weiner's analysis aside, the idea that political culture is the cause behind
bureaucratic norms is difficult to establish. Although Weiner himself did not seek to explain
subnational variation in the delivery of primary education, or changes over time, treating political
culture as a unified system of beliefs makes it hard to test the causal claim in his theory. Based on
my own fieldwork, the evidence gleaned from interviews with public officials and civic actors across
the three states offered nothing like a coherent, uniform set of beliefs. The attitudes expressed over
the education of children belonging to lower caste groups varied remarkably across respondents
within each state, and sometimes even varied within the same interview. Senior officials interviewed
in Himachal Pradesh were no less critical of India's universal primary education program than their
counterparts in other states.28 2
By the same token, in Uttar Pradesh I found many cases in which school teachers and local
officials went beyond the call of duty notwithstanding the lack of bureaucratic support for their
work. Yet their efforts were systematically undervalued or reproached. Second, the mixed
outcomes observed across Indian states make it further difficult to test the political culture thesis.
The rapid growth of school infrastructure and student enrollments across Uttar Pradesh, for
example, would be hard to explain by an absence of will in the education bureaucracy.283 None of
this is to deny the possibility that relatively coherent belief systems may exist and vary systematically
across states. And it may well be the case that Weiner's thesis as applied to India overall remains
correct. It is only to point out how difficult it is to establish this version of the political culture
thesis empirically.
6.3.2. Exploring the Role of Political Leadership
The above discussion saw the limits to a plausible theory based on political culture. Yet the
question of origins-where do bureaucratic norms come from?- continues to vex this dissertation.
In this section I explore a potential explanation centered on political leadership, which emerged
from field research. Based on oral histories collected from several retired senior bureaucrats in
Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, preliminary evidence suggests that political leaders in these
two held distinct visions, which may have helped guide and motivate senior bureaucrats. The
interactions between political leaders and bureaucrats was most critical around the time of state
formation, a period when norms within the state-the unwritten rules of the game-were yet to be
established. Around that time, senior officials within the bureaucracy turned to political leaders for
a vision of state politics as well as how to carry out that vision within the bureaucracy. These
political-bureaucrat interactions, in turn, may have helped set in motion distinct normative paths for
public agencies across these two states. These ideas, though speculative at this stage, are based on
interviews with retired officials, media reports and other documentary sources. They offer a
plausible direction for future research on the origins of bureaucratic norms.
282 Several officials I interviewed believed that certain features of India's primary education program, including the
curriculum, was out of touch with the needs and realities facing rural children.
283 Take further the state of Tamil Nadu, which Weiner cites as a case of weak political will. The prevalence of child
labor in some sectors and regions across the state notwithstanding, Tamil Nadu is also recognized for having
conceptualized and implemented the most successful Midday Meal Program in India (Srinivasan 2010). It is difficult to
attribute these varied outcomes to a unified system of beliefs regarding caste and education.
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The first Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh, Dr. Yashwant Singh Parmar is widely credited
for having led the movement for a separate state. Before Himachal Pradesh was granted statehood
by India's central government in 1971, there were serious concerns about its financial sustainability.
Due to the geographic and climactic constraints of the Himalayan region, large-scale industrial
development was not feasible. In making the case to New Delhi for creating the new hill state, Dr.
Parmar's arguments focused on the challenges and opportunities for economic development within
the hills. 2 4 His vision was to set in motion a self-sustaining hill economy, which could serve as a
model for development in the broader Himalayan region. Yet Dr. Parmar's vision went beyond the
financial viability of Himachal Pradesh, and subsequent policies for health and education would
prove costly to the national exchequer in New Delhi. Dr. Parmar's vision was for an inclusive form
of economic development, which drew on the participation of common Himachalis.
Dr. Parmar's concern for everyday hill residents is widely appreciated in Himachal Pradesh.
While one would expect leaders form the Congress Party to credit Dr. Parmar, leaders from the
opposition party, the BJP, have given due recognition to his visionary leadership. During the recent
celebration of Dr. Parmar's 10 6 h birthday, held at the legislative assembly headquarters of District
Shimla, the leader of the BJP and current Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh, Prem Kumar
Dhumal noted: "He [Dr. Parmar was of the ideology that we should render concerted efforts for the development of the state and
understand the social system, politics and literature and agony of the weaker section of the sociey." 285
Hailing from a remote village located in District Sirmaur, Dr. Parmar was intimately aware of
the difficulties of delivering public goods and services with the hill region. He was also known to go
on extended treks through hills, visiting some of the most isolated regions to understand what
villagers needed for development. My interviews with retired bureaucrats reveal that he was eager to
spread that awareness among senior officials in the bureaucracy. According to senior officers from
the HP state civil service as well as members of the IAS who spent their careers administering the
newly formed state, Dr. Parmar frequently interacted with them and was keen to share his vision.
Take for example the words of S.K. Alok, a retired IAS officer and former Secretary of Education:
When Dr. Parmar was Chief Minister, many times he would undertake a tour on foot. He would
come visit my district once in a while, and we would walk for 3-4 days in villages. This gave me as
DM [District Magistrate] the opportunity to interact with him on his view and vision ... 'Welfare'
is not the word he liked to use. These people have to be 'empowered' to take their own decisions, he
would say. They will send their children to school ifyou empower them.2 86
The ease of access that bureaucrats had to senior leadership itself is an interesting observation.
Bureaucrats placed at similar positions in Uttar Pradesh expressed great difficulty meeting senior
political leaders, let alone spending days touring with them.
A closer examination of interactions like these between political leaders and senior
bureaucrats in Himachal Pradesh may also help us understand better why the content of deliberation
has been developmental in Himachal Pradesh. In Uttar Pradesh, meanwhile, political leaders did not
express a vision for development within the state. Rather, their political aspirations were tied to
284 Among the extensive writings of Dr. Parmar see especially: Parmar, Y.S. (1965) HimachalPradesh: The Casefor Statehood,
Directorate of Public Relations, Shimla.
285 "HP progressed due to visionary policies of Dr. Parmar: Dhumal," Daiy Post, August 5, 2012. Available at:
http://www.dailypostindia.com/news/28752-hp-progressed-due-to-visionary-policies-of-dr-parmar-dhumal.html.
286 Interview with S.K. Alok, retired IAS Officer and former Secretary of Education, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh.
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national stage. Govind Ballabh Pant, a prominent nationalist and statesman within was first elected
Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh under British rule, and again later once the India gained
independence. Yet his leadership within UP was short-lived. Pant's ascent within the Congress
Party brought him to New Delhi, where he became Home Minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru. The pattern obtained among subsequent leaders within UP, including Congress
Party stalwart Narayan Datt Tiwari, who served three times as Chief Minister of UP. In between his
stints as Chief Minister, he was appointed to India's Planning Commission, served on the upper
house of Parliament, the Rajya Sabha, and took on various Cabinet positions.
The career aspirations of political leadership within UP were tied to national politics, to the
neglect of development within UP itself. The same goes for the hill region of Uttarakhand, even
before it split off from UP. As a high literacy region with both political and administrative
significance, Uttarakhand produced many early Congress Party leaders and UP's early Chief
Ministers. Interestingly, both Pant and Tiwari actually hailed from the hill district of Almora, which
became part of Uttarakhand after the state split. More recently, Tiwari was elected Chief Minister of
Uttarakhand after the split, a position he later gave up after Congress Party leadership appointed him
governor of Andhra Pradesh. Within Uttarakhand, Pant and Tiwari were both revered but also seen
as absentee leaders who were more committed to politics in Lucknow than development in the hill
region. Meanwhile in Lucknow, they were seen to have greater commitment to the national political
stage. So involved was N.D. Tiwari in national politics that he earned himself the nickname "Nai
Dilli Tiwar" (New Delhi Tiwari), as he we seen to spend more time in the nation's capital during his
terms as Chief Minister than in Lucknow.2 7
There are several reasons why political leaders in Himachal Pradesh may have a vision for
developing the state while those in UP did not. As India's most populous state, Uttar Pradesh has
long been the kingmaker of India's national politics. Eight out of fourteen prime ministers hailed
from UP, and many more have been in the national cabinet. The state also had significance for the
Congress Party, whose top leaders like Sonia Gandhi continue to run from constituencies in UP.
Yet the pursuit of power at the national level is not unique to Congress Party leadership in UP. The
more recent Chief Minsters of UP, who belong to regional parties targeting lower caste voters, have
expressed a similar interest in national politics. Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) head and recent Chief
Minister, Mayawati, has been particularly vocal about her interest in becoming Prime Minister of
India. In one of many motivational speeches in advance of the upcoming national election,
Mayawati stood on a stage that made as a replica of Delhi's LalQila (Red Fort), and appealed to her
party workers: "You must ensure a big victory for BSP in the next general elections so that I can deliver the
Independence Day speech as Prime Ministerfrom the Red Fort"8 8
The impact of these political aspirations on the bureaucracy demands further examination.
Interviews conducted with members of the IAS revealed that senior bureaucrats from UP often
aspire to positions in New Delhi's central administration. To the extent that following official rules
is rewarded by political and administrative leadership in New Delhi, then senior bureaucrats in UP
may even face incentives to promote legalism further down the hierarchy. While these ideas are only
speculative, the political vision and aspirations of leaders may be one mechanism that helps account
287 Multiple interviews with academics, senior bureaucrats and retired officials in Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand.




for the origins and maintenance of bureaucratic norms. To be sure, if it can be sustained, even that
line of argument does not offer complete solace, for the question of where political leaders and their
visions originate from presents its own difficulties.
6.4. Beyond the Cases
Having discussed the main findings, contributions and limitations of this dissertation, I now
consider how the theoretical insights gleaned from this dissertation might speak to problems of
implementation in other sectors and country contexts. The conceptualization of deliberative norms
has a close affinity with a broader set of mechanisms and processes that fall under the rubric of
participatory governance. Contemporary political philosophers have theorized the role of
deliberation in shaping the interests and expectations of citizens, as well as supporting the legitimacy
of public institutions (Cohen 1989; Cohen 1997; Habermas 1998). Social scientists have applied
these ideas across a range of policy areas, from public service delivery to regulation, analyzing
whether and how deliberative mechanisms can foster citizen participation and improve the quality of
implementation (Sabel 1994; Ostrom 1996; Fung and Wright 2003).
6.4.1. Beyond Primay Education: India's Panchayati Raj Institutions
Within India, perhaps the most widely studied domain of deliberation is the Panchayati Raj
system of elected village government. Along with decentralized government, the India's panchayats
aim to equalize political power through quotas reserving village council head seats for women and
lower caste groups. A large body of research has analyzed the effect of the panchayat system across
a wide range of governance outcomes (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Besley, Pande et al. 2005;
Heller, Harilal et al. 2007). Others have looked beyond the material outcomes associated panchayat
to examine its role in fostering participation and practices of citizenship more broadly. Most often,
the panchayat is presented as a participatory, democratic alternative to the rigid, top-down,
bureaucratic model of state planning in India (Isaac and Heller 2003). The gram sabha, routine
public meetings, of the panchayat is portrayed as a site of deliberation, a space for the poor and
otherwise marginalized to engage publicly and make claims, not least of all, for dignity (Rao and
Sanyal 2010).
Although valuable in their own right, these studies have largely overlooked the role of the
bureaucracy in implementing the panchayati raj system. As some have argued, the devolution of
resources and formal authority to local village governments does not by itself yield greater
responsiveness within the state (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). Formal elections and
accountability structures do not always carry over into substantive forms of citizen participation,
what Heller (2000) refers to as the varying "degrees of democracy" across Indian states. Yet the
question of how deep and uneven India's democracy is may itself turn on the quality of bureaucracy.
In the context of Hindi belt states like Uttar Pradesh, even the implementation of village
elections has been deeply problematic, leading to calls for greater administrative oversight (Dutta
2012). In the case of Kerala, which has been widely acclaimed for the depth of its democratic
decentralization, panchayat reforms was underwritten by civic agencies like the Kerala Sastra Sahitya
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Parishad (KSSP) that helped organize citizens and provided local, field-based knowledge with public
agencies (Isaac and Heller 2003). Yet the ability for the KSSP to influence the quality of
decentralization was itself contingent broadly inclusive norms within the state encouraging civic
input, norms, which in Kerala's case, had evolved over time through bottom-up class mobilization
(Heller 1999).
The comparative analysis of bureaucratic norms across Indian states can shed light on the
mechanisms through which democratic decentralization takes place. Although panchayats in
Himachal Pradesh are not as developed as those in Kerala, they are evolving and the system has
gained recognition for being one of the best-functioning in north India. Like the bureaucracy in HP,
that state in Kerala faces the same formal design, organizational structures and administrative
capacity constraints. While HP has not experienced anything like Kerala's social movements, the
presence of active and inclusive civic agencies like KSSP are not unique to Kerala. The Himachal
Pradesh branch of the same civic organization, HGVS, which I examined closely in the field, also
launched a campaign to strengthen the panchayati raj system. HGVS in fact drew inspiration and
practical lessons from KSSP. Yet the ability for civic agencies like HGVS to participate in the
process of democratic decentralization was driven by the state. With financial and organizational
support from the Department of Rural Development, which oversees panchayats in Himachal
Pradesh, HGVS invited officials from KSSP to run training sessions on the panchayati raj system for
its own field staff.2 11
Public agencies in HP have also taken concrete steps to strengthen the participation of
citizens and community groups, particularly women. Meetings between women's associations and
line departments, along with training and capacity building exercise, have helped women assume
leadership roles within the panchayat system. These interactions at the local-level have also
provided learning opportunities for the state, allowing public officials to witness first-hand the
possibilities and challenges for female leadership in the panchayat system. To be sure, public
officials in Himachal Pradesh are by no means satisfied with administrative efforts thus far in
developing the panchayat system." Yet the state has gone much further than its neighbors in the
Hindi belt, and in some ways, it is has been more progressive than most other states in India.
Himachal Pradesh took the lead, for example, in expanding the reservation for female leaders in the
panchayat system. While the Indian constitution requires that one third of village council head seat
should be reserved for women, Himachal Pradesh went beyond the law and extended the quota to
fifty percent, allowing half of panchayats to be led by women.
To the extent that public agencies can promote citizen participation and learning among
civic agencies involved in panchayat reforms, then bureaucratic norms may influence the very quality
of India's democracy. That observation also carries important methodological implications for the
study of local democracy in India. As mentioned above, much existing scholarship has tried to
identify the effect of local village government, and policy reforms such as the reservation of
leadership positions within the panchayat for women and Dalits, on public goods provision and
other implementation outcomes. However, unless and until we identify the norms that shape how
289 I had the opportunity to attend some of these training sessions run by the KSSP for HGVS field staff in District
Shimla. On some occasions, officials from different line departments were present as well, blurring the boundaries
between the learning process for civic agencies and the state itself.
290 Both senior officials and local bureaucrats I interviews across line departments were extremely critical of the
continued centralization of authority within the bureaucracy. Yet the level of criticism within the state may reflect
expectations that are driven by norms encouraging citizen participation in governance.
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public agencies relate to citizens, then we may be missing out on the mechanisms that underwrite
citizen access to the state. As Kruks-Wisner (2012) has shown in the case of rural Rajasthan, citizens
make claims on the state through a diverse mix of formal and informal mechanisms and
relationships. And yet, the set of feasible (and preferable) claim-making strategies may itself be
contingent on the norms that guide public agencies and structure their relations to citizens.
Bureaucratic norms that encourage public officials to work with women's groups in policy
implementation may, in turn, make the individual claim-making strategies of rural women very
different in Himachal Pradesh vis-a-vis Rajasthan.'
Finally, these findings also suggest a degree of caution in drawing inferences regarding the
impact of governance reforms over the delivery of public goods and services in India. While the
formal features of panchayat reforms are more or less consistent within and across Indian states, the
informal features of governance, how the panchayat is experienced on the ground, who actually
participates in it, how citizens' capacities are (not) developed, even whether and how elections are
held, are likely to vary, in part due to the uneven quality of public agencies in charge of
implementation. Meanwhile, prevailing methods for analyzing the effect of panchayat reforms on
public goods outcomes tend to presume consistent implementation.2 12 Without more fine-grained
evidence of how public agencies relate to citizens on an everyday basis, our understanding of the
impact of India's democratic decentralization must remain incomplete.
6.4.2. Beyond India: Poly Implementation in Comparative Perspective
This dissertation has focused on the implementation of the right to education in India. This
leads one to ask whether the theoretical mechanisms lend themselves to other sets of rights, policies
and country contexts. How does the Indian case fit within a broader, comparative perspective of
rights enforcement and service delivery? Grounded as they are in the empirical realities of
educational service delivery in India, the causal driver of bureaucratic norms and the two ideal types
theorized here-deliberative and legalistic-carry forward to other contexts as well, perhaps even to
a fault.2" The concept of deliberative norms in the education bureaucracy draws important parallels
to Archon Fung's (2001; 2006) study of governance reform in the Chicago Public School system.
His findings reveal that the institutional design of school reforms in Chicago, which decentralized
authority and drew parental input through locally elected school councils, was necessary but
insufficient for sustaining substantive results. Active support from centralized agencies, in the form
of training, local capacity-building and the publicization of achievements, helped to sustain
participation among front line workers and parents.
291 Indeed, Kruks-Wisner explicitly controls for variation in the quality of bureaucracy across states, allowing her to
identify the mechanisms by which individuals access the state within the context of rural Rajasthan. The comparative
analysis of bureaucratic norms across Indian states may offer a useful complement to her individual-level analysis.
292 This is particularly so for experimental techniques, whose (laudably) exacting standards of causal inference rest on
assumptions of uniform, if not perfect, implementation of panchayat reforms.
293 A vigorous debate inspired by South Asianists, postcolonial scholars in particular, has ensued over the years regarding
the applicability of Enlightenment concepts such as democracy, deliberation and civil society to postcolonial societies
like India. See, for example: Chatterjee (2006) and Kaviraj(2002). Most recently, Chibber (2013) has rekindled this
debate in his critique of postcolonial theory and defense of employing Marxist concepts of capital, class and labor for the
study of India's political economy.
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The theoretical construct of bureaucratic norms allows one to take these insights a step
further. It provides a framework for analyzing certain sociopolitical features of the state that enable
public agencies, which are often centralized and hierarchical, to promote local innovations and apply
lessons and best-practices systematically across the organization. The framework also points to
some systematic constraints that bureaucratic organizations may face. As the findings from UP's
education bureaucracy showed, legalistic norms prevented local agencies from learning about, let
alone adopting, the innovations in the Mahila Samkhya KGBV school program. To the extent that
similar mechanisms constrain bureaucrats in school systems outside of India. As Fung (2001)
observed once again, centralized bureaucracies that oversaw the Chicago school (and police) system
did not effectively harness local innovations to institute broader, system-wide improvements. The
framework of bureaucratic norms developed here may offer a theoretical avenue to help explain why
that was the case.
A related body of research on co-production, institutional arrangements in which local
agencies and citizens manage implementation collectively, brings out the importance of public
agencies in fostering citizen participation (Ostrom 1996; Joshi and Moore 2004). Although this
work has been framed in terms of social capital, which provides communities with the ability to
engage in collective action, a closer examination of the case studies reveals the critical role of
bureaucracies in helping to build and sustain local collective action. 294 Take for example Elinor
Ostrom's (1996) analysis of the failure of co-production in Nigeria's primary education sector. As
she observed, it was not the absence of social capital that explained poor implementation outcomes,
as the villages had informal associations engaged in collective action around education and other
policy domains.2 11 In a pattern similar to what I observed in villages of Uttarakhand, public agencies
in Nigeria discouraged active community associations from participating in the implementation
process. Although Ostrom does not use the language of bureaucratic norms, she described the
internal functioning of Nigeria's education bureaucracy in legalistic terms. Rules would be applied
uniformly without due regard to the varying needs across communities, a style of administration that
disempowered not only parents but local officials and school teachers as well.
The theoretical import of bureaucratic norms extends beyond primary education to the
enforcement of other rights and policies. Scholarship on regulation analyzes the conditions under
which public agencies implement labor and environmental rights. Much like the developmental state
literature, this work has often relied on Weberian assumptions regarding the bureaucracy. However,
in countries across Latin America, where politicized bureaucracies violate the standard assumptions,
a growing body of research has identified alternative mechanisms of implementation. - Analyzing
labor regulation across a number of countries, Piore and Schrank (2007; 2008) document the rise of
a "Latin model" of labor enforcement in which labor inspectors adapt regulatory policies on the
ground according to the needs of individual enterprises and varying socioeconomic contexts. They
connect the model to the broader organizational norms and culture within regulatory agencies,
which promote flexibility and instill the value of collaboration in new inspectors.
294 The emphasis on social capital is reasonable in light of the prevailing perspectives on development at the time, which
assumed that local communities lacked the ability to organize collectively (Ostrom 1997). It may be fair to say, however,
that the tides have now swung in the opposite direction and that our theories of governance may be too demanding of
local communities to the neglect of public institutions. On that last point, see Mansuri and Rao (2004).
295 As Ostrom observed, "[v]illages that had demonstrated their capabilities to engage in collective action were
discouraged by government officials from active engagement in the education of their children" (1996:1076).
296 See for example the following studies: Piore and Schrank (2008), Pires (2008), Amengual (2011) and Coslovsky
(2011).
230
Similarly, in his study of Brazil's Minist6rio Publico, charged with enforcing labor and
environmental regulations, Coslovsky (2011) finds that some prosecutors devise innovative, context-
specific strategies for solving problems of non-compliance, what he calls "relational regulation." Yet
the formal features of the agency, including the official recruitment and training practices cannot
account for this behavior, as it tends to promote rule-following and conformity with standard
procedures. Finally, Amengual's (2011) study of labor and environmental regulation in Argentina
further demonstrates that regulatory agencies that fail to meet the Weberian criteria of political
autonomy can, nevertheless, enforce the law effectively when they possess certain administrative
resources and linkages with societal groups. Taken together, studies in both the political economy
of public service delivery and regulation point to the significance of bureaucratic norms (and other
qualitative features of bureaucracy) that allow for effective policy implementation.
6.4.3. Rethinking State Capadty
The study of bureaucratic norms can also help inform broader debates regarding state
capacity. Dominant approaches to analyzing state capacity draw on Weber's classic formulation of
bureaucracy, highlighting the formal systems and procedures that allow for bureaucratic autonomy
(Migdal 1988; Evans 1995; Chibber 2003; Kohli 2004). Even as they point to the problems with
bureaucratic autonomy, limitations of formal authority, and the need for societal embeddedness, the
Weberian conception continues to loom large in our understanding of state capacity. To be sure,
the Weberian model may well be useful for explaining some portion of the disparity in bureaucratic
effectiveness across countries (Rauch and Evans 2000). However, can any and all departures from
that model be read as a sign of weak state capacity? The findings from this dissertation suggest
otherwise. Notwithstanding the same formal administrative features of the Indian state, one that
many characterize as a fair approximation of the "rational-legal" ideal that Weber had in mind, the
quality of India's public agencies varies significantly.297
In shifting our analytical gaze to the informal norms that guide bureaucrats and structure
their relations with citizens, this dissertation raises some important questions for the literature on
state capacity and development. To begin with, is the Weberian conception of the state the correct
ideal? While the Weberian state model has long been thought to provide the foundations for
modern economic and political development, scholars increasingly question it on both theoretical
and empirical grounds. Migdal (2001) argues that the basic assumptions of the Weberian model so
rarely obtain that even Weber himself would not have accepted it as a norm for countries to
consciously adopt. Others have interrogated whether the developmental achievements across
countries, particularly in the OECD, can be attributed to Weberian features of the state (Sabel and
Zeitlin 2008; Pritchett, Woolcock et al. 2010). Within the domain of education, a great variety of
organizational forms exist among high performing countries, and some of the very best performers
appear to have more deliberative, flexible forms of organization.298 While that observation has led
scholars to advocate the adoption of these alternative organizational forms, it is unclear whether
297 Robert Wade's fascinating study of corruption in India's irrigation sector offers a point of departure from the
Weberian ideal, yet he too models India's bureaucracy as one in which "most of the modern features of bureaucratic
structure apply" (1985:468).
298 For example, see Sabel et al's (2010) discussion of the organizational features of Finland's education system.
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these forms are always appropriate either. It may just be the nature and complexity of tasks
associated with delivering educational services that gives the deliberative model an advantage, at least
in some instances.
One may still contend that the Weberian ideal captures a critical feature of modern
governance, namely, the importance of rational-legal authority. Even if deliberative, flexible forms
of bureaucracy were found to generate better implementation outcomes, their full functioning and
legitimacy would depend on bureaucracies enjoying autonomy from particularistic interference and
corruption. Informal bureaucratic norms, while interesting to observe, could not form the
foundation of a theory of state capacity. The concern for rational-legal authority is exacerbated by
the realities facing the state in India, including the politicization of traditional identities, such as caste
in Uttar Pradesh. According to the dominant discourse, caste politics necessarily undermines state
capacity, for it entrenches particularism and undermines any notion of the collective good. As we
saw in the case of UP's education bureaucracy, even a legalistic state cannot not overcome the pull
of particularism, especially in such a deeply divided and hierarchical society. Under such conditions,
the law itself may serve as a mechanism for privileged sections of society to maintain their
dominance over the process of implementation.
There is no denying that caste politics places significant strain on bureaucratic efforts to
apply rules consistently. However, the issue is whether we should treat this as an aberration en route
to modernity, or else a normal feature of governance, especially under conditions of rapid political
and economic development. I would argue the latter. In fact, one need not look as far as rural Uttar
Pradesh to find difficulties with rational-legal authority as the basis for state capacity. In her study
of peasant politics in France, a state as modern and centralized as one might hope to find, Suzanne
Berger (1972) observed that peasants did not enter politics according to the smooth teleology of
modern development. Rather, traditional peasant organizations adopted distinct strategies for
organizing the interests of their constituents, and in so doing, inserted them unevenly into the
French political system. Some organizations fiercely guarded peasants from party politics, keeping
them outside the remit of the French state. Others mobilized peasants politically to gain control of
Paris for their particular ends. The notion that informality and particularistic identities are the
remnants of tradition, while the modern state entails a kind of programmatic politics, is difficult to
sustain.
The upshot for our understanding of state capacity in developing democracies is twofold.
First, informality and particularism should not be read as signs of state failure. Rather, they can
form (albeit imperfect) levers of authority, especially when the rational-legal bases of authority are
seen to be weak. Second, the study of bureaucratic norms offers a framework for analyzing
variation in the modes of governance across the wide range of states that face challenges to rational-
legal authority. And it does so with an eye towards developing more informative analytical
categories that can help us better understand and classify those states. With regards to future
research, while much existing scholarship continues to emphasize the formal design of institutions,
we also know that public institutions are subject to informal, unwritten rules that shape how they
function and relate to citizens on the ground. These observations compel us as researchers to go
beyond the dejure rules of the game and consider how their defacto interpretation and enactment by
public officials and citizens influences the quality of governance.
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6.5. Concluding Implications
How might the findings of this study help inform policy initiatives for improving the
delivery of public services and strengthening public institutions? As an initial step, the modification
of formal administrative and accountability structures within the state should not occupy the sole
attention of educational reform efforts. As recent waves of democratic and decentralized planning
have shown, even the most well-intentioned institutional reform efforts can fail, sometimes with
tragic consequences. At least as much, if not more, attention and resources ought to be devoted to
uncovering the norms and practices through which governance is enacted on the ground. In
developing its universal primary education policy, India followed an approach taken by many
governments, adopting an organization blueprint without fully assessing its environmental fit. To
that end, identifying ways to promote experimentation and learning prior to large-scale adoption
may bear fruit.
What about the case of public agencies that appear locked in a set of norms that do not
accord with societal needs? Do the findings from India's education system inspire any ideas for
change? One possibility is to attempt change incrementally, say for instance by providing external
support to actors who are willing to attempt innovations, even when the larger bureaucracy may not
encourage their efforts. The problem arises then, of course, as to how one might scale up such
innovations, which points perhaps to the limits of incremental change theories. However, to the
extent that innovators can be granted autonomy to pursue alternative models within an organization,
as with the Mahila Samakhya KGBV program in Uttar Pradesh, then there may be fruitful
opportunities for change that have yet to be realized, even in the least likely places.
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Appendix. Methodological Note: The Study of Bureaucratic Norms
Bureaucratic norms are unwritten yet widely shared understandings within public agencies
that instruct officials on how to behave. They provide the standards and guidelines by which
officials learn to enact their roles and responsibilities, and evaluate the actions of their colleagues. In
this Appendix section, I discuss in more detail how exactly one can go about establishing the
presence of a bureaucratic norm. Earlier in the chapter I discussed the methodology of this study.
Fieldwork within the bureaucracy consisted of in-depth interviews with state planners, senior and
local officials and school teachers. Interview evidence was supplemented by participant observation
of meetings and informal interactions, both within the concerned agencies, and between public
officials and citizens.
For these methods to yield reliable data on bureaucratic norms and their connection to
policy implementation, the researcher must first achieve a firm grasp, a "thick description," of the
organization (and sociopolitical context) in question and develop a native understanding of how it
functions (Geertz 1973). That requires one to invest significant time both "inside" and "outside"
the agency, both to establish a rapport with officials and triangulate observations across multiple
individuals and sources of evidence (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995; Gellner and Hirsch 2001).2"
The study of bureaucratic norms thus entails iterative adjustments throughout the data collection
process. It is in the course of honing a sensitivity to the sociopolitical context and organizational
environment that one can identify the right questions and appropriate ways of engaging respondents
during interviews (Weiner 1964; Rubin and Rubin 1995).
The ethnographic methods described above help generate reliable data on the inner
workings of a public agency. Still, to identify bureaucratic norms and connect them to behaviors, we
must subject the process of data collection and analysis to discipline (Miles and Huberman 1994).
To that end, I develop a decision tree that guides the analysis of bureaucratic norms in my case
studies (see Figure 1. 4.1)."' We begin with question in STEP 1: Can bureautratic behavior be predicted by
formal institutions? According to Brinks (2006), that question allows us to establish quickly whether a
study of norms is even necessary. To my mind, that is not quite right. Even if bureaucratic
behavior appears consistent with the predictions of formal institutions, that observation in itself
does not rule out the operation of norms.
To understand why, one need only consider the earlier distinction made between norms and
patterns of behavior. No matter how many times we observe individuals taking their hats off in a
church, we cannot claim with certainty that a norm is driving their behavior and not some other
factor-the church building could have a particularly hot environment. Similarly, the correlation
between formal incentives and an observed behavioral regularity, while certainly helpful evidence,
does not by itself amount to a causal explanation. We would need to examine more closely the
causal mechanisms by which bureaucrats respond to the incentives in question.
If we have evidence to show that bureaucratic behavior can be predicted by formal
incentives, then we can ask the follow-up question in STEP 2: Do bureaucrats describe their behavior in
299 It involves the researcher "participating overtly or covertly, in people's daily lives for an extended period of time,
watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions - in fact collecting whatever data are available to
throw light on the issues that are the focus of the research" (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 1)
301 Following Brinks (2006) and others who have studied informal institutions,
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terms of rules of conduct? This gets at the issue of normativity, whether members of the bureaucracy
possess a common understanding of how they ought to behave. Given the inherent difficulties of
determining what a common understanding might be empirically, we must turn at this stage to
qualitative evidence, including field methods such as participant observation and in-depth interviews.
These methods allow for close observation of how public officials behave, the learning process they
experience, and how they respond to pressures within and outside the organization. If nothing like a
norm is understood by bureaucrats to be at work, then we can safely say that, in all likelihood, such
norms either do not exist, or do not influence the behaviors in which are interested. If bureaucrats
do describe their behavior in terms of norms, then we are left to probe further how informal norms
interact with formal incentives to produce the observed patterns of behavior.
Much more could be said about the situation when empirical evidence points to both formal
incentives and norms. But I will leave that aside for now, since the problem that interests me here is
when formal institutions (which are held constant in this case) do not predict well the variation in
bureaucratic behaviors that concern us. When the answer to the first question in our decision tree is
no, we continue along with the question in STEP 2: Do bureaucrats describe their behavior in terms of rules
of conduct? We turn here to the qualitative data taken from interviews and participant observation
methods within the bureaucracy. If bureaucrats do not communicate any shared understanding of
how they ought to behave, then we can say that the presence of norms is indeterminate, or that they
do not influence the patterns of behavior that interest us. At this stage we can probe other
theoretical mechanisms more closely, such as formal institutional design, or factors outside the
bureaucratic agency.
If, on the other hand, bureaucrats do describe their behavior in terms of informal rules of
conduct, then we have reason to probe further. STEP 3 aims to probe, with hard evidence, whether
bureaucratic norms are actually applied. At this stage we ask: Do cases ofprohibited behaviorgetpunished?
Are cases of exemplary behavior rewarded? Here we want some evidence of social approval or disapproval
with respect to bureaucratic behavior that interests us. Take for example behaviors associated with
communication across the bureaucratic hierarchy. When lower-level bureaucrats try to convey
ground realities to their seniors, are they met with approval and support or disapproval and
resistance? Ideally, the analyst could observe directly observe cases of punishment or reward. In the
absence of that, however, in-depth interviews provide respondents the opportunity to share such
cases. These kinds of primary evidence (of reward and sanction) can give us some confidence that a
bureaucratic norm is at work.
What happens, however, in the absence of primary evidence? Here we arrive at a real
dilemma, for norms quite often do not carry evidence of sanction or reward. In fact, the most
effective norms may be the ones that are least visible to the external observer, since they have been
internalized by members of an organization or society. In the absence of primary evidence we move
to STEP 4 and ask: Do the bureaucrats know the rules of conduct? Do they act in antiipation of rule enforcement?
We turn again here to in-depth interviews and participant observation. If bureaucrats do not
convey even a mild awareness of informal rules of conduct, then we can safely say that a
bureaucratic norm does not exist with regards to the behavior that interests us. However, if
bureaucrats do exhibit knowledge of an informal rule at work, then we can probe further into their
behavior and examine whether they act in ways that anticipates rule enforcement. For example, in
explaining why they are unable to pursue a certain course of action, if bureaucrats point to the likely
disapproval of their officemates or superiors, then we have secondary evidence for the existence of a
bureaucratic norm. If not, then we have evidence that a norm is not at work.
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The decision tree below offers a way to collect and interpret qualitative evidence for
establishing the presence of a norm and how it shapes behavior within a bureaucratic organization.
It allows one to systematically identify the mechanism through which norms operate. In some cases,
informal communication is all that is necessary to enforce a norm. In other cases, formal
institutions can play a role. For example, official meetings held by organizational committees can
serve as a mechanism to convey social approval and disapproval. Given the multiple means by
which bureaucratic norms can be enacted and enforced, primary evidence is always preferred,
though ideally one should supplement it with secondary evidence whenever possible.
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Figure 1.4.1 Decision Tree for Identifying Bureaucratic Norms
Q: Does bureaucratic behavior match formal institutional predictions?STEP 1
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